Setting the Stage for Success

Success at a Combat Training Center (erC) is truly a matter of perspective. To some leaders, success is conftnn-ing a home station training plan. To others, it is providing a training opportunity for a newly realigned chain of command. And to the individual soldier and his first line supervisor, success is very simple - beating the - OPFOR. Against a professional, seasoned OPFOR, we all know this is a tough challenge. However, some units consistently perform well on all missions at the CTC. Their missions have no glamourous concepts of operations nor special effects to confuse the OPFOR. Their plans are simple and demand precise execution of the basics - gunnery, navigation, oveIWatch, and massed fires. The foundation these commanders build to achieve this success deserves examination. Scores of CALL bulletins, professional journals, and field manuals document the tactics, techniques, and procedures of how to succeed. Commanders must rate and apply these insights to their particular unit. Most leaders accept the challenge and integrate documented lessons-learned into home station training. However, there are other requirements that set a unit up for success. Commanders provide a critical battle focus. This is the intangible understanding and discipline that subordinate leaders and their soldiers apply to preparing and executing battle. This focus breeds success in the mind of the soldier and then on the battlefield. Specifically, the battle focus should:

• Demand thorough application of the troop-leading procedures.. Specify the decisive point for the mission and how each unit supports that end.

• Train a common vision for warfighting. There is nothing unique about these tasks. They do not guarantee the defeat of the OPFOR. However, they set a sound foundation for efficient plan- 44 ning and operations. Successful units routinely perform all three of these tasks very weU. However, aU too often, it is not the case. When the OPFOR successfully accomplishes its mission, one or more of these three tasks was absent from the commander's battle focus. Troop Leading Procedures The eight-step troop-leading procedure is doctrine. It hangs on the walls of most operations centers. Leaders do not enforce the procedure. Most units do not have a rehearsed drill for OPORD development. It is executed differently each time. It should be refined to a science at home station. Incomplete orders, inefficient time management, and impromptu shortcuts typically erode the process at the CTC. Warning orders, issued sequentially as the mission analysis process proceeds, assure parallel orders development at lower levels. Warning order development and transmittal (verbal and hard copy) must be a drill. A recommended sequence is:. WARNORD Ion receipt of mission.. WARNORD 2 on receipt of initial planning guidance from the commander.

• WARNORD 3 after course-of-action decision. Once this guidance is given to companies, platoon leaders and below can focus supply preparations, conduct drill rehearsals, and complete pre-combat inspections. Individual soldiers can now prepare. They are usually the last checked, if at all. Their immediate leaders only need overlays, the final plan, and a mission rehearsal to now complete preparations. Leaders must ruthlessly manage time. Make the schedule and abide by it. Adjusted meeting times and lengthy meetings erode preparation as the effect ripples down the chain of command. First-line supervisors and their soldiers, who must prepare to fight, are the real bill-payers. Leaders must block their third of the available time. This must include the time for rehearsals and back-briefs. The procedures for these two tasks - rehearsal and back-briefs - must be a drill. They usually digress to open-ended discussions and wargames that prove of little value as mission execution unfolds. Simulations provide excellent training opportunities for most troop leading procedures (and OPORD drills). However, taking impromptu shortcuts at the Combat Training Center, such as using 'canned' plans from home station to do things faster, only hurts.

The staff robs itself of a valuable training opportunity and usually overlooks critical implied tasks and limitations. JANUS and BBS simulation are superb training aids to refine procedures and wargame concept options. They are not CTC mission orders, ready for execution. The staff should instead document the internal procedures they use to develop the OPORD. The insights garnered through simulation in developing force array and targeting complement OPORD development and execution efficiency. Once in the maneuver 'box' at the CTC though, discipline the use of troop-leading procedures. Complete the mission analysis, albeit compressed. Train "what right looks like. Discipline the WARNORD and OPORD process and adhere to your time schedule. A disciplined process at battalion-level becomes the standard for company and below. Oecisive Point The commander must specify the decisive point - that place or event where the main effort and all its contributors must achieve success. Whether wargamed in the mind of the commander or provided by his staff, the commander must decide. The decision is usually delayed, then gets lost in the myriad of current events as the mission unfolds. Anticipative planning and shaping the battlefield remain basic to our doctrine. This is a measured decision of where and how to accept risk. Too many units try to 'sort it out on the fly,' both when and where to take risk and the place and means to achieve success. The result is that obstacles do not reinforce the terrain, fires (direct and indirect) do not complement the obstacles, and maneuver cannot exploit the success of rlTes. Achieving success at the decisive point must be the focus for planning and executing the operation. While there is military art to planning, laws of physics and science directly affect the tempo of the fight. The plan must consider attack rates, obstacle resources (time, personnel, and materiel), and times to call, adjust and complete the fire mission at the decisive point. The plan will not achieve success at the decisive point if it is infeasible to synchronize the combat functions the commander envisions. Violent execution and superb soldiering cannot always overcome inadequate synchronization planning. With the decisive point and the method to achieve it clearly articulated, subordinates can help focus combat power to achieve the commander's endstate. Warfighting Vision The art of warfighting involves a common vision of the battlefield. The commander must personally communicate it to his subordinates. It addresses what success should look like and how the unit will achieve it. The written commander's intent articulates the purpose, method, and endstate for the mission. Many commanders' intents are incomplete. Hyperbole and fluff usually fill the commander's intent. It includes superfluous phrases like: aggressively recon or quickly reestablish contact. The intent should clearly describe: eThe decisive point, in terms of time, event, or space. e What the unit should achieve there. eHow the unit's combat functions support that end. e Where risk will be taken, in terms of units or location. eThe endstate. The intent is not the concept of operations which, based on the battlefield framework, describes the form and concept of maneuver. The intent may also specify where he is wiIIing to accept risk, and what he sees as key terrain. The commander's intent for the mission is critical, but there is more. The commander must teach his subordinates - personally - how he expects the unit to fight. There is no time for a tutorial on the radio once in contact. Leader development programs led by the commander lay the groundwork. The overhead is simple: chalkboards or 'duck-walks' with model vehicles and their leaders on a gym floor. Many soldiers, not to mention leaders, have never seen their whole unit portrayed to scale in formation as it executes a drill or play. This picture, narrated by the commander, becomes indelibly etched in the mind of the leaders. The commander must mold the vision for battle. It takes time, but it is an investment with an immense return. Boldness and tenacity are reinforced by soldier and leader confidence in themselves and in their unit. Communicating the vision requires conscious preparation. The vision must be in place throughout the unit before arrival at the CTC. The Combat Training Center experience is the Super Bowl of training opportunities. The training objective should focus on refining the vision, not developing it. The warrior spirit is alive in our Army today. Our ranks swell with superb soldiers. Leaders must mold them with a common vision of task and purpose. Key parts of this vision include: disciplined troop-leading procedures (from mission analysis to OPORD development drills), specifying the decisive point for battle, and training a common vision of warfighting. The result is confident leaders unafraid to make bold decisions that invariably lead to success - at the CTC or on the battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel G. C. Harris is currently a senior task force observer/controller at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. He received his commission from the U. S. Military Academy in 1975. His previous aSSignments include rifle platoon leader, support platoon leader, rifle company XC, and battalion S1 with 2- 60 Infantry (M), Ft. Lewis; battalion S4 and mech company commander, 2-21 Infantry (M), Ft. Stewart, Ga.; chief, Theater C2 Systems, CAC DA-C3 I, Ft. Leavenworth; G3 Training Resources, 1AD, Ansbach, Germany; S3, 3d Bde, 1 AD, Bamberg, Germany

STORM); and Commander, 1-30 Infantry (M), Erlangen, Germany. He has attended Naval Postgraduate School and MS Info Systems Technology School. 45