Training Basecamp Security Operations

Training Basecamp Security Operations Role Playing and Imagination Prepare Brigade Combat Team For Peace Support Role in Bosnia by Captain Michael D. Henderson 46 ARMOR — July-August 1999 confusing. Consequently, after four years of PSO, the civilians know how to take advantage of new units in theater. The scenario starts with a farmer approaching the base camp and claiming that an SFOR convoy struck and killed one of his livestock with a HMMWV. The farmer is very upset because his only means of transporting his produce to market is dead and he is unable to make a living. Initially, the sergeant of the guard had no idea in what direction to point the farmer, so on day one little was accomplished. Finally, on day four, the farmer was linked up with civil affairs and JAG and was allowed to file a monetary claim, similar to those filed by soldiers who lost baggage in transit on a PCS move. Filing the claim was the desired end-state for this scenario. Although, the unit reached the desired end-state, the amo unt of time it took to file the farmer’s claim caused agitation among the farmers and a perception that SFOR might be anti-Bosnian, which caused some minor demo n-strations at the front gate. Such responses are very realistic in such an ethnically divided region. Because of this dynamic, observing this training was very exciting, due to the fact that no two days were the same.

When developing the TE&Os, our staff developed desired end-states for each scenario, however, these end-states were not carved in stone. Common sense played a large role in the decision-making cycle of the player units. For example, we tried to create a pattern of events in hopes that the player unit would form a pattern analysis of people and events in order to adjust their force protection level, or as a preventive measure to avoid any confrontations with the local populace. On a daily basis, our role players made themselves visible to the base camp, by farming the nearby land, fishing at a nearby pond, and just loitering around the camp perimeter. Sometimes the civilians would be friendly and harmless — at other times they were hostile, drunk, and anti-SFOR. During the evening battle update briefs of the player units, my OCs keyed in on any local intelligence that the guard force provided to the rest of the task force. Things that we keyed on were who are the leaders of the civilians, their ages, their activities, and the times that these activities occurred, so that if the civilians deviated from their “routine,” this became a PIR to the task force. Also, when General Krstic was arrested, we initiated a scenario with the Bosnian role players being concerned that Serbs were arming in negative response to the arrest of General Krstic. Consequently, the Bosnians, happy that the arrest took place, insisted that SFOR arrest all of the criminals, but if SFOR could or would not do this, the Bosnians would take the law into their own hands. Once making that statement, we as OCs, began to create scenarios in which the Bosnian Army was training local militias in preparation for a continuation of fighting with the Serbs. This obviously, a very real concern to SFOR, therefore justifying a possible increase of the force protection levels. Overall, the training went very well, but it was not without difficulties. Our two biggest shortcomings were communication between OCs and control of the role players. During most of the events our OC team was dismounted. The lack of PRC-127s made communication slow, which hindered us in controlling simultaneous events.

We wanted to have OCs at the location of the scenario and in the task force TOC for all events. This enabled us to watch the event unfold and monitor the accuracy of the spot reports to the task force. Aware of both situations, we could make in-stride adjustments to the scenario in order to “reward” the proper response. Due to insufficient commo, at times we lost control of the role players and failed to tailor the event to the response of the unit quickly enough.

In closing, there is no greater training challenge than to train a unit for a mission when little to no doctrine exists. It compounds the challenge when the trainer, in this case me, has no practical experience in performing the mission other than reading some “home made” TE&Os. However, in conducting this mission, I can honestly say that my unit has gained valuable training in regards to the SFOR mission and is much more prepared for Peace Support Operations than had we not worked with 2nd BCT.

CPT Michael D. Henderson is a 1991 graduate of the Boise State University ROTC program. He has served as a tank platoon leader in 2-72 Armor, Camp Casey, Korea, and as a tank platoon leader, tank company XO, and HHC XO in 4-37 Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. After completion of AOAC, he served as an assistant brigade S3, 3rd Brigade, First Cavalry Division and commander of Delta Company, 3-8 Cav, First Cav-alry Division. He is currently the commander of HHC/3-8 Cav.

ARMOR — July-August 1999 47