The Company/Team Preparation for Combat

Preparation for Combat by Captaln Davld J. Lemelln Jr. The company/team ( COm commander must ensure that the unit’s preparation for combat for every mission includes:. OPORD

. Graphics Pre-Combat Inspection. Reconnaissance. Rehearsal. Resupply oBoresight/Zeroing Once the CO/ru makes contact with the enemy, the commander’s influence on the outcome is limited. In order to minimize this limitation, he must take full advantage of the time before battle, when his influence is all but unlimited, to prepare his subordinates for the decentralized action which is to occur. Here, then, in the, “pre-combat” time, is where the commander “eams his pay” and can do the most good toward mission accomplishment.

Given the speed, fluidity, and Go-lence of modem mounted combat, units -especially COm -must anticipate the loss of key leaders and prepare to be successful in that event. Further, CO/Ius’ personnel and equipment must be adequately prepared to focus combat power more rapidly than the enemy and maintain excellent situational awareness in a rapidly changing scenario. The seven tasks listed above each build essential redundancy and depth in the Together, when accomplished, these preparations have a synergistic effect on the CO/Iu’s ability to fight successfully regardless of the dynamic situation and loss of leaders. As stated earlier, the CO/Iu must issue an OPORD, distribute graphics, conduct X I, boresight and/or zero, rehearse critical actions, conduct reconnaissance and resupply, each in some form, for every mission. Time, the most valuable of the METI’-T factors, will determine the extent and thoroughness with which each task is accomplished. Even given minimal time before crossing the LD or defending, the commander and the COm can get them done. In these abbreviated circumstances, the commander must exert his will to prevent time from being an excuse for failure to adequately prepare for combat. co/Tpvf’s posture in specific areas. The OPORD This order is the catalyst for all subordinate planning. It must provide the platoon leaders with enough information so that they can function in the event that they find themselves in command of the CO/ru. The order is also probably the least overlooked of the combat preparations. Optimally, it is very detailed and covers all contingencies with a clear picture of the commander’s intent. As a minimum, the commander must pare down the enemy situation for the platoon leaders and explain the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous course of action. He must give a clear pic-of the task force commander’s intent and scheme, as well as his own, and an easily understood mission statement. The scheme of maneuver must include the critical contingencies should the battle not go as expected. When time is short, the commander can use his “staff” to assist in preparing portions of the order. For example, with minimal guidance the COm FSO can prepare the ‘Fi” pararaph and a fire support execution matrix. The first sergeant can, with guidance, prepare the “Service Support” paragraph and matrix. The XO can assist in preparing any portion of the order, given proper guidance. The XO, however, may be busy supervising the CO/”s preparation for combat in accordance with the timeline. This timeline, issued with the WARNORD and modified in the OPORD, must include all seven criti- ARMOR - cal prep for combat tasks, be logical and flexible, and BE ENFORCED.

Graphics clarify and augment the OPORD and, optimally, clearly portray the scheme of maneuver. In the best circumstances, each subordinate leader and vehicle commander (including company trains and attachments) should have the operations, fire support, CSS, and enemy graphics. The COm should limit the number of actual overlays these leaders must post over their maps, however. Time and acetate available should drive the commander to combine the operations, fire support and enemy graphics onto one overlay. When time is limited, distribution of the CSS graphics can be limited to first sergeant, XO, and the platoon sergeants. By insisting on this level of graphics dissemination, the commander ensures redundancy of understanding of all aspects of the ensuing fight.

The commander must, of course, add company graphics to the task force graphics to provide enough detail for company- and platoon-level operations. Company graphics should improve flexibility of command and control. That is, these graphics should have enough control measures to execute the scheme of maneuver and to shift forces to cope with contingencies. These graphics must supplement task force graphics but not replace them. Subordinate leaders must have the task force graphics in case they find themselves on the task force command net where they must refer to task force, and not CODM, control measures.

In order to efficiently disseminate these overlays, the COnM commander must establish an “overlay drill,” if you will, with his command post personnel and within the individual platoons. The end state of this drill is that each member of the COm orders group is issued one full set of overlays to take back to his platoon or section. A successful technique, given the right circumstances, starts &th the task force issuing the CO/Iu commander a full set of overlays before the start of the task force OPORD. The COm commander gives these to the NCO who has accompanied him to the order’s brief. This. NCO then takes the overlays back to the XO or other responsible leader at the COm command post, who then begins the actual copying. The commander’s, XO’s, and FSO’screws are available for this task and must be supplied with plenty of acetate and alcohol pens.

Each unit must have a plan to execute this drill at night and in poor weather. Mech-heavy COm can use the commander’sand XO’s vehicles, backed together with tarps over the gap, as a work area. Tank-heavy CO/Ius can use a similar arrangement with the FSO’s track and a medic track. Regardless of conditions, the optimum result is that each member of the orders group has the graphics posted when he attends the CODM OPORD. Meanwhile, the platoons (including the 4th platoon, i.e., company trains) are executing their own “overlay drill.”

As the adage goes, no time spent on reconnaissance is time misspent. Optimally, the commander and his subordinate leaders will conduct a visual recon of the objective and the approaches to it, or, in the defense, of the battle position and engagement area. The latter is more likely than the former. Given the constraints of time and the tactical situation, the CO/ru commander must personally recon as much as possible. Subordinates must examine what he cannot recon personally. What leaders cannot physically recon, they must look at on the map. Additionally, what the COm commander cannot recon, he can request be looked at by task force assets. A good solution, given typical time and tactical constraints in the offense, is for the COm commander to conduct a map recon of the objective and area forward of the LD with his subordinate leaders. Then, have the lead platoon leader conduct a recon from the assembly area to the LD. If a vantage point is available overlooking the LD (one m l y is), then the commander and leaders can conduct a visual mon from there. In the defense, better reconnaissance is generally possible and the commander can personally see virtually everything, given the time.

Resupply and LOGPAC operations are critical tasks for every mission. The COm LOGPAC should be routine and efficient. The basics of fuel, ammunition, food, and water must be resupplied for all missions. Additionally, the COm commander should advise his XO and first sergeant, at the time of the WARNORD, of any adjustments in requirements based on task organization (e.g., two tank and two mech platoons instead of two and one, or anew attachment of a Vulcan platoon) or on the type of mission (e.g., urban fighting, antitank ambushes, or breaching have different ammunition requirements). It is the CODM commander’s responsibility to promptly correct any deficiencies in resupply so as not to effect the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission.

Rehearsal Rehearsals are arguably the most important of all the pre-combat tasks. Good rehearsals greatly enhance command and control and situational awareness by improving all participants understanding of the flow of the battle, i.e., the sequence of events, what action triggers another action, where each element is at each phase of the fight, how the combat support ARMOR - elements are integrated into the fight, and so on. Ideally, units conduct rehearsals at all levels, like building blocks, with smaller element drills being rehearsed in isolation, then in-corparating these drills into platoon, then full COm rehearsals. There are different types of rehears-those that units conduct with all personnel and vehicles on similar temin. Key leader rehearsals are full-up with only key leaders participating. Units conduct sand table rehearsals when time or the tactical situation do not allow a full-up rehearsal. Given very limited time, a CO/TrJr commander can conduct a rehearsal with subordinates moving unit symbols on a map. The key to a good reheanal, regardless of the type, is that the participants actually walk through their actions in some form and physically and/or visually understand their portion of the fight in relation to the other elements. Like resupply, rehearsals begin with the WARNORD. The COKM commander can initiate squad, platoon, and even company rehearsals just knowing whether he is attacking or defending. For example, if the commander knows he is lead element in a movement to contact, he can have the platoons (especially mech platoons) begin breach drills and action drills. If the situation permits, the commander can then conduct full COm breach and action rehearsals. The XO can supervise the rehearsals if the commander is unavailable. Once the task force issues its order, the COm commander can refine his rehearsal plan. Even if, at this point, the mission has changed from the WARNORD, the platoon rehearsals will have had the benefit of getting the soldiers’ heads in the game, if only by synchronizing actions within their elements. Finally, CSS elements must rehearse their own actions within the unit’s rehearsal. The medics must rehearse evacuation procedures and the routes to each of the aid stations or exchange points. Sometimes, CSS elements and als, of coutse. Full-up reheads attachments benefit the most from E-hearsais because, often for the first time, they can see where they fit into the scheme of maneuver in relation to the combat elements.

PreCornbat Inspections Good pre-combat inspections (PCI) result from good, usable checklists and ruthless enforcement. COKM commanders should have two PCI checklists. One is all-encompassing, for more formal, stand-by type inspections, when time is not critical. The other, more often used, is tailored to the type of mission anticipated, covers critical items, and can be completed in a short amount of time. All leaders must rigidly adhere to the standards of each check and must ensure, if the inspection is delegated to a lower level, that subordinate leaders adhere to the standards. COKM commanders must also apply the above criteria to attached units, and ensure the COFM has a checklist for that type unit, e.g., a Stinger section.

It is a rare tactical situation that allows the commander to personally conduct a full pre-combat inspection. More often, the commander can only spot check. It is critical, however, that he fmd time to inspect some critical item. For example, the commander can check that tank commanders and dismounted squad leaders have the appropriate graphics posted. If one does not, that fact may be indicative of a larger, more serious dissemination problem. The commander will get a feel for his unit’s readiness, even through a brief spot check. Junior leaders, in turn, get to see the commander and perhaps get clarification on some part of the fight they might not have otherwise gotten. Boresig htlZero Units must boresight/zro at every opportunity. A COnM can maneuver brilliantly, but they are of no use if they cannot kill. This fact seems self-evident, yet this precombat task is often either overlooked or not done frequently enough. All weapons must go through this procedure at every o p portunity, including the small arms of the infantry. Other pre-combat tasks are often decentralized, but boresight/zem is so essential to the CO/TM’s lethality and survivability that the commander may consider conducting the task under CORM supervision at the anticipated engagement ranges.

We train as we fight, or more exactly, we fight as we have trained. CO/Iu commanders, then, must emphasize the capabilities, limitations and maintenance of their MILES systems just as they do the actual weapons. If soldiers and leaders constantly check, clean and boresight their MILES in training, those habits will cany over to combat.

The COm commander can most influence the outcome of his fight by insisting that these pre-combat tasks be accomplished kfom every mission. Further, he must instill in his subordinate leaders the understanding that they must accomplish them in the commander’s absence.

Captain David J. Lemelin Jr. is a 1983 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy. He has attended the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He has commanded a Bradley-equipped infantry company and HHC, 1/32 Armor, 1st Cavalry Division, the latter during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and during three NTC rotations. He is currently a small group instructor at the Armor Officer Advance Course.

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