HMMWVs and Scouts: Do They Mix?

and Scouts: DoThey Mix? by Major Barry Sctibner Scouts Out! To a cavalry platoon leader in an armored cavalry regiment, that means one thing; to a scout platoon leader in a tank battalion, that means something entirely different. However, the Tables of Organization and Equipment (T0"kE) under the Hand J series appear to treat the two platoons as one.

In the former case, there is a focus on covering force operations and guard-type missions. In the latter case, battalion commanders generally use the scout platoon intelligence to gather and as alight screening force.

Can a scout platoon equipped with HMMWVs adequately perform the missions assigned it by a tank-heavy battalion task force? The "Desert Rogues" Battalion, 1-64 Armor, based at Fort Stewart, Georgia, tested this concept during its August 1988 rotation to the National Training Center. The task force found that a HMMWV-equipped scout platoon was enormously effective during both the offensive and defensive phases of task force and brigade operations.

There are several missions that the scout platoon did not perform I during this rotation, due to the nature of the battalion's operations. It is impossible on the basis of one rotation, with one scout platoon and nine "battles," to develop any meaningful statistical conclusions concerning the propriety of equipping the scout platoon with HMMWVs in lieu of M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles. Rather, given the small sample size, the difficulty in assigning numerical ratings to the results, the lack of a "conlror group, and the large intra-platoon variation, this evidence must be considered anecdotal in nature. We believe that it is well suited to additional iterations of wheeled scout platoons. Additionally, we hope that the results of our rotation will stimulate debate within the force-development community regarding the usefulness of a wheeled scout platoon.

The genesis for the wheeled scout platoon begins with concern about the survivability of scout platoons at the NTC. In our November 1986 rotation, the platoon took heavy casulties during every battle. Often, the OPFOR detected and destroyed the scouts early in the battles. The scout platoon sometimes forgot its reconnaissance mission and attempted to close with and destroy I " the enemy, usually resulting in a one-sided victory for the OPFOR. Perhaps Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFV) would have provided the answer to both problems. but our scout platoon had not transitioned from M113s and ITVs to M3s. Thus, when the corps commander presented the possibility of using HMMWVs on the upcoming rotation, the battalion seized on the idea. The scout platoon had eight HMMWVs for this rotation. Three were hard-shell versions that included a TOW system. Two were pickup trucks, and three were four-passenger models.

We did not specify the type of HMMWVs we received: the selection was based strictly on what was available within the division and local National Guard units. The selection was not the best for the scout platoon.

The platoon received an assortment of day and night vision devices. Among the most useful were 16 sets of PVS-5s and six TOW2 night sights. Three of the latter were attached to the TOW weapons mounted on the hard shell vehicles. The remaining three were The TVS 4As and 5s were of no value to the scout platoon. The space they consumed could have been allocated to service support requirements, as well as room for litter patients. Thermal sights and PVS5s ruled the night during this rotation.

Batteries for the thermal sights In addition to the personnel nor- “died of wounds” patients in ti offense.

Manpower resources were adequate....__.__.

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- _ _... -1-1- _ -.. r-... 111 --_. t, were a constant promem. ic was em-dent this would not have been a problem if we had had M3s. Planners should consider battery needs well in advance of a rotation if using wheeled vehicles. Overall, if the mix of HMMWVs was changed to eliminate the hardshell vehicles and include at least four 100-amp pickup-truck HMMWVs (necessary because of the two-radio requirement for scout vehicles), eight HMMWVs provide adequate room for cargo and personnel.

Vehicle recovery was not a major problem during the rotation. Because there were eight within the platoon, vehicle recovery did not hinder the platoon’s mission accomplishment. There was never a situation when a disabled HMMWV required. more than one other HMMWV for recovery operations. Manpower Requirements The scout platoon deployed with 29 enlisted personnel and one officer. This is consistent with the manpower authorization for the J-series TOE. The eight HMMWVs provided sufficient passenger-hauling capability for the platoon, although the comment above concerning replacing the hard shell vehicles with pickup trucks and four-passenger models applies. The scout platoon was able to emplace three or four OPs per offensive mission, with one exception, when time was a critical factor. At least three scouts manned each OP. There were also at least three OPs emplaced for each defensive mission. There is no need to increase the TOE for the scout platoon. Manpower resources were adequate for mission accomplishment.

In addition to the personnel normally assigned to the scout platoon, the supporting field artillery unit provided an enlisted forward observer (FO) and digital message device (DMD). These additions proved invaluable. The DMD almost eliminated the need to send fire missions over voice systems. The forward observer was particularly useful during the deliberate attack, when precise grids allowed the task force to strip away much of the OPFOR’s security force and deplete his tank reserve before the task force crossed the LD. Given the number of fire missions from the scout platoon, vis-a-vis the infantry platoons, serious thought should be given to changing the TO&E to reallocate the FO from the infantry platoons to the scout platoons. We submit that the infantry platoons have no greater need for an FO than tank platoons. The scout platoons can make excellent use of artillery fires. Plans were made to attach an engineer squad to the scout platoon for offensive operations. The intent was to provide the scout platoon with some experts in the field of obstacle breaching.

Unfortunately, this attachment occurred only once. It would have been ’ difficult, given the carrying capacity of the HMMWVs, to carry six additional personnel. If the hard shell vehicles were eliminated, there would be sufficient space for the additional personnel. Regardless of the vehicles assigned to the scout platoon, a squad of engineers remains an attractive concept in the offense.

We attached a medic to the platoon for the rotation. He proved to be a valuable asset. The aid he provided to the litter patients contributed significantly to the lack of “died of wounds” patients in the scout platoon. We will continue to attach a medic to the platoon. HIND helicopters caused problems during two of the operations. Although the scout platoon was more adept than other units’ scout platoons at avoiding detection, attachment of a STINGER would have been extremely helpful. We do not believe, however, that a STINGER team needs to be attached to the scout platoon. Rather, we advocate that scouts be trained in STINGER operations, and consideration given to authorizing one STINGER weapons system to the platoon. We were unable to effect this attachment during the rotation because of the NTC‘s reluctance to deviate significantly from TORtE authorization. However, to the extent that the United States can train Afghan guerrillas on the use of the STINGER, we submit that category I-IIIA scouts can be trained with minimal resources. In any event, it is an area we intend to experiment with during our next rotation. Weapons Systems and Survivability There was a weakness in the mix of weapons available to the scout platoon. Besides the usual TO&E complement of M16s, VIPERS, and Mms, the scout platoon had six TOW weapons systems and eight DRAGON systems available. The scout platoon knew at the outset that these weapons were for breaking contact, as opposed to ambushing or attacking enemy vehicles; unfortunately, there is no way to separate the data on the scout engagements between the two categories. However, regardless of the rationale for engaging enemy vehicles, OPFOR direct fire systems killed significant numbers of scouts. One obvious reason for the relatively high mortality rate among scouts (an average of three vehicles per offensive mission were lost prior to reaching the objective) is the nature of the TOW and DRAGON weapons systems. In both cases, the scouts must track the enemy for upward of 12 seconds. Such weapons systems are not conducive to quickly disengaging. The platoon complained at length about the problems associated with the TOW system. Not only was it inadequate to deal with enemy BMPs, but the space required for ammunition cramped CSS operations.

Given this experience, we believe there is a clear need for a HMMWV-mounted weapons system to provide immediate suppression. The M3, with its 25-mm cannon, does not have this problem. The Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher would appear to fit the needs of a HMMWV scout platoon. The ammunition storage requirements are no greater than a Hoffman box, and the quick-fire nature of the weapon would quickly suppress a BMP.

Tanks would still pose a problem, but tanks pose a threat to the M3 as well. The Mark 19 is simple, compact, and appears to be easy to master. We do not want to turn the scouts into regimental cavalry platoons, but we do want to offer them a modicum of protection if they are surprised by enemy vehicles. That more scouts did not "die" in direct tire engagements is more a testimonial to their stealth than to the TOW'S effectiveness. The DRAGONS provided enough firepower in those situations where a very lucrative target presented itself. More than eight systems would be nice, but carrying capacity is limited, and lack of large numbers of offensive weapons systems helps ensure that the platoon is adequately circumspect, once it identifies an enemy vehicle.

The Impact of HMMWVs On Command and Control The scout platoon was organized into three sections. There was one pickup truck or four-passenger HMMWV and one hard-shell HMMWV per section. The scout platoon used the wingman concept. Typically, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant would each follow one of the sections. On occasion, the platoon leader would erect an antenna to act as a relay between a vehicle and the task force command post. Contrary to the brigade's conventional wisdom, scouts should have had either RT524s or RT246s, because of the extended ranges over which the scouts were forced to operate. All radios, to include the AN/PRC-77s, operated in the secure mode. We know of no occasion when the OPFOR located a scout by direction finding. Our experience suggests that the scout net must be secure at all times. Each scout section must also be able to monitor simultaneously the task force command net and the scout net. Only three of the eight HMMWVs had this capability.

However, the radio configuration within the platoon allowed the platoon sergeant and the senior section sergeant to take over the platoon and report to the task force commander in the event of the platoon leader's "death." The platoon leader found that control of eight vehicles was manageable. During the training period before the rotation. the platoon was assigned 10 HMMWVs. Based on this experience, the platoon leader is convinced that eight vehicles is optimal, and that additional vehicles would add little to the platoon's effectiveness. Rather, he believes that command and control would suffer. Finally, the hard-shell vehicles lent themselves to the wingman concept. The platoon was uncertain whether, in the absence of vehicular-mounted TOWS, it would continue with this practice. However, the three-section concept worked well and there was never a situation where the scout platoon was unable to perform the S3 and the S2 reconnaissance missions.

Conclusions At the outset, we cautioned that the findings from this experiment would be more qualitative than statistically analyzable. One must be careful not to attribute the success of the scout platoon to the wrong input. There was a labor input, a highly motivated and well-trained platoon of smart soldiers; and a capital input, the HMMWVs. How much of the scouts' success was due to the independent effect of being assigned wheeled vehicles, in lieu of tracks, is difficult to determine and inherently subject to speculation, but the scouts provided the task force with important intel-hand held. Additionally, the platoon had two DRAGON nlght sights for its use.

The task force's missions during this rotation consisted of a combination of movement to contact operations (where the scouts were allowed to cross the LD/LC less than 30 minutes prior to the advance guard), hasty and deliberate attacks, and defense-in-sector/counterattack-by-fire operations. Most task force missions had LD times during daylight hours. However, the scouts often would move during periods of limited visibility. are extremely quiet, and unlike previous rotations, not one scout vehicle was lost due to enemy "spot light" teams (two OPFOR vehicles, one with a searchlight attached to the turret to illuminate targets at night, and a second to destroy the illuminated targets.) With one exception, the brigade hasty attack, the scouts were always able to perform reconnaissance on the task force's objective and provide intelligence critical to the commander's prosecution of the battle. On average, five vehicles reached the objective, and three scout vehicles survived until "change of mission."

The task force rotation was extremely successful. This success was due, in part, to the effectiveness of the scouts. Effectiveness is a nebulous concept at best, and we do not attempt to expand upon the seminal work done by Goldsmith in this area.' We take as a given that scout effectiveness is an input that adds to mission effectiveness.

However, we contend that scout effectiveness is, in fact, an intermediate product whose inputs include the ability of the scouts to reach an Objective, survive long enough to provide meaningful intelligence to the task force, sustain operations beyond one battle, and provide command and control to the personnel assigned to the scout platoon.

Survivability Survivability is a historic problem for scouts at the NTC. This is particularly true during offensive operations, such as movements to contact and attacks. In previous rotations, scouts were destroyed crossing the line of departure, enroute to the oh-jective, and immediately upon reaching the objective. We found that the HMMWV-equipped scout platoon could almost travel with impunity around the battlefield. HMMWVs During the task force deliberate attack, the scouts moved out during hours of daylight, and continuously reconnoitered the objective and the task force's routes to the objective for two days and one night. The scouts emplaced three 3-man OPs and gave six-digit coordinates to the task force on 80 percent of the enemy's vehicles. The result was an incredibly effective artillery preparation that destroyed close to one third of the enemy's combat power before the task force crossed the line of departure.

During this mission, the scout platoon was able to make continuous trips back to the task force command post. Enemy fire got only one HMMWV and one OP before the task force crossed the LD. Ultimately, four of the scout vehicles were destroyed (one was lost to artillery, and three to enemy direct fire). Some argued that the scouts' "invisibility shield" came from the OPFOR's inability to distinguish between its own HMMWVs, the observer-controller HMMWVs, and the scout platoon HMMWVs. That may or may not have been the case. There is no way to disaggregate the data to confirm or deny that assertion. However, the OPFOR knew the scout platoon was equipped with HMMWVs. It also knew the locations and acthities of its own vehicles, and it knew controller vehicles would not "die." Additionally, only the scout HMMWVs had a green fluorescent "v" taped on their sides. Thus, we do not believe that OPFOR confusion was a major factor in the ability of the scouts to roam across the battlefield.

During the brigade movement to contact, the scouts were again able to deploy quickly and more than two kilometers in front of the task force advanced guard. Unfortunately, in this case, all operational scout vehicles eventually were destroyed, and at first glance, the raw data might indicate that the lack of armor protection on HMMWVs is a significant disadvantage.? However, the scouts' inability to survive during this battle was due to other reasons, not so much to the soldiers being surprised. Scouts were killed attempting to engage BMPs positioned to ambush the task force along its route of advance and attempting to disengage from Hind helicopters. Both enemy weapons systems are effective against HMMWVs, M113s, M901s, and M3s. The scout platoon also had significant problems disengaging from enemy BMPs during the task force movement to contact, although two vehicles ultimately reached the objective (20 km from the LD) and survived. On the average, three scout vehicles survived until change of mission during task force and brigade offensive operations. The average number of OPs that survived was two. Direct fire engagements accounted for a vast majority of friendly casualties. The average number of HMMWVs lost per mission due to enemy artillery was one. In terms of stealth, HMMWVs played a critical role during offen- “Direct fire engagements accounted for a vast majority of friendly casualties. The average number of HMMWVs lost per mission due to enemy artillery was one.‘i sive operations, particularly during attack missions. They were able to reconnoiter the task force routes to the objective and usually determine the enemy’s disposition on the objective. During movements to contact, when the time between the scouts deployment and the deployment of the advance guard was short, the speed and stealth of the HMMWV allowed the scouts to screen the task force’s advance. Only when the scouts attempted to close with and destroy the enemy, or attempt to disengage when fixed by the enemy, did they suffer significant casualties. The scout platoon is unanimous in its view that the addition of tracked vehicles to the equipment list, while providing additional firepower, would be offset by the vehicles’ high profile and noise. major plus for the scouts during the defense was the HMMWVs’ maneuverability.

OPs were emplaced quickly in areas such as Tiefort Mountain, which is untrafficable to tracked vehicles. Not a single scout was lost during any of the three defensive missions assigned to the task force. Scouts would typically deploy OPs, both vehicle-mounted and dismounted, up to eight kilometers in front of the FEBA. Initially, the scouts tended to bunch up during the emplacement of the OPs, but that is not unique to the use of HMMWVs.

No OPs were destroyed, which means that either the enemy did not observe their emplacement or, more probably, just avoided the areas covered by the OPs:’ Medical evacuation of wounded personnel was made easy by the number of vehicles available to the scout platoon and the speed of the HMMWV.

The scout platoon’s eight vehicles, coupled with their speed, helped ‘wounded soldiers” survive:. only one soldier “died” of wounds during the entire rotation. If the scouts had not had wheeled vehicles, an average of seven soldiers would have “died“ because many of the ’wounded soldiers” were located in hard to reach tcrrain, up to 40 kilometers forward of the jump aid station. This estimate is based, however, on a comparison of the capabilities of HMMWVs and M113s, not M3s. In hindsight, the scout platoon should probably have carried one stretcher per vehicle.

Contributing to the scouts’ success was the ability to quietly emplace dismounted OP scouts within 500 meters of the OP‘s destination. OPs were, therefore, on station quickly. Without stealth, a scout platoon is nothing more than the forward combat element of a task force. A heavily armed platoon may offer increased security for the task force main body, but it provides little in the way of intelligence, and the probability of reaching its objective is small.

During task force and brigade defensive operations, stealth was not a major factor in the scouts’ survivability and the ultimate success or failure of the task force. In terms of stealth, the HMMWVs offered no particular advantage to the scouts’ ability to deploy. However, a Combat Service Support (CSS) To be effective, the scout platoon must be able to sustain itself beyond the first battle. It is, therefore, particularly appropriate to discuss the CSS issues at this point. First, the operational readiness rate for the scout vehicles was outstanding during the rotation. The scouts deployed with all eight vehicles on five of the nine missions. During three of the missions, the scouts operated with seven of the eight HMMWVs, and on one mission they had six of eight.

HMMWVs are reliable pieces of equipment capable of sustained operations over rough desert terrain. This should not come as a surprise given the observerkontrol-led reliance on these vehicles for several years.

Resupply was easy with the HMMWV. The vehicle is not fuel hungry, and the scouts carried 10 additional gallons of fuel per vehicle on every mission. The HMMWV’s speed enabled the platoon to resupply in times consistent with mission requirements. The scout platoon received a hot meal every time the task force main body received a hot meal. However, space aboard the HMMWVs was at a premium, and it was difficult to push adequate amounts of classes 111 and V forward during offensive operations. Part of the problem was due to the large number of night vision sights carried by the scout platoon, and the lack of room inside the hard shell vehicles. We probably could have reduced the number of night sights significantly with little degradation of scout effectiveness.

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F. O. l r w C I W Y U l R l l U I n 52ulPr.n lignce and suffered fewer casualties than expected. The scout survey, conducted at the conclusion of every battle, indicated that scout personnel who were used to training with tracked vehicles all believed that a large measure of their success was due to the HMMWVs.

The fear that enemy artillery would devastate the unarmored platoon proved groundless. Less than one HMMWV per mission was destroyed due to enemy artillery. Moreover, 100 rounds of artillery will destrov a Bradley as easily as a HMMWV. The fact that so few HMMWVs were destroyed by artillery says much about the stealth, especinlly in the offense, of a HMMWV scout platoon.

We hope that more NTC-bound task forces will be allowed to use HMMWVs to enlarge the data base on wheeled scouts and offer a meaningful standard against which we can measure MZequipped scout platoons. Currently, there is the possibility of weighing the costs versus the effectiveness of the M3 for task "How much of the scouts' success was due to the independent effect of being assigned wheeled vehicles, in lieu of tracks, is difficult to determine and inherently subject to speculation, but the scouts provided the task force with important intelligence and suffered fewer casualties than expected. I' force scout platoons by continuing to analyze the concept of wheeled scouts.

Not all divisions are equipped with M3s.

We advocate allowing non-M3 equipped scout platoons the option of using HMMWVs during their NTC rotations as a low-cost means of expanding the data base on scout platoons from one platoon to 20 or 30, so that we can gather some truly robust statistics. Notes 'See Martin Goldsmith and James Hodges. hdvina the National Training enter Experience: Tactical Reconnais- (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, October 1987), Rand Report 14-2628-A. 2During this operation, all six M3s assigned to the mechanized task force were also destroyed. It appears that scouts have an inherently difficult mission to perform during movements to contact. 'Casual conversation with the M3 scout platoon assigned to the mechanized task force indicated that its OPs were forced to dismount much farther away from the sites they intended to occupy. 4Much discussion has been devoted to the use of motorcycles in conjunction with M3s. Motorcycles offer advantages similar to the HMMWV in terms of stealth and, ipso facto, survivability. In fact, there is reason to believe that motorcycles would provide those riding more stealth than a relatively large wheeled vehicle such as the HMMWV. However, since we did not employ motorcycles, any comparisons we make are purely speculative in nature. There is also reason to believe that the eighth operating system, safety, would suffer if motorcycles were employed in a manner similar to the HMMWVs. The training requirements for effective use of motorcycles on unimproved- surfaces are likely to be significant. Even then, the safety aspects of using a motorcycle on unimproved surfaces seem substantial. That is one advantage of the HMMWV. It is a stable platform that tends not to pose safety problems for indMduais maneuvering over rough and mountainous terrain. The scout platoon, for all its rough terrain and night maneuver did not suffer a single injury.

Would a motorcycle equipped platoon be as fortunate?

Major Barry Scribner is a 1974 graduate of the United States Military Academy and has a doctorate from Harvard. He served In a variety of troop assignments, including troop commander, in the 2d ACR in Germany.

A CGSC graduate, he is currently the S3, 1-64 Armor at Ft. Stewart, Ga. This fall, he is scheduled for assignment to Office, Chief of Staff, Program Analysis and Evaluation, at the Pentagon. ARMOR - JUly-AUgUSt 7989 Soviet Vehicle 1.

Recognition Quiz Compiled by Craig Hughes I 2.

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