Learning the Hard Way

Learning the Hard Way: The Coordination Between Infantry Divisions and Separate Tank Battalions During the Breakout from Normandy by Captain Richard S. Faulkner As the 83d Infantry Division’s attack toward Sointeny began on 10 July 1944, the 2d Platoon leader of A Company, 746th Tank Battalion, started to worry. His platoon was attached to 2d Battalion, 329th Infantry Regiment with orders to provide any support possible to the battalion. The 2-329 battalion commander had turned down the platoon leader’s request for infantry to cover the tank platoon’s exposed flank. As the lone platoon maneuvered through the maze-like hedgerows of the French bocage country, the platoon leader’s worst fears became reality. Without warning, well-concealed antitank guns opened fire on the American tanks at point-blank range. Withii minutes the 2d Platoon had ceased 1 to exist. The experience of the 2d Platoon is but one example of how the failure of light infantry and armor to work together led to high losses for both arms during the breakout from Normandy. Contrary to the popular image of American armor blitzing across France, the reality was a slow and methodical fight through the hedgerows of Normandy. This tight was a slugging match that required infantry and tanks to coordinate their efforts for mutual survivability. The breakout from the beachhead quickly showed that both arms were ill trained, organized, informed, and equipped to meet this challenge. By studying the use of armor by the lst, 9th, 29th, 30th, and 83d Infantry Divisions from 6 June through 31 July 1944, we can better understand the problems of combined light infantry and armor operations. All the infantry regiments of these divisions 24 ARMOR - JUly-AugUSt 7990

"Contrary to the popular belief of American armor blitzing across France, the reality was a slow and methodical fight through the hedgerows of Normandy. This fight was a slugging match that required infantry and tanks to coordinate their efforts for mutual survivability." I

FIGHTING ALONG A HEDGEROW IN FRANCE

fought and moved on foot. Though not classified as light infantry during World War 11, these units are very close in organization and tactics to the "light-fighters" of today's Army. It is also important to understand the nature of warfare in the hedgerows. The hedgerows of Normandy are tall mounds of earth with impenetrable growths of trees planted on top. Norman farmers built the hedgerows to protect their fields from the ravages of the sea winds. Over time, the hedgerows grew into walls enclosing each small farm. The Norman countryside is criss-crossed by blocks upon blocks of these natural fortifications. Though the landscape of Normandy is unique, it does provide examples of how infantry and tanks worked together in armor-limiting terrain. Armor and Infantry Organization in 1944 One of the major. problems encountered during the breakout from Normandy was that there were no armored units organic to infantry divisions. All separate tank and tank-destroyer battalions were corps assets, allocated by the corps commander, depending on the situation and the mission. In theory, the corps commanders had enough tank and tank-destroyer battalions to attach onq of each to every infantry division.- However, tank losses following the invasion quickly drained the corps' ability to keep the infantry divisions supported with armor. As a result, the existing tank battalions constantly rotated among the infantry divisions in contact. The majority of the tank battalions were attached to at least two different divisions during June and July. For example, the 746th Tank Battalion was attached to three dif-febent infantry divisions (the 9th, 83d, and 90th) from 12 June through 16 July 1944: These continuous rotations further weak-ened the corps' depleted armor assets, and prevented "habitual" attachment of specific tank battalions to specific divisions. These problems remained until the arrival of additional tanks allowed corps to maintain a "one-battalion-to-one-division" ratio, and a reserve. Once an infantry division received a tank battalion, the division commander usually gave a tank company to each regiment. The regimental commander in turn would attach a tank platoon to each infantry battalion. The June 1944 After Actions Report of the 745th Tank Battalioii stated that the best ratio for the attack was one platoon to each battalion, and in the defense, a pure company to the regiment as a counterattack force." The habit of reducing the tank battalions to platoon-size elements left many battalion and company commanders without units to command. The loss of control by the armor commanders proved to be a problem without a real solution. The armor commanders became coordinators and advisors to the division and regimental commanders. Because the Norman terrain precluded the mass use of armor, the diffusion of tank power was easier for the armor commanders to accept. The tank platoon attached to the infantry battalion was normally not split any further, though employment of one or two tanks to a company was not uncommon. Commanders quickly discovered that tanks deployed below the platoon level suffered increased casualties due to the lack of interlocking support. The tank platoon was usually attached to the lead company or maintained as a battalion reserve. The infantry battalions used tanks mostly as mobile machine gun platforms to clear the hedgerows of enemy snipers and machine gun nests. The infantry provided the tanks additional "eyes and ears" to locate and reduce antitank guns and mines in the thickly-wooded Norman countryside? As units became more battle-wise, infantry company commanders often attached a rifle squad to their supporting tank platoons to provide the tanks direct flank security and route reconnaissance." When both the armor and infantry leaders understood the tactics and abilities of the other, the task organization worked extremely well. Armor-Infantry Team Training The major hindrance to tank-infantry cooperation was a lack of infantry and armor team training before the invasion. All infantry divisions were supposed to have received tank training in the United States as a part of their certification for overseas movement.' Additional tank-infantry team training was to have been accomplished in England during preparation for the invasion. The amount and quality of training ARMOR - JUly-AUguSt 1990 25 in both the United States and England varied greatly from division to division, but for the most part was less than adequate. Training in the United States was hindered by shortages of tanks available to the infantry divisions. These shortages were due to arguments over the employment of tank battalions, and an Army policy of stockpiling tanks in Great Britain for the invasion? The argument over the employment of the tank battalions was based on whether to gather all tanks into armor divisions, or to leave some tanks available to infantry divisions from corps pools. The solution was a compromise that decreased the number of tank battalions in armor divisions to free up tanks for the corps. The tank battalions released from the armor divisions were not available to the infantry divisions for training until late 1943: too late for most of the divisions in the Normandy campaign. Armor and infantry training in Great Britain also proved to be poor. Training in the infantry divisions tended to focus on the assault of the beaches, rather than tactics for the breakout. No one seems to have given much thought to the problems of operating in the hedgerows. Many of the infantry regiments that would fight in Normandy received only cursory armor training in Britain. The only combined arms training the 747th Tank Battalion received consisted of "taking infantry for tank rides on the Devon Moors."" Armor and infantry team training did not cease with the unit's deployment to combat. Real bullets and casualties quickly showed how ill-prepared infantry and tank units were to work together. When possible, the corps and division commanders pulled units out of the line for tank team training. The 747th Tank Battalion, for example, was pulled out of combat from 20-28 July 1944 to practice reducing hedgerows with units from the 29th Division." This type of training was common throughout June and July, as units developed their own tactics to deal with situations for which they had not been prepared. The lack of combined arms training before the invasion greatly contributed to the high losses in tanks and infantry. The American soldier in Normandy received the majority of his tank-infantry training through the school of hard knocks. Combat proved to be the catalyst that welded the two arms into an effective fighting team. Early Problems With Tank-Infantry Coordination Lack of Cohesion and Team Building. During the Normandy Campaign, the tank battalions were unable to effectively fit into the infantry divisions' organization because the divisions did not "own" the tank battalions that supported them. Effective working relations and operating procedures were difficult to establish when the divisions were constantly changing tank battalions. Personnel turnover and the incessant use of the tank battalions, further aggravated this problem. A soldier of the 743d Tank Battalion observed, "A tank cortipariv riiiglrt work with one infantry regiriiertt one day arid another regiment the nert, but it was alwqys working, alwqs moving ahead on an attack, or remaining on the alert in an advanced road block or defensive position. tt12 The overall result was poor cohesion and team-building between the tankers and the supported unit. These problems would remain until late 1944, when additional tank battalions allowed semipermanent attachments of armor to all infantry divisions. When infantry divisions were finally allowed habitual relationships with their tank battalions, cohesion problems tended to go away. The 1st Infantry Division was unusual in that it had the 745th Tank Battalion attached to it from June 1944 to the end of the war. The 1st Division habitually attached tank companies aad platoons to specific regiments and battalions. The men found that the "permanent attachments of tank platoons to battalions increased the respect for capabilities of the ~ther."'~ The tankers of the 745th began to feel that they were part of a team, and responded with greater loyalty to the infantrymen whom they supported. Communications Problems. Communication between tanks and infantry was the major technical problem of the combined arms team. The radio sets issued to infantry platoons and companies would net only limited frequencies with tank radios.14 'Walkie-talkie" squad radios were ineffective in infantry-armor operations because of static produced by the tank engines." Infantry leaders had to climb on the tanks to talk to the tank commanders. Because the tanks buttoned-up in combat, the infantryman had to first beat on the tank to get the tank commander's attention. This proved to be a dangerous and inadequate way of transmitting orders under enemy fire. Early use of hand and pyrotechnic signals met with only limited success. These type signals were difficult to see and understand from a buttoned-up tank in close terrain. Inventive American soldiers provided many solutions to the com- 26 ARMOR - JUly-AUgUStl990 munications problem. Tankers of the 743d Tank Battalion linked field phones to their vehicles' intercom system. The field phones allowed the infantry leaders to pass on instructions without exposing themselves to enemy fire.16 All tank battalions in Normandy eventually developed similar systems. These systems worked well as long as the infantry could keep close to the tanks. When the tanks received an independent task to accomplish, communications again broke down. The communications problem was completely solved when additional infantry-type radios became available in July for installation in the tanks." Lack of Tactical Understanding Between the Arms. The greatest problem encountered in tank-infantry operations in Normandy was the failure of both arms to understand the tactics and employment of the other. This problem was a direct result of the tank battalions not being organic to the divisions for training and combat. A 1st Army after-action report stated, "Many of our infantry commanders do not possess sufficient knowledge of the proper employment of tanks as an infantry support weapon, and insufficient opportunitjl is given in the infantry division in training to become familiar with, and work with, the separate tank battalions."'* Armor leaders, in turn, did not understand the mechanics of working with the infantry and could not advise the infantry commanders. On the battlefield, this lack of understanding would cause undue confusion, casualties, and lost opportunities. Many infantry commanders tended to use their attached tanks and tank destroyers as nothing more than mobile pillbo~es.'~ If infantry commanders subscribed to

HEDGEROW BOUNDARIES BETWEEN NORMAN FIELDS HINDERED MANEUVER.

the mistaken idea of armor inwl-nerability, the other extreme was to use tanks in unsupported attacks. Experience showed these tactics to be a great waste of a limited resource. The infantrymen and tankers soon found that no advance was possible without close coordination and support. Each had to explicitly rely on the abilities and firepower of the other to survive. Unfortunately, this proved to be a lesson that had to be painfully relearned by each new division that landed in Normandy. The tank battalions were not without their share of tactical misconceptions. The tankers had conducted a majority of their training as part of a whole battalion or company. Armor officers, remembering the French mistake of parceling out tanks to the infantry in 1940, were reluctant to support the infantry divisions. Both officers and men had come to think of tanks as weapons that used speed and mass to break through all enemy resistance. Working in the hedgerows with the infantry forced the tankers to re-examine their concepts of armored operations. Many tankers learned the hard way that unsupported "blitz" attacks through hedgerows were a fast way to win Purple Hearts." As combat experience grew, in. fantry leaders relied more on the input and judgment of the armor commanders. The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, both veterans of campaigns in North Africa and Sicily, rapidly assimilated their tank battalions, and had fewer problems with tank-infantry cooperation. An officer in the 1st Division pointed out, "It was found most important to have a platoon leader's recommendation prior to an attack, since he was much better qualified to determine routes of approach."21 The 29th, 30th, and 83d were "green" divisions with little experience in armor operations. The failure of these units to learn from the mistakes and lessons of others was best illustrated in the burning tanks and dead American soldiers that dotted the Norman countryside. The 30th Division's 14-15 June attack toward the Vire-et-Taut Canal was slowed by regimental and battalion commanders' failure to listen to the advice of officers of the 743d Tank Battalion which had learned some hard lessons by previously supporting the 29th Division. One infantry battalion S3 ordered a tank platoon of the 747th Tank Battalion, though out of ammunition, to sup-ARMOR - JUly-AUgUSt 1990 27

AFTER NORMANDY BREAKOUT, INFANTRY OF THE 29TH DIVISION MOVE THROUGH THE RUBBLE OF VIRE, FRANCE.

port an attack to keep up the thin belly armor to close-range an-morale of the infa11try.2~ titank fires. The tanks could not move until the infantry destroyed Overcoming the Problems the antitank guns. The infantry could not destroy the antitank guns Early attempts at unsupported at-because the tanks could not sup-tacks by both branches proved cost-press the enemy machine guns. The ly. Tanks trying to climb over the solution was to breach the hedgerows exposed the vehicles' hedgerow so the tanks could get to m i-4 the flanks or rear of the enemy before antitank guns could respond. American soldiers quickly improvised methods of accomplishing this task. When they found the use of demolition charges alone ineffective, the soldiers hit on the idea of attaching two poles to the front of the tanks to bore holes in the hedgerows. This device allowed them to place the demolition charges deep inside the hedgerow." Once the breach was made, the tanks and infantry. would rapidly move in and secure the objective. The drawback to this method was the time it took to make the breach, and the dust kicked up from the explosion often alerted the enemy to the attack. Sgt. Culm is credited with discovering that plow-like teeth welded to the front of the tanks enabled the vehicles to push directly through the hedgerows without stopping. These devices became standard equipment for tanks until the end of the campaign.'s

MONTHS AFTER NORMANDY, THIS M4 STILL HAD ITS CULIN DEVICE ATTACHED.

28 ARMOR - July-AUgUSt 7990 Another problem to overcome was the difference in mobility between the tanks and the infantry. Infantry training did not include moving troops quickly around the battlefield to exploit success or fight off counterattacks. The infantry regiments depended on the truck companies of the division for most long-range movement. When terrain became more open, the tanks were still restricted by the movement of the foot soldiers, because the truck companies were not considered a combat asset. To overcome this problem, the infantry often rode directly on the tanks for exploitations and hasty movements. The 9th Division's 60th Infantry Regiment and 746th Tank Battalion used this technique with great success during the 16 June attack on Reigneville? Other units went as far as mounting infantry squads on tanks for assaults on hedgerows. This tactic was risky, but could provide a good mix of tanks and infantry at critical locations during an attack. Normandy is also dotted with small towns and some fairly large cities. Narrow city streets could be more dangerous to tanks than the worst hedgerow. In small towns, the tanks would move under close infantry support and provide "bunker-busting" fires. In the cities, the infantry commanders would use some armor for close support, but would leave the majority of the tanks to cut off enemy retreat and reinforcements. The use of armor to cover the escape and counterattack routes was decisive in the capture of St. Lo and Cherbourg. Summary The Normandy campaign illustrates how infantry and tanks worked together in armor-limiting terrain. The breakout from the beaches proved that proper organization, training, and knowledge is essential for tank-infantry cooperation. The organization of forces during the campaign did not provide adequate armor support to the infantry divisions. Because the tank battalions were not organic to the divisions, the building of teams and cohesion was hindered. It is also clear that training did not place enough emphasis on tank-infantry teams before combat. This lack of training prevented both arms from understanding the tactics and employment of the other. Both tankers and infantrymen were forced to gain a working knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the other before they could make progress. Even with these difficulties, American soldiers were able to improvise to solve most tactical problems. Survival compelled the two arms to work together and exchange ideas. Notes 'After Actions Report of the 746th Tank Battalion, July 1944, p. 8. 2Kent Greenfield et at., U.S. Armv In World War II. The Armv Ground Forces, The Oraanization of Ground Combat TrOODS, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 333. 3AAR of the 746th Tank Battalion. 4After Actions Report of the 745th Tank Battalion, JuneJuly 1944, p. 1. 5FM 17-36, Emdovment of Tanks With Infantw, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 March 1944), p. 2. 6First U.S. Army Report of Operations: 20 October 1943-1 August 1944: Part I and Annex 3-11 (Headquarters, First U.S. Army, 1944), p. 122 (Part I). 7Greenfield, p. 294. 8Robert Palmer et al., Y.S. Armv In World War It. The Armv Ground Forces, The Procurement and Trainina of Ground Combat Troops, (Washington D.C.: US. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 557. 'Greenfield, p. 333. l0LT Homer D. Wilkes, The 747th Tank & (Scottsdale, Ariz.: Self-published, 1976), p. 6. "After Actions Report of the 747th Tank Battalion, JuneJuly 1944, p. 2, Para "LT John D, Hess, Move Out. Verifv: The Combat Stow of the 743rd Tank Battalion, (Frankfurt-On-Main, Germany: Unit-Published, 1945), p. 31. 13James A. Huston, BioPraDhy of a Battalion (Gerlng, Neb.: The Courier Press, 1950), p. 38. II, 1-3. 14FM 17-36, pp. 15 and 101. 15Hess, p. 58. l6Ibid., p. 58. "Martin Blumenson, Y.S. A rmv In World War 11. The EuroDean Theater of Ooerations. Breakout and Pursuit, (Washington D.C.: US. Government Print-In Office, 1961), p. 43. QBFirst Army Report of Operations, p. 122 (part I). "Greenfield, p. 416. mFirst Army Report of Operations, p. 21Camptmll, p. 4. 22Hess, p. 46. 23Wlkes, p. 15. 24Ewing, p. 83. 25Blumenson, p. 206. 26CPT Joseph B. Mittleman, Elaht Stars To Wcton/, (Washington D.C.: Ninth infantry Division Association, 1948), p. 169. 123 (Part I). Captain Richard S. Faulkner received a B.A. in history from Kennesaw State College in 1985. He was commissioned in 1984 under the Early Commissioning Program, and served in the interrogation and counterintelligence sections of the 273d MI Company (USAR). He entered active duty in Armor and is a graduate of AOBC, Airborne, and AOAC. He has served as a tank platoon leader and tank company XO in 1-33 Armor at Ft. Lewis, and is presently assigned to 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division as assistant S3. ARMOR - JUly-AugUst 1990 29