The Combat Reconnaissance Detachment In the Meeting Engagement and Defense Or, how to beat them at their own game

Acknowledgntertts llte concept of a senti-independent advance guard oganizatioit within an anitorliiecitatized task force is not an original one witlt this writer. BG Wesley Clark, contritaitdec NTC Ft. Irwin, arid foniter brigade coni-ntander, addressed tlte need for an organization and tactics to counter tlte Soviet meeting ertgagernent doctrine in 1987, afer exercising Iris rotational brigade in riteeting engagentents at the NTC. LTC J. Richard Wallace, contritartdirtg a balanced battalion task force, achiallv employed a siritilar fonnatioit in riteeting eitgage-ntents at the NTC in 1988. rite ideas of these two oficers, arid tlte efiorts artd lessons-Ieanted of real soldiers iirtder titent, have foniied tlte basis of this article. The Problem The Soviets believe the meeting engagement will be the typical battle of the next war. Their doctrine and trainiig focuses on removing or minimizing all of the unknowns prevalent in a meeting engagement. On the other hand, U. S. Army doctrine for the battalion task force in this situation appears to operate in a vacuum. It does not consider, nor capitalize, on the. predictability of Soviet doctrine for the meeting engagement. FM 71-2 focuses on a meeting engagement with a single enemy entity, whereas Soviets will, move to contact in separate echelons, a technique geared toward defeating an opposing task force focused on one enemy entity! Our doctrine directs that the battalion task force designate a forward companylteam as its advance guard, providing security, and enabling the task force main body freedom to maneuver uncommitted. Curiously enough, it also directs that the task force will support the advance guard by following within two kilometers.' That short interval commits the main body to an axis of advance following its advance guard companylteam and will, within four minutes, bring it under fire of the same enemy (most likely the Soviet Forward Security Element or FSE) ARMOR - 7 engaging the advance guard. The close proximity of the task force main body to its own advance guard makes the job of reconnaissance for the Soviet Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP) and FSE so much easier. It puts the entire task force within one sweep of the binoculars. The Soviet advance guard battalion commander, yet uncommitted with his main body, merely designates the appropriate battle drill, a direction of attack, and the battalion objective - an enemy task force attempting to extricate itself from a fvring battle with the Soviets' own

FSE.

Just as significant, the vagueness inherent in our doctrine requires commanders to train for and consider a host of different contingencies, when they need focus on only a few, based on Soviet doctrine. Worse, they might focus on the wrong situation. That vagueness requires commanders to consider and train for any number of events which SOPS and battle drills can't adequately cover. Decision-making takes longer. Execution takes longer. "The friction of war" infects decision-making and exemtion as tired, confused leaders labor with a myriad of courses of action to cover every contingency; subunits interpret and react to FRAGOs for which they did not anticipate or rehearse. So much for getting inside the other guy's decision cycle. A contrived scenario? No. Too many readers have seen this actually happen, or variations of it, at the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin. The Blue Force meets defeat in the meeting engagement for a number of reasons; piecemeal deployment of combat power, first-battle jitters, poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield, etc. But there exists a more fundamental weakness; we execute tactics based on doctrine of FM 71-2 without sufficient consideration of Soviet doctrine. Page-to-page comparison of FM 200-2-1, Soviet A n y Operations and Tactics, and our own FM 71-2 illustrates the disparity. Soviet View of Meeting Engagements According to FM 200-2-1, Soviets characterize the meeting engagement by 0 Intense combat with con- 0 Extremely limited planning ocontinuous effort to seize and 0 Deployment into combat from 0Uncertainty due to lack of 0 Sudden changes in the situation. 0 Open flanks on each side. siderable room to maneuver. time; heavy reliance on battle drills. maintain the initiative. the march at high speed. detailed intelligence. They will m i n i i e the meeting engagement as purely a chance occurrence by anticipating it and planning for it. Soviet commanders will make extensive use of continuous reconnaissance. They will organize their forces to ease reconnaissance, extend their decision-making t\me and allow for speedy deployment.' One could liken the Soviet's use of the FSE to a boxer's left jab. The boxer jabs with his left, pushing, frustrating his opponent, sensing the distance to his jaw, f n g his exact location, all the while planning for the instant to release a decisive roundhouse right fist against the side of his opponents face. Unfortunately, our accepted tactic of maintaining all of our task force elements, advance guard and all, within. direct fire support of each other, amounts to tying our own left hand behind our back and smacking our opponent's left jab with our face! The Solution This situation is not all gloom and doom. Soviet doctrine makes their forces extremely predictable. Regimental and battalion-level battle drills require extensive coordination with supporting arms. Command groups, especially at battalion level, are not effectively staffed to provide either coordination or flexible responses to unexpected situations. 3 We can still beat these guys simply by turning their predictability against them, task-organizing for combat to frustrate their organization and intentions, and gearing our tactics to counteract their speed and inflexibility. Task organization requires no changes to our existing TOE. Our tactical doctrine is basically sound. But, to be effective, it must attend to the opposing doctrine. Introducing the Combat Reconnaissance Detachment We can task organize to create our own "left jab" and still maintain enough combat power in our task force main body to outgun the enemy battalion main body. The following task organization depicts this new force: Combat Reconnaissance Detachment 0 Provisional Tank Platoon (con- 0 M901 TOW (1TV)Platoon 0 Mortar Section (3 Tubes) 0 Engineer Platoon (Mobile sisting of 6 tanks) Obstacle Detachment) Each tank company will' detach one headquarters tank. These four 8 ARMOR - July-August 7990 tanks will task organize with the two battalion headquarters tanks and, under command of the battalion's master gunner, will form the provisional tank platoon. Tanks will comprise the principal combat element of the detachment. Overwatch and long-range fires will be provided by one ITV platoon normally cross-attached from the sister mechanized battalion. If the task force scouts are equipped with HMMWVs from within the battalion, their ITVs may join this element, further increasing its firepower. A split section of mortars (three tubes) with fire direction center (FDC) from the armor battalion's organic mortar platoon will provide immediate indirect fire suppression and smoke by direct lay. An engineer platoon(-) (OPCON) will provide support in mobility, countermobility, and engineer reconnaissance. One squad from that engineer platoon will support the scout platoon with engineer reconnaissance. The armor battalion's headquarters company commander, normally the most experienced combat arms company-grade officer, will command and control the detachment. Because the CRD's initial contact will be critical to the continued success of the mission, the task force S3 should position himself to provide overall direction to the CRC, report its situation, and recommend courses of action to the task force commander based on its progress. He is the second most experienced combat arms officer in the field. Coupled with the experience of the CRD's commander (if properly selected), engineer platoon leader, ITV platoon leader, and battalion master gunner, a preponderance of leadership now lies forward in the task force, where it can best influence a most critical stage of the meeting engagement. CRD Effectiveness Against Soviet Doctrine Aptly named, this unit will fight as an advance guard, detached from its parent armor task force, up to seven kilometers forward and away from immediate direct fire support. Current doctrine designates a company/team as the advance guard, depriving the commander of 25 percent of his combat power for maneuver against the Soviet advance guard battalion. The CRD provides a separate, detached combat force to deal with the CRP and FSE, leaving the armor task force largely intact. The commander still has four complete company/teams with which to maneuver against the Soviet advance guard battalion. The mission of the CRD is uncan-nily similar to that of the FSE. The scout platoon will vector the CRD toward the Soviet platoon-sized CRP. The CRD will attempt to ambush and destroy the Soviet CRP quickly, or fm him with direct and indirect fires. Whatever the outcome, the CRD will not embroil itself in that fight, because its primary mission is to find and ambush the Soviet FSE. Once the scouts acquire the FSE, they will now vector the CRD toward an engagement area where it can expect to engage and fur the Soviet element. The CRD intends to destroy the FSE, or neutralize it so that, on order, it might position itself to block a likely avenue of approach of the Soviet advance guard battalion. In a movement to contact, the CRD will march at.least seven kilometers behind the leading scout platoon screen,. and approximately six kilometers forward of the armor task force. Assuming the scouts can see forward three kilometers, that interval gives the CRD commander ten kilometers of maneuver space, but only ten minutes or so to deploy against the Soviet CRP. Remember, the two forces are closing on each other at a combined 60 kilometers per hour. Assuming the CRP can be engaged and destroyed within five minutes - not unrealistic, considering the CRD will ambush it with a two-to-one advantage - the CRD still has another 10 to 15 minutes, based on Soviet march rates, to get set against the oncoming FSEP If time runs short, the CRD commander uses his option to drop a small sub-element from his detachment to fur the CRP, taking it out of the play and away from a position to observe and report to the Soviet battalion commander. He still maintains a favorable ratio of forces with which to ambush the FSE. Timely and accurate reports by the scouts are critical to enable the CRD commander to anticipate engagement areas around which he can establish an ambush. In addition to firepower, his advantage lies in ability to get set first and ambush the Soviet units, rather than collide with them and likely suffer one-for-one casualties. The detachment can sustain itself in all classes of supply through various options. Preferably, it may receive logistical support through the mortar platoon's resources, under supervision of the mortar platoon sergeant, or a designated "field first sergeant" from headquarters company assets. The unique logistical requirements of its diverse weapons systems makes this option most attractive, especially if the CRD will permanently task-organize under control. Another option would consist of habitually assigning logistical responsibility to aline company/team. Under this option, the detachment ARMOR - 9 would co-locate for replenishment with the nearest habitually assigned company team. Picture, if you will, this CRD’s impact from the perspective of a Soviet advance guard battalion commander moving to contact. His CRP platoon leader reported that he has engaged a combined arms element of approximately company size (much bigger than a platoon), but sees no sign of a larger body. Where is it? The Soviet commander has two options at this point. He can deploy his FSE to an anticipated flank of that last contact, hoping the remainder of the American task force will appear, or he can maintain the FSE‘s original route of march. Either way, the FSE will make contact with, and be fmed by, the CRD. He cannot fm a location of the task force because it remains over three kilometers beyond the contact, out of visual observation, but moving, awaiting the scouts’ first spot reports of the Soviet advance guard battalion. As the Soviet FSE and the CRD make contact and transmit

The Combat Reconnaissance t As Advanced Guard for the Taa letachment;k Force initial contact reports, the Soviet battalion commander still lacks hard intelligence on the location of the task force. Once again, he has two options: march to the sound of the guns, hoping the task force will appear in the vicinity of the contact; or bypass the fight, and kick out another FSE and CRP to continue the search. With his FSE in contact he has only two-thirds of his combat power remaining with which to maneuver. He intends that speed will offset his lack of numbers. Meanwhile, the American task force is still intact. If the scouts are successful, they will have detected the movement and direction of the Soviet advance guard battalion. The task force commander now has the information he needs to select an engagement area, deploy his company/teams, and engage the Soviet battalion on his own terms. When his CRD made contact with the Soviet FSE, his task force and the Soviet battalion would be closing from, by doctrine, eight to ten kilometers. Enough time? Probably, considering that the task force easily outguns the Soviet battalion, it maintains a reconnaissance advantage over a relatively ‘%blind” Soviet battalion, and it still has room to maneuver. With this task organization, you have given the task force commander a means to accomplish his mission without drastic or fanciful changes to TOE, or doctrine. He will win because his tactics and task o%anization are designed to disrupt the Soviet battalion commander’s reconnaissance, prevent premature decisive engagements, and increase his own freedom of maneuver and reaction time. With these advantages, the task force commander can seize the initiative. 70 ARMOR - July-AUgUSt 7990

Counterarguments What aspects of the organization and tactics of employment of the combat reconnaissance detachment, might possibly contradict doctrine? It departs from FM 71-2 in two areas. The CRD, as advance guard for the battalion task force, marches seven kilometers Forward of the task force main body, rather than the one-to-two kilometers stated in FM 71-2. The increased interval protects the main body from being engaged simultaneously with its own advance guard. Secondly, effective execution requires some increased interval between scouts and the advance guard, ideally one-half hour or more. Real world considerations of passing through an allied unit restrict early crossing of the LD/LC. It follows that the acceptable interval from scouts to advance guard could be gained only by delaying the CRD's crossing of the LD. Similarly, the task force main body would delay crossing the LD for at least 15 minutes after its CRD. The total time required by a lead task Force of a brigade combat team to complete passage of lines and cross the LD will approach 60 minutes, along time, but necessary in order to build the interval needed that provides adequate security to the task force and ultimately, the brigade. Summarizing the Advantages The CRD provides the following advantages: 0Allows more efficient use of combat power, creates economy of force, gives four maneuver teams back to the task force.. Places a preponderance of experienced leadership forward at a critical location on the battlefield. 0 Gives the task force commander a standoff capability, allowing him to maneuver unobserved with greater combat power against the Soviet main body. 0 Headquarters tanks are now better used as fighting vehicles rather than command and control vehicles.. Gives added depth to the task force defense in sector. 0 Forces early deployment and disrupts synchronization of Soviet attack. 0 Can organize without changing current TOStEs. Conclusion Soviet doctrine demonstrates that they have made the meeting engagement a critical scenario, one they plan on winning. By their use of battle drills, the Soviets have made the meeting engagement an exercise in reflexes. Those of us who have experienced that doctrine, as practiced by the OPFOR at the NTC, can attest to its effectiveness. Unfortunately, our o m present doctrine fails to attend to the meeting engagement with the same deptn of analysis. It fails to account for the left jab and roundhouse right punch in the Soviet combat formations. Employment of a CRD will counter his left jab by neutralizing his reconnaissance, and destroying the formation with which he intends to fuc our task force. The CRD will accomplish its mission sufficiently forward to allow the task force main body freedom to maneuver, unobserved and intact, against the Soviet advance guard battalion. The CRD gives added depth to the task force's defense mission. All of this can happen without changing TOSrE, or adding extra personnel. The means already exists within our organizations. All that remains is to make it happen. Notes 'Field Manual FM 17-2. The Tank and Mechanized lnfantrv Battalion Task Force, September 1988, pp. 3-44 - 3-46. *Field Manual FM 200-2-1. The Soviet Armv. Operations and Tactics, 16 July 1984, p. 5-30. %. J. Dick, "Soviet Battle Drills, Vulnerability or Strength?," International Defense Review, No. 5, 1985, pp. 663-664. 4Timings for friendly forces are based upon a 12-15mph march speed, at which it would take just over 2.2 minutes to traverse one kilometer. Soviet forces move at a doctrinal rate of march of 30 kilometers per hour. At that pace, they would traverse one kilometer in exactly two minutes. Major Bryan L. Oliver graduated from West Point in 1974. He led tank and scout platoons at Fort Hood, Texas, and Germany, and commanded a tank company. He taught tank and cavalry platoon tactics at the Armor School at Ft. Knox and commanded an OSUT Cavalry troop. Major Oliver acted as operations officer for the commandant at West Point. He graduated from CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, and has recently completed a two-year assignment as a tank battalion S3 at Ft. Carson. He is presently assigned as Armor Branch Assistance Team Chief, Readiness Group, Ft. McCoy, Wisconsin. ARMOR - 11