Is Your Battle Staff as Blind As the Six Men of Indostan?

The Blind Men and the Elephant by John G. Saxe It was si x men of lndostan To learning much inclined. Who went to see the Elephant (Though all of them were blind), That each by observation Might satisfy his mind. The First approached the Elephant, And happening to fall Against his broad and sturdy side, At once began to bawl: "God bless me! but the Elephant Is very like <I wall!" The Second, feeling of the tusk, Cried. "Ho! what have we here So very round and smooth and sharp? To me 'tis mighty clear This wonder of an Elephant Is very like a spear!" The Third approached the animal, And happening to take The squinning trunk within his hands, Thus boldly up and spake: "I see," quoth he, "the Elephant Is very like a snake!" The Fourth reached out his eager hand. And felt about the knee: "What most this wondrous beast is like Is might plain," quoth he; " 'Tis clear enough the Elephant Is very like a tree." The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear Said, "E'en the blindest man Can tell what this resembles most; Deny the fact who can, This marvel of an Elephant Is very like a fan!" The Sixth no sooner had begun About the beast to grope, Than, seizing on the swinging tail That fell within his scope, "I see," quoth he, "the Elephant Is very like a rope!" And so these men of Indostan Disputed loud and long, Each in his own opinion Exceeding stiff and strong. Though each was partly in the right, And all were in the wrong! 22 Like the blind men of Indostan, battle staffs are in the business of describing elephants. If you have ever been on a staff you can attest to the various qualities of size, smelJ, sound and yes, taste of many of these beasts. But, no matter the characteristics of these pachyderms, they still must be properly named, subdued, and ruled. For the battle staff the most gargantuan of these creatures can often be seen in a tactical operations center destroying the efforts of each staff member. However, unlike the elephant the blind men so poorly described, this elephant will not hold still to be portrayed. This elephant's name is synchronization. The Elephant FM 100-5 (1993) defines synchronization as arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. For the combat arms community, mass in most cases equates to the effects of overwhelming combat power at that decisive point. Experience from the combat training centers (CTCs) indicates that working this definition out is oot as easy as describing it. Why is synchronization so difficult? I believe synchronization is difficult because we don't train staffs in the art of visualizing the battlefield. Much like the blind men, we're not trained to visualize the elephant prior to departing from Indostan. Battle staffs must be trained into an integrated fighting team. Team building requires training in the science of the military decision-making process (MDMP) that goes beyond the advance course and CAS3. A battle staff is a team when it can visualize the battlefield through the eyes of its commander and his fellow staff members. Unfortunately, current "how-to" doctrine doesn't fully address the art of visualizing the battlefield before and during synchronization. For example, the two primary "how-to" synchronization resources, FM 71- 123, Tactics and Techniques for the Combined Arms Heavy Forces, and CGSC ST 100-9 (1993) do not link techniques of seeing the battlefield to the synchronization process. FM 71- 123 only mentions the process of wargaming as it relates to course of action development. ST 100-9, (an ever changing nondoctrinal publication), provides a plethora of completed synchronization matrices but doesn't explain the art behind the battle staff's visualization of the battlefield. So, what is a technique that will enable a battle staff to see the battlefield and therefore synchronize better? The battle staff battlefield visualization process, is a combination of techniques that can bridge the gap between visualizing the battlefield and synchronization. It is composed of three interrelated techniques. First, the battle staff must actually see the battlefield. Second, each member of the battle staff must understand how his fellow staff members see the battlefield. Finally, each member of the staff must see the battlefield from a three-dimensional perspective. See The Battlefield - The Leaders' Reconnaissance Unfortunately, leaders' reconnaissance implies just that - leaders only. Battle staffs are normally excluded because they are not considered apart of the troop-leading process. Battle staffs need to have an opportunity to depart from lndostan. Battle staffs need to see the battlefield from the commander's perspective, not only to be of better assistance to the commander but, of equal importance, to visualize how the enemy will shape the battlefield in relation to their combat function. When included in the leaders' reconnaissance, the staff is afforded the same protection as the recon force, as well as any updated visions of how the commander sees the battle unfold-

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Il XO NOTES: Use overlay drop drill to check integration. Figure 1. Battlestaff Integration Matrix ing. Additionally, the subordinate commanders have the battle staff in the vicinity to ask questions about their portion of the battlefield. The battle staff must come prepared to participate in the reconnaissance. They must have their mission analysis products in hand, as well as a checklist of questions developed from these products and the commander's concept of the operation. These questions should be answered by seeing the terrain and cross-talking with other members of the staff. This should be done prior to moving back to the TOe to finalize the plan. The staff, like the leaders, must bring the necessary reconnaissance tools. These are binoculars, pickets, engineer tape and any other tools that will assist the staff's recollection when it returns to the battlefield. Adjusted maps and sketches of battlefield truth will assist the individual staff member and the battle staff as a whole to correct misconceptions and unforeseen dilemmas that two-dimensional map reconnaissance cannot capture. The leaders' reconnaissance is the battle staff's first true concerted attempt to arrange activities in time and space to mass at a decisive point. The leaders' reconnaissance becomes the foundation for the battle staff's synchronization efforts. In order to capitalize on this vision of the battlefield each member of the battle staff must be thoroughly familiar with his combat function, as well as the effect his combat function has on his fellow battle staff members. This is better known as battle staff integration. For example, what if the blind men shared with each other their vision of the elephant to come up with a more accurate corporate perspective? Battle Staff Integration Battle staff integration is the executive officer's business. It is his responsibility to get the blind men to see the commander's vision of the battlefield. He cannot divorce himself from the responsibility. The operations officer or a battle captain does not have a complete picture of the unit's status and capabilities. They, and the other staff members, are too close to their combat function to be able to stand back and objectively integrate all of the combat functions represented by the battle staff. When the operations officer is allowed to substitute for the executive officer, he usually will view everything from a biased maneuver

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05TEtEM..-rrf'l!5' P< --\ LOclltn...... of 1:..........;tr1' perspective, therefore distorting the efforts and the contributions of the battle staff. The executive officer's responsibility to ensure integration of the staff is not easy. Again, each member of the staff is focused on his particular combat function and usually becomes so focused on it that he will either forget or avoid working with other members of the staff. When this happens, integration doesn't occur. At this point of the MDMP, each staff member is anned with an understanding of the unit's mission, the commander's concept of the operation, and a personal picture of the battlefield from the leaders' reconnaissance. It is the executive officer's challenge to begin piecing together each staff member's vision of the battlefield into a unified battle staff vision. Timelines, mission analysis briefs, battle update briefs, and staff huddles help the XO to facilitate staff integration. However, they do not require the staff to commune, coordinate with, or convince each other as planning is going on. Another technique is the use of an integration matrix (see Figure I). An integration matrix is the XO's catalyst. t6' help' battle staff members share 23

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_________. J F E E o B A C K Figure 2. The MDMP Incorporating BBVP their vision of the battlefield. It is also the executive officer's measurement tool to judge if integration is occurring. If staff integration is occurring, it will be borne out in the form of a historical record on the integration ma-true Upon the return of the battle staff from the leaders' recon, the XO has each member of the staff brief the battle staff and him on what was discovered as it relates to his combat function. This sharing of information is the genesis for staff integration. During the brief, each staff member states what he needs to know about the combat function of the other staff members. This is recorded in the appropriate block on the matrix, whether or not it is answered during the brief- 24 ing. The XO, as the manager of the integration matrix, is the only one who can check off or scratch through an information requirement or coordinating event once entered on the matrix. When the briefing is complete and estimates are being developed, any staff member can and should add any request for information or insight to the matrix as long as it relates to one or more other staff member's vision of the battlefield. Therefore, it is imperative that the matrix be posted in a central location in the TOe and under the supervision of a battle captain when the executive officer is not in the TOe. The integration matrix becomes an indicator that staff integration is occurring. Using the matrix, the XO can bring the staff together as a whole, as a group such as the S2, FSO and engineer, (for example, to check on the completion of shared targeting information), or with an individual to ensure integration is happening. If needed, time-dependent events can be transferred to the timeline as another positive check for integration. Through training, the integration matrix will become second nature for certain types of missions and will mainly be influenced by the various types of terrain a unit could find itself fighting on. The integration matrix is not to be confused with a synchronization matrix. Remember, we are not yet arranging activities in space and time. The staff is only gathering their personal visions of the battlefield and comparing them. From this comparison, rnisper-ceptions are corrected, requests for information is generated, and times for further coordination are made. The staff is only making the foundation they built from the recon much stronger. Again, all of this is done initially in an XO-controlled briefing and then amongst the battle staff, through the MDMP, and under his discerning eye. Once all battle staff members have shared information about their combat function and have the answers to their questions for their estimates, then the battle staff is ready to wargame the course of action from a three-dimensional perspective. Three Dimensional Wargaming Reading and applying the aspects of terrain to a particular series of events from a three-dimensional military map takes time and is difficult to master. Some would view it as a gift that only a few possess. The point being, that seeing the battlefield on a flat surface such as a 1:50,000 or 1:25,000 map is difficult. (Imagine the blind men attempting to describe the elephant from apiece of paper). In most cases, it is too abstract a task for the novice. Even though contour lines are superimposed on the map to give the terrain a three-dimensional effect, it takes a master's eye to understand the terrain from a 360-degree perspective. Now, add maneuver, fire support, and several other graphics and the skill is degraded even for the most astute map reader. However, remember the definition of synchronization. The dent.ion eqires the staff to arrange activIties In tIme and space. Therefore, the staff must understand what space is. Normally, the S2 is given the responsibility to make the rest of the staff smart on battlefield space. But he can't be everybody's critical eye, nor can he prepare the rest of the battle staff's estimates. The S2 can only lay the foundation. Each member of the bttle staff is. responsible for refining hiS products In relation to their combat function. Lessons learned from the crCs indicate the average battle staff has not mastered synchronization from a map. Part of the problem is the abstractness described above. Another is the diffiCUlty of getting ten sets of eyeballs on a standard map sheet, which makes it almost impossible to wargame as a team. The end result suggest that syn- hronization fails because only a portIOn of the staff participates in the wargaming of the COA and that eventually most wargaming occurs after the plan has been issued at the unit rehearsal. Now, why is synchronization occuring after the issuance of the OPORD? I submit that units are only doing hat comes naturally. Sandtables pro- ":Ide a three-dimensional perspective mISSIng when the staff attempts to warge off what really is a two-di-mel!slOnal map. What happens is that dunng the rehearsal, it becomes clear that the plan has some major flaws because it wasn't properly wargamed. So, commanders begin to wargame from the hip during the rehearsal. Commanders then wonder why the staff was so blind. The staff can't understand how the commanders could so easily arrange events on the battlefield. It's simple! Good commanders know what it is to live and fight in a three-dimensional world so they wargame as they will fight. (They usually are the master map readers as well.) Therefore, a sandtable makes the battlefield less abstract and more available and accessible for each member of the staff. Accurate sand tables should be used by the staff to better see the battlefield from the commander's perspective.. The.use of. a andtable for wargamIng bnngs WIth It some inherent prob- lems. The first is accuracy, which has been addressed. Building the sandtable while or before the battle staff departs for the leaders' recon will allow the staff member to immediately check for accuracy and make corrections upon his return. Strict and disciplined placement of grid lines is the start of a good sandtable. The second pr.oblem is the tendency to do away WIth maps altogether. This should not be a problm. When wargarning, to support estImates and battle staff input, the XO should ensure his soldiers use individual. and operational maps, as well as quality graphic products. He should never alI ow the battle staff to create an estimate from the sandtable alone. The last problem is that to use this technique requires work. The entire battle staff must be involved. The operations sergeant will be glad to lay the sandtable's foundation, but each member of the battle staff must be rpresented, especially when it comes time for the various graphic control measures to be emplaced. Fil!a1.ly,. in ans.wer to the argument tat It IS ImpossIble to do this every hme, I offer a personal observation. I recall, from observing approximately 40 battalion task forces at the NTC that almost all of them conducted sandtable rehearsal for each mission regardless of the circumstances of time and weather. Why would it be so hard. to construct a sandtable upon the receIpt of the warning order, to be used initially for the battle staff and ultimately for the unit rehearsal?' This way, as an additional benefit, the sandtable is available to the staff as a substitute if it is unable to be apart of he leader' recon. It is just a matter of Incorporatmg these techniques in your planning (see Figure 2). Conclusion The mechanics of the battle staff's battlefield visualization process are techniques that will help produce better synchronized plans (prior to the issuance of an operations order), when used in conjunction with the military decision-making process. It places art into the science of the MDMP. The key to the technique is to afford the battle staff every opportunity to see the battlefield. Remember, this takes training in the art of wargarning and n inclusion in your TOe SOP pnor to deployment. Wargarning from a sand table enables alI the battle staff to see the terrain while wargaming. The sandtable's Irger scale and relief provides a real-life 360-degree perspective missing from a map. The leaders' reconnaissance ensures the sandtable is accurate and more importantly prepares e battle staff for the wargaming ses-SlOn through well thought out and well integrated estimates. Now that the battle staff can visualize the battlefield through the eyes of the commander and their fellow battle staff mebers, it is well on its way to becOmIng a team. The XO is now ready to subdue and rule the once feared beast caled synchronization, before he and his battle staff depart from Indostan. Major Michael C. Cloy received his ROTC. Infantry commission in 1982 as a Distinguished Military Graduate. He holds a BS in Education of the Deaf and a MS in Adaptive Physical Education from the University of Southem Mississippi. His military education includes CGSC, CAS3, JOMC, AOAC, M1 Abrams Certification Course, M3 Bradley Certification Course, IMPC,

RC Special Forces Qualification Course, and Jumpmaster, Pathfinder, Ranger, and Airbome Courses. He has served as a battle staff and mechanized company/team trainer at the NTC; BMO, Bradley company and HHC commander with 5-18 Inf, 3d Bde, 3d AD, Germany (served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM); rifle pit Idr, company XO and support pit Idr with 4-9th Inf Regt. at Ft. Ord, Calif. He has previously been published in Infantry Magazine and Army Trainer. He is currently assigned to G3 Operations, III Corps, Ft. Hood. 25