The Decisive Point

decisive point for any given operation. The term decisive point is found in some doctrinal manuals, however, the concept remains undefined and vague. FM 100-5, Operations, says: Decisive points provide commanders with a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are often geographical in nature, such as a hill, a town, or a base of operations. They could also include elements that sustain command, such as a command-post, critical boundary, airspace, or communications node... Commanders designate the most important decisive points as objectives and allocate resources to seize or destroy them.1 This paragraph does not offer a definition of a decisive point, but gives examples. It still does not provide the task force or company commander with a solid explanation of what a decisive point is, or how to use it in planning and execution. FM 100-5 clearly states that there is a difference between decisive point and center of gravity, but does not explain why they are different. The assertion is valid, however, because a decisive point, as defined later, is related to the friendly unit’s purpose, while a center of gravity is related to the enemy unit’s vulnerabilities. FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, in its excellent section on company command estimate, talks about a single decisive point that is the beginning of course of action (COA) development. FM 7-10 goes on to describe possible decisive points, related to the company’s mission, in terms of terrain, enemy units, or assets and friendly vulnerabilities.2 However, even this description is inadequate as a defini-ton and does not go far enough in describing how to use this essential concept. A good definition of decisive point, one in use at the Armor Officer’s Advance Course, is the following: An enemy force or asset, key terrain, critical time, or combination thereof, where the applied effects of the unit’s combat power will lead to accomplishment of the mission or achievement of the mission’s purpose. This definition is more specific than anything in current doctrine and encompasses the concepts suggested by FM 100-5 and FM 7-10. At the tactical level, each mission has one decisive point per level of command. The commander, with input from his staff, designates the decisive point as a part of mission analysis. The decisive point is based on the purpose of the unit’s mission, as articulated in the unit commander’s intent. It is, as stated in the definition above, a specific thing, not an action. “The decisive point for this mission is the enemy platoon at NK123456” or “...the high ground west of the town of Midway.” Now, the commander and staff must determine a manner to apply the unit’s combat power against the enemy platoon or the high ground during COA development. So, the decisive point is designated independent of the scheme of maneuver and is therefore not “destruction of the enemy platoon...” or “securing of the high ground...” since each possible COA may apply the unit’s combat power differently at the decisive point. In an offensive example, Figure 1, the task force commander and staff have completed mission analysis and determine their mission as: TF 1-10 attacks 200600 MAR 19XX to seize OBJ Yellow and secure passage lanes in order to pass 2d Brigade forward to conduct the division main attack. The commander has stated the purpose and endstate of his intent as: “The purpose of our attack is clearly to secure the passage lanes and pass 2d Brigade. The earlier we can achieve this, the better. Our endstate then is at least one lane secured and enough combat power there to facilitate 2d Brigade’s passage. All enemy forces that can interfere with the passage must be fixed or destroyed. If we accomplish these things, we will be successful.” Now, before developing COAs, the commander must designate the decisive point to focus the efforts of the task force during planning and execution. He says: “The decisive point for this mission is the hill vicinity ES664002. If we control that hill, we can control Route Alpha, the preferred passage lane, and we will be able to support the passage with direct fire to the north.” All COA planning begins at the decisive point. The commander and staff determine the combat power necessary and budget that force for the main attack at the decisive point. It is important to note here that a unit may designate different forces as the main effort, shifting throughout an operation, but a unit only conducts one main attack. As FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, states: In a battalion task force attack there is only one main attack. All other elements of the task force support the main attack... Both main attack and main effort are mechanisms for allowing the concentration and coordination of combat power, but they are not synonymous. The main attack is the task force’s main effort at the decisive phase of the attack.3 While clearly defining main attack,” FM 71-2 still does not define the “decisive phase.” Decisive point, as defined above, provides the needed focus for the main attack. Usually, as in our example, the decisive point is further designated as an “objective.” Forces are arrayed to be committed against that objective with sufficient 38 ARMOR — July-August 1994 The Decisive Point by Captain David J. Lemelin combat power to, in this case, “secure” the decisive point. The force may “seize,” “destroy,” “fix,” etc. the objective that is the decisive point, whichever mission is appropriate for the situation. The overriding principle being to mass combat power at the decisive point. FM 100-5, echoing Napoleon I and Clausewitz, defines the principle of war “Mass” as: “Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.”4 Again, we understand the business of massing effects; the problem is usually finding the decisive place and time. By analyzing the situation and designating the decisive point, the commander clearly shows where combat power must be massed for the unit to be successful. Returning now to our example, the task force staff now begins to develop COAs, starting with the task force’s main attack and its objective already determined. The decisive point is designated as Objective Green. The remainder of the scheme of maneuver is designed to support and posture to execute the main attack. Given the link between the mission’s purpose and the decisive point, and the difficulties of protecting the force conducting the main attack, it is usually advantageous to conduct the main attack as early in the operation as possible. The more activity prior to the main attack, the greater the risk of dissipating the unit’s combat power before its concentration at the decisive point is required. Additionally, if the unit achieves control of the decisive point early in the operation, and thereby achieves its purpose, then the remainder of the enemy’s combat power is rendered irrelevant, to be dealt with only if necessary. Our example task force may develop a COA that uses a force to initially fix the enemy platoons that could influence the main attack, such as the platoons at ES686014 and ES696008, a supporting attack to fix or suppress the platoon at ES678003, then conduct the main attack with a relatively large force to seize Objective Green, the decisive point. Once Objective Green is seized, the enemy cannot influence Passage Lane 5, so the task force begins passing 2d Brigade. Finally, the task force attacks only those enemy forces necessary to complete seizure of Objective Yellow. This situation illustrates another advantage of the decisive point as a method for concentrating combat power in the offense. That is, we initially only fight the enemy forces necessary to achieve our purpose. Then, once we control the decisive point, we are in an advantageous position to complete the mission. We have, in most cases, disrupted the enemy defense and have a distinct psychological and positional advantage. Note also that if a unit’s purpose was enemy destruction or was in some other way oriented on the enemy force, the decisive point might be different. It could be a terrain feature, selected to achieve positional or psychological advantage, based on disposition of the enemy force. An enemy-oriented decisive point might be a particular enemy force against which the unit, if its combat power were concentrated, could gain the same advantages discussed above. Certainly, in many situations, the decisive point will not be obvious. In ARMOR — July-August 1994 39 Continued on Page 42 Figure 1 (Continued from Page 39) fact, after thorough analysis, the Commander and his staff might find validity in multiple possible decisive points of varying descriptions. All these points may be important to the mission and therefore the unit should address them in the scheme of maneuver. However, the commander must select ODe as the decisive point to provide focus for the unit's planning, preparation, and execution. Liddell Hart, in his 1944 work. Thoughts on War, states: "The principles of war could, for brevity, be condensed into a single word: ·ConcentraIion.' "5 Concentration indeed, but where? Intuitively, commanders know that concentration at the right place is fun· damental to successful combat A conunander must begin to concentrate his unit toward that "right place" early in the tactical decision-making process. His designation of the decisive point for each mission will provide tbe necessary focus aI the beginning of the planning process and provide the "place" for the application of the unit's combat power. Notes IFM 100-5, Operations. 14 June 1993, p. 6-7. 6-8. "2FM 7-10. The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990, p. 2-19, 2-24. 3FM 71-2, me Tank and Mechanjzed Infantry Battalion Task Force. T7 September 1988, p. 3- 25. "FM t 00-5. p. 2-4. 5Liddell Hart. Sir Basil. Thoughts on War, 1944, as quoted in Dicttcrw.ry of Military and Naval Quotations, United Stales Naval lnstitute. Annapolis, Maryland. 1966, Robert Debs Heinl. editor. Captain David J. Lemelin is a tactics small group instructor in the AOAC at Ft Knox, Ky. He was commissioned in Infantry from West Point in 1983. He served as a light infantry platoon leader and in other assignments in the 193d Infantry Brigade in Panama. He commanded a BFV-equipped infantry company and an armored battalion HHC, both in the 1 st Cav Division. He commanded throughout DESERT SHlELDiDE-

SERTSTORM.