Attack Helicopters Offer Armor Leaders Third-Dimension Maneuver

Attack Helicopters Offer Armor Leaders Third-Dimension Maneuver by Captain Steve Miles During 10 months of leading attack helicopter missions in and around the “Sunni Triangle” of North-Central Iraq, C Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment (Attack), 4th Infantry Division, developed and integrated successful tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for air-ground integration. Due to the unique operational environment encountered during this war, many of these TTPs were refined over several months. In the interest of keeping follow-on units from reinventing the wheel and to further improve existing procedures, this article provides insight on how attack aviation can best support the ground tactical plan. After reading this article, you will be an aviation “in sid er” who knows how to obtain the great est amount of synergy by working with attack aviation. Many aviators might identify this information as “trade secrets.” These particular aviators fear micromanaging by shortsighted leaders who do not understand or care how to be a good steward of aviation resources. Unfortunately, there are a few leaders who fit this description, but it is in our best interest as combat arms leaders to know the capabilities and limitations of the other. This article lays it all out on the table, including fighter management, flight hours, and weather. What a reader should understand is that aviation is about risk management, not risk aversion, and the limits discussed below are designed to preserve combat power, while providing flexible and substantive support. The Attack Aviator Attack aviators are pretty much volunteers, and like armor officers, they chose to take on the attack aviation mission because destroying the enemy through maneuver, firepower, and shock effect appeals to them. An attack aviator is expected to “move to the sound of the guns,” demonstrate tremendous initiative, and attack in the absence of orders. This aggressive demeanor is tempered by a general conservatism born of the unforgiving aviation environment. Attack aviators come in two basic varieties. Most attack pilots are aviation warrant of ficers, skilled experts in the tactical employment of aircraft. These professionals focus on being extremely proficient warriors. Other attack pilots are aviation branch commissioned officers, usually company commanders and platoon leaders. Like their armor branch brothers, aviation branch commissioned officers master their fighting platform over several years, and then transfer to staff positions. Both commissioned and warrant officer attack aviators are dedicated combined arms officers who want to contribute to the success of the ground units they support. What Attack Helicopters Bring to the Fight During this conflict, the AH-64D Apache Longbow has proven to be both a capable and survivable instrument of warfare; however, like any tool, one must know its capabilities and limitations. The Longbow Apache is a tandem-seat attack helicopter with a crew of two. The back crew station is optimized for maneuvering the aircraft, and the front crew station is optimized for employing the weapons; however, both crew stations are very similar. The aircraft can be flown and weapons fired from either crew station. 7

A heavy division attack helicopter battalion fields 18 Apaches in three companies of six aircraft each — each company has two platoons of three Apaches each. Corps-level battalions have 21 aircraft, while battalions in the 101st Airborne Division have 24 each. Most all unit maintenance and support assets are at the battalion level, a key factor when considering task organization. For planning considerations, the Apache can fly at a speed of about 4 kilometers (kms) per minute for about 2 hours without refueling. The hotter the temperature, and the longer the aircraft hovers, less fuel endurance is expected. During extreme heat, Apaches may not have the capability to hover at all. Technology Sights and Sensors. The front and back seats are equipped with the integrated helmet and display sighting system (IHADSS). IHADSS has three components, which include a helmet-mounted monocle with aiming reticule, a device that precisely tracks the movement of the helmet in three dimensions, and a boresight reticule for aligning the helmet-mounted sight with the aircraft centerline. The IHADSS displays basic flight, navigation, and weapons information to a pilot through the helmet-mounted monocle. IHADSS enables the aircraft weapons and forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensors to be slaved to the helmet line-of-sight. This allows the pilot to visually acquire a target, position his head so the helmet-mounted reticule is superimposed on the target, and squeeze the trigger making for incredibly fast acquisition-to-engagement times. Day television system. The Apache target acquisition/desig nation sight (TADS) is equipped with a day TV system for acquiring and engaging targets up to a 6km distance during sun hours. The day TV is capable of a 127-power zoom and has a black-and-white display. FLIR. The Apache is equipped with two FLIR sensors, each of which can be displayed on the helmet-mounted IHADSS monocle. The pilot night vision sensor (PNVS) is designed for use in flying the aircraft. The second sensor, a component of the TADS, features a 32-power zoom for weapons engagements, but can also be used to fly the aircraft. FLIR sees heat, not visible or near-infrared (IR) light. The Apache FLIR is first-generation and is optimized to see armored vehicles, which it does very well. Using the FLIR, vehicles can be acquired and engaged effectively out to 3.5km. However, dismounted personnel can rarely be seen at ranges of more than 1.5km, a serious consideration when employing Apaches at night. To observe small arms weapons carried by individuals, the range is much shorter. Much like tank thermal sights, overcast and rainy weather further degrade FLIR capabilities. Fire control radar (FCR). One-half of the AH-64D Apache Longbow fleet is equipped with millimeter wave radars mounted on the main-rotor mast, commonly referred to as the “cheese wheel.” The FCR is capable of detecting stationary targets out to 6km and moving targets out to 8km. It classifies targets into one of 16 categories, differentiating between airborne and ground, stationary and moving, tracked and wheeled, and other criteria. The radar uses a programmable prioritization scheme to select and display the 16 highest priority targets to the aircrew. The effectiveness of the FCR in acquiring and identifying targets is directly proportional to the amount of other ground clutter around them; for instance, the radar works better in the desert than in a forest. During our operations, the radar has proven most effective in locating vehicles moving after curfew and vehicles attempting to cross national borders in remote areas. Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). AN/AVS-6 goggles can be employed by Apache crewmembers in the front seat only. These NVGs are just slightly more capable than standard AN/PVS-7 ground goggles and have similar limitations. NVGs are the only way Apaches can observe IR strobe lights, IR chemlights, or IR lasers. Weapons Cannon. The M230E1 30mm chain gun is the attack aviator’s preferred implement for cutting the heart out of an insurgency. “A heavy division attack helicopter battalion fields 18 Apaches in three companies of six aircraft each — each company has two platoons of three Apaches each. Corps-level battalions have 21 aircraft, while battalions in the 101st Airborne Division have 24 each. Most all unit maintenance and support assets are at the battalion level, a key factor when considering task organization.” 8 — July-August 2004

With a rate of fire of 650 rounds per minute, the cannon sprays high-explosive dual-purpose projectiles with a lethal bursting radius of 4 meters. While the maximum range of the gun is 4,200 meters, engagements are most often made with the IHADSS at ranges of less than 1,000 meters in Iraq. Maximum capacity is 1,200 rounds of 30mm ammunition. The cannon is devastatingly effective against dismounted personnel and soft-skinned vehicles. Rockets. The Apache can carry up to 76 folding-fin 2.75-inch aerial rockets. These rockets may carry many different types of warheads, to include:

• High explosive (HE) — 10-meter burst radius and 7,500 meter range, useful for surpression and harassment fires.

• Flechette — rockets fly toward the target then explode midair, saturating a 100- by 100-meter target with up to 1,180 “nails.” Imagine an air-delivered claymore mine.

• Multipurpose submunition (MPSM) — each MPSM warhead dispenses nine shaped-charge bomblets capable of penetrating four inches of steel and producing casualties out to 20 meters.

• Illumination — each illumination rocket provides illumination similar to a 120mm mortar illumination round. They will burn for about 2 minutes and can significantly aid target acquisition and identification when using NVGs.

• Hellfire missile — the AGM-114 Hellfire missile comes in two distinct varieties: laser and radar guided. The laser-guided missiles have a minimum range of between 500 and 1,400 meters, depending on version and a max range of 8km (remember the sight limitations discussed above). The radar-guided Hellfire is a fire-and-forget weapons system that is not optimal for the current fight in Iraq. Hellfire missiles have a 34-pound HE shaped-charge that will destroy most armored targets, but is not enough to level a building. Communications The Apache Longbow is well equipped with a variety of technological communications systems, which include:

• FM single channel and ground airborne radio system (SINCGARS). Each Longbow Apache carries two FM SINCGARS radios with frequency hopping and secure capability.

• Ultra high frequency (UHF) have quick. This is a frequency-hopping UHF radio, capable of secure communications, primarily used for communications with other aircraft.

• Very high frequency (VHF). This is a single-channel nonsecure VHF radio, primarily used for talking to air traffic control services.

• Enhanced position locating and receiving system (EPLRS) and blue-force tracker (BFT). Most deployed Apaches are equipped with either EPLRS or BFT, commensurate with other systems fielded by their parent unit. Other Equipment The Apache is also equipped with many other features, which enhance its battlefield capability:

• Laser rangefinder/designator (LRFD). The LRFD has a range of out to 9,999 meters and designator out to 7km. The LRFD can also designate for copperhead and air-delivered, laser-guided bombs.

• Laser spot tracker (LST). The LST acquires laser designations from other Apaches, jets, and laser designators used by fire support teams.

• Videocassette recording system. All Apaches are equipped with a video recorder for capturing FLIR and day TV video. Many use the standard 8mm video format. Effective uses include recon of ground attack routes and raid objectives for pre-mission review by ground leaders, as well as battle damage assessment. “The M230E1 30mm chain gun is the attack aviator’s preferred implement for cutting the heart out of an insurgency. With a rate of fire of 650 rounds per minute, the cannon sprays high-explosive dual-purpose projectiles with a lethal bursting radius of 4 meters. While the maximum range of the gun is 4,200 meters, engagements are most often made with the IHADSS at ranges of less than 1,000 meters in Iraq. Maximum capacity is 1,200 rounds of 30mm ammunition. The cannon is devastatingly effective against dismounted personnel and soft-skinned vehicles.” July-August 2004 — 9

• Improved data modem (IDM). Longbow Apaches exchange target information, and pass fire support requests to field artillery units digitally through the IDM. The IDM interacts with all onboard radios to send digital messages in various protocols. Maintenance Helicopters, like modern tanks, are very maintenance intensive by virtue of their complex systems, but the sky has no tolerance for malfunctions. If a tank throws a track, it stops; if a helicopter throws a blade, it is catastrophic. As a result, helicopters have many inspections required at intervals as short as 10 hours of flight time. These inspections and the inevitable repairs they require take significant amounts of maintenance time. Further, Apaches are required to be completely overhauled after just 250 hours of flight time, which is called a “phase.” Just as an armor leader takes care to ensure his tanks do not all require semiannual services at the same time, aviation leaders must ensure their aircraft do not all reach phase at the same time. While in Iraq, our battalion completed an average of four phase overhauls per month and this drove our sustainable flying rate of 1,000 hours per month, or 333 hours per company. Flight Time Based on the above sustainable flying rate of 333 hours per company per month, that equates to about 12 aircraft hours a day. Maintenance test flights, required pilot training, and evaluations will take a portion of this time, so do not think an operational control (OPCON) company “owes” exactly 12 hours of air missions per day — 12 hours is more of a total target pace to sustain continued mission support. Twelve aircraft hours flown by a team of two Longbows, results in six mission hours per day. Fighter management is a tool that keeps aviators and aircraft safe to fly another day. Inadequately rested crews flying $24 million aircraft just does not pass the common-sense test. In our unit, crew rest means 10 hours off between 14-hour duty days, and aviators who do not get quality rest can self-ground. One might think that this self-grounding option would lead to abuses, but in practice, it really does not. Attack aviators are professionals with a strong sense of personal responsibility and duty. Each aviation unit has a standard operating procedure (SOP) that specifies daily flight hour limits. In Iraq, we used a rough guideline — 8 hours of day flight or 5 hours of night flight during one duty day, assuming the aircraft has sufficient flight time before the next maintenance inspection or component replacement. Finally, aircrews may not fly at night past the 10th hour of their duty day. Our attack company has six aircraft and six crews. Just like with armor crews, the number one attack aviation crew rule is “never leave your wingman,” so we are organized into three teams of two aircraft each. Our default posture is one day team, one evening team, and one late-night team. Each team adjusts sleep schedules to wake just prior to their shift. This provides the ability to support short-notice missions, 24 hours a day. If a unit requests more than one team in the air, we can adjust if given enough notice. We require about a 12-hour notice for two teams, and a 24-hour notice to mass all three teams. The Apache has several components that warm up slower than Grandma’s vacuum-tube television. In the heat of the desert, run-up times are extended due to waiting for components, such as the FLIR, to cool down. Without an advance mission notice, it takes approximately 2 hours to get Apaches airborne. If we receive a forewarning that we may be required to fly, we will preflight and run-up the aircraft in advance to make sure everything checks out. This is called “REDCON 3,” and allows us to be airborne within 30 minutes. If we really think we will be needed, we can sit in the aircraft with the auxiliary power unit running, which is referred to as “REDCON 2,” and be airborne within 15 minutes, but this burns fuel and is not sustainable in high temperatures. One might think Apaches should always be at “REDCON 3,” but remember, getting the aircraft preflighted and ready to go starts the aircrews’ duty day and could significantly curtail them from flying when they are needed. Our attack company has a total of 27 personnel on the modification table of organization and equipment and less on the ground in Iraq. Consisting of only officer pilots and enlisted crew chiefs, these personnel can be considered 10-level operators. All 20-level unit maintenance takes place at the battalion or above. If an attack company is physically separated from battalion-level maintenance, it’s just a matter of time until there are several nonmission-capable aircraft. Keep in mind that broken aircraft cannot just be towed back to the unit maintenance collection point. Apaches cover large distances rapidly, 100km is a 25- minute flight; weigh the value of dislocating an attack company from its parent battalion carefully. In most situations, a “The low-intensity nature of the conflict in Iraq has blurred the distinction between traditional attack aviation missions and tasks considerably. Supported units have difficulty articulating what they want attack aviation to do for them. Common mission requests include tasks like “perform presence patrol” and “provide overwatch,” but these are not doctrinal attack helicopter tasks and have ambiguous meanings. Staffs and LNOs must shape these requests into tactical tasks that attack helicopters can perform, such as recon or screen missions. “ liaison officer (LNO) from the attack company and/or forward aviation refueling will be a better solution. Ground troops know that the enemy does not attack when Apaches are flying overhead. Commanders want air cover 24/7 because it keeps the enemy at bay. Unfortunately, keeping “iron in the sky” indefinitely is not sustainable, so we must make efficient use of the time we can fly. Attack Aviation Missions The low-intensity nature of the conflict in Iraq has blurred the distinction between traditional attack aviation missions and tasks considerably. Supported units have difficulty articulating what they want attack aviation to do for them. Common mission requests include tasks such as “perform presence patrol” and “provide overwatch,” but these are not doctrinal attack helicopter tasks and have ambiguous meanings. Staffs and LNOs must shape these requests into tactical tasks that attack helicopters can perform, such as recon or screen missions. The results are worth the effort, as missions will focus on clearly defined goals — staffs know what kind of products are necessary to support the mission, and everyone will understand what is expected. The following examples are fictional, but very accurately portray the character of real missions: Scenario 1: A forward operating base (FOB) comes under mortar attack nightly and the brigade commander directs his OPCON attack helicopter company to deter these attacks. Bad example: The aviation LNO passes a request for a presence patrol to the aviation brigade, who then passes it to the attack battalion. When it gets to the attack company it is a PowerPoint slide with a 1:250,000-scale map of the FOB and states, “perform presence patrol at FOB from 2000-0100.” The attack aviators know the FOB comes under mortar attack, they guess from 82mm mortars, and perform a map recon for likely firing points within 4,900 meters of the FOB. They arrive overhead that night and identify a truck with a covered cargo bed and warm engine parked along a road. After flying presence patrols over this FOB night after night, they know it is unusual for a truck to be stopped here at this hour. They call the FOB with a spot report, but all the radio operator can do is say, “roger.” After some prodding, the attack aviators are finally able to speak with a battle captain and ask for someone to come out and investigate the truck. No one at the FOB is tasked to support the Apaches, so it takes about 40 minutes to get a quick reaction force (QRF) out the gate. During this time, three individuals emerge from a nearby grove, enter the truck, and drive off. The Apaches follow the truck for a while and it merges on to a major highway. The Apaches try to vector the QRF to the fleeing truck, but eventually they must break off for refuel before the QRF can catch up. Good example: The brigade S3 tasks the Apaches to perform an area recon to identify, and on order, attack to destroy, enemy indirect-fire assets within range of the FOB. The brigade S2 develops named areas of interest, integrates the aircraft into the FOB reconnaissance and surveillance plan, and provides a detailed estimate to the attack helicopter company of what to look for based on recent attacks and other intelligence. The Apaches come on station that night with a clear plan and observe a truck with a missing front fender, of which, the S2 briefed them, may have been involved in an earlier attack. On closer examination of the vehicle that they may have otherwise disregarded, they observe three figures, hiding in a nearby grove, toss rifles and a mortar tube to the ground. The Apaches call in a spot report to the FOB who dispatch the QRF. The Apaches guide the QRF to the truck and the suspicious individuals are subsequently captured. “Like many other weapons systems, since the cessation of major hostilities in Iraq, Apaches have made a significant departure from the Cold War paradigm. Where battalions and even regiments of attack helicopters may have attacked in mass before, a single team of two Apaches has enough firepower to dominate any likely engagement. Where helicopters previously hugged the terrain to avoid engagement by long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the principal threat to helicopters now comes from small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and the occasional shoulder-fired SAM. The situation is different, and tactics used by Apaches are changed to suit this difference.” July-August 2004 — 11

Learning points:

• Always request a tactical task, such as recon, screen, or attack from Apaches. It may seem like placing round pegs in square holes, but assigning tactical tasks enables a wealth of institutional knowledge about what staff work is required to support a mission and what is expected from aircrews.

• Always pass pertinent intelligence information along with a mission request.

• When asking for a recon mission, always consider what actions to take when the Apaches find something. Apaches cannot search cars or boats and the enemy rarely brandish weapons when Apaches are overhead. Have a ground asset ready to investigate spot reports. Scenario 2: Intelligence indicates an individual on the high-value target list is taking refuge in a house in the 1st Battalion, 55th Infantry Regiment’s (1-55) sector. The 1-55 Infantry’s S3 operations officer requests Apache support for a 0200-hour raid. Bad example: The 1-55 Infantry’s assistant S3 calls the brigade aviation LNO with the mission for Apaches to “provide overwatch at 0200 of A/1-55 IN BN raid at grid LC 123 456.” Despite having access to digital maps and satellite imagery, he gives a six-digit grid for the target instinctively because the observer controller at the combat training center told him this was the standard last spring. The mission is passed over the radio to the attack helicopter company command post from their battalion, with the additional information to “contact Animal 6 on FH770.” The Apaches take off at 0145 hours, fly toward the target house, and attempt to contact Animal 6, the A Company commander. As the Apaches get within 15km of the raid objective, Animal 6G answers and indicates Animal 6 is in a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) moving to the objective and wants the Apaches to contact him on FH772. The aircrews switch to the new frequency and begin to monitor Animal 6 and Blue 1, who are discussing an Iraqi police vehicle, which took a wrong turn and left the convoy. The aircrews seize a break in the transmission and check in with Animal 6. Animal 6 replies that he wants the Apaches to keep out of earshot of the objective until he calls them forward to clear the rooftops of Objectives Lion and Tiger. The Apaches make a quick assessment and determine they are upwind of the objective area, so they make a sharp turn to avoid getting any closer. Since they did not receive the company refinements to the mission graphics, the Apaches call Animal 6 back and ask for the grids for Objectives Lion and Tiger. Animal 6 tells the Apaches to standby and then calls Animal 5 to ask if his blocking position is set. Animal 5 says he is “set at the bridge but the red element dismounts are still moving.” Animal 6 calls the Apaches back after reviewing the two company objective graphics on his Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) screen and reads off two 10-digit grids to the Apaches. As the Apache crews convert the 10-digit grids into 8-digit grids that their aircraft navigation system uses, Animal 5 calls to say the cordon is set and he has the Iraqi police at his location. Animal 6 replies, “Good, I am crossing Phase Line Claw now and turning into the village, send the Iraqi police up to meet me on Lion.” The Apache crews are now orbiting 8km to the north while they study maps trying to figure out at which bridge Animal 5 is located, and exactly which houses are Objective Tiger and Lion. At exactly 0159 hours, the Apache front seat crewmembers wearing NVGs observe a long stream of tracers arc across the ground in the vicinity of the objective and erupt into the sky. “Animal 6, Blue 1, contact with one guy with an AK vicinity Tiger, my gunner engaged with coax but he’s gone toward the canal!” an excited voice announces over the radio. Animal 6 acknowledges the transmission and instructs the Apaches, “come on in and look for an enemy dismount egressing west toward the canal.” The Apaches turn toward the objective and begin heading inbound. About two kilometers north of the objective, they pass an M2 Bradley astride a canal bridge. The back seat crewmember using the PNVS FLIR saw it first from about 2kms away, the heat of the Bradley engine and exhaust contrasted sharply in the pilot’s monocle display, but the front seat crewmember wearing goggles was unable to observe the M2 until he was on top of it due to poor illumination. As the Apaches follow the canal down the west side of the objective, the lead aircraft announces to his wingman on the UHF radio, “muzzle flashes, three o’clock, breaking right.” The lead Apache banks hard to the right, back across the canal, while the trail aircraft acquires the muzzle flashes and turns toward them. Both crewmembers in the trail Apache crew observe a pickup truck full of personnel firing rifles toward the objective. “Tally,” the trail Apache crew responds, “Two’s in, switches cold.” The back seat crewmember instinctively feels with his thumb for the switch that will send hydraulic power to his cannon turret and slew it at 60 degrees per second, in line with his helmet line-of-sight. Cautious and unsure of what the situation is on the ground, the crew won’t action that switch until they are sure they need to fire, but they want to know they can if they have to. As they get closer, the front seat crewmember with NVGs makes a quick short gasp as he clearly makes out the shape of flashing AKs in the hands of the personnel in the truck. A beep and a rush on the radio break the tension, “Animal 6, Animal 5, the Iraqi police are firing something up from the back of their truck.” Good example: The 1-55 Infantry’s assistant S3 calls the aviation LNO and says, “Animal company is going to do a raid at 0200 hours tonight and we would like some Apaches to help with our cordon, I’ll send you all the graphics we have right now on email.” The aviation LNO reviews the graphics, calls the assistant S3 back, and says, “I see you have the Apaches screening west of the objective to prevent egress through that area, you won’t be able to observe from the road.” The assistant 3 replies, “Right, and they need to be in a position to visually clear the roofs on the objective houses.” “OK,” the aviation LNO responds, “I see now, you have this slide with the satellite imagery that assigns a number to each house in the village.” “Right,” says the assistant S3, “and the target individual should be in house 12. By the way, Animal Company is conducting its final rehearsal at the FOB at 2300 hours tonight, if your aircrews can make it.” The aviation LNO passes all this information through to the attack helicopter company. The crews who will fly this mission are asleep when the mission is received the afternoon prior, so their counterparts begin some backward planning to determine if their duty day and the mission timeline will support attending the rehearsal: Mission ..................................... 0200-0400 Takeoff en route objective ........ 0145-0200 Run-up aircraft at OB ............... 0115-0145 Rehearsal .................................. 2300-UTC Takeoff en route FOB................ 2200-2230 Brief/preflight/run-up................ 2000-2200 Begin duty day ................................... 2000 If the aircrew begins their duty day at 2000 hours with their own brief and preflight, their unit SOP permits them to fly until 12 — July-August 2004

0600 hours, 10 hours after the duty day starts. The attack helicopter company commander is concerned about starting duty days unnecessarily early, he wants crews to be as fresh as possible during mission execution, but he knows the opportunity to do a face-to-face with the ground unit is worth the risk and approves the mission with the stop off for rehearsal. The aircrews begin their duty day, fly to the FOB, and participate in the rehearsal. They receive the company graphics that subdivide the battalion objective into Lion and Tiger, they know where all the friendly forces will be during the operation, and at the FOB they distinguish the Iraqi police truck. The raid goes smoothly, despite some nervous shooting by the Iraqi police. The Apaches observe an individual fleeing on foot and vector dismounted infantry to catch him. Later, interrogation reveals that this person was the intended target. Learning Points: Fratricide prevention is a combat multiplier. Apaches must know the ground scheme of maneuver and should be integrated prior to the mission. Once the raid is underway, it is too late for an effective briefing in the air. Ensure aircrews have all the graphic control measures ground units will be using. If there is any chance of friendly troops using non-U.S. vehicles or weapons, it must be briefed to the aircrews.

• Six-digit grids do not offer sufficient resolution to pick out an individual house in a village. Use staffs to develop and disseminate urban grid system products for each mission.

• An 8km upwind and a 4km downwind has been empirically proven in Iraq to be sufficient standoff for Apaches to remain undetected by sound at night. Note that this distance exceeds the capability of Apache FLIR to see individuals or any vehicle details, so do not plan on Apaches observing and remaining undetected.

• The best way to brief a mission is in person. Do not hesitate to ask for aircrews, or at least LNOs, to attend rehearsals — they will attend if at all possible.

• Aviation leaders will attempt to start an aircrew’s duty day as close as possible to mission execution time. This ensures two things: the aircrews will be fresh for the mission; and if there are delays or a requirement to fly longer, the aircrews will have sufficient duty day remaining to support it. Other Concerns Two methods should be used to ensure Apaches know where friendly troops are: use IR light sources and tell the Apaches where friendly troops will be located. Vehicles should have IR strobe lights and personnel should have either an IR chemlight or, even better, an AN/PAQ-4 or AN/PEQ-2 IR laser-aiming device active on their weapons. Glint tape on uniforms is nearly invisible to Apaches because the aircraft has no IR light source to reflect the glint tape. Most importantly, tell the Apaches where friendly troops are before the mission starts by ensuring their locations are passed to the aircrews. It is not a bad idea to ask aircrews to call the battalion S3 via landline before takeoff and discuss the friendly scheme of maneuver, if it is complex or undetermined. If mission graphics do not completely speak for themselves, some information will be lost as the mission is passed up and down the chain. At a minimum, when Apaches come on station, take a minute to ensure the aircrews know where all the moving pieces are located. Apaches sometimes cancel missions due to weather or maintenance. Aircrews are expected to risk their aircraft to enemy fire to support troops on the ground, but not to take a chance on maintenance or unsafe weather. Various regulations and technical manuals detail what aircraft malfunctions are acceptable to fly with, and which ones are not. There are very few subjective judgments to be made, particularly with an advanced aircraft with onboard test equipment like the Longbow that detects malfunction. Weather minimums are also detailed by regulation and classified theater-specific instructions. Objective Air Force personnel make weather forecasts and observations, not Army aircrews. Only extreme circumstances, such as friendly units in contact with the enemy, would prompt consideration of flying in “The simplest method to get an attack helicopter looking in the right direction is to pass a grid and target description. The Apache Longbow possesses a sophisticated navigation system that obtains a position confidence of less than 14 meters. A grid entered into the navigation system can be used to cue and slew aircraft sensors, weapons, and even the helmet-mounted sight. Imagine having big crosshairs painted on the ground; that is what it looks like when we cue our helmet monocle to a target grid.” July-August 2004 — 13 below-minimum weather, and that risk decision would have to be made by a senior aviation leader. The best way to avoid mission cancellation due to weather is to request an Air Force weather team be positioned in the vicinity of key operations to accurately report current conditions. Like many other weapons systems, since the cessation of major hostilities in Iraq, Apaches have made a significant departure from the Cold War paradigm. Where battalions and even regiments of attack helicopters may have attacked in mass before, a single team of two Apaches has enough firepower to dominate any likely engagement. Where helicopters previously hugged the terrain to avoid engagement by long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the principal threat to helicopters now comes from small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and the occasional shoulder-fired SAM. The situation is different, and tactics used by Apaches are changed to suit this difference. Apaches now conduct reconnaissance and attacks primarily at airspeeds between 60 and 100 knots for reasons such as improving survivability (it is harder to hit a moving target) and conserving fuel (hovering burns fuel faster than cruise flight). Hovering is a tool we still use, albeit a suboptimal one for most situations we encounter. In this environment, when planning the tac tical employment of attack helicopters, focus on their effects, not their flight paths. Aircrews are more effective when left to determine how to maneuver their own aircraft. Include a purpose and desired end state with tasks to convey intent. Use of fire support control measures, such as restricted fire lines, is a straightforward, clearly understood way to deconflict fires. The simplest method to get an attack helicopter looking in the right direction is to pass a grid and target description. The Apache Longbow possesses a sophisticated navigation system that obtains a position confidence of less than 14 meters. A grid entered into the navigation system can be used to cue and slew aircraft sensors, weapons, and even the helmet-mounted sight. Imagine having big crosshairs painted on the ground; that is what it looks like when we cue our helmet monocle to a target grid. There are disadvantages to sending a grid, which include the time it takes for the observer to determine it, for the aircrew to enter it, and the many opportunities for it to be misread or incorrectly entered. If time is of the essence, an old-fashioned talk-on works best. For example, “from the lead vehicle in the convoy, ten o’clock at 300 meters, there is a two-story house with a pickup truck in front of it, in that pickup is the shooter.” Talk-ons should be progressive, starting from one known point, preferably a large terrain feature or manmade object, and moving outward to the target. Use the clock technique (12 o’clock means toward the front) or cardinal directions for headings. Because an aerial perspective is significantly different from a ground view, ensure references are as specific as possible; for instance, while the ground commander may observe only one large plume of smoke in front of him, the aircraft may see several. During hours of darkness, IR lasers work well to mark targets. Purpose-built IR pointers (similar to the type the Air Force enlisted tactical air controllers (ETACs) use), IR weapon-aiming systems (the AN/PEQ-2), or even a standard briefing laser pointer are extremely easy to acquire with NVGs. Just provide the aircrews with the cardinal direction or clock-technique heading where the laser is pointing. This heading does not have to be exact, but it ensures aircrews are in the right direction for the spot, as laser energy only reflects back in about a +/-60 degree azimuth. For example, “I’m lasing the target to my north now, its the second-floor window of the apartment.” Keep the laser spot moving so it will stand out from other lights when viewed through NVGs, often a looping motion around the target works best. Most infantry and armor units have embedded ETACs. While ETACs usually work with fixed-wing close air support (CAS) aircraft, their skills and equipment transfer well to attack helicopter operations. Do not overlook these specialists. During several large operations where FM radio command nets were constantly in use, the ETAC’s UHF radios served as a backup link between the ground commander and his attack helicopter support. Also often overlooked is the synergy that develops when CAS and attack helicopters work together. For example, IR flares dropped by an A-10 CAS aircraft can often make a significant improvement in the reconnaissance ability of an NVG-equipped attack helicopter. When CAS and attack helicopters are simultaneously operating in an area, ensure that both elements are made aware of the other. Attack aviators are also proficient at controlling CAS and can be a “surrogate ETAC” for ground commanders when others are not available or not in a position to observe. The conflict in Iraq is both unique in some ways and “back to the future” in others. New technologies meet proven tactics to forge enhanced warfighting capabilities for our units. Attack helicopters offer a third dimension of maneuver to armor leaders that our mission and soldiers deserve to have fully realized. The TTPs described in this article successfully enabled one unit to meet the challenge in north-central Iraq. Other locations, different units, and specific circumstances may indicate alternate recommendations. Use this article to compare how your unit does business with attack aviation, and make any sensible adjustments. Finally, the next time you see attack aviators walking around your FOB, offer them the chance to get in your turret and see how you view the world. CPT Stephen W. Miles is commander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment (Attack), 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX, currently in Tikrit, Iraq. He is a graduate of San Francisco State University. His military education includes the Aviation Officer Basic Course, Field Artillery Captains Career Course, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has served in various command and staff positions to include attack platoon leader and support platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment (Attack), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Hunter Army Airfield, GA; assistant S3, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Tikrit, Iraq; and division tactical command post aviation liaison officer, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX. 14 — July-August 2004