The Stryker Company and the Multifunctional Cavalry Platoon

During the 1960s, the armored cavalry platoon was organized in a manner similar to one of the special organizations defined in Captain Robert Thornton’s article, “Fighting the Stryker Rifle Company,” in the March-April 2004 issue of ARMOR. In those days, each platoon had four scout vehicles (two teams), an infantry squad, a 4.2-inch mortar squad, three tanks, and a platoon leader’s vehicle. The troop commander could “scramble” the troop to build a mortar platoon, infantry platoon, two tank platoons, and a large reconnaissance platoon. “Scrambling” was the exception, not the rule. The Stryker company looks very similar to a scrambled cavalry troop of old. The obvious question is: why not start with a combined-arms team at the platoon level and only scramble when necessary, rather than continually re-task organize? This question will become even more relevant as the Army transitions to the world of future combat systems (FCS). The 21st-Century Cavalry Platoon An individual cavalry platoon using Stryker-type vehicles of several configurations would be capable of dealing with all but the most sophisticated opponents. The basic organization would be built around a modification of the cavalry platoon described above. Each platoon would have:

• Four infantry carriers with an infantry squad.

• One platoon leader’s carrier.

• One 4.2-inch mortar carrier.

• Two gun platforms (either 90mm or 105mm, but able to destroy a T-72).

• Two tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW)/antitank-guided missile (ATGM) platforms (the mixture of ATGMs and guns is required to provide overwatch in depth and deal with situations in urban terrain where only a gun will suffice.) This 10-vehicle platoon could operate in almost any terrain and over dispersed distances. Its speed on the battlefield and the embedded requisite digital command and control systems will allow it to mass quickly. The speed issue is critical. Any modern unit needs to disperse and then mass quickly to overcome an opponent. In this case, mass means primarily massed fires, not side-by-side vehicles. Speed, Agility, and Flexibility Speed is the key to all cavalry operations — reconnaissance, security, offense, defense, and convoy protection. Speed comes from the inherent speed of the platform and the ability to accurately navigate to clearly defined points on the battlefield. The ability to navigate is a function of the digital command and control system and the global positioning system (GPS) links of each vehicle. The combination of digital and vehicular speed provides a significant combat multiplier for every action in which the new cavalry platoon will be involved. Additionally, individual vehicles and elements are free to operate more independently because of their shared operational picture and awareness of the other’s location and activity. The electronic links to over-the-horizon-attack capabilities mean that no element of the platoon is truly alone. Each infantry squad would be more like a well-trained scout element — trained and equipped to find and engage targets with indirect fires or to vector direct fire weapons onto the target. The situational awareness data provided from all-source intelligence sources will also facilitate the confirmation of targets and enemy locations. 24 —

Massed Fires This digital connectivity also facilitates massing fires of all kinds —artillery, mortar, close-air support (CAS), and attack helicopters. The troop-level fire support officer (FSO) would be the fire integration expert, who would attack targets developed by squads and platoons timely because of the situational awareness that digital connectivity provides. The FSO would be proactive by monitoring spot reports and instantly matching them with the commander’s attack criteria. He would also respond to requests for fire. Naturally, the platoon mortar would always be available for suppression, reconnaissance by fire, and other such missions where other indirect attack assets are unavailable. Engaging the enemy becomes similar to an ambush in the enemy’s mind because of the surprise achieved by the stealthy target acquisition by the platoon and the timely and accurate fire brought to bear. Massed time on target mixes of direct and indirect fires will be the norm and will further enhance the achievement of surprise. Both offensive and defensive operations are, in fact, reconnaissance operations and could be called security or economy-of-force missions. In each case, the platoon is acquiring targets and engaging them by massed direct and indirect fires. This platoon would not be a commander’s first choice for deliberate attacks against well-prepared defenses in depth. Nor would the platoon be a first choice for digging in and defending against large enemy attacks. Such operations would negate the platoon’s advantage of speed. Defensive Operations Conceptually, in the defense, this places infantrymen on key terrain and in the early warning and channeling mode — building the kill sacks while denying key terrain — and only firing if attacked. Dismounted infantry squads with their carrier are dispersed and capable of observing an axis of advance while denying the enemy infiltration routes. Indirect fires would be planned in depth to allow maximum engagement time and to channel the enemy into kill sacks. The gun systems and ATGM/TOWs are then in depth and available to maneuver to kill enemy vehicles in kill sacks that infantry squads have created. All of this is supported by the platoon’sown mortar. Note: The company-level mortar platoon cannot range to cover all three dispersed platoons in a Stryker company. The defensive example in Figure 1 could be the platoon in the defense, as part of a covering force mission or in an economy-of-force/security mission. In this example, infantry squads are deployed to screen the platoon’s frontage with a focus on the crossroads to the front and within the platoon’s sector, and to deny the key terrain overlooking the crossroads within the platoon’s sector. The squads would have on-order positions to the rear to provide options to deal with subsequent threats. The fire support plan would include trigger points and target reference points to mass fires at the right time and place. This might also include family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) or other channeling devices to reinforce a kill sack. In Figure 1, the concept is to disrupt the attack forward of the platoon and then destroy it within the platoon’s sector. The ATGM section and gun section would be positioned to provide defense in depth, while being able to attack by fire within and behind the platoon’s initial positions. The sections could operate as pure elements, or the platoon leader could combine a gun platform with an ATGM platform to provide a mix of types of fires deep into the battle position from both sides. Both sections would have hide positions and attack-by-fire locations to move to as vectored by the platoon leader. As shown in Figure 1, the western gun section could reposition to the rear after its initial engagement and sit behind the second row of hills to engage stragglers who escaped the initial engagement more quickly than they could get from the kill sack. — 25 Figure 1

Subsequently, the second gun section could reposition to engage those same stragglers from the east, while the infantry denied follow-on forces entrance into the engagement area. The platoon leader would be fighting a defense in depth. The ability to fight at night with the aid of night-vision capabilities and digital navigation makes this defense even more robust. The situational awareness coupled with detailed rehearsals — electronic and actual — gives the platoon leader multiple options on where and when to attack the enemy. The word “attack” is chosen to characterize the defense because it uses speed and agility to get forces and fires to the required spot on the battlefield quickly. What looks to be a fairly static defensive operation is, in fact, replete with many options for the platoon leader. His choice is facilitated by his situational awareness advantage and the speed with which he can move his elements around the battlefield. Even at the platoon level he is able to operate within the opponent’s decision cycle. The synchronization of this effort, given the ability to structure decision points and decision criteria, would not be as complex as it might appear. The platoon sergeant is an important part of this synchronization. In this example, he might be in command of the gun sections or the infantry sections. Offensive Operations In the offense, the process is deliberate and dynamic — deliberate searching, finding, and fixing by dismounted infantry, infiltration, and then coordinated massed fires against critical nodes that cause the enemy’s defense to come unhinged. The operational awareness that digital connectivity provides brings to the platoon targets to be verified and engaged, if appropriate. Thus, every offensive operation, except a deliberate attack, will resemble a route/area reconnaissance. The platoon is attacking against known and unknown enemy positions based on all-source intelligence. The platoon leader has positioned his mortar section in the center of sector so that it can range most of the sector for immediate suppression missions and reconnaissance by fire. The platoon is operating in two sections of infantry and overwatching gun and/or ATGM elements. The infantry squads are overwatching each other and are, in turn, being overwatched by the gun/ATGM elements. The ATGM elements in Figure 2 would probably be mixed with the guns since there are two axes to be covered. Each overwatch element would consist of a gun platform and an ATGM platform. The gun platform would move under careful overwatch of the ATGM platform. Therefore, we have the platoon moving and continually covering the moving elements so that security is provided to guard against the unknown. The platoon leader would coordinate to ensure both sections’ efforts are synchronized. The platoon’s first action is to seize overwatch positions and then direct fire from direct and indirect fire assets on the first set of targets. The mortar section could also engage these targets in a reconnaissance-by-fire mode. The mor- 26 — tar section would move forward by bounds, ready to conduct a “hip-fire” mission, if necessary, during its moves. The mortar section would be prepared to provide smoke to deny the enemy observation of moving elements. As enemy elements are overcome, the platoon continues to move through the sector by coordinated bounds, confirming all-source intelligence, developing new targets, and engaging by the most appropriate means. The anticipated bounds are shown in Figure 2; however, exact sequencing and positions occupied will be situation dependent. Should it be necessary, elements from one axis could be used to flank or engage the enemy confronting elements on another axis. The platoon, should it encounter unanticipated enemy strength or fortifications, might have the option of bypassing this enemy force so a larger force could deal with it. This offensive action may sound deliberate and slow; however, in actual execution, it will be dynamic and allow the platoon to exploit its inherent speed, agility, and flexibility. Using move-set drills that were important years ago remains important in the 21st century. The cavalry troop headquarters would include requisite maintenance, command and control, and liaison capabilities. The strike capability orchestrated by the troop fire support team (FIST) is critical in this organization. The interface of this agile, flexible platoon-sized force with air cavalry and other external sources warrants discussion. This interface would initially occur at troop level, though direct coordination between forward elements (platoons) and air scouts is very feasible. Air scouts may be the source of targets and with the digital passing of data, the air-ground team will be able to react quickly and make every engagement tantamount to being an ambush. This is true at whatever level the interface occurs. Since the data is distributed in near real time, the appropriate element will know what is happening. This close integration is available today — one does not need to wait until FCS comes along in the future. The above characteristics also make the force capable of widely dispersed peacekeeping operations or operations in urban terrain. As noted, the ability to digitally issue orders, call for fires, and navigate are key to executing tactics and techniques discussed above. Platoons with combined-arms capability built around the Stryker could provide the test-bed for tactics and techniques to be used by units equipped with the FCS. The first, and maybe most dramatic of these, would be to replace the mortar section with a Netfires section. The basic concept of Netfires is to develop a family of artillery missiles based on a vertical launcher design. The box launcher is fully autonomous, meaning it can operate without a support vehicle. Light enough to ride in the back of a HMMWV, Netfires can be deployed by ground or air assets throughout a theater and networked by radios to engage an en- — 27 which would give the platoon the ability to reach out and engage targets with over-the-horizon fires and would thus further contribute to making every engagement an ambush, from the enemy’s perspective. The accuracy promised for Netfires and its near 100-pound warhead make it capable of destroying virtually any target acquired — a perfect complement to the cavalry platoon of the future! The Armor School Challenge The purists will argue that training lieutenants to command such complex platoons will be difficult. Conversely, if a lieutenant can command a true combined-arms team and synchronize its efforts, the Army will be better served and the future force inherently more flexible, responsive, agile, and effective. The Armor School challenge is to figure out how cavalry lieutenants were trained in the past and do it again! Retired Colonel Bruce B. G. Clarke is president of Bruce Clarke Consultants, Inc., Topeka, KS. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy, and an M. A. from University of California, Los Angeles. During his career, he completed the Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, Ranger School, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College. He held various command and staff positions, including director, U. S. Strategic Studies, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS; senior political/military staff officer, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D. C.; commander, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Bad Kissingen, Germany; and commander, A Troop (Airborne/Mechanized), 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, Sandhoffen, Germany. emy rapidly. The launch unit includes power generation and control systems, as well as a total of 15 missiles, each with a warhead similar in size and capability to a 155mm artillery shell, “Speed is the key to all cavalry operations — reconnaissance, security, offense, defense, and convoy protection. Speed comes from the inherent speed of the platform and the ability to accurately navigate to clearly defined points on the battlefield. The ability to navigate is a function of the digital command and control system and the global positioning system (GPS) links of each vehicle.” 28 — Figure 2