Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V) Thermal Signature Identification Training

ROC-Vis a Windows-based thermal sight training program developed by the U. S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (CECOM NVESD) and sponsored by PM FLIR, Fort Belvoir, Va. ROC-V helps soldiers learn to identify the thermal signatures of combat vehicles by using an interactive curriculum that teaches unique patterns and shapes of vehicle hotspots, and overall vehicle shapes. ROC-V also teaches soldiers thermal sensor image controls. Using virtual sight controls, soldiers learn to effectively adjust their thermal image to find targets and bring out their thermal ID cues. ROC-V 9.0 includes higher resolution imagery; a larger vehicle set, including helicopters; expanded tactical vehicle descriptions; occluded target views; samples of vehicle sounds; and a completely separate “iron sight” day view version. The day view version will teach visible target ID using ROC-V teaching principles. Both these trainers will include on-board training/testing for the TRADOC Soldiers Manual Common Task (SMCT), Skill Level 1, for visual vehicle identification, currently being developed by TRADOC and the U. S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team (USJFCOM JCIET). JCIET POC is Mr. William Rierson, (850)882-6700 ext. 7515. Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command Product Manager, Ground Combat Tactical Trainers (STRICOM PM GCTT) has distribution authority for the program. PM GCTT POC is MAJ Scott Pulford, (407)384-5265 (DSN prefix 970). The Target Management Office (TMO) has configured ROC-V 8.0 as a downloadable product. It is available to institutional U. S. government users. For user name and password to access the website, contact TMO POC Mike Day at mxregistrar@ redstone.army.mil. The web address is: https://rocv.army.mil/ROCV/ Motivational, fast-paced exercises teach combat vehicle thermal identification. Virtual sensor panels provide practice using sensor controls.

many senior leaders, both military and civilian, who need to have their views challenged, don’tread ARMOR, at least not with the regularity that Neanderthaloid tankers and cavalrymen do. This seems evident to me in the Department of Defense’s recent cancellation of the Crusader program, in favor of redirecting that money, in the words of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, “to accelerate other Army Transformation technology research programs which promise early returns” (ArmyLINK News, May 2002). The Army’s news release ends with Secretary Rumsfeld’s statement that the Crusader was seven years into development and yet no prototype exists. Meanwhile, Comanche, which has been in development much longer than Crusader, will not achieve initial operational capability until 2006. The Future Combat System, on which so much of the Objective Force depends, is just now entering development with only the vaguest notion of what it will be, yet the Army is making plans that this system will be in the hands of soldiers by the end of this decade. Many will read into Eden’s argument that he is arguing against transformation of the Army. I think not. Eden is challenging the notion that conventional warfare is dead forever or, even if it is not, that there are silver bullets out there just over the technological horizon that will obviate the need for heavy, conventional forces. The point is that we don’t know what the future holds, we don’t know that technologies will or will not pan out — we don’t know what we don’t know — and history, contrary to popular opinion, doesn’t reliably teach us anything except, perhaps, that we should expect the unexpected. This article deserves the wider audience of Army, and I hope that the staff of ARMOR will inquire about a possible reprinting there. I expect that LTC Eden’s views will generate quite a response and nothing but good can come from that. The asymmetric/RMA warriors have had the battlefield to themselves long enough — if they are right in the prog-nostications about the future of war, a healthy and open debate will only strengthen their arguments, not weaken them.

LTC, Armor (Ret.)

Dear Sir: I would like to discuss several aspects of LTC Eden’s article that I disagree with. LTC Eden has a lot of common sense and a good inoculation against RMA political correctness. However, his article is a bit excessive in its treatment of history and its dismissal of maneuver warfare. The great maneuver commanders he cites were not losers. Their side lost, their strategy failed, or their operations fell short, for reasons mostly beyond their control. Grant knew the virtue of maneuver warfare, as we all agree. But he abandoned it because: he faced Lee, an enemy commander who was as good at it as he was; he realized his subordinates in the east (Meade and his corps commanders) were not Sherman, Thomas, and Sheridan, and for all their considerable virtues had neither schooling in the method nor a history of offensive success; he had the resources to win through simple numerical attrition; and he appreciated the threat to Washington and to Lincoln’s reelection prospects if he ever let Lee’s attention wander from the grind toward Richmond. Napoleon, as any commander, depended on his subordinates for the execution of his operational method. As his best marshals were lost, or dispatched to the Peninsula to be bested by Wellington (another great maneuver commander), and as a consequence of poor strategic decisions, his fortunes waned. His 1814 campaign was indeed brilliant, and he certainly could not have fought half as well or half as long by any other method. Rommel lost his campaign in North Africa for lack of resources, not because of any flaw in his operational method. Montgomery, like Grant, understood that his advantages were in materiel and manpower and exploited them intelligently. Does anyone believe that Rommel could have fought so successfully for so long by means of attrition warfare? Or that he could not have driven all the way to Suez or beyond if he had been better supported with fuel, air support and materiel replacements during his pursuit of the British toward Alexandria in June-July 1942? Correct me if I need it here, but it is my impression that the German solution to the trench deadlock in 1918 (infiltration or “stormtrooper” tactics, an expression of manuever warfare principles) was quite effective at the tactical level, and only failed to gain a significant victory for reasons unrelated to its tactical virtues: the lack of mechanization prevented deep exploitation of the breakthroughs they achieved; and the infusion of American manpower and materiel on the Western front decisively altered the correlation of forces. It is only true, as LTC Eden says, that “maneuver warfare doesn’t work against competent foes,” if you say that every foe defeated by it was, evidently, incompetent. What shall we say of attrition warfare against competent foes, particularly if the practitioner lacks overwhelming numerical superiority and the willingness to accept massive casualties? Americans should think hard about that last condition particularly. Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Gallipoli, the Somme, and Goodwood all come to mind. That several of these combatants eventually won their war is irrelevant to the argument that their methods, in these and other examples, were often stupid, wasteful, and doomed to failure. The initial battles of encirclement in the Soviet Union in 1941 are excellent examples of maneuver warfare in practice, and these operations were hardly the result of desperation. Had their leader appreciated the concept more fully, and Moscow been maintained as the center of gravity for that campaign, the outcome might have been very different. LTC Eden is wary of future Alamos, but it is difficult to imagine that our forces will not, someday, fight outnumbered and outclassed. When that time comes, they should know how to fight like Rommel in 1942, Manstein in 1943, or Napoleon in 1814. Had the Gulf War really started when our troops on the ground consisted of one brigade from the 82d Airborne, LTC Eden’s definition of asymmetric warfare (“I have tanks and you don’t”) would have been proven out in American blood. If we can imagine such a circumstance arising again, we better have other forms of asymmetry to apply. I agree that we need to keep enough tanks, attack helicopters, mechanized infantry, artillery, and the heavy lift to move them, to fight a stand up fight and win — and as an extension of LTC Eden’sown argument, as long as we do so, our fights will mostly be of a different nature. We had better prepare for these as well, unless we want to wait for the fight to reach the Rio Grande. Hyperbole is somewhat forgivable in the context of the current debates, but if we see the sense of Bellamy’s quote, “How can we say that maneuver and attrition are anything other than indistinguishable?” Can’t we avoid exaggeration and straw-man arguments, and learn to get along?

U. S. Department of Energy Fort Chaffee, Ark.

Eden’s Article Hits the Mark

Dear Sir: I read LTC Eden’s article and thought it was right on the mark. In my current job, Ideal a lot with computers and administer a wide area network. I know pretty well what computers can and cannot do, and being an AH- 64A Gunpilot, I know what is needed to fight the enemy. I am always reading editorials or articles and end up thinking just the same as he does. I think that many people regard computers as the magical box and think that it will do anything. This probably happens because technology is a mystery and leaders get away with relying on the experts to sort through it. My experience has been that the experts are computer geeks who have never ridden in a tank or flown in a combat aircraft, hence they do not know anything about what is really needed in combat. Computers are useful and have a place, but we will get rid of the bayonet and tank at our own expense. I do wish that he would have mentioned how everyone was talking about the tank being obsolete after Just Cause. With Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama, everyone was talking about what a waste of money it was

ARMOR — 45 and how all the future wars were going to be light intensity conflicts. Same thing with the A-10. Desert Storm showed otherwise. When I look at the Axis of Evil, I see large mechanized forces that will need to be destroyed. That does not even include China! LTC Eden deserves praise for his article and it should be taken to heart by those at the Pentagon who are planning and shaping the Army of the future.

6th US Cavalry Brigade Tactical Operations Officer

Eden’s “Three Cheers...” Is Flawed; Renders Itself Unnecessary

Dear Sir: It was saddening to read LTC Eden’s explicit defense of attrition warfare in the March-April issue of ARMOR. Not only does attrition warfare usually leave a substantial butcher’s bill on both sides (remember Verdun), but it negates what armor is all about. What tanks brought to warfare was not big guns or invulnerability (fortresses can have both), but operational mobility. In attrition warfare, operational art does not exist, so operational mobility becomes meaningless. We might as well replace our tanks with super-heavy Sturmgeschuetze (perhaps with the Abrams we have). Space permits me just to touch on some of LTC Eden’s errors:

• Many winners with force superiority have also used maneuver warfare. The Red Army at the operational level in 1944-45 and Mao in main force operations after 1945 are two examples.

• If maneuver warfare against an equal opponent has its risks, attrition warfare against an equal opponent means you must be able to accept attrition better than he can. The United States might have a small problem with that.

• The quote from Rommel — “The day goes to the side that is first able to plaster its opponents with fire” — refers to the use of fire for suppression, not mere attrition. Suppression with fire is often necessary to permit maneuver. The most important error in LTC Eden’s article occurs at the outset, when he equates maneuver warfare with the so-called “revolution in military affairs” and suggests that SAMS is teaching maneuver warfare. In fact, the RMA is pure attrition warfare, the ultimate dream of the French army of the 1930s: war reduced to nothing but acquiring and bringing fire on targets. Its spectacular failure in Kosovo was recently repeated in Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda. The last time I visited SAMS (more than ten years ago), it was a virtual recreation of the Ecole Superieur de Guerre: war had been reduced to nothing more than rote processes. As the students put it to me when I tried to talk about war, “This is very interesting, but we have paperwork to process.” In the end, LTC Eden’s article is superfluous: the U. S. Army’s practice, if not always its formal doctrine, is attrition warfare. And no one teaches it better than SAMS.

“We Must Fight to Win, Not to Not Lose”

Dear Sir: I hope the comments made by LTC Eden in the March-April ARMOR were simply to stir up debate. I think it is clear to any who study warfare that maneuver-style warfare is not simply the tool of an underdog. Germany used high tempo maneuver warfare-type tactics when the Wehrmacht was at its height of strength, 1940 to 1942. In fact, Germany began losing the war when they went away from that philosophy, Stalingrad and Kursk being the most notable examples. High tempo, exploitation-type tactics, and when possible going where the enemy is not, have been used in many instances besides Germany. The Pacific war against Japan, the 1973 war between Israel and Egypt, and the Persian Gulf War are again notable examples. Maneuver warfare is anything but the desperate gamble of a dying army. These battles all lasted between three days and two weeks. This is not the exception, but the norm in today’s world of fully mechanized and motorized armies. These rapid, short-duration conflicts will continue to be the norm in the foreseeable future. Do the risks increase against a more capable foe? Of course, but do they not with any tactic? Indeed, using an outdated, slow style of warfare against a competent foe only increases the risk of defeat against a thoughtful, well-prepared enemy. We must fight to win, not to not lose. The U. S. military today has taken great strides in developing and disseminating maneuver warfare doctrine. The importance placed on tempo, commander’s intent, and operating in a chaotic environment are discussed regularly. Despite this, we still see reliance on the linear battlefield in the preponderance of wargames, studies, and exercises. If we truly want to shape the battlefield and thrive in a chaotic environment, why not create the fluid battlefield ourselves? Why not eliminate thinking and acting along the lines of the FEBA, FLOT, and always having an adjacent unit? LTC Eden reinforces this outdated concept when he describes the need for secure land routes to handle logistics. Only heavy forces need that type of large logistics train. Particularly in the Marines where maneuver from the sea, and the logistic capability that goes with it, is becoming more and more a reality, the U. S. military should be working to create a totally fluid environment where interdiction of enemy supply and communications, operations at night, and rapid, mobile resupply is the norm. Rather than spend time and energy thinking of ways to supply high-demand units, we need to think of ways to reduce that demand. The equipment and doctrine needed for this leap are in place. The LAV is particularly suited for this role. The combination of strategic transportability, long tactical range, and ease of resupply (low fuel consumption and relatively light ammunition, making helicopter resupply simple, effective, and feasible) enable it to bridge the gaps between strategic, operational, and tactical mobility. The Army is pursuing this same concept with the LAV, and soon the pieces will be in place for both ground services to pursue this type of rapid, exploitative warfare. Only one major obstacle remains: the lack of an equally mobile and sustainable fire support asset. Towed artillery is no longer the answer, however light it may be. The Paladin is a superb weapon, but clearly too heavy for this type of operation. The answer is ready for production; the LAV-120 turreted mortar. Imagine the possible tempo increases with a heavy fire support asset equally as mobile as your fastest platform, in fact on the same platform, with common fuel consumption, parts, and mobility. The role of aircraft may slightly change. Reliance on airpower as the main supporting arm is not new to units such as LAR. The deep mission still exists, but the vast majority of sorties should be directed to ground-controlled CAS to reduce friendly fire in this environment. Attrition warfare is not the key to the future; in fact, it has been obsolete for at least 100 years. The key now is to take warfare to the next step. The equipment and training is mostly there, all we need now is a slight shift in thinking away from established battle lines into the creation of a fluid, chaotic battle area that transcends the division between forward and rear areas. Are we up to the task?

School of Infantry Camp Pendleton, Calif.

My first editor warned me never to respond to letters. Thus, without directly replying to the many, pro and con, who took the time to read my article, I will take this opportunity to clarify my thoughts in light of their comments. I got my history wrong. Several avid readers wrote in to point out that Grant beat Pemberton at Vicksburg, not Price. My only defense for this is that, in the white heat of creation, I neglected to check my facts. However, I'll stand behind my other historical illustrations — obviously oversimplified due to the constraints of space — and would be happy to debate our differences of opinion over a beer anytime. Parenthetically, the officer corps as a whole is sadly ignorant of military history in general. Many are buffs, with

ARMOR — a wealth of trivial knowledge about things like the differences between the Panzer IIIg and the Panzer IIIh, but few can carry on an intelligent conversation about military history or historiography. Frankly, I've had more serious talks on the military art with NCOs than I have had with officers, my fellow history instructors at West Point excepted. I clearly don't understand maneuver warfare, or I have deviously created a maneuverist strawman. True, on both counts. To cut to the chase, I wrote my article because I was tired of waiting for someone else to pick up the gauntlet. I felt that some superannu-ated tanker with no particular skills needed to state the obvious to all the purveyors of maneuverism: we don’t know what the hell you are talking about. We grew up preparing to fight an enemy who was superior to us in many ways and practicing against an OPFOR that regularly slobberknocked us. We didn’t know there was a difference between maneuver and fire; you used one to employ the other, and vice-versa. Now that enemy has disappeared, and we are being told that the battlefield has moved on. No need to prepare for a mirror-image enemy. Hell, soon they’ll be building refugee camps at the NTC. The problem is twofold. First, those who believe that a revolution in military affairs has arrived have failed to convince those of us who don’t that the paradigm of modern warfare is indeed broken. In fact, they rarely try — their arguments proceed from the assumption that mechanized warfare between rough equals is a thing of the past, or strictly for third worlders. Thus, the two camps have no common ground to argue from. Secondly, the vocabulary we all use is so imprecise, transitory, and vague as to be useless for intelligent discussion. This is not because our manuals are failing us — they seem more concerned with taxonomy than with tactics nowadays — but because the discipline imposed by having a ‘contrarian’ viewpoint in opposition just does not exist. Hence, I hope to spark a little healthy debate, one that will show that the dichotomy between maneuver and attrition warfare is a false one. The armor community is the fulcrum on which we will raise tomorrow’s army. Why? Because, alone of all the branches, we possess the bridge between maneuver and attrition. Only the tank, whatever it may look like in the coming century, is capable of both. And, in my opinion, only armies that can employ both, at need, can win wars.

ACCC Transformation Requires Modifications

Dear Sir: Let me first say that I wholeheartedly agree with much of what MG Whitcomb expressed in his “Commander’s Hatch” column in the March-April 2002 issue of ARMOR. In particular, his emphasis on “intent-based training” and extending institutional training beyond the walls of the school house to allow for life-long learning and professional development were, in my opinion, right on target. That being said, however, I find it odd and somewhat antithetical to advocate experienced-based training where resident schools such as the Armor Captains Career Course become more “leadership- and battle-command centric” (a good thing), and yet simultaneously support the transformation of this important course into a mere four-week resident course supplemented by two weeks as an observer at a training center (read: excessive and unavoidable ‘downtime’ between activity ‘spikes’ in observed rotations), all prefaced by home station distance learning (DL) where the future student will be forced to juggle the daily rigors of his line unit (which will NOT go away) and this new, pre-AC3 DL requirement. MG Whitcomb wrote that, “We must develop leaders in a battle school and allow them to gain experience in the execution of battle command.” I unequivocally agree. However, I am at an honest loss to see how much experience, much less mastery, of battle command a student can expect to achieve in less than a month in anew course where SGI mentorship has been ruthlessly pruned to the trunk of the educational tree. In my opinion, this appears to be yet another paradox where a couple of very sound educational ideas (experience-based training and extended/career martial study) are espoused and yet the requisite research and analysis have not been invested to preclude a hastily-contrived, even damaging product from resulting. While I do not know if this proposal to change ACCC is official, I do know that the collective body of SGIs at Fort Knox has been briefed that “this is going to happen,” and that a pilot-course of this model will be executed in November of this year. The idea of its immanency is so widespread that Colonel (Retired) Hackworth has published his views about it in the media (they are not favorable). I’m not sure how much more official it needs to be before we go so far down this road we can’t turn back. MG Whitcomb’s aviation school analogy was appropriate — they do not send aviators out into the force prior to one proving himself as a flyer because they invest nearly two years in initial military instruction and flight school training. I would submit that sending armor captains out into the force to command companies after four weeks of “battle school,” fighting computer TACOPS battles with only a very select few students commanding in CCTT, or alive tank gauntlet sounds ludicrous (once again respectfully using the terminology in his analogy). I’m not sure what is the preeminent force driving this change — money, personnel shortfalls in the force, senior leader memories of a totally different course they attended long ago, or some other impetus. But while I know that the technology exists to train much of the knowledge-based portion of the program of instruction through distance learning, my own opinion is that it equates to training a football team by having the players watch ESPN (to borrow another analogy). Further, anyone who has ever participated in DL courses can attest to the generally accepted fact that the quality of mentorship in such cases hovers close to zero. Perhaps I am not seeing the big picture, but I strongly feel this proposed educational design would be an egregious disservice to the officers we are duty bound to train at this institution. As the Armor Captains Career Course currently stands, I believe we are within MG Whit-comb’s intent of training leaders by “teaching the playbook” through classroom instruction and student dialogue while executing this knowledge in experience-based training. From day one, our captains are required to make rapid decisions and communicate their intent with tactical decision games and company- and task force-level operations in constructive, virtual, and live battle scenarios. There is still work to be done in achieving more resources, greater predictability, and standardized opportunities for every student in the course, but we are making experiential-based training work, and we are doing it in combination with the all-important aspect of SGI-student mentorship. The most vital resource we need to maintain is time. We already lose the students for three entire weeks of the course by sending them over to be “mentors” for the officer basic course. While this briefs well, personal experience and prolific student feedback forces me to question the benefit of this lost time and its impact on the captains that are here for their training. Additionally, much valuable time is also lost in practicing the visualize and describe aspects of battle command because we are now prohibited from taking the students on tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) to reinforce the missions we plan, prepare, and execute in the classroom, SIMNET, or CCTT. Current organization and resource limitations allow only a small percentage of students to command a company (a two-platoon, seven-tank company at that) during alive tank gauntlet, so these TEWTs are often the only opportunity to get captains out of the classroom or virtual environment and into the mud. The ACCC small group instructors are committed to graduating self-confident, adaptive leaders into the force armed with the tools they need to be successful as company commanders and staff officers in today’s unpredictable operational environment. That is our mission and our duty, and that is why I am submitting this letter in response to MG Whit-comb’s editorial. I truly cherish the unique American freedom to air my deeply-held views concerning our honorable profession in such a forum of open and free debate without fear of censure or retribution. In most armies of the world, this is not the case. Thank you for your time, consideration, and commitment to the education of our officer corps.

ARMOR — 47

I want to thank CPT Dunivan for his comments on OES Transformation. ARMOR is an excellent forum for discussion and thought about all aspects of our profession. You raise some important points that should be considered as we move forward with OES Transformation. Some of his issues are addressed in “Refocusing the Leader Development Lens,” on page 15 in this magazine. In particular, transforming institutional learning must include more hands-on, experientially-based instruction than classroom instruction. I am very pleased with the work that our small group instructors do to prepare captains for command. Regardless of how the final course is structured, we need prior commanders — preferably with CTC experience — as instructors to coach, teach, and mentor the future leaders of the mounted force. What we have now is not broken — it is successful. One of the important reasons we are looking at ways to improve OES is that our education system must advance at the pace of the U. S. Army’s transformation in doctrine, materiel and equipment, and organization. It must also transform with society and technology to some degree, and the capabilities that the computer age brings are enormous. Successful OES Transformation is critical to the Army. We welcome everyone to the fight and discussion.

Force-on-Force Training Provides Excellent Opportunity for New LTs

Dear Sir: LTC Mark Pires’ article, “Training Lethal Tank Crews and Sections” (March-April), offers many useful insights and techniques to increase the effectiveness of our tank platoons. As a tank platoon leader, I fully understand the challenges he describes. Anew lieutenant arrives at the platoon with an understanding of the doctrine and tactics used in small units armor maneuver, but he possesses very few of the techniques and procedures necessary to command a tank. Specifically, he lacks the experience and “tricks-of-the-trade” possessed by his NCO tank commanders. The force-on-force training described by LTC Pires would provide an outstanding opportunity for the new lieutenant to learn how to maneuver and survive. An essential element of the force-on-force training event is the purity of the exercise; the tank commanders could focus on tank maneuver without the added complications of the command net, calling for fire support, logistics, and casualty evacuation. These tasks enter the training at the platoon level, after completing individual tank skills. This process is similar to the tank gunnery crew completing Tank Table VIII before adding the additional tasks for Tank Table XII. As tank platoon leaders, it falls on our shoulders to make such training happen if the schedule does not formally allow it. There is not an armor battalion or cavalry squadron in the U. S. Army that possesses a surplus of training time. As a lieutenant, one is not responsible for scheduling major training events, but if one carefully manages the Troop Leading Procedures, this type of training can be used for mission rehearsals. Rehearsals at the platoon level do not involve specific actions on specific terrain, they should focus on battle drills that will result in mission accomplishment regardless of where or when contact occurs. The force-on-force training would be an excellent rehearsal of contact with inferior, superior, or unknown forces. As a tank platoon leader, my NCOs and I look for MILES training opportunities any time the troop is positioned in an assembly area. If the situation permits removing a platoon from the perimeter, one can use any small piece of terrain to drill one-on-one, three-on-one, and section-on-section. In addition to creating lethal tank sections, this experience was the most fun our platoon had during field training. The bragging rights for the winning tank were worth the extra three hours of training. The AARs were conducted internally, and the best lessons I learned as a tank commander were the result of being zapped by one of the other tank commanders. This type of training also prevents the boredom of the assembly area from setting-in; tankers are happiest when they are tanking. In closing, the tank platoon leader cannot wait for scheduled training time to prepare a platoon. If your unit does not have the time for a formal force-on-force tank exercise, then the challenge is to incorporate it into the only time you own, the mission preparation.

Current Pistol Qualification Standard Inadequate for Airport Security Duty

Dear Sir: I want to thank MAJ Pryor for his article, “Conducting Homeland Security: Moving Swiftly into a New Era of Defense” (March-April ARMOR), and emphasize one point he made. He stated that during his mission analysis for National Guardsmen to serve as armed security in civilian airports, his staff determined that these soldiers would require handgun skills far beyond the Army’s standard combat pistol qualification. I strongly agree and applaud his staff for recognizing this and implementing a more rigorous training standard. The Army’s standard pistol qualification is, in my opinion, inadequate for minimal combat defensive purposes. An active security guard in a crowded, busy civilian environment requires and deserves a much more intensive training and performance requirement. The civilians in these protected facilities also deserve a soldier who can perform this important duty safely and competently. The Army pistol qualification gives a soldier 40 rounds of ammunition and only requires he hit 16 targets out of 30 presented. This means that the soldier can fire and miss with 24 rounds, over half the rounds issued, and still be “qualified” with the M9 Beretta pistol. Twenty-four missed shots on a firing range do not present a problem. One missed shot in a crowded airport, or any other civilian populated area, is a serious, deadly problem. Military tactics are full of terms for small arms implementation such as “suppressive fire,” for which again, fired rounds that don’t actually hit a threat target are acceptable. These security missions among civilians require a much more precise, surgical approach to shooting. The Kentucky National Guard has recognized this and has taken steps to accomplish it. The KYNG has contracted a nationally known instructor/trainer on practical handgun shooting to train its security force on safely and effectively engaging threat targets in a civilian environment — in other words, how to quickly and safely end a gunfight in your favor without endangering bystanders. Another lesson they have learned is that not only is the standard army pistol training not adequate for such missions, but the standard army holster is inadequate as well. The M12 holster issued to most soldiers with the M9 pistol has a flap covering the grip of the gun, which is secured with a buckle. The instructor demonstrated this problem during the initial training of the KYNG security force. He had the top-shooting soldier in the group face the target with his loaded pistol hol-stered. Another soldier stood next to him (unarmed), but faced the opposite direction. The instructor directed that when he blew the whistle, signifying that the threshold for deadly force had been reached, the shooter was to draw, aim, and fire, and the soldier facing rearward was to run away from the firing line and stop when he heard the first shot. The first shot was fired in over 5 seconds, at which point the “runner” had covered nearly 40 yards. Clearly, this put the security guard at a great disadvantage. If he were engaging a deadly threat moving away from him, the threat would be out of range of his weapon before the guard could fire. If the threat were attacking the guard, the soldier would not be able to use his weapon before having the threat upon him, and possibly losing control of his weapon. After this demonstration, the security force was issued holsters that safely secured the weapon, but allowed a much easier and quicker draw of the weapon. When we place soldiers in armed security positions among civilians, we owe it to them and the public to ensure they are properly trained and equipped. Too often, leaders and planners only see these soldiers as a deter-

ARMOR — rent to possible threat. The presence of a uniformed, armed soldier certainly is a deterrent to most people. But we also must not rule out the possibility that deterrence may fail, and these soldiers may face a deadly threat and need to use their weapon to protect their lives and the lives of others. We do not have to make these soldiers Olympic-caliber marksman or quick-draw gunslingers, but we must ensure that we train and equip them to the best of the Army’s ability for this difficult mission.

Fort Knox, Ky.

Dear Sir: Please allow me to thank the Armor Association for the opportunity to serve on the Executive Council. Individually and collectively, we represent and serve all armor and ground cavalry soldiers with dignity and pride to preserve the integrity of our branch and our Association. Each year the Executive Council is charged with revising and solidifying the Association’s bylaws, reviewing the criteria for awarding the Order of St. George and the Noble Patron of Armor, and discussing how the Association can improve and better support our armor and ground cavalry soldiers. For 3 years, I have had the opportunity to hear astute guidance from some of the most revered graybeards — men who have much experience and are a wealth of knowledge. I have also had opportunities to share thoughts, concerns, make recommendations, and vote on issues affecting the Association. However, it appears that there is some disagreement over award criteria. This issue is not a blatant disregard or an intentional abuse of the system, but rather a lack of understanding. During the last Executive Council meeting, the Council addressed qualifications for various awards offered by the Association. Once again, the issue was raised that soldiers who were not of armor or ground cavalry lineage be allowed to receive the Order of St. George. The Executive Council discussed this possibility and voted against including verbiage in the bylaws to allow such submissions. Criteria for the award is available online at www.usarmor-assn.org. Please take the time to review the standards! Armor and ground cavalry leaders can show their support for our branch and the Association. Each time a name is submitted for the St. George, ask yourself if all the members, current, past, and future of the Order of St. George would embrace this individual as a member of their honored society. We need to protect our heritage, keep it sacred, renew it to be something that young soldiers and officer’s ascribe to and desire to achieve. In my opinion, we have not done a very good job in the past of protecting our lineage or supporting the Association. For those of you who think the requirement to send a fee is away of supporting the Association because it creates a profit for the Association — you are wrong. The fee covers the cost of the medallion, printing the certificate, and shipping and handling. For those of you who have pushed through a St. George for an unqualified individual — shame on you. For those of you who have submitted individuals to receive the award and signed the recommendation without being a member of the Association — shame on you. More importantly, for those of you in the routing chain who approve packets that do not qualify — shame, shame on you because not only do you allow the St. George or Joan-de-Arc to be cheapened, you are failing your supervisor who may or may not be aware of the violation. Finally, and this happens more than most of us realize, the recipient should not pay for his own medallion. Whoever submitted or endorsed the packet should be responsible for the associated fee. The new bylaws remove any gray area, clearly defining who can be honored with the St. George. I encourage each of you to adhere to the bylaws when submitting a recommendation for the award. For commanders who want to recognize individuals who have served the armor and mounted cavalry above and beyond — the Noble Patron of Armor is just as prestigious. Therefore, care and judgment must be used when submitting those nominations as well. We are a proud branch, we have an amazing history and lineage, we are at the leading edge of all future combat developments and operations, and we are by far the most technically and tactically competent branch in the Army today. I encourage each of us to continue supporting the Armor Association, become a member, renew your memberships, and encourage soldiers and peers to do the same. We have an inherent duty as tankers and ground cavalrymen to protect and perpetuate the embodiment of the St. George. I want to know that when I earn the right to wear the Order of St. George bronze medallion that I am among the finest tankers and ground cavalrymen.

CPT, Armor Texas Army National Guard

“Master Gunner” Responsibility Should Belong to Armor Leaders

Dear Sir: I would like to comment on the master gunner letter by SFC McIntosh in the March-April 2002 issue. I agree with the general thrust of his proposal to change who has responsibility in this regard; however, I submit there should be afar different outcome. When I was with troop units, there was no such thing as a master gunner. As a platoon leader, troop commander, company commander, and squadron commander, I was the master gunner of my unit (and I have the ears to prove it). When I was a tank gunnery instructor at the Armor School (1958-61), the master gunner program was not even a remote consideration. I was truly amazed when I learned some years later that such a position had come into existence. I considered it a misguided attempt to solve a glaring problem, such as, a general lack of gunnery experience and knowledge by the majority of armor officers (coupled with a deficit of properly trained turret mechanics). In my dealings with artillery units, I can honestly say I never worked with any of their company-grade officers who was not a master gunner. I cannot say the same for armor officers (and, ironically, direct fire is far less involved than the artillery’s indirect approach). Because there is still such a position as master gunner, I assume the same shortcoming exists today and that is an abomination. We should emulate the artillery in this respect and make all armor leaders gunnery experts. The way to do this is to give more than lip service to the fact a tank is a weapons system and not a vehicle. The gunnery aspect should be touted as paramount and not coequal to automotive and communications. The only reason we move and communicate is to effectively employ our firepower. Every armor officer should be made to understand he is expected to be masterful when it comes to the gunnery art and science (but don’t get the turret mechanic’s duties involved in this qualification). After all, gunnery is the raison d′être of a tank. For their part, the Armor School should weight their course curriculums and priorities accordingly. It follows that there needs to be more unit firing. In these ways, there will be created a revelation and revolution in capability within the Combat Arm of Decision. This new standard and expectation would also obviate the need for a master gunner and place the responsibility where it clearly belongs — on all armor leaders.

COL, USA, Ret. Radcliff, Ky. P. S. I must confess that I have long had a sneaking suspicion that artillery officers have a bit more gray matter than their armor brethren. I say this not only because of their gunnery prowess, but also for their superior powers of persuasion. As an example of the latter, they have somehow convinced the powers-that-be to give them a whopping eight men to operate and maintain a self-propelled howitzer, while the best armor can do is to try and scrape by with a four-man tank crew (which often ends up to be three or less), but that’s a story for another day.

ARMOR — 49

Avenger 6: This is Avenger 6, send it, over. Blue 1: Eagle 13 reports one stationary BMP oriented north on Route Lucy at grid 058612, time 1010 hours…they still have observation and request mortar fire. Avenger 6: Roger…have them drop to Hammer’s net and execute the call for fire, over. Eagle 13: Eagle 13 monitored…dropping to mortar net.” Net planning for AWTs is critical to success. With two FM radios per aircraft, the AMC or team lead should monitor squadron/task force command and troop/company command. His wingman should monitor troop/company command also, and drop to platoon net on his second radio. This ensures redundancy at the troop/company level, and allows AWTs to operate across the full spectrum. Eavesdropping allows AWTs to assist in situational awareness between troop/company commanders, the squadron/task force commander, and sometimes, between platoon leaders. The remaining UHF and VHF frequencies are used to talk team and troop/company internal. Conclusion: Like all mission essential task list related tasks, air-ground integration must be constantly assessed and embedded into every training opportunity. Training opportunities are plentiful in cavalry squadrons and regiments, and should include joint terrain board exercises, the “ride and fly program” (where tankers and scouts are given orientation flights and aviators load or gun on an M1 or M3) and, most importantly, troop- and squadron-level officer professional development program (OPD). These OPDs should begin the process and focus on building a common understanding of both air and ground missions, capabilities, limitations, and “how you fight.” In battalion-size task forces, the ability to train air-ground integration is more challenging. However CTC rotations, gunnery densities, or any maneuver opportunity is also an air-ground training opportunity. Seize every possible occasion to train and build your combined arms team. A simple convoy could easily become an integrated air-ground training event with minimal effort or planning. While no single training event alone builds these lethal and cohesive teams, the combination of events yields a powerful combined arms relationship that capitalizes on mutual understanding and clear mission execution. The end result of effective air-ground integration provides leaders at all levels unparalleled flexibility and the ability to rapidly develop any situation in all environments.

CPT Thomas Feltey graduated in 1993 from Rutgers University as an ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate. He served as a tank platoon leader and battalion scout platoon leader, 1-66 AR, 2AD/4ID; as a scout platoon leader, 1st Bde, 4ID, BRT; and as A Troop and HHT commander, 1-4 Cav. Currently, he is assigned to O Troop, 16th Cav as a small group instructor. MAJ Brian Serota graduated from Iowa State University and was commissioned as a Distinguished Military Graduate into the Aviation Branch in 1991. He graduated Flight School from the Scout Track and the OH-58D(I) AQC. His assignments include 2-2 AVN Bde as the TARP platoon leader; 4/2d ACR as an aeroscout platoon leader; D/1-4 Cav as troop commander; and as a SGL for the Aviation Captain’s Career Course. Currently, he serves as the SGS for the U. S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. CPT Erick (Zeke) Sweet graduated in 1994 from Boston University as a Distinguished Military Graduate. Following Aviation OBC, Flight School Scout Track and the OH-58D(I) Kiowa Warrior AQC, he was assigned to 4-7 Cav in Korea. Following the Aviation Officer Advance Course and CAS3, he served as the squadron S1 and F Troop (AVUM) commander with 1-4 Cav, 1ID, Germany. Currently, he is the commander, E Troop, 1-4 Cav. 50 ARMOR —

Air-Ground Integration Continued from Page 25

4COL John M. House, “The Enemy After Next,” Military Review, March-April 1998, p. 22- 27. 5Fred P. Stein, “Army Digitization Operational Impacts,” www.dodccrp.org/1999CCRTS/ pdf_files/track_6/025stein.pdf 616th Cavalry Regiment Training SOP, dated 21 November 2001. 7BG Huba Wass de Czege and MAJ Jacob Biever, “Optimizing Future Battle Command Technologies,” Military Review, March-April 1998, p. 17. 8A detailed description of the Gauntlet Training Exercise is outlined in the 16th Cavalry Regiment Training SOP, dated 21 November 2001, p. 4-5. 92LT Humayun S. Khan, “Enter the Gauntlet,” ARMOR, March-April 2001, p. 38; available online at www.knox.army.mil/armormag under the “Back Issues” link. 10For a good description of FBCB2 capabilities, see Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and the Information Dominance of the Battlefield. This paper was written by CPT Lopez during Phase II of the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course, and can be found under “Professional Development Articles” at www quartermaster.army.mil/ltd/index.html. 11An outline of the CABCC course can be found on the Fort Knox website by going to the “search” function and typing in “CABCC” and downloading the CABCC PowerPoint presentation.

CPT Jason C. Slider is a 1992 graduate of the Officer’s Candidate School, Fort Benning, Ga. He served as a scout platoon leader, assistant squadron operations officer, and HHT XO in the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment; as a troop commander in the 1st ATB; and as the project officer for Mounted Warrior Soldier Systems, as a combat developments staff officer in the Directorate of Force Developments, Fort Knox. Currently, he is the commander of HHT, 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, and the senior instructor for the 16th Cavalry Regiment’s digital training and initiatives.

CPT William H. Goin IV is a 1998 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy. He served as a tank platoon leader, battalion support platoon leader, and battalion S4 with 2-8 Cavalry, Fort Hood, Texas. He is currently waiting to attend the Armor Captains Career Course at Fort Knox, Ky. Gauntlet from Page 18