The Battalion Task Force S2 - Scout Platoon Leader Relationship

The Battalion Task Force S2 -Scout Platoon Leader Relationship by Captain Herbert R. McMaster Jr. Recently, many have written about the reconnaissance battle at the National Training Center. These articles, along with improvements in FM 17-98, have engendered a greater understanding of Cavalry Fighting Vehicle-equipped scout platoon operations. There are, however, certain important aspects of scout platoon operations that have not been addressed. Perhaps most important of these is the battalionhask force S2s relationship with the scout platoon leadcr. To be completely effective, the S2 and the scout platoon leader must work together as a team.

The scout platoon leader requires the S2’s assistance most while planning the operation. Time is perhaps the most limiting factor in the planning and execution of reconnaissance missions at the task force level. Time is usually in shortest supply as we prepare for the attack. During offensive operations, the scout platoon leader often cannot afford to wait for the task force operations order before the platoon begins reconnaissance. Time allows scouts to move with more stealth and reconnoiter more completely. It is extremely important that the S2 help streamline the planning process for the scout platoon leader. When the task force receives anew mission from brigade, the S2 should issue to the scout platoon leader as complete a warning order as possible over the radio. The warning order should include who, what, where, when, and why for the scout platoonl and not just parrot the task force warning order. It should also include a brief fragmentary order for establishing a forward screen in the new area of operations. Assuming secure communications, an example of a warning order issued to the scout platoon leader is as follows: A1K conducts a zone reconnaissance in sector NLT 272000 April 1989 oriented 011 Objective Tvicr (NK5910) to detect and report eiiertty eleritcrtts and obsracles. Task force soiitltcnt boiindr?, froin 4293 to 5296 to 6104 to 6308. Northern botindar?, fiorii 4605 to 5309 to 5712. Esfablislt screen along tire 49 north-soiitlt grid line oneiited east ASAP.

After receiving the above order, the platoon will execute a hasty screen to provide security for the task force as it moves into the area and prepares for the attack. The platoon’s noncommissioned officers know the mission and can begin preparation. The platoon leader has enough information to formulate a rough tentative plan. He can assign section sectors and observation posts (OPs) for the screen mission. A brief execution matrix is helpful, to include movement to the observation posts. The scout platoon leader should plan for the OPs to serve as the start point for each section’s reconnaissance mission. This allows section leaders to conduct a visual reconnaissance of their sector early in the planning process. Once the scout platoon leader issues the warning order for the upcoming mission and the fragmentary order for occupying the screen line, he goes to the task force tactical operations center (TOC) for a more complete briefing. The platoon sergeant conducts a pre-combat inspection, resupply operations, and controls the occupation of the screen line. While the platoon leader is enroute, the S2 should gather infcwma-tion necessary for the scout to plan his reconnaissance. The primary medium for providing guidance to the scout platoon leader is the reconnaissance and surveillance (RSrS) plan or overlay. If time does not permit, this plan need not be the final R&S plan, which the S2 will include as part of the intelligence annex to the operations order. Its purpose is to give the scout platoon leader enough information to plan the platoon’s reconnaissance. The S2 bases this plan on taskings from brigade headquarters, what is known about the enemy, and the task force commander’s priority information requirements (PIRs). The S2 designates named areas of interest (NAIs) to focus the scout platoon’s reconnaissance effort. Other information the scout will need includes: 0 The situational template. This includes all confirmed and templated enemy positions and obstacles in the task force area of interest. When we are attacking, it includes possible enemy counterattack routes. When we defend, it includes possible enemy avenues of approach.

Any attachments/linkup information. The S2 should ask the S3 ”The more time that the scout platoon has to prepare a forward screen, the more successful the counter-reconnaissance battle will be.” for scout attachments as early as possible. Scout attachments, such as a tank platoon employed in a counter-reconnaissance role, should conduct their troopleading procedures with the scouts. The scout platoon leader must also conduct rehearsals with his new team members.

The task force commander’s intent, both for the task force mission and the reconnaissance effort. This must include the primary axis along which he intends to attack. 0 Brigade and task force operational graphics.

A follow-on mission for after the reconnaissance mission is complete.

The fire support plan in its current form. Or particular importance are priority of field artillery and mortar fires during the reconnaissance mission, priority targets, scheduled fires that may affect the platoon’s mission, and the fire support overlay in its current form. The lire support coordinator should allow the scout platoon leader to plan several additional targets to support his reconnaissance. 0 Air defense artillery threat warning and weapons control status. 0 Nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare threat and mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level.

Essential combat service sup port information. This includes the location of the combat trains and ambulance exchange point during each phase of the operation. 0 Any signal information unique to the upcoming mission. Examples are pyrotechnic signals or pre-planned frequency hopping. The S2 can include much of the above information on an overlay.

After the S2’s briefing, the scout platoon leader can quickly plan his operation and develop his graphics. The scout platoon leader now briefs his plan to thc S2 and leaves a copy of the graphics with him. The S2 can now follow the scout platoon’s proggess by eavesdropping on the scout platoon net. He can also brief others, specifically the team commanders, on the scout platoon’s scheme of maneuver. An execution matrix is a particularly helpful reference for the S2 personnel, as well as Tor scout section and squad leaders.

The S2 must have responsibility for maintaining radio contact with the scouts. The xout platoon does not have sufficient assets to provide radio relay. For certain operations, the S2 should plan to use the battalion RETRANS vehicle, or some other kind of relay.

The S2 monitors the scout net for numerous reasons. Obviously, he records any information -the scouts gather, disseminates it to the task force commander, S3, and companyheam commanders, and updates his situational template. He must also remember to relay the scout platoon’s disposition to the task force S3, team commanders, and fire support element to reduce the scouts’ vulnerability to friendly direct and indirect fires. The fire support coordinator should establish restricted fire areas around scout positions.

During defensive operations, the S2 should assist the scout platoon leader in the same manner. The more time that the scout platoon has to prepare a forward screen, the ARMOR - more successful the counter-reconnaissance battle will be. During the defense, however, the scout platoon leader and the S2 have greater opportunity lor more extensive preparation and continuous planning.

Just as effective reconnaissance and security operations are a significant combat multiplier for a battaliodtask force, efficiency during the scout platoon’s planning and preparation phase greatly enhances their effectiveness. If he understands the information the scout platoon leader needs, the S2 is a considerable asset to the scout platoon and his battalion. The scout platoon leader must also understand what information the S2 needs from him concerning the scout platoon’s scheme of maneuver. The effectiveness of reconnaissance and security operations at the task force level depends not only on the individual competence of the S2 and the scout platoon but also on their ability to work together as a team.

Captain

Herbert R.

McMaster Jr. was commissioned from the USMA in 1984, and is a graduate of AOBC, AOAC, the Airborne and Ranger courses, and the Cavalry Leader’s Course. He served as a support platoon leader, tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and company XO with the 1st Bn., 66th Armor, 2d AD. He is currently assigned to Corn-mand and Control Squadron, HHT, 2d ACR.

Continued from Page 6 reserve to counter any penetration. The battle group could also be assigned the sector astride the main enemy avenue of approach and given a delay mission, with the intention of creating an assailable flank to set the preconditions for a counterattack.

The battle group is not limited to defense. It may lack the combat power to penetrate the enemy regimental first echelon, but its high mobility and speed make it ideal for exploitation. It could also serve as a follow and support force for an exploiting brigade. Another mission would have the cavalry battle group conduct a supporting attack to fur enemy reserves, while one of the division’s brigades conducts a penetration.

Then the second brigade exploits the success. Although the battle group may have limitations of size and support, it provides flexibility, can influence the battle, and can help take the initiative. Restructuring the division to provide the third maneuver unit allows the commander to use the same tactics which he and his staff have already mastered. The employment restrictions of the cavalry battle group will be similar to those of a brisade depleted as a result of combat actions. The difficulty of integrating roundout divisions in a combat zone invites intervention by Murphy’s Law. We must figure out how to compensate for the possibility of a delayed link-up. Forming a third maneuver element on the cavalry squadron base provides the division commander with a solution that will allow him to fight effectively until his unit is complete. Forming a third maneuver element on the cavalry squadron base provides the division commander with a solution that will allow him to fight effectively until his unit is complete.

Recognition Quiz Answers This month‘s vehicle identification 9uiz again focuses on Soviet armored vehicles currently fielded with Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces. All vehicles are identifiable by unique features shown in these photographs. We encourage your comments, questions, or suggestions regarding our quiz.

Contact Craig M. Hughes, Threat DivisionlDCD, AV 464-4757 or Cornmerical (502)624-4757.

1. BTR-80. The Soviets modified the truncated cone turret used on the BTR-70 for the BTR-80 by redesigning the mantlet. This allows the 14.5-mm and coaxial 7.62-mm machine guns to be elevated to a maximum of 60 degrees. This high angle of fire is useful in engaging targets on steep mountain sides, such as those in Afghanistan. The redesigned side doors are split horizontally. The upper portion opens forward. The lower portion opens down, forming a step. Six smoke grenade projectors are mounted on the rear of the turret.

2. BMP-2. The BMP-2 is an infantry combat vehicle variant of the BMP-1 that includes an enlarged two-man turret which mounts a 30-mm automatic gun, with along, thin tube and a double-baffle muzzle brake; along with a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun on its front. On top of the turret is the AT-5 SPANDREL.

3. BMP-1. A centrally located, extremely flat, truncated cone turret mounts a 73-mm smoothbore gun and a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun. A launching rail for the SAGGER AT-3 attaches above the gun.

4. T-64B. The T-64 and the T-72 are similar in appearance, however, there are several design differences between the two tanks. Among features peculiar to the T-64 are six small stamped road wheels, four track return rollers, the gunner’s IR searchlight to the left of the main gun, and a newly designed 12.7-mm NSVT antiaircraft machine gun on the commander’s cupola, which can be fired from a buttoned-up posture.

5. BMD. Like the BMP-1, its main armament is a 73-mm smoothbore gun, with a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun mounted on the right side of the main gun (seen here) and with a SAGGER AT-3 or SPANDREL AT-5 (the rail visible here in the extreme upper left hand corner). The Soviet airborne insignia is on the top of the commander’s hatch.

6. ACRV. ACRV (Artillery Command and Reconnaissance Vehicle) is the overall designation for a series of vehicles known to consist of four versions: 1V13, 1V14, 1V15, and 1V16. All four use the MTLB chassis. The four versions of the ACRV are deployed in self-propelled howitzer battalions.