The Highlander Code: Be a Soldier

“Leaders usually explain tasks to their soldiers; however, sometimes they just have to trust their leaders (of course, that is earned trust) and execute regardless. This sets up a two-way implied contract: we do not waste soldiers’ time and efforts and they follow leaders even when the mission has not been thoroughly explained.” confidence. Soldiers should know that this is the old forerunner to “move-shoot-communicate,” but is more vital and more basic. Prepare a pitch on good physical training, weapons, and maintenance, but above all, integrity. It’s either attitude or ignorance. When soldiers or leaders make mistakes, the responsibility can go two ways: “If it’s ignorance of the standard, then it is my fault, and I will train and teach you. If you know the standard and blow it off, then it’s an attitude problem, and you’ll fix it (with my help).” As time passes, reduce emphasis on this portion of the code. You may not need it at all, unless your unit has a discipline problem. “Don’t forget nothing.”2 When briefing new soldiers, offer a 4-day pass if they can tell you the origin of this expression. Sadly, I only gave out one. Apply this to everything, such as ensuring alarm clocks are set, preventive precombat checks are scheduled, soldiers’ bills are paid, and parent-teacher conferences are attended. In this profession, we do not have the luxury to forget; when we forget something in this job, people get killed. Soldiers only do well what leaders check. So check everything! Warn good senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) not to feel diminished if they are spot-checked. A commander should make the NCO aware of how much he cares and of how important it is for the NCO and commander to share similar priorities. This is clearly aimed at cutting through the dreaded “NCO and officer business” myth. Standing priorities of work: horse-sad dle-man. Old cavalry mottos are great! Do not even ask if the platoon can be dismissed until vehicles, equipment, and soldiers have been taken of. This goes for chow, sleep, and even garrison days. Priorities for leaders are actually horse-saddle-men-self. Discipline is not an option. To paraphrase the words of Napoleon, “an Army without discipline is just a mob. It is the core of a military unit.” There is only one standard. This one is self-explanatory and you can use this line from time to time to suit subjective leadership challenges you are trying to fix in your unit. It is vague in the sense that it can be adapted to current issues or trends in your company. There is no room for harassment or discrimination, nuf’ said. Be adamant that soldiers are aware that this covers families as well — I was the equal opportunity (EO) officer for my soldiers’ wives and children. We all need a positive environment in which to work and play. “Recognize that you have volunteered to serve your country. Try to impart the notion that the U.S. Army is a volunteer force. They made a conscious decision as adults. This is targeted at breaking the “getting screwed” malaise.” 48 — July-August 2004

Sometimes there is no “why,” it’s just your duty or the right thing to do. The emphasis is on duty. Leaders usually explain tasks to their soldiers; however, sometimes they just have to trust their leaders (of course, that is earned trust) and execute regardless. This sets up a two-way implied contract: we do not waste soldiers’ time and efforts and they follow leaders even when the mission has not been thoroughly explained. Be a man. Take care of yourself, your family, your fellow soldiers, and your equipment — do your duty. This is the corner stone to our company’s leadership climate: personal responsibility and accountability. Three months after I took command, the junior enlisted soldiers approached me and asked to change the company motto to “Be a Man!” That was a great day in command. If you have male and female soldiers, you will of course have to change the “man.” When discussing this portion of the code with your soldiers, add what kind of people you consider men, such as John Wayne, then add that men pay their bills, men do not beat their wives, men know how to drink within their limits, and men do not need to be told to shave and be in the correct uniform. Be blunt and tell soldiers they will be held personally accountable for not taking care of themselves. If they cannot man age this, they are children, and “I don’t give guns to children; I need men to fight.” During my first article 15, a known troublemaker stepped in front of my desk and before I could speak, he volunteered, “Sir, I failed. I gotta be a man. I did it and I am ready to execute like a man whatever punishment you give me.” That soldier had already been busted to E1 and was on the short list for an administrative discharge. He is now a sergeant, serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom — another great day in command. After 19 months in command, including a deployment, this code really worked. Together, HHC, a 300-man company, led the brigade in retention, had zero DUIs, drug incidents, spousal or domestic problems, absences without leave, and EO/harassment issues. With the announcement of the Chief of Staff, Army’s new Soldier Creed, the timing for simple leadership codes is perfect. I do not for one second pretend to have invented anything new. This is commonsense stuff, borrowed from numerous places. It works in a tank company, an HHC, and with staff soldiers when I was an aide.3 Notes 1Robert A. Heinlen, Starship Troopers, Ace Books, New York, 1987. 2Standing Orders, Roger’s Rangers, SH21-76, United States Army Ranger Handbook, Ranger Training Brigade, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA, July 1992. 3Special thanks to my platoon sergeant, Retired Sergeant First Class David Mast, and the best first sergeants I ever worked with, now Sergeants Major Lauer, Thomas, and Moore. Thanks also to Lieutenant Colonel Clemson Turre-gano for encouraging me to publish this piece and for the many reviews. Last but not least, thanks to my first senior NCO mentor, Retired First Sergeant Jim Steele. CPT Mike Jason is currently a student at Georgetown University, enrolled in the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Office of the Secretary of Defense intern program. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and is completing his M.S. at Georgetown University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic, Armor Captains Career Course, Airborne School, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. His has served in various command and staff positions, including aide de camp, G6, U.S. Army NATO Southern Region, Italy; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 1st Battalion, 35th (1-35) Armor Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany and Kosovo; commander, B Company, 1-35 Armor, Baumholder; XO, B Company and HHC, 2d Battalion, 12th (2-12) Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; and platoon leader, 2d Platoon, B Company, 2-12 Cavalry, Fort Hood. “At all times, you must be able to “ride, shoot straight, and speak the truth.” The cavalry mindset has long been an inspiration due to the characteristics of such units, namely autonomy, reliance, élan, courage, and a unique brand of self-confidence. Soldiers should know that this is the old forerunner to “move-shoot-com municate,” but is more vital and more basic. Prepare a pitch on good physical train ing, weapons, and maintenance, but above all, integrity.” July-August 2004 — 49

With two combined arms battalions, the BCT has a total of only four infantry and four armor companies. Once any one company is rendered ineffective, its battalion loses cohesion and the BCT is unbalanced. Task organizing a replacement company is one remedy, rotating in a fresh replacement battalion while reconstituting the original is another. Both are simple for a home-stationed division that has deployed one or even two brigades into theater. In fact, the division can routinely rotate maneuver battalions in and out of the battle area and even in and out of theater. But this is impossible for a “modular” (fixed) BCT. Without task organization, the entire BCT must remain at reduced effectiveness or be withdrawn for reconstitution. “I want to know if he can turn his three brigades into five maneuver brigades, and if I provide the right equipment, can they be one and a half more lethal than before…This is just a question, but I believe with the right enablers it can be done.” If Colonel Benson uses this quote from General Schoomaker’s speech accurately, then the Chief of Staff, Army provided the answer he expected, and is now sure to get it. Colonel Benson expresses concern that, “Far too many people adhere to the notion that the Army cannot transform from within, as we are too hide-bound, too wedded to orthodoxy.” I’m sorry to say, but that about sums it up. Army staffs have been handed the answer to prepare and are simply buffing and burnishing minor details. There is no serious analysis of alternatives, much less deep thought. [History buffs should compare this guidance with MG Leslie McNair’s guidance for and subsequent testing of tank destroyer doctrine during the “Louisiana Maneuvers” of 1941]. What is missing here is a clear understanding of why we need these numerous small units and why are they supposedly better than divisions. A separate brigade is obviously easier to deploy than a division, but why not deploy a tailored divisional brigade or task force? Perhaps two or three such BCTs should be stood up, but do we really need all divisions and brigades to be organized this way? So, what is the answer? Quit reorganizing and instead determine the actual problem to be resolved, and then look for solutions. Just because the phased deployment of some unit did not go according to plan is no reason to re-shuffle the entire Army’s force structure. But if you must reorganize, if you absolutely insist on it, then expand the size of and increase the number of companies and battalions within each brigade. Expand the size of each BCT, not the number of BCTs within a division. That is why the armored cavalry regiment is so effective. It has a very flat organization. Numerically, each of its three cavalry squadrons has the equivalent of a tank battalion, a mechanized battalion, and an artillery battery. The regiment can be augmented with tank, mechanized, and engineer battalions without any expansion of organizational overhead. Heck with it! Here’s the answer — eliminate the division echelon altogether and replace each heavy division with three separate ACRs. Instead of one commanding general (O-8), two deputies (O-7), and six or seven brigade commanders (O-6), you need only three regimental commanders (O-6), and you get increased combat power to boot. Do the analysis! Count the personnel, count the systems, and count the organizational overhead. Check doctrine, check history, and figure logistics. Fewer but larger units (flatter organizations) are better.

CHESTER A. KOJRO

LTC, U.S. Army, Retired A Close Combat Badge Would Recognize All Who Face Fire Dear ARMOR, I have to add my voice to the debate on whether or not we should have an armor combat badge. My vote is “no,” because we are now and likely will always be fighting on a noncontiguous battlefield. Our Chief of Staff, Army, has rightly called on all of us to be and remain warriors. With that in mind, what we really need, in my opinion, is a close combat badge for any soldier of any military occupational specialty (MOS) who has engaged with the enemy on the ground. Here is a portion of a note I received from an officer who worked for me and is now the XO of a military intelligence (MI) battalion in Iraq: “Sir, I tell you today was one of those days you don’t forget. We sent soldiers down a road in harm’s way on a high-risk mission that had to get done. That does something to you to look men in the eyes and tell them to run a gauntlet of enemy fire to get supplies to folks who are black on food, water, and fuel. But it wasn’t the fact that we could not get anyone to go, or that guys were bitching. It was the fact that we had to hold guys back from getting into the trucks to move out and get the job done that hit me. I had guys in tears because I had to pull them off the convoy. We are definitely in a fight, but in all honesty, I don’t think the bad guys understand what we are made of and they are about to find out the hard way.” MI troopers in the attack! At one time this would be the punch line of a joke, but now it is a reality. We cannot be exclusionary in our quest for recognition for our armor and cavalry troopers who are in harm’s way against a cunning foe. All of our soldiers are in the fight, therefore, we have to come to grips with recognizing anyone who faces fire regularly. We can work out the details on the level of command, duration of action, and so on. This is what armor/cavalry should be leading the charge on — a close combat badge that will recognize everyone who faces fire. The combat infantryman and combat medical badge have an honored place in our tradition of recognizing people who do war’s dirty work. Given the reality of noncontiguous battlefields, improvised explosive devices, unconventional war, and the need to sustain morale in the face of these challenges, as well a thinking enemy, everyone must be a professional soldier and everyone who faces fire ought to have the opportunity to be recognized in some tangible form. If authorizing a badge will allow its wearer to stand out as one who faced fire, we ought to take this step. All of our soldiers are taking the fight to the enemy.

KEVIN C.M. BENSON

COL, U.S. Army Experience in Iraq Has Changed View on Need for Tanker’s Badge Dear ARMOR, First off, I would like to say that I have always been against the proposed combat tanker’s badge. Having been an armor crewman and master gunner for the past 18 years, I have not felt a need to advertise to the world who I am or where I have been (isn’t that what ribbons are for?), besides, we already have enough bells and whistles. Even though there have been some very good arguments, my views were steadfast. However, I have recently discovered that I may have been wrong. My platoon is currently serving in Iraq and is doing so without the protection of armor in a very dangerous place. In reality, I lead what is now a small infantry platoon, whose biggest gun is only 7.62mm, which receives and executes the same missions that our other two platoons in the company execute (we are attached to an infantry company). On a normal day, we go from conducting raids to dismounted night patrols and conducting cordon and search operations, and, of course, ducking during daily mortar rocket-propelled grenade and improvised explosive device attacks. All of this, is done either on foot or from a HMMWV, which is fine with the platoon — we have received some outstanding training and we understand facing ground warfare is different over here because you cannot get a sniper out of a crowd with an M1A2 SEP. What has changed my mind regarding the combat tanker’s badge is the look on my soldiers’ faces when they watch their infantry partners receive their combat infantryman badges, which was subsequently rubbed in the faces of armor soldiers, but was handled professionally. They do not understand how they can be placed in the same dangers and stressors as their counterparts (including receiving the Purple Heart), and still not receive any recognition for their service while someone who doesn’t even leave the patrol base receives an award. I hate to think that 10 years from now soldiers will be judged by the badges and tabs they wear and thought to have done nothing but sit in a rear area and stare at their tanks during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As I prepare to retire in a couple of years, I look back and see all the great things that our 19-series guys have done (and the scouts as well). From missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti to some very dangerous times in Baghdad, our armor force has shown that it can take any mission and conduct it as well, if not better, than the next guy. It is time that armor soldiers and future Army leaders gets the recognition they deserve.

SFC WILLIAM FERGUSON

U.S. Army, Baghdad, Iraq 50 — July-August 2004 LETTERS from Page 3

Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife by Major John Nagl, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2002, 272 pp., $81.95 (hardback) The next war and how it will be fought are primary concerns today as the U.S. Army finds itself engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while in the midst of its transformation to a more mobile force. Of utmost concern is how to combat the guerrilla forces in Iraq — well-resourced insurgents that strike and then disappear into the population. Major John Nagl addresses the problems of fighting a guerrilla force with a conventional army in Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam. In his study, Nagl looks at the British army’s experience in Malaya in the 1950s and America’s experience in Vietnam. For both of these conflicts, Nagl provides an in-depth analysis of the military institutions and how they adapted to effectively combat an unconventional enemy. The British army of the 1950s was a conventional force fresh from the battlefields of World War II. In the early days of the conflict, it was a force unsuited for the task of trying to subdue the communist guerrillas of Malaya, wasting manpower in huge battalion sweeps of the jungle. Yet its organizational culture allowed it to evolve over time. A history of colonial policing and small-unit actions, along with a receptive command climate, permitted the British army to adapt to its environment and eventually destroy the communist insurgents. The author contrasts this counterinsurgency success with the performance of the U.S. Army during Vietnam. Solely concerned with the next big conventional war and misusing lessons from Korea, the Americans failed to adapt to their environment, preferring to use indiscriminate firepower as the solution, and viewing the eventual North Vietnamese invasion rather than the Viet Cong forces within South Vietnam as the enemy. Refusing to learn lessons from the British and their junior leaders in the field, the U.S. Army failed to learn as an organization and eventually lost the conflict. Impeccably researched and well written, Nagl has chosen a subject critical to today’s Army, namely, how to defeat an insurgent enemy. He contends that to succeed in future “savage wars of peace,” the Army must adapt as an organization and step away from the preoccupation with solely waging conventional warfare against other nation states. Overall, this is a great book and a must read.

ELIAS OTOSHI

CPT, U.S. Army JARHEAD: A Marine’s Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles by Anthony Swofford, Scribner, New York, 2003, 260 pp., $24.00 (hardcover) The dust jacket on the back of this book contains paeans of praise, saying that this book will “elbow for room on that short shelf of American war classics that includes Phillip Ca puto’s Rumor of War.” Malarkey — this book has no business being near Caputo’s Rumor of War, Webb’s Fields of Fire, Herr’s Dispatch es, or even Westmoreland’s A Soldier Reports. I read this book because my sister sent it to me. Don’t bother. Swofford is indulging in what some folks would call a catharsis. He is purging his soul. He talks about how hard it was to become a Marine scout/sniper. I’m sure it is; I remember attending Amphibious Warfare School and a demonstration by the truly expert marksmen from the Marines’ Sniper School. Those were impressive warriors. This book is more about self, self-pity, and a dysfunctional outfit. There are flashes of very good prose in this book. Swofford will likely become a good writer; indeed, he taught at universities, received a fellowship, and is even now writing a novel. The prose is terse and well constructed. As far as an example of the writer’s craft, this is a good book, with an interesting style. Still, when I read this book, I rather felt as if I was overhearing a confession, rather than learning something about young men going to war. The case could be made that I am what I am, an old, balding, middle-aged colonel who is a long way from being a young man going through war. That would be admittedly correct, but it does not disguise the fact, in my view, that this book is more about how not to prepare young men for war and the results of absent leaders. Swofford’s description of his scout/sniper platoon brought to mind lone wolves; he was clearly influenced by Oliver Stone’s movie Platoon. I know that there are weak platoon leaders/ commanders and independent soldiers and Marines, but I have a difficult time believing Swofford’s platoon was as dysfunctional as he portrays. Once, in the desert of Saudi Arabia, he describes becoming so despondent that he loads and locks his M16 and places the muzzle flash in his mouth. One of his platoon mates stumbles on him and talks him out of doing something really stupid. This brought to mind descriptions of “le cafard” or “the bug” of boredom faced by French Legionnaires. He also describes another incident wherein he places a loaded weapon against the head of an annoying fellow Marine. If this outfit had a halfway competent officer or noncommissioned officer, Swofford would have been in a padded cell away from weapons or facing courts-martial. There are also the too-familiar stories of how difficult it is to adjust, once warrior heroes return from the fray. The narrative of Swofford’s career and life even after he leaves the corps, or “the suck,” as he refers to the Marine Corps, is peppered with drugs, drinking, and fighting. I am not naïve enough to think that units, such as the 1st Marine Division and the 3d Infantry Division, faced tough times with light hearts and unburdened spirits during Iraqi Freedom, just as Desert Storm units faced tough challenges during Swofford’s time. I do not look at the world with rose-colored glasses; again, I have served too long in the service for that self-deception. Swofford describes not a well-trained unit, but hubris bumping into uncertainty with a large dose of undisciplined bravura. I recommend this book to others only if they wanted to read a book that would help them identify indicators of a rogue outfit; other than that, give this book a pass. It is assuredly not as good as the dust jacket would indicate.

KEVIN BENSON

COL, U.S. Army Tannenberg 1914 by John Sweetman, Cassell, Sterling Publishing, Inc., New York, 2002, 240 pp., $21.95 (hard bound) The Battle of Tannenberg, which was the opening conflict on the Eastern Front, was quite possibly one of the most crucial battles of World War I. Pre-war agreements with the French committed the Russians to military operations against Germany 15 days after the initiation of hostilities. Launching a two-pronged invasion of East Prussia, the Russians had numerical superiority, but the German plan (executed by the combined team of von Hin denburg, who was called out of retirement at the age of 66, and Ludendorff), as well as Rus sian tactical errors, resulted in a massive Rus sian defeat with over 30,000 casualties and an estimated 95,000 captured, as opposed to 20,000 German casualties. The battle ended with the suicide of Samsonov (the Russian com mander), which contributed to the eventual promotions of von Hindenburg to chief of staff, and Lu dendorff to quartermaster general, and shocked Russia’s allies, who were relying on the strength of Russia to keep pressure off the Western Front. In Tannenberg 1914, John Sweetman gives us an in-depth and well-crafted historical review of a pivotal battle. Recounting the whole of the Russian campaign in East Prussia, Sweetman’s book comes across as an authoritative, finely researched, and methodically constructed historical account. He has selected an excellent series of photographs, as well as supporting maps and illustrations to sustain his research. On an interesting historical note, Sweetman prefaces his study of the battle with an account of the defeat of the Teutonic League by the Poles near Tannenberg in

1410. This conflict four centuries earlier weighed heavily on the Germans, who viewed their defeat of the Russians in 1914 as a just revenge. I found Tannenberg 1914 easy to read, well documented and a recommended addition to any professional military library. I have a personal interest in World War I as my paternal grandfather fought in France at Verdun with the 29th Infantry Division, receiving the Distinguished Service Cross and French Medaille Militaire for his actions, so this was an easy and interesting read for me. Aficionados of modern warfare and warfare in the Industrial Age will find the book interesting to compare July-August 2004 — 51