Division Capstone Exercise Verifies the Effectiveness of Army’s Tactical Internet

from exercise reports. – Ed.) The Army’s search for enhanced combat capabilities through the application of advanced technologies — a process known as digitization — reached another milestone this spring at the National Training Center, where the first fully digitized brigades demonstrated that they were fully capable of accomplishing their wartime missions. The Division Capstone Exercise (Phase

1) (DCX I), conducted against Fort Irwin’s world class OPFOR, demonstrated the capabilities of the 2d Brigade Combat Team and 4th Aviation Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The exercise confirmed that these “Ironhorse” Division units, equipped with the M1A2 SEP tank, the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopter, can contribute decisively to the III Corps’ land campaign counteroffensive capability, and that these Legacy Force systems, especially as updated with the latest technology, remain dominant battlefield killers. Over the past ten years, the Army has searched for advanced technologies that would empower its formations to dominate information as an element of combat power. The search for these advanced technologies and concepts came to be known as “digitization,” and began in earnest in 1994 with the first advanced warfighting exercise, Desert Hammer, at the National Training Center. Soon after that, III Corps’ 4th Infantry Division (M) was designated as the Army’s experimental division for the application of advanced warfighting concepts. Subsequent combat training, materiel developments, and further field experimentation have led to the incorporation of a range of organizational, doctrinal, combat platform, and information systems improvements to the division’s formations. The outcomes of brigade and division Advanced Warfighting Experiments in 1997 demonstrated that the Army was on the verge of achieving powerful enhancements to waging combat. As such, the goal was set to bring the 4th ID’s combat brigades to ago-to-war status employing advanced capabilities. The Division Capstone Exercise, Phase I, was the expression of this goal. In October, a second phase of the DCX at Fort Hood, Texas, will continue the assessment. During Phase I of the Division Capstone Exercise at the NTC, leaders expressed tremendous confidence in their organizations and equipment, which greatly improved a range of capabilities: “When fighting at night, these systems are unmatched. My Bradleys made direct fire kills routinely at 3700 meters - All Photos by Robert L. Stevenson 44 ARMOR — and beyond. Additionally, the FBCB2 increased our situational awareness dramatically. We were able to conduct bold maneuvers at night that we would normally only do during daylight,” said CPT Dane Acord, commander of B Co, 2-8 IN. Phase I of the DCX focused on combat brigade operations in an expanded tactical battlespace, the ability to exploit information, achieve dominant maneuver, execute fire and maneuver, conduct tactical assault and sustain combat power. Phase II will focus on a division combat operation as part of a III Corps fight in a robust Battle Command Training Program scenario, exercising the full range of division command and control capabilities at brigade and divisional level. “The new systems give soldiers greater levels of understanding of where friendly forces are located, where soldiers are located themselves, and where the enemy is located,” said SGT Robert Munsey, B/1-67AR. “With the new systems, we can virtually pick and choose our fighting positions, giving us the freedom to seize every opportunity.” DCX I was more than just a assessment, certification or experiment. It demonstrated the 4th ID’s ground maneuver and aviation brigades’ combat mission capability across a range of attack and defend missions — enabled with battle command, organizational, equipment, doctrinal, and C4ISR enhancements. Tough, demanding, realistic training challenged the competence and character of every soldier and leader and the reliability and contribution of our new technologies. They conducted non-stop operations against a very adaptive enemy employing asymmetric strategies, and validated new Army tactics and strategies for combat operations. SFC Campos, platoon sergeant for 2nd Platoon, A Co, 3-67 AR, provided one example of the demonstrated lethality of the 4th ID during the DCX. On 4 April, as the OPFOR attacked, SFC Campos destroyed 15 enemy armored vehicles. With the powerful sights of the M1A2 SEP, he identified targets up to 8 kilometers away and destroyed them as they entered his engagement area. This ability to acquire, identify, and destroy targets was the result of several factors. First, SFC Campos had the most lethal equipment currently available. Second, empowered by advanced technology, he had excellent situational awareness that maximized the potential of his direct fire weapon system. Third, SFC Campos had a trained crew. His gunner has been with him for two years. They knew their tank and they knew each other. The warfighting activities during DCX I were executed in force-on-force and live-fire scenarios designed to replicate likely deployment and contingency operations in a major theater of war. Extraordinary effort was expended to develop a contemporary operational environment that would challenge 4th ID units with a world class opposing force that operated continuously across the spectrum of conflict. The opposing force was designed to execute adaptive and asymmetric strategies, and employ the full range of unpredictable and lethal tactics expected on today’sand future battlefields. The range of modernized and recapi-talized combat systems, such as the M1A2 SEP Tank, AH-64D Longbow Apache and the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, have significantly increased the lethality of the 4th Infantry Division. The 2nd Generation Forward Looking Infra-red Radar (FLIR), Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV), and enhanced mechanical reliability improved warfighting capability. An upgraded and modernized information network, linking these combat platforms, empowered commanders to execute precision maneuver and fires. “The DCX provided us with continuous operations in a tactical environment that challenged our systems — our communications systems, our digital systems, and our warfighting systems — against a very, very competent OPFOR,” said MG Ben Griffin, commander of the 4th ID. DCX I demonstrated that the soldier remains the centerpiece of the Army and represents the core of the nation's ability to fight and win wars — decisively. DCX I provided an opportunity to enhance combat leader development in a contemporary threat environment. Tough, field-wise soldiers and leaders in well-trained teams achieved a level of situational awareness during DCX I that empowered them to accomplish their combat tasks under extremely demanding, continuous, and lethal conditions. They were able to exploit the nature of their environment, apply their competencies in field craft and technology, and relentlessly pursue their tactical missions to fight and win engagements and battles. Enhanced and enabled by the latest ground combat and information systems, the soldiers of the “Ironhorse” Division proved their mettle against a wily and cunning foe and came out better trained and prepared to win on the battlefield. “… It is clear at this point that these units are superior warfighting outfits whose great soldiers are able to superbly leverage information technology to significantly enhance the combat

Bradley crewman enters enemy location data on the FBCB2 touch screen. ARMOR — 45 effectiveness of the Army,” said MG B. B. Bell, Chief of Armor, who served as Exercise Director. The Army’s investment in developing the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), along with doctrinal, organizational, and materiel system upgrades, powerfully enhanced the 4th ID (M)’s ability to fight. The observed units were judged to have achieved their training goals and possess a formidable go-to-war capability. Maneuver units are more lethal than before. They possess and routinely employ an all-weather night and day combat capability. They are survivable, and can effectively dominate the enemy in an expanded, dispersed battlespace. During DCX I, the training units, enhanced with ABCS, operated with greater initiative, at faster tempo, and adapted more quickly to changing battlefield situations. The 1-67 AR Scout Platoon demonstrated the significance of having a Common Operating Picture (COP) that accurately portrayed both friendly and enemy locations. The scout platoon, having completed the security zone fight, experienced one of their most challenging operations. Using advanced technology to pinpoint their locations, the platoon moved back on a moonless night, in the midst of a blowing sandstorm, and passed safely through designated lanes in the mine/obstacle belt without delay or casualty. Equally important, the battalion had an accurate picture of the scout locations and accurately tracked their rearward movement. The new, networked Army Battle Command System (ABCS) empowered soldiers to be responsive and dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. The sharing of knowledge between the primary killers on the battlefield — the M1A2 SEP Tank, the M2A3 Bradley, and the AH-64 Apache Longbow — enabled the division to apply overwhelming combat power at the decisive point in order to defeat the enemy. The unparalleled navigation capabilities and situational awareness provided by this electronic network gave 4th ID the ability to know where its forces were, as well as the location of the enemy, even during periods of darkness, sandstorms, and in difficult terrain. Armed with this accurate information, 4th ID demonstrated unprecedented synchronization, speed, and agility under all battlefield conditions. The advantages also extended to the area of air-ground integration. The integration of Air Force A-10s and F-16s into the 4th ID’s tactical internet provided friendly locations on the pilots’ Head-Up Displays (HUDs) and proved decisive in the close air support role. An Air Force JSTARS provided Moving Target Indicators digitally to the cockpit of Apache Longbows, significantly enhancing the 4th ID’s ability to apply decisive and overwhelming force on the battlefield. The exercise surfaced some solid conclusions:

• DCX I units have achieved ago-to-war capability.

• III Corps is postured today to deliver the legacy counteroffensive force, with full-spectrum relevance, against a contemporary operational threat for the next 15-20 years.

• Recapitalized and modernized legacy systems are more lethal than ever and demonstrate significant overmatch against potential enemies.

• The force significantly increased its pace and tempo in continuous, day/night operations.

• Effective information technology (ABCS) systems provided the same picture of the battlefield to all friendly forces.

• Continued improvements in advanced technology will build an even more significant overmatch capability for the future.

• Information superiority significantly improved the logistician’s ability to provide proper resources at the critical place and time on the battlefield.

• Well-trained and well-led soldiers, equipped with appropriate technology, remain central to effective combat operations.

• Improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (e.g., tank 50-power FLIR, TUAV, JSTARS, etc.) dominated acquisition at extended ranges.

• Artillery, while performing satisfactorily, requires improved range, rates of fire, mobility, and survivability. Future systems require simplified sensor-to-shooter links and quicker response times for accurate fires. DCX I confirmed the course for the transformation of III Corps into the nation’s land campaign counteroffensive formation. While the Army pursues solutions to Objective Force requirements, III Corps’ counteroffensive capability will form the nucleus of the nation’s ability to fight and decisively conclude land campaigns over the next 15 to 20 years. DCX I thrust the mechanized and aviation brigade combat teams of the 4th Infantry Division (M) into a complex threat and terrain environment typical of what we expect on today’s battlefields and those in the future. The brigades executed their warfighting doctrine, learned to synchronize the elements of combat power, and employed their full range of combined arms. Importantly, DCX I demonstrated the brigades’ ability to effectively employ information as an exponential element of combat power. These units are fully capable of fighting and winning decisively. “The process of digital transformation isn’t just about new equipment. It is a process that involves developing leaders who can see opportunities in time and space provided by information superiority, and be versatile and adaptive enough to take full advantage of those opportunities,” said LTC Damon Penn, commander of 1-67 Armor. 46 ARMOR — tanks, five-tank companies assigned to four-company regiments (21 tanks). The authors misstate the doctrinal mission of the tank platoon, which is NOT to act as a single element (i.e., fire or maneuver). Per FM 17-15, Chapter 1, Section 1: “The tank platoon is the smallest maneuver element within a tank company. Organized to fight as a unified element, the platoon consists of four main battle tanks organized into two sections, with two tanks in each section.” Though, admittedly, poorly worded, further reading clearly emphasizes operating by sections in order to fire and maneuver. A three-tank platoon lacks this flexibility. The authors’ contention that the wider frontages of digitized operations overtax the platoon leader’s ability completely misses the point of digitized command and control, and simplifying platoon collective training by eliminating tasks (and capabilities) is just bad training. Having fewer tanks per platoon does not solve logistical problems unless you reduce the total numbers of tanks overall (massing tanks by consolidating them into a single brigade, as suggested in the article, defeats the purpose). The suggested improvement in manpower is illusory, since shortages are a percentage of authorized strength, and a three-tank platoon can be at 75 percent strength just as readily as a four-tank platoon. Historically, the three-tank platoon was an inefficient response to a desperate situation when all else failed. Rather than anew approach, it is a last resort. Let’s not go there. Let’strain to standard, instead.

LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.)

Three-Tank Platoon Poses Problems of Terrain, Training

Dear Sir: After reading Major Stringer’sand Major Hall’s article, I have to disagree with some of their arguments for reducing the size of the tank platoon. First of all, the truth in the argument is that money is the bottom line. If it were not for budget constraints, we would not be discussing this topic at all. The primary arguments in support of this change are that a second lieutenant can focus better on three tanks rather than four. [Other points are that] reduction of the number of tanks in the company will solve personnel shortages, and that the M1A2 is capable of operating over wider frontages because of its advanced technology. First, the authors are forgetting corps, division, brigade, and battalion red cycles. With the J-Series MTOE, the platoon could possibly salvage 50 percent of the crew during battalion and brigade red cycles, but forget trying to train during corps and division red with 16 soldiers, let alone 12. I led two platoons, one in Korea and one at Fort Riley, both with four tanks, and with the ebb and flow of personnel shortages. I had no problem managing or focusing on the 8 to 15 soldiers and four tanks that I had, depending on what time of year it was and what training cycle we were in. So, I don’t understand the claim that we need to make a platoon leader’s job easier by giving them one less tank and four fewer soldiers to lead. I would submit that by taking away those four soldiers the platoon leader’s life just got worse. In addition to that, I’ve commanded an M1A2 company at Fort Hood where that installation wrote the book on red cycles and the Good Idea tasking. The M1A2 technology is perishable. Unless the digital system is trained at least weekly and integrated into every single crew, platoon, and company training period, we may as well fight the M1A1. Second, operating with four fewer soldiers with the same OPTEMPO will not improve our lethality, but will exacerbate the problem with maintaining competent, lethal tank crews. I don’t think the authors can guarantee that my prime time training will increase just because we have reduced the tank battalion by another 9 to 12 tanks. My last counter-argument is with the claim of operation over wider frontages. Okay, yes at NTC, Kuwait, and Iraq, no argument. But what about CMTC, Korea, and the Balkans? I’ve OC’d six heavy rotations at CMTC. Fighting a platoon across a frontage that stretches from the 15 Tango Bowl down to the Hohenburg DZ does the platoon no good if the one T-80 in the CSOP is facing one-on-one with “A11.” In restrictive terrain, you aren’t going to get three-and-a-half-kilometer shots with the FLIR. If the platoon leader is unable to mass his THREE tanks rapidly on that T-80 IAW FM 17-15, I don’t see how a three-tank platoon is more lethal. At least with the four-tank platoon, the platoon leader has a wingman that provides the ability to fire and maneuver. According to FM 17-15, page 1-2, the wingman concept is a doctrinal technique. FM 17-15 states: “Under battlefield conditions, the wingman concept facilitates control of the platoon when it operates in sections.” Again, with the loss of a wingman, taking advantage of the technology by operating on extended frontages in restrictive terrain is nullified with the three-tank platoon. Although the IVIS will let me know exactly where my platoon is dispersed in restrictive terrain, it won’t be able to magic move my vehicles to mass fires on the enemy if the enemy is protected by a ridgeline. The CITV, I think, is the best improvement that the M1A2 has to offer (I have no experience on the SEP); however, the CITV offensive engagement (B1) on TT VIII is conducted on a smooth course road and is not performed on the “washboard” at the NTC. Therefore, the CITV pays the most dividends in a defensive or counter-recon scenario. Again, there is no advantage offensively that I can see going to a three-tank platoon. Finally, we’ve already begun to eliminate 14 tanks, 14 Bradleys and 2 M1064 mortar carriers from every heavy battalion and the challenges to the task force commanders and their staffs trying to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures is already producing wild new concepts. The four-tank platoon works, the wingman concept works, and if a platoon leader can’t handle four tanks, how will he handle 14 as a captain?

An Infantryman Speaks Out On the Challenges of His Branch

Dear Sir: My reply concerns one of the letters to the editor in the May-June 2001 ARMOR magazine, “No Badges Needed for Esprit: Armor-Cav Is Elite Enough,” a letter from CPT Robert Ricks, I offer the following response. While I certainly agree in principle to some of CPT Ricks’ letter to the editor concerning the [proposed] Expert Armor Badge/Combat Armor Badge (EAB/CAB), I take issue with several portions of his thought process. First, his statement that, “There is no glamour or élan inherent in the world’s oldest branch of arms.” Maybe in his opinion. However, I did not become an infantryman for the “glamour or élan.” I joined it for the tough, realistic, soldier-oriented roles and challenges it offered me as a leader, and the opportunity to tackle one of the toughest, most undesired and unglamorous, yet critical, roles on the battlefield — that of the combat infantryman. We do what others could not accomplish, or would not dare to attempt. CPT Ricks’ premise that Cav has the “toughest mission” in the Army is from his perspective. I know a lot of infantrymen who would beg to differ. Our roles are complementary. Each has its “tough” portions. Second, don’t equate the cost of equipping, maintaining, and/or sustaining with the quality of a soldier or unit. While historically this may have been the case, just because you “cost” more does not make you “better” or create or indicate “élan.” A discussion on élan with some 75th Rangers or some old infantrymen from the Big Red One, who fought in every war in the last century, might broaden his horizons and understanding of “élan.” Again, we each have our role. Infantry forces are better suited on some terrain, against some enemies, and provide certain capabilities. Likewise, mounted forces. The point is combined arms and a “team” effort, not about “who’s better or cooler.” (Incidentally, élan has two definitions: 1) enthusiastic liveliness and vigor: ZEST; 2) flair:style. Which part of élan is he equating the Cav with? Some would argue the latter, which does not necessarily equate to combat capabilities.) ARMOR — 47

LETTERS from Page 4

Third, his reference to “badge-happy” infantrymen. Most honest to goodness infantrymen I know could give arat’s butt about badges. It’s about competence AND demonstrated skills. All a badge shows (for the most part) is a demonstrated skill. I’ve known several infantrymen with every badge the Army can bestow who were not worth the price of their AAFES uniform. Additionally, to imply that badges artificially “create élan” is a tremendous leap, and one that demonstrates a lack of understanding of the Infantry ethos. I applaud his understanding of the Infantry’s “thankless and dirty chore,” but it’s a “chore” that in a lot of cases makes the difference between being decisive or just providing firepower and an ability to maneuver quickly. Some of us may not have chosen to be Infantry, and likely so in his branch. But most choose to be an infantryman, tanker, or cavalryman, and thankfully so. We all play for the same team. Be careful the slings and arrows you throw around.

Remembering the Black Beret: Time, Honor, and Distinction

Dear Sir: In late May of 1978, I was allowed to join the ranks of a young volunteer Army. I remember how excited, but scared I was as I rode the bus to the reception station at Fort Knox, Kentucky. I remember, as I got off the bus, seeing the old two-story wooden barracks, the sounds of drill sergeants sounding off commands, and two distinctive items of headgear, the drill sergeants’ hats and the armor headgear, a black beret with the silver ornamentation of the WWI tank. I remember my dreams of seeing myself as a member of one of the elite units of the U. S. Army, the United States Armored Corps. Yes, we were once thought of as elite also. I wanted so much to earn the honor of being able to wear my black beret with my khaki uniform... In September of that year, I graduated OSUT and was allowed to purchase and wear the black beret, as did my armored brethren. Yes, I had to purchase it then, but I was no less proud of it than the Rangers are of theirs. My beret symbolized and acknowledged that I was part of one of the most elite military corps in all the world’s armies, a tanker. Today, in almost all the armor units in the world, you will find them in black berets, as we too once had. I was so proud of that beret and all I had accomplished to earn the right to wear it. No, I did not have to go to an extra course to get it, nor did I have to train to a different standard, but I did have to meet and exceed the standard set before me. The following year, the U. S. Army decided that we must give up our berets and that only the Rangers could have this coveted headgear. We were now separated from our armored brothers in the other armored corps around the world. Now this may not mean a lot to young armor soldiers today, but very few of today’s soldiers were in the Army when tankers were allowed to wear this special headgear. [Instead of berets,] we were ordered to wear the old baseball caps. We did not agree, nor like being told we could no longer wear our berets, but because of the true professionalism of armored soldiers, we quietly folded our berets, never to be worn again. We did as all good soldiers do: we followed the orders of our superiors without dispute. I’m not saying that we agreed — at least, I did not — but as a soldier, I obeyed. Now, 22 years later, on the day that I will leave the service, June 14th, this old first sergeant can once again remove my old black beret and wear it one more time with honor and distinction. I can leave as I had come. With this, I thank the Chief of Staff for his decision. I would like to commend and salute the professionalism of all the Rangers who are quietly following and obeying the orders of the Chief of Staff. Even though you have aright to be disappointed, your professionalism and dedication to perfection makes you the ELITE soldiers that you are. You will wear the tan beret with honor, as you did the black beret, because you are true professionals. As a first sergeant and a soldier for 23 years, I salute you and thank you, the Rangers, for your devotion and commitment to excellence. To all the others making statements openly disrespecting other soldiers, statements such as, “They just barely meet the standard or just meet the minimum standard,” I say you truly dishonor your corps. You are displaying your lack of true professionalism by your whining, complaining, and unprofessional attitude. I further would like to say that if you honestly believe that the black beret is what makes you special, then you have missed the mark about what makes Rangers special. A true professional will understand what I am saying. To the Rangers who are crying and disrespecting fellow soldiers with your statements about how much more above the standard they are, I give you this challenge: Come to my range here at Fort Hood, climb down inside one of my M1A2 (SEP) tanks with minimal training and shoot 1000 points out of

1000. Yes, we all understand that you are good at what you are trained to do, but we are good at what we are trained to do also. Yes, I understand that you may think you are better than the rest of us lowly MOSs and you may not have a need for us, but you may someday find you will need the pilots and crew chiefs of the helicopters you use, or the medics and doctors that treat your wounds, or the artillery that gives you fire support, or the signal corps that give you your much needed communications that allow you to call for evacuation or fire support, and yes, even the armored forces that will move in to assist you when your backs are to the wall. Yes, you had better hope that we, the other soldiers, meet and exceed the standards, just as you do. I have been hearing how the black beret is the uniform item that shows your distinction above others, but you’re wrong. You have a distinctive item, which I do not. You wear it on all your uniforms. It’s called a tab, a Ranger tab. All Special Forces type units have a distinctive tab which designate them as being special and elite. In closing, I would like to say thank you for allowing me to wear my black beret one last time and that all soldiers are elite in their own right. I say to all soldiers, wear the black beret with pride and distinction, for it has along, time-honored history and many great soldiers have worn it.

Company A, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor Fort Hood, Texas

An Observation from Kuwait: All Soldiers Are the Same

Dear Sir: “All soldiers are not the same.” For years I have be told this, and up to now, I believed it. I work as the Master Gunner/Brigade Advisor for the Kuwait Land Forces 35th Armored Brigade, “The Martyrs,” which includes the 7th Armor Battalion (K-SA M1A2). The 7th had recently completed crew-level qualification gunnery and I was fortunate to have been invited to attend their post-gunnery award ceremony. When I arrived, the troops were just starting to form up. As they moved into formation, the statement that “all soldiers are not the same,” came in to my mind, so I took the opportunity to observe them in order to see what made them so different from American soldiers. As I watched, I noticed the Kuwaiti privates laughing and joking with each other, the Kuwaiti sergeants alternately barking orders at the privates and talking amongst themselves about the tank tables they had just finished firing. The officers walking around were loudly boasting about their own shooting prowess, and who had the best platoon. The longer I watched, the more they sounded exactly like American soldiers. Soon, I began to see the faces of my old company members in the formation. I flashed back to my last unit, A Company, 3-69 Armor, and could see all of my old soldiers doing the very same things before our own post-gunnery award ceremonies. As the ceremony started and the awards were handed out, the reactions of the Kuwaiti soldiers convinced me more and more that this could easily be an American ceremony. The shouts and applause from the formation, the reactions of the individual soldiers when they received an award, and

ARMOR — the emotions of the 1st Company soldiers when they captured the high tank award were the same emotions that my company had displayed when we took the high tank trophy. I watched as the 2d Company commander accepted the high tank company trophy from the battalion commander and then walked over to his company and presented it to the youngest private. The company as amass then lifted the private on their shoulders and carried him around the formation as if he were the winning quarterback at the Super Bowl. I was completely taken aback: the actions of the Kuwait soldiers were definitely not what I had been told to expect. I was most certainly stunned to see the same reactions that I know so well displayed by a foreign army several thousands of miles away from the army that I call my home. So the next time that someone tells you “all soldiers are not the same,” particularly when referring to another country’s army, that person is only seeing the equipment, and not the people.

Has the Tank Finally Reached The End of a Historical Cycle?

Dear Sir: ARMOR is one of the best military journals I receive. Your thoughtful articles and excellent graphics are a winning combination. I am particularly enjoying the intelligent debate between proponents of heavy armor vs. light. The contest may be moot, however, in that the day of the tank in any form may soon be over. We’re all aware that a weapon system grows in size and strength (and expense) until it is outmoded by something small, light, cheap, and entirely new. One example: fortifications start out as a wooden palisade on a hilltop and progress to a massive stone castle taking millions of dollars and twenty years to build. Eventually, the castle is rendered useless by the new, small, and relatively inexpensive cannon. Another: warships grow from Henry VIII’s Mary Rose to fleets of huge steel battleships, the construction of which nearly bankrupt many nations in the 20th century. The battleship is then made obsolete by aircraft. Does the 70-ton, multi-million dollar Abrams represent the apogee of the historic cycle for tanks? If so, what novelty will bring on its obsolescence? I don’t know — I’man historian, not an inventor — but perhaps the new weapon will be a handheld laser projector carried in every infantryman’s haversack, or something similar. Whatever it may be, now would appear to be the time for the armor branch to start thinking small — thinking outside the tank, so to speak. The business schools like to teach that the railroads went out of business because their management thought they were in the railroad business when actually they were in the transportation business. Likewise, the armor branch is in the tank-busting business, not the tank business.

ex-Captain, USAR

Changes in Washington Unlikely to Bring Relief

Dear Sir: The latest news of DOD cuts (Washington Post) indicates that the Bush Administration plans to take a big swipe at the Army’s force structure. ARMOR readers with good memories may remember how many articles have been published (for years!) in ARMOR saying that the Army needed to ‘lighten up’ or be made irrelevant to future warfare. The heavy force’s heavy hitters were triumphant in keeping the heavy tanks, and in killing the M8 Armored Gun System, among other victories (Yes, I know there’s more than one set of fingerprints on that knife.) Several authors said that the Armor force was getting smaller and would put itself out of business. There is another old saying: “Be careful of what you wish for — you may get it.” Most of the military wished to see a Republican Administration, and the heavy force guys wished to be rid of the M8. The victory party can soon be held in a telephone booth — that’s all the space needed.

Lynden, Wash.

Historian Seeks Veterans’ Accounts of Operation COBRA

Dear Sir: I am looking for eyewitnesses of all ranks (but the lower the better) who were in the various stages of Operation COBRA, including the weeks before U. S. troops were trying to drive through the Bocage to reach a good start line for COBRA.

Church End Lane Runwell, Wickford Essex, SS11 7DP England Email: KTout45678@aol.com

Dear Sir: I am currently writing a book on the Siegfried Line, which is due to be published in March 2002... I would like to contact anybody who was involved in the fighting for the Siegfried Line.

Helston Road Nailsea, Bristol, BS48 2UA England Email: neil.short@talk21.com

Dear Sir: The May-Jun 2001 article, “Forging the Red Thunderbolt,” about Russian armored trains, was an interesting introduction. If anyone is interested in the subject, I suggest three books published by Schiffer Books: Armored Trains of the Soviet Union 1917- 1945 by Wilfried Kopenhagen,

0887409172 German Armored Trains of World War II Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 by Wolfgang Sawodny, ISBN: 0887401988 and 0887402887, respectively.

LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.)

A Reader Wonders: Where Did All the Horses Go?

Dear Sir: I came across some figures indicating that the U. S. Army had more than 12 million horses and 4½ million mules at the beginning of World War II (U. S. Army Handbook 1939-1945 by George Forty, Barnes & Noble Books, 1998). And I have read elsewhere that the Army had its own stud farms and that many Army horses were used by the Coast Guard for coastal security patrols during World War II. Apart from the 26th Philippine Scouts’ use of horses in combat, some provisional local horse recon units, and pack animals, the Army didn’t use horses in combat. My question is: What happened to all the horses, stud farms, and saddles/bridles/harnesses? I’ve been a member of the Armor Association since 1970, but don’t recall any articles on the subject. Might make an interesting historical article.

GORDON J. DOUGLAS JR.

Fullerton, Calif.

1/77th Armor to Hold Reunion

The 1/77th Armor is having their second annual reunion in Louisville, Ky., July 11-15. For more details, contact Bruce Goldsmith at bjgold2@juno.com or phone (636) 282-3302.

ARMOR — 49

The Demise of the Tank: Another Analysis

The Tank Debate by John Stone, Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 2000, 201 pages, $50.00. John Stone, a British academician, has produced a thoughtful and balanced book on the future of the tank. Keeping in mind that prognosticating the future of armored warfare has been something of a cottage industry among British military intellectuals since 1919, this particular volume should have a longer shelf life than most, because Mr. Stone has grounded his analysis firmly on the history of the tank and the endless debate about its battlefield utility. Mr. Stone’s conclusion is that the modern battle tank — as represented by the Abrams and the Challenger — has reached an evolutionary dead-end. Not because of technology, mind you, or any future antitank ‘silver bullet’ that may come along, but because they are unfit for the new environment of information-based maneuver warfare. The heavy tank, in short, is akin to the dinosaur: invulnerable, but unable to survive when the swamps dried up and the weather turned cold. The author is almost apologetic for reaching this conclusion, as he spends much of the book in explaining why past prophets of doom were proved wrong, but his logic is compelling and refreshingly original. He begins by tracing the development of Anglo-American military thought (the weakest part of the book — as if there were such a thing in the first place), but moves quickly to following the inter-relationships between battlefield performance, doctrine, and tank development as they develop across the years. He illustrates that the three have rarely been synchronized, providing ready ammunition for shortsighted critics, but western militaries have generally done an excellent job of bringing the three back into balance when one component has lagged behind the others. This has maintained the utility of the tank through Desert Storm. He parallels this theme by following the technical race between armor and bullet (whether kinetic or chemical), showing that every advance in killing power was quickly matched by improvements in protection. He also points out that the tank has been made considerably more efficient over the years. In constant dollars, the Abrams is only twice as expensive as the Sherman, while its killing power and survivability have expanded exponentially. It is, however, twice as heavy and far more constrained by terrain trafficability. In his concluding chapters, Mr. Stone brings together these historical and technical threads. He dismisses the argument that modern battle tanks are too expensive or vulnerable to new weapons. Top attack and precision guided munitions are troublesome, but he is confident that countermeasures can and will be found to reduce their effectiveness. However, Abrams and Challenger are products of development processes aimed at producing centerpieces for attrition warfare on the North German Plain. Changes in doctrine, beginning with AirLand Battle and continuing through present day theories of information warfare, have renewed emphasis on operational mobility. Both tanks are too heavy and require far too long a logistical tail to fulfill a meaningful role in maneuver-based warfare. Unfortunately, it is not possible to simply lighten them in any meaningful way without destroying their effectiveness. Thus, the balance between development, performance, and doctrine is irrevocably overthrown. In other words, tanks remain kings of the battlefield — they just can’t get to the next one in time. While Mr. Stone foresees an eventual ‘tank-like platform’ entering service, he concludes that the conventionally configured tank has outlived its usefulness. Agree or disagree with Mr. Stone (and I have my doubts; maneuver warfare is a fine concept, but evenly matched opponents invariably end up in a slugging match), he has written a fine book which both sides can draw upon for material to fuel the never-ending tank debate.

LTC, Armor Fort Knox, Ky.

Following the Tanks — Cambrai 20th November-7th December 1917 by Jean-Luc Gibot and Phillippe Gorczynski. English translation by Wendy McAdam. Privately published by Philippe Gorczynski, Béatus Hotel, 59400 Cambrai, France, 1999, large format hardback, 192 pages, fully illustrated, including loose map. ISBN 2-9511696-1-2, UK price £29.95. The book is also available through Naval and Military Press, www.naval-military-press.co.uk for $53.00. The Battle of Cambrai gave tanks their first chance to operate on solid ground in the forefront of an attack. While the battle has been the subject of several books, these tend to cover the broader picture of the battle with the role of tanks included as part of the whole. The approach here is very different, as the actions of each tank are traced from original reports and accounts of those who manned them. Weaving all sources together allows this important battle to be described from the all-important point of view of the tanks. There is more than ample detail on the other arms involved, including numbers and type of guns used, support, Royal Flying Corps squadrons overhead, and detailed orders of battle of all the divisions involved, but the tanks’ part has pride of place. The text follows, as far as remaining sources allow, the actions of each individual tank during those fateful days. The location of each is recorded using a facsimile of the original operations map, suitable sections of which appear alongside the account of each section of the battle. As a bonus, these are combined as a loose map as well. Each tank is listed, noting its identification number, nickname, and commander’s name. The accounts are illustrated using original photos, while contemporary color images show the ground as it appears now. This combination of accounts, photos, and maps, together with a brief suggested itinerary, make a tour of the battlefield an easy matter. Just as important are appendices which list awards made to those who took part, tank losses and, more poignantly, the locations of the graves of those who gave their lives. This book, the culmination of many years of research, shows great attention to detail and betrays a love of subject which can only come from true enthusiasm. Not only have both authors searched records and archives, they have actually searched the battlefield to locate the remains of several of the tanks lost. As a result, it was possible to actually recover one of them! D51 DEBORAH came back to the surface in November 1998 and will be the focus of a memorial to the action and those who fought in it. Proceeds from this book will help preserve a truly unique piece of history which is well recorded here in print.

The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession by Matthew Moten. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 2000; 269 pages, $47.95, hardcover, ISBN 0-89096-925-6. With the characteristic academic detail of a doctoral dissertation, Matthew Moten’s new book is a comprehensive study of the early development of the American Army’s military professionalism, with particular emphasis on the contribution of the little-known, but influential Delafield Commission in 1855. This book is a recent addition to the Texas A&M Military History Series. Moten is a lieutenant colonel in the U. S. Army, and is a graduate and former history instructor at West Point. His book is really the combination of two academic requirements. His analysis of the Delafield Commission appears to be his master’s degree thesis, with the additional wrap-around hun-

ARMOR — dred-page study of West Point and antebellum military thought comprising his doctoral dissertation. The combined result is a thorough presentation of the early development of American military thought (1815-1860), which profoundly influenced the military culture and society in the Civil War. Half of this book tells the history of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point and how it contributed to professional military development as primarily a school of military engineering. Moten discusses the early philosophical rivalry between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson over the role of a professional, standing army, as well as the controversial influences of militarism, elitism, and Federalism. Best are Moten’s excellent portrayals of legendary West Point figures like Sylvanus Thayer and Dennis Hart Mahan, men who devoted their lives to the ideals of professional military education. West Point may have been the mecca of military education in the first half of the 19th century, but it also fostered a restrictive culture of branch parochialism and a stifling “system and habit of thought.” While Moten lays out the background of military thought well enough, it is his portrayal of the Delafield Commission that is the real value in this study. By 1855, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, himself a West Point graduate, recognized the need for reform and an infusion of new ideas in the U. S. Army. He ordered a trio of regular army officers, headed by Major Richard Delafield, to travel to the Crimea to observe the European-style war being fought by the British, French, and Turks against the Russians. The commission was also to travel in Europe, visiting England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, to learn of European military organization and innovation. Delafield was to study fortifications and engineering. Major Alfred Mordecai was to study artillery and ordnance, and Captain George B. McClellan (yes, that’s the one, of Civil War infamy), was to study cavalry. These three men did not get along all that well, but they were professionals and dedicated to the heavy responsibility of this diplomatic and military mission. The commission’s year-long, 20,000-mile journey was only a partial success, due to their own dithering, political delays, and travel problems. Moten’s presentation, however, is both entertaining and instructive, as he describes the commission’s observations, misconceptions, complaints, praises, and conclusions. Interestingly enough, he analyzes their reports both for what they did write and for what they did not include. The Delafield Commission achieved most of what Secretary Davis intended, but because of West Point’s institutional “system and habit of thought,” they missed the most important opportunities. The reports became doctrinal texts, but, as Moten points out, they lavished misguided praise on the Russian army, proscribing it as the new model for the U. S. Army to follow (despite the fact it was soundly defeated by the allies and desperately needed reform itself). They focused on tactics, not strategy, on weapons, not warfare, and on technical detail, not concepts. This is an important work on the history of West Point, the U. S. Army, and the development of the American military profession. The Delafield Commission was a fascinating journey of discovery and misdirected intellectual thought, and it had a profound influence on the United States as it prepared itself for civil war.

USMC, Retired Sebascodegan Island, Maine

Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall by Joseph P. Hobbs, Second Edition, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1999, 272 pages, $16.95. Undoubtedly, the U. S. Army has produced some of the finest generals in the military history of the United States, and possibly the world. Among that distinguished list, two names undoubtedly can be found at the very top — Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Joseph P. Hobbs’ Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall is an intimate portrait of these two military leaders whose combined talents led Allied armies to victory over Nazi Germany beginning in North Africa (1942), in Italy (1943), and finally in the Northwestern European Theater of Operations, starting in 1944 up through the end of that titanic struggle in May of 1945. Hobbs examines both men’s contribution to victory over the Axis forces through their wartime correspondence that began in June 1942 and lasted up through V-E day in Europe on 8 May 1945. Throughout the letters Eisenhower wrote to General Marshall, one can sense not only the frustrations and many headaches associated with command of all American forces in Europe but the respect that he had for the latter’s judgment and guidance in dealing with the multitude of problems in fighting a coalition war, and in dealing with subordinates (i.e., General George S. Patton, Jr.) and our British allies (Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, among others) who oftentimes would’ve rather preferred to fight each other than the Germans. Prior to his description of the wartime correspondence between the two men, the author provides the reader with a brief, though concise, biographical sketch of both Generals Marshall and Eisenhower to illustrate the different career “paths” both men followed prior to their wartime relationship. General Eisenhower, a Kansan who graduated from West Point (1915), and General Marshall, from the Virginia Military Institute (1901), came from entirely different backgrounds, but each possessed strengths that in the years ahead would bring both of them together into what can be described as one of the most remarkable command relationships in the history of the U. S. Armed Forces. While General Marshall came from an infantry background, and Eisenhower was one of the earliest armor proponents, destiny and history propelled both men’s careers inexplicably toward the relationship that developed during World War II. Yet what is even more important is the fact that the World War (1917-18), and all of its technological and operational innovations had greatly affected both Eisenhower’sand Marshall’s careers — particularly that of the former who, in his assignment to the Tank Infantry School at Fort Meade, and later at Camp Colt, Gettysburg, Pa., under Brigadier General Samuel

D. Rockenbach, had the responsibility of training new volunteers to the Tank Corps and had come to the attention of his superiors as an outstanding young officer. It seemed that even at Camp Colt history itself had destined Eisenhower to one day command a large body of soldiers as he rose quickly during the wartime expansion to the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel to lead an estimated 10,000 soldiers by war’send in 1918. General Marshall’s career was just as meteoric, rising to become General John J. Pershing’s Chief of Staff in France during the World War, and the man responsible for the first American offensive at war’send in the Meuse-Argonne. Indeed, the World War served not only to train the generation of officers that won the first major conflict of the United States in the twentieth century but also the same generation that would lead the U. S. Army to victory over both Germany and Japan in 1945. It was not until the mid- 1920s, though, that Eisenhower and Marshall met, when the former had been appointed to the Battlefield Monuments Commission in Washington, D. C. After a series of staff assignments in Washington and in the Philippines, Eisenhower had seemed to reach the pinnacle of his career. Marshall, meanwhile, had gone on to make a name for himself at Fort Benning, where he implemented what became known in time as the Fort Benning or Marshall Method of thinking, whereby Army (and Marine) officers had been trained to “think outside the box” of conventional military operational art. It was while teaching at Fort Benning that Lieutenant Colonel Marshall noted the young officers that he deemed the future leaders of the U. S. Army in any future war. By July 1939, Marshall had become Chief of Staff, and with war clouds gathering in Europe it became his task to begin the slow but steady task of rebuilding the U. S. Army that had slipped from the top ten at the end of the World War to that of seventeenth. In fact, by the eve of the U. S. entrance into World War II in December 1941, General Marshall had become once again acquainted with then-Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower,

ARMOR — 51 who at the time had served as Major General Walter Krueger’s Chief of Staff during the all-important Louisiana Maneuvers of 1940. Marshall’s ever-increasing respect for Eisenhower, coupled with his abilities as a planner (on General MacArthur’s staff), sent Brigadier General Eisenhower to head the Operations Division in the War Department in December 1941, and later onto England where the latter went on to command all U. S. forces in the European Theater of Operations. One of the most important themes stressed throughout Dear General is the close working relationship that developed between Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, one that was built on both loyalty and trust. Throughout the different phases of the war, starting with both the initial build-up of U. S. forces in England (Bolero) in 1942-3, and eventually “Round Up,” which culminated in the Normandy landings on 6 June 1944, General Eisenhower’s letter to Marshall reflected the frustrations and problems in waging war over abroad front, and with subordinates and allies who proved to be even more troublesome at times than the Germans themselves. Of particular interest here is the relationship between Eisenhower, Patton, and Montgomery, and of the problems and difficulties in waging a major war with allies who differed on strategy and even tactics as they both set out to defeat the same adversary. One can see that General Marshall trusted Eisenhower’s judgment on all matters so much that he gave the latter much latitude in dealing with these and other problems as the time drew near for the Normandy landings in June of 1944. Indeed, it was Marshall’s trust in his subordinate that allowed Eisenhower to deal with many of the problems of command, particularly over logistics, shipping, and over command in the different theaters. What makes this book perhaps one of the best volumes on the problems of command during World War II is the fact that it reveals Eisenhower’s oftentimes stormy relationship with the British and the differing approaches to taking the fight to the Germans on the continent. Whereas the Americans preferred the direct approach via a landing in France in 1942 or 1943, the British, under the leadership of Prime Minister Churchill, favored the all too familiar indirect approach along Nazi Germany’s periphery. In the end, it was the former view that ultimately defeated German military power on the continent. Though as Hobbs points out, it was Eisenhower, ever the politician, who was able to persuade, cajole, and sometimes threaten the British, who seemed determined at times to push their own politico-military strategy at the expense of their American allies. Only with General Marshall’s firm support of General Eisenhower were the British, most notably Field Marshal Montgomery, forced to cooperate within an Allied strategy. This was most evident during the German Ardennes offensive (16 December 1944 - January 1945), when Montgomery sought to claim credit for a victory that even Prime Minister Churchill squarely credited to the tenacity and skill of the American soldier. Dear General is an excellent book, though at times one wishes that the author could’ve included a few maps to illustrate the theater of operations under discussion and the plans that Eisenhower had been sent to Europe to implement. Nonetheless, Hobbs’ includes Eisenhower’s many thoughts on armored warfare, which one might add are excellent and thought-provoking, particularly in his comparison of U. S. and German tanks, as well as his thoughts on conducting amphibious training and operations, and in handling personnel — from privates up through general officers (i.e., Patton, Bradley, Hodges, etc.). This is a book that has an appeal to every interest. While it remains a story of two of the greatest soldiers ever to wear U. S. Army khaki, it is a book about waging and fighting war on all levels, with the greater emphasis on how that war was fought on the highest echelons of command, as well as how those decisions affected the individual tanker, rifleman, and logistician. It is a book that offers many lessons on combined and joint warfare through his use of Eisenhower’s letters to Marshall on tactical and operational planning and warfighting, something biographies oftentimes miss or purposely ignore. Soldiers and military historians alike need to read and reread this book, for it demonstrates that the waging of war is more about personalities rather than abstract political ideas.

Gysgt, USMCR Columbus, Ohio

Duty First: West Point and the Making of American Leaders by Ed Ruggero, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, New York, 2001, 342 pages, $27.50. What is the leader development program for cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point? Ed Ruggero, a former infantry officer and a graduate of West Point’s Class of 1980, attempts to explain it in this very readable book. Ruggero’s work is the latest of a vast amount of literature about West Point over the years. This book distances itself from others about West Point because it offers a current look at the Academy’s leadership training as the U. S. Army makes its transition into the next century. West Point’s administration allowed Ruggero unfettered access to cadets and faculty members for an entire year. Ruggero elected to follow the lives of several plebes, and the upperclassmen that train them, from the first day of Cadet Basic Training until the graduation ceremony the following spring. He brings up some contentious issues with respect to the changes in the Academy’s leadership development program and its honor code in the past decade. Without drawing any conclusions, Ruggero presents multiple viewpoints on these issues from both cadets and faculty members alike. Perhaps the most disconcerting thing about this book is the lack of commitment and apathy expressed by many of the cadets Ruggero interviews. Nevertheless, Ruggero also portrays other cadets and most faculty members very favorably with respect to their leadership and commitment to the U. S. Army. In the aggregate, one should still come away impressed with the leadership development experience cadets undergo at West Point after reading Duty First. For the civilian interested in learning more about West Point, this work offers a vivid, non-biased account of the daily lives and attitudes of today’s cadets. I would recommend Duty First to anyone considering attending West Point because of its rich depiction of cadet life. All readers will gain an appreciation of the first summer of military training and the cadets’ numerous activities, as well as an understanding of the leadership development program the cadets experience. This book, however, has only limited value to soldiers desiring to gain greater insight into military leadership. Ruggero has demonstrated that he can point out leadership lessons in his narratives of the cadets’ experiences, but his lessons are not new for most soldiers.

LTC, Armor Fort Knox, Ky.

In Rommel’s Backyard: A Memoir of The Long Range Desert Group by Alastair Timpson with Andrew Gibson-Watt, Leo Cooper, South Yorkshire, England, 2000, 182 pages, $36.95. In June 1940, the Western Desert Force formed the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) in North Africa. For the next three years, the men of the small LRDG kept watch over Axis movements, harassed enemy convoys and supply points, and escorted numerous parties of Special Air Service (SAS) commandos to and from their targets. In Rommel’s Backyard chronicles the exploits of one of those selected members of the LRDG, Alastair Timpson and his small group of desert warriors. In Rommel’s Backyard is a memoir of Timpson’s exploits in the desert. He kept a detailed journal of his operations, and like many members of his generation who fought in World War II, resisted publishing them until well after the war. The editor, Andrew Gibson-Watt, does a creditable job of organizing the book and putting the operations of G Patrol into the context of the entire war in the desert as a whole. Those who have served in the desert environment of Southwest Asia and the desert of the National Training Center will empathize with Timpson and his men as they navigate the sand seas,

ARMOR — rocky slopes, and generally inhospitable North African desert. The Long Range Desert Group was small, with a group headquarters, and five separate patrols of 36 men each, that normally operated in two groups. Each half of a patrol comprised four 1.5-ton Chevrolet or Ford trucks, one jeep and 18 men. Then-Captain Timpson began his duty with “G” or Guards Patrol in September 1941, serving until January 1943 when he returned to his regiment, the Scots Guards. The soldiers of G Patrol are volunteers from the 3d Battalion Coldstream Guards and 2d Battalion Scots Guards. All the men of the patrol get their experience on the job, learning from the veteran members how to navigate by sun compass, drive across sand dunes, and avoid detection by the enemy. Timpson details clearly the training and operations of his patrol. The bulk of the narrative concerns the relentless monotony of the desert, interspersed with incredible moments of sheer terror as German and Italian aircraft strafe and harass their tiny columns; the weeks of “road watch,” lying only 300 meters from the enemy’s main supply routes, observing and carefully recording every Axis vehicle and cargo traveling to and from the front; the occasional attempt to attack the soft rear of the Axis supply lines; and the inevitable, yet unwelcome, reality of the death of members of the patrol. In Timpson’s private arena of war there are many moments of incredible bravery, daring escapes, and astonishing luck. One such incident is of particular note, as it epitomizes the bravery, daring, and ingenuity displayed by the LRDG patrols. With the 8th Army defending along the Gazala Line in May of 1942, Timpson’s patrol was given the mission of interrupting enemy maintenance traffic along the road from Tripoli to Benghazi. As the patrol approached the road through a wadi at dusk, they noticed a large pile of stones on the side of the road, left there for repair work. Timpson formulated an simple plan: push the rocks out onto the road and create a temporary detour that looked authentic, slowing enemy traffic long enough for his patrol to place timed satchel charges in the back of each truck. The Italian drivers, however, did not cooperate, driving quickly around the “detour” before Timpson or his men could climb out of the ditch alongside the road! After several frustrating attempts at this game, Timpson brought his own truck up to the road, placed a soldier on the hood with a satchel charge, and chased enemy trucks down the road. Driving at high speed without lights, Timpson would close on the speeding Italian truck as the soldier on the hood lofted the bomb into the back. The technique worked several times, but Timpson would never know the effects of his night’s work, as the patrol was discovered and chased away the next morning. It was a small incident, in a very big war, by a small group of dedicated men. After reading the overviews of the war in North Africa, with their large-scale maps and arrows showing the movements of divisions and corps, take the time to read In Rommel’s Backyard, and discover the incredible efforts, sacrifices, and accomplishments of a company grade officer and his 35 men, and their small but important contribution to victory in World War II. There was no micromanagement here, only the daily enervating tasks of command and decision by a young captain and his soldiers in the unforgiving desert wastes of North Africa. In Rommel’s Backyard is the timeless story of a soldier and his part as one of the world’s “Greatest Generation.”

Grizzly 07, CMTC Hohenfels, Germany

Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler by John Kennedy Ohl, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, 291 pages, bibliography, extensive notes and index, $59.95. In his preface, Professor Ohl notes that the history of the U. S. Army “is the history of two armies. One is the regular army consisting of professional, or career, soldiers. The other is the citizen army consisting of various components, including militiamen, volunteers, National Guardsmen, draftees, and reservists who serve on a temporary basis in times of emergency.” In a similar fashion, this book is two stories: one, the story of Robert Beightler who enlisted in the Ohio National Guard, served in World War I, rose to become a major general and commanded the 37th Infantry Division, Ohio National Guard, throughout World War II. The other is an essay that runs through the book on how Regular Army officers habitually viewed National Guardsmen as substandard soldiers and their officers as political hacks whose competence was mediocre at best. This theme is so persistent it detracts from the rest of the book, yet the primary source was Beightler himself in his letters to his family and friends! Beightler was not just another National Guard officer. He was committed to the concept of the Guard, but he recognized that most Guard units and officers fell far short of Regular Army standards. An intelligent, ambitious and energetic man, he determined to win the approval of his RA peers and superiors. He trained his own troops to very high standards. He committed himself to the RA career pattern by winning appointments to both the Command and Staff College and the Army War College special sessions. He served on the General Staff so successfully that his six-month detail was extended to four years. When General Marshall weeded out all the old and physically unfit Guard officers in anticipation of combat, Beightler was the obvious choice to command the 37th Division. He trained his division hard; took them to the South Pacific, to New Georgia, Bougainville and Luzon; was a visible, up-front leader who protected his troops’ lives by heavy artillery preparations; and made his Guard division one of the best and most respected units in the Pacific. But through it all, he struggled for professional recognition for himself and his division from the Regular Army generals, and he was constantly sensitive to the hostility and condescension accorded Guard officers. Yet he tended to blow every perceived slight out of proportion: if he didn’t get his wishes met, he believed it was only because he was a Guard general, even though other factors may have dictated differently. A case in point: General MacArthur wanted desperately to free Manila early, but the Sixth Army Commander, General Walter Krueger, tended to move more slowly. So MacArthur visited both the 37th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division and encouraged their commanders to race to Manila and win historic acclaim. The 37th had been fighting in Luzon for months; the 1st Cavalry was newly arrived, was mechanized and enjoyed better terrain. The Cavalry arrived in Manila at 1900, February 3 and the 37th twelve hours later. Yet Beightler was convinced for the rest of his life that obstacles had been put in his way deliberately so that a Regular Army division would win Manila instead of a Guard unit! It was true that General Krueger openly scorned senior Guard officers and probably had a hand in denying Beightler a corps command and a third star, even while admitting Beightler was one of his best generals. And it was true that Beightler watched several general officers who had less command time and less combat service receive promotions and higher commands. Disillusioned and embittered, he blamed it all on Regular Army hostility toward the National Guard. Then, after the war, he was one of three generals offered a Regular Army general officer commission by Eisenhower. He accepted, hoping for challenging assignments. Instead, he received lesser assignments, yet continued to win high praise — but no promotion. In 1952, he suffered a heart attack and had to retire. Reading this book makes you reflect on just how you have looked at National Guard units and their officers. My personal observations have been that they have been very, very good or very bad, with few in between. General Beightler and his troops were definitely in the very good category. This book would be good reading for each of us to alert us to any hidden bias in our own thinking, and it would be especially useful for young National Guard officers to show them that determination, professional standards, and hard work can bring them the rewards of higher command.

COL, USA (Ret.) Alexandria, Va.

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