Army Fitness and Combat Readiness

Notes

1. A current copy of DA Pam 25-30, Consolidated Index of Armv Publications and Blank Forms. This pamphlet is a source document for 12-series subscription members for administrative. doctrinal, and training publications. Units previously subscribed to publications in these categories by submitting DA Forms 12-4R through 12-12A-R. all of which have been superseded by the new "E forms." DA Pam 25-33. page G-1 (Glossary) describes the "E form" and its use. DA Pam 26-30 is updated and pubilished quarterly in microfiche format. How to use DA Pam 25-30? Easy. We will use FM 17-98. Scout Platoon. as an example. Just follow these steps: 0 First. look at the last page of your DA Pam 25-33. It should be DA Form 12-99-R. A is an "R form." and reproduction is authorized. Find a copy machine and run a few copies.
2. Second. go to your microfiche viewer with your packet of DA Form 25-30. Find the FM category (Section 5-1 of the Dec 88 edition). Look for the line "FM 17-98. Scout Platoon." Immediately following the title should read "Subscription Form: 12-11-E BLK 1041."
3. Third. go to your reproduced DA Form 12-9943. Under the column headed FORM NUMBER. enter "11-E." Under the column headed BLOCK NUMBER. enter "1041." Under the column headed QUANTITY REQUIRED. enter the total number of FM 17-98s your unit needs. Complete your unit's publication request and submit per your unit SOP (normally to higher headquarters where publication requests are consolidated). In using this example. we have assumed that you have an established account in good standing with Baltimore, and all is in accordance with Chapters 3-6 of DA Pam 25-33. The system can work, if we make it work. USE YOUR TRAINING PUBLICATIONS. A Use for Carbonless Carbon Paper in the Field CFJT David M. Dodge of 3-66 Armor suggests that units in the field reproduce orders on carbonless paper. A's available in the supply system under the NSN 7530-01-078-7144, That gets you a box of 700 sets of 5-part carbonless paper. It's also good for producing multiple copy sector sketches. If you can think of any other field uses. write your suggestion down. and send your idea to Advanced Tactics Branch, Command and Staff Department, U.S. Army Armor School. Fort Knox, Ky. 40121-5211. POC is CPT Bob S. Stone, Advanced Tactics Branch, Combined Arms Division. Command and Staff Department, AV 464-231916651. Four Crews Score 1,000 Points Four M551A1 Sheridan crews achieved perfect 1.000-point scores on Tank Table Vlll at Fort Bragg's Range 63 as 3d Battalion. 73d Armor fired for annual qualification. A total of 59 crews fired. with 47 qualifying on the first run. The members of the crews with perfect scores were CPT F. Sherman, 2LT G. Owens, SSG A. Pegues. SSG P. Hernandez, SGT G. Craig, SGT J. Feliciano, SGT M. Naegele, SPCs R. VanKluyve, A. Holquin, T. Collings. D. Soder-berg, PFCs D. Place, J. Oryan, PV2s M. Adkins, W. Staggs, and PVT M. May. Results of the gunnery were released by the 82d Airborne Division. ARMOR - July-AugUSt 7989 Vietnam at the Macro Level: Part of a Three-way Struggle Between the U.S, China, and the Soviet Union? Vietnam: Strategy for a Stalemate, by F. Charles Parker IV, Paragon House. New York, 1989. 257 pages. $19.95. As a West Point graduate and a veteran of the Vietnam War. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Parker, like many soldiers, has found it difficult to understand the apparent lack of policy and purpose in the Johnson administration's conduct of that conflict. With subsequent research in receiving a doctorate in history in 1987 from Georgetown University, and then as a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institute, he has deduced that the conflict primarily resulted from Soviet policy to entangle the U.S. in Vietnam, to keep Communist China dependent on the Soviet Union, and to prevent a Sino-American rapprochement. Former President Nixon acknowledges that Parker's work is "the first to explore in depth the intricate moves on the international chess board between 1963 and 1968, involving the Soviet Union, China and the United States." The Kennedy and Johnson administra-tions committed forces to Vietnam on the false assumptions. says Parker, that it was vital to contain Chinese Communists, who "did not need to be contained," and that the Soviets were less a threat. They failed to understand the extent of the Sino-Soviet split. and did not respond to signals from Mao Zedong about improving Sino-American relations. A violent struggle for power was, in fact, aoing on in China. with Mao Zedong determined that the People's Republic take a course more independent of the Soviet Union. He was opposed by a faction led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (currently Vice Premier) who favored cooperation with the USSR, while a group including Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai was a swing faction. Khrushchev supplied weapons to North Vietnam to escalate the American commitment, urging "unity of action over Vietnam." to force the Chinese to reestablish their relationship with the Soviet Union. The pattern of the fighting, in Parker's view, reflected Soviet decision-making, for "Without Soviet support, the North Vietnamese could not have escalated the level of conflict." Thus the decline of Viet Cong activity by 1963 was actually because "Khrushchev had to allow the Americans to develop the perception that the advisory effort was achieving success." This success encouraged the Americans to proceed with their increasing commitment to South Vietnam, the American military presence, in turn, intended to force Mao Zedong's China back under Soviet protection. Parker's linking of the war in the field to the Kremlin's policies does get complicated. He contends that Khrushchev then escalated the war to provoke a Sino-American confrontation, which prompted the McNamara-Taylor mission, but then curtailed the flow of weapons through Sihanoukville as Mao. in turn, increased Chinese shipments. Finally, the Sino-Soviet rift over Vietnam led to Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964, which "could be viewed as a concession to China." Yet the author does not acknowledge the other factors, including Cuba and the Virgin Lands issue, that may also have prompted the political change, and in any case, the policy of Brezhnev and Kosygin remained unchanged. The Johnson-McNamara troop build-up in 1965 prompted Mao to turn on the Liu-Deng pro-Soviet faction in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966, and to boycott the 23d Party Congress in Moscow. This, in turn, argues Parker, convinced Moscow to support a Tet offensive, which would be defeated by U.S. firepower, encouraging the U.S. to mobilize to achieve final victory, and thus giving ascendance to the pro-Soviet Chinese to seek closer ties with the USSR. The Soviets did not realize that McNamara had become disillusioned (not about winning, but winning before the November 1968 elections), and that the Johnson administration had decided to limit the US. commitment to maintain a stalemate. (This administration decision for a stalemate, but without defining new national goals, is Parker's theme, though not his focus.) Nor could the Soviets have predicted Johnson's despair after Tet. As it became evident that Nixon was determined on phased withdrawal, the Soviets escalated support to slow American disengagement, especially as the new president hinted at a rapprochement with Red China. Parker touches on aspects of the American war effort and, as a soldier, is understandably critical of McNamara's approaching war, "as a mathematical equa- - -iknV based cm rcswrces and kilkatios. likewise, he is contemptuous of the "brandy-sipping oolfccrion of journalists" at the Caravelle Hotel in Saigon. who reported th6 Tet offensive as an American defeat. with such dramatic political results. mer ' s thesis is intriguing and, indeed, Ihe Sno-Soviet spri is a watershed in the world balance of parver. It is important to be reminded that events do not occur in isolation. but rather in the context of historical cwrents whose inter-relationships are not easily divided. tn the book's subject area in particular, however. decisiow making in Moscovr and Beijmg is obscured by the lack of authoritative sources. and the author's research. while extensive, is limited to open literature sow-ces, such as Pravda, the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. and the English-lan-wage Peking Review. k, any case. it can also be argued that Ho Chi Mmh and the Communist Wet-namese leadership were not simply pawns of their powerful affies, but had their own political agenda. And that uC t-mately. it was their people. not Kennedy's, who were prepared to "pay any price. bear any burden" in accomplishing their goals. AHARWNGGANZ Associate Professor. History Ohio State University at Newark The Haider War Diary: 1939-1942, Charles Burdick and Hans-Ad& Jacobsen, editors. Presidio Press, Novato. ca., 1968. 716 pages. $35 (Hardcover) 1SBN: 089141-302-2. General Fn#n HaMer was chef of Staff of the Gemran Army in the first days of WorM War 11. From the invasion of Poland until !he pa me thrust toward Stalingrad (September 1942). Halder was a key par-iicipant and. most important far history. an observant recorder of events, people. and conditions. The book is especially herprul to the student of armor and its deployment in those formafive years. (;errsral Halder had the habit of reoord-ing m e than just dates and the day's events. He listed units. deployments, op tiooS. and ottm details so necessary if one is to know the condiions under which decisianS occwed. The readec could easily understand some of the dynamics at work. The thinking of those present in these major decisions is explained. The sense of the times comes through easily-the introduction of blitzkreig in Poland. the breakthrough m the west the penetrating and encircling thrusts into Russia. One of the major tasks facing the editors was the need to cut the material down to reasonable size. From the original German work. the editors have put together the key diary entries necessary for the interested student of the early days of the war in Europe. The reader win have to be a serious student. This book is not for the casual reader. One needs to be familiar with the specific times and campaigns. PETER CHARLES UNSINGER San Jose State University The Last Magnificent War, by Harold E. Straubing. Paragon House. New York. 1989. 403 pages. $24.95. Winston Churchill once stated that the American Civil War was the last gentleman's war. The Last Maanifwnt War not only refutes that statement. it em-phasises that WWI, the first global conflict since Churchill's reference, was in all respects something less than a gentlemanly conflict. Straubing. a social historian, uses excerpts from contemporary magazine and newspaper articles. diaries, private files. speeches. books, interviews. poems. military journals. and political texts to produce an enlightening documentary of that fateful conflict. Straubing delves into diplomatic. nationalistic. religious, and military materials. as well as the two opposing coalitions - the Triple Alliance of 1882. between Germany, Austria, and Italy; and the Triple Entente of 1907. when Britain allied herself with France and Russia - and presents concise treatise of the war's an-tecedents and the final excuse for its hap pening. the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. on 28 June. 1914, in Sarajevo. The author artfully weaves in-depth data, journalistic opinions. and readable statistics that are of real value to the serious student of W. This is good fead-ing. as well as being highly informative. The Last Maanificent War is not only for the professional historian: its value also Res in its applicability to the miRtary professional for its lessons learned ohat oft-repeated but seldom heeded catch phrase). The lay reader desiring a more insightful look into that war's breeding. and how it was fought in the capitals and the newsrooms. as well as in the trenches. in the air and on the sea. will find this an especially intriguing and enlightening volume. RE. ROGGE Radcliff. KY A Portrait of the Stars and strips, by l3ud Hannings. %ram Publishing Inc.. Glenside. Pa.. 1988. 430 pages. $39.95. A Portrait of the Stars and Stripes is not a typical book of military history. The author does not concern himself with the politics or roots of America's wars. He offers no lengthy discussions of campaigns or their results. Instead. Bud Hannings has wr.Men a reference book for patriotism and valor in the American military. This book pays tribute to the thousands who have wOm the uniform. fought the wafs. and defended our country. Bud Hannings begins his book wittr the flag of the United States and "the Pledge of Allegiance." He explains: "Many of us. to be quite candid, merely take this grand Republic of ours for granted: too busy to acknowledge that our present day existence is the masterwork of a distinguished group of unselfish Americans. whom we call Patriots." Then. he provides a chronological listing of our military heritage from 19 January 1770 to 1 December 1918. A short summary text precedes each section. The book focuses on individuals who made sacrifices and is filled with memorable quotes and gallant deeds. There are accants of privates at Valley Forge, sailors and marines in Tripoli, and cavalrymen in the West. To read it is really a patriotic experience. Each section has a listing of historical sites and museums. There are extensive instructions on the care and display of the flag. The author lists both the presidents and vice presidents. as well as Medal of Honor recipients (1863-1918). He lists the Union and Confederate generals and prominent Union naval officers of the Civil War. Also. he includes other brief sections of patriotica. Some people may find the book naive. However. the author does not aggrandize warfare. and he gives accurate coverage to individuals on both sides of our military conflicts Although a great deal of the book is devoted to the Civil War. this is not inordinate It was the largest American conflict during the time period covered The author plans two sequels to deal \-,it11 our military heritage from 1918 up to the 1980s Any large. historical reference work of this nature IS bound to have some errors. Nevertheless. the few minor flaws do not detract from the author's intention. Bud Hannings wrote the book because he saw a need for his message. After rejections from publishers. Hanning decided to self-publish. (Seniram is marines spelled backward.) A Portrait of the Stars. and Stripes is a well-put-together book. The paper. printing and binding are top quality. There are many striking illustrations and photographs throughout the work However. the book is limited to black and white. and color would have benefited sonie of the illustrations A..P-ofiait of the Stars ana Stripes is not a typical militaiy histoiy book Yet it is a Iook that any 4iiierican ,-mulct enjoy having CPT \JCN IrJ B(!i:'kdEIT ARMOR Staff LETTERS (Continued from Paae 3) tle guidance. Effective intelligence preparation of the battlefield (or commander's preparation. as BG Funk mentioned) is the key method to focus the reconnaissance effort. The S2. S3. and the scout platoon leader must communicate and quickly understand the commander's intent.
4. Too many scouts are vehicle bound Platoons that successfully dismount can get in close to gain valuable intelligence. Fighting scouts lose every time. 0 Scouts need to be ready to breach obstacles. Successful platoons reduce obstacles with stealth. and mark them for follow-on engineers. A good en-gineerbcout relationship must exist. Some scout platoons move with an engineer squad during the offense. This requires extensive planning and rehearsal. 0 Unobserved artillery fire is generally ineffective. Scouts are in a position to call the first indirect fire. They need confidence and training to do this. It requires working with both the battalion FSO and the mortar platoon. Some units have successfully experimented with attaching FIST personnel. or moving with organic mortar elements.
5. Scouts need to drill on OPFOR oi-ganization and tactics This is often lip service Every scout needs to knoa what he is looking foi and why it is significant This can be acconiplished through the use of scale models sand taldes and flash cards Think of the old Indian scout and why he was such an asset to the unit 0 The scout platoon needs to sustain This is often the haidest lesson for the battalion scout platoon. FM 17-98 did not address its unique needs in a "J" series battalion. Who feeds and refuels it? What happens to casualties? Is one of the niech platoons designated to take the scout platoon's mission if it is destroyed or reconstituting? The battalion reconnaissance effort will stop if the scouts cannot resupply. Successful units use detailed logistical SOPS. The S4 and S1 must plan for increasing a nearby company LOGPAC or creating a special resupply team. Whatever the technique. only detailed planning will avert disaster. I believe the proposed scout platoon organization of 10 HMMWVs and four motorcycles is in the right direction. and will suit the application of many of these lessons. 0 This proposed organization and equipment focuses on the battalion scout platoon s piiniary mission. reconnaissance through stealth 0 The platoon is flexible. It could quickly cover more ground and more NAls (named areas of inteiest). 0 The platoon is more sustainable The PLL is coiiimon to the battalion's other vehicles and more trained mechanics are available by MTOE. Class V will be lighter and easier to move 0 One recommendation: add sniper-trained personnel. Scout platoons in Korea have l l B snipers assigned by MTOE. They continually prove their worth through long-range patrolling and application of their unique training. The NTC is our greatest training asset. and I'm sure scout platoons will continue to hone their skills in the never-ending challenge to detect and find the dreaded OPFOR of the Mojave. BART HOWARD CPT. Armor 1-72 Armor. 2d ID ROK