Rehearsals: The Silent Requirement

A Soviet Assessment by Captain James M. Warfotd “Rehearse all movenients, in gas masks, with no conrmririicatioiis, and at nigltt. Assiinre that conf ision will reign at tire iiroineirt of eseciition, mid rehearse aN procediires according@. ” That statement, taken from James

R. McDonough’s book, nre Defense of Hill 781, was Captain Yuri Kharkov‘s starting point.

The division commander of the 7th Guards Tank Division had asked him about some of the data that had been “acquired” from the U. S. Army’s National Training Center (NTC).

According to reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, representing a sample of U. S. tank and mechanized infantry battaliodtask force (BN/TF) rotations, only half of the units rehearsed, and almost half of the rehearsals were not considered effective. Time was not the problem; a more thorough rehearsal was possible in 80 percent of the operations. The question that puzzled the Soviet commander was, why weren’t these U. S. units conducting rehearsals?

Yuri was not enthusiastic about his task. He had already spent so many hours studying the U. S. Army that further effort seemed to be a waste of time. The division commander’s order was clear. Yuti’s mission was to examine rehearsals in the capitalist army and answer these questions: 0 Do U. S. Army doctrinal references cover the subject of rehearsals? If so, how in-depth is this coverage?. What types of rehearsals can a BNnF or CO/TM use?

0What points must a unit commander consider to develop an effective rehearsal plan?

What points must a unit commander consider to conduct an effective rehearsal? e What are your recommendations concerning the conduct of rehearsals in the 7th Guards Tank Division?

As he read the NTC reports, it was clear that some of the American BNnFs were neglecting to conduct rehearsals before a tactical operation.

Making matters worse, the CO/TMs and platoons were also failing to carry out this fundamental task. How could unit commanders know that their subordinate leaders and vehicle crews fully understood their plan? Yuri hoped that his research would provide some answers.

NOTE: At riiiriiriiiirit, a relieanal coirld irivolve ortlv the k q leaders of the irriit. coordinated rehearsal was ended by the fire of a friendly unit emplaced on the same terrain.

Certain documents and publications were "obtained" for his use. Yuri's superiors gave him copies of MTP (coordinating draft), ARTEP 1, a few old Ranger Handbooks, and some important data from the NTC. Little of the material was useful, not because of an acquisition problem, but because the U. S. Army apparently had not published any doctrine on rehearsals. While all of the references either suggested or recommended a rehearsal, they failed to explain what type, or how to conduct rehearsals. FM 71-1, FM 71-2, ARTEP 71-1-17-237-10-MTP, FM 7-75, FC 17-16-Finding little detailed information, Yuri turned to the dictionary. A rehearsal was defined as a private performance or practice session preparatory to a public appearance, or a practice exercise. Yuri could not understand why a rehearsal would not precede a public appearance such as an attack. The next question was, what type of rehearsal could a BN/TF, CO/TM, or platoon use before a tactical operation such as an attack?

With his experience as a tank company commander, along with some general guidance, he developed the following: After examining his list, Yuri realized that offensive mission rehearsals and defensive mission rehearsals are virtually the same. The single exception is that during a defensive mission, a BN/TF could give its CO/TMs the luxury of rehearsing on the same terrain that they would defend, For an offensive mission, the best the CO/TMs could usually hope for would be the use of similar terrain. Yuri noted the importance of using similar terrain; a stage in a different theater is still a stage. It was becoming clear to Yuri that most of the older references dealt almost exclusively with American infantry, with the most specific information contained in the Ranger Handbook.

The 1972 version provided a breakdown of the necessary coordination and tasks required to conduct a rehearsal. Although the list included several steps applicable to modern US. CO/TMs, one point stood out. The last item on the Ranger Handbook list referred to the possibility of having to coordinate with other units that either share or own the terrain where the rehearsal would take place. Yuri smiled to himself: He had just been reading about an incident at the NTC when an un-Offensive Defensive

4. Walk Through (w/o Unit Vehicles)

5. Dress Rehearsal on

4. Walk Through (w/o Unit Vehicles)

5. Dress Reharsal on similar terrain ' actual terrain Now Yuri could see that an effective rehearsal must start with a detailed and coordinated rehearsal plan. EM 71-1 and 71-2 offcred general guidance, noting that units conduct rehearsals to reinforce both the scheme of maneuver and the fire plan. The manuals recommended that units conduct rehearsals under limited visibility or NBC conditions whenever possible. They urged commanders to ensure that the rehearsal includes the actions critical to the accomplishment of the actual mission. Yuri realized that the CO/TM commander must be fully confident that his unit can accomplish these actions, given the unit's state of training, its orders, and the expected weather and terrain conditions. To ensure there is time for a rehearsal, the commander plans backward during his conduct of the troop-leading procedures, and develops a rehearsal plan. The rehearsal plan and sequence of events should speci* the following: 0The time the rehearsal is to begin.

0The items or actions the unit will rehearse.

Specific tactical techniques and drills the unit should rehearse. 0The critical areas and operations the unit should observe. 0 The location of the rehearsal. 0The time that the rehearsal will end.

liis ylaririirtg, the COITM cortiritaridcr allows the ricces-say time for rehemais dtiring the mi-penision phase. Titis planning misf also incliide enoiigli time for the platoons arid vehicle crews to con-diict tlteir own reltearsais. After examining all of the available information concerning the development of a solid rehearsal plan, Yuri felt that the commander still needed further guidance to best use the limited time available. To help with this difficult task, Yuri developed the following notes: 0 Emphasize events that trigger different contingency actions. e Emphasize fire support, to include the targets to be fired, when they will be fired, and who is responsible to call for and adjust the fire. 0 Emphasize unit problem areas, critical tasks. and actions on contact.. Emphasize and verify that the commander’s concept and guidance reach all those who will execute the plan.. Emphasize that if the unit makes any suggested changes to the COnM or BNRF plan following the rehearsal, it reports the changes to the commander.

Emphasize that the vehicle commanders brief their crews and conduct additional training to prepare for the mission.

Once Yuri was satisfied with the rehearsal plan guidelines, he concentrated on the actual conduct of the rehearsal. He felt that the best way to conduct a rehearsal, and to ensure that it achieved its aim, would be to have the commander conduct the rehearsal himself. Not only would this ensure quality control, but it would also satisfy the commander that his unit fully understood his concept. The rehearsal would start of with a briefing and orientation for the key leaders of the unit, and then a review of the OPORD. This review would include a discussion of maneuver danger areas, calls for fire, reporting procedures, and any other points that the commander felt were critical to the mission.

Depending on the type of rehearsal, and the time available, the sub-unit leaders would demonstrate their understanding of the plan and how they would carry it out. As stated earlier, this could range from a simple brieback to a dress rehearsal on the actual terrain. Yuri decided to highlight this point. He had always been a little envious of the amount of initiative the Americans allowed their junior leaders. The rehearsal would include practicing contingency plans in response to enemy activity. The unit would repeat all of these actions until the commander was satisfied that all of his sub-unit leaders were capable of leading the actual mission.

After the rehearsal, the commander would update or change his plan, based on what he’d learned during the rehearsal. This was another point that Yuri decided to highlight. No matter how effective a rehearsal seemed, if the lessons learned were ignored or not identified, the plan that should have been improved could go unchanged. The CO/l”M commander would report any changes to his commander or suggestions that would affect the BN/TF plan, and would also emphasize that he expected his platoon leaders to do the same with the CORM plan.

Finally, the CO/TM commander would end the rehearsal in time for the platoon leaders to conduct their own rehearsals at platoon level. These platoon rehearsals, like the CO/TM rehearsal, could be any one of the types described earlier.

Yuri decided that the rehearsal procedure should extend to one additional level, the vehicle crews. The soldiers who would actually carry out the plan must understand the commander’s intent. At this level, the preparation would probably be nothing more than the vehicle TC explaining the events to his crew over the vehicle intercom. Although this briefing does not qualify as a rehearsal, and is not included in the list of rehearsal types described earlier, Yuri felt that it was important enough to include in his report.

At what level should units conduct rehearsals? So far, Yuri’s report had concentrated on the CORM and its platoons, but shouldn’t higher echelons also plan and carry out rehearsals? Yuri decided that the process should start at brigade level and include, as a minimum, a briefback. Once the brigade commander formulated his plan and briefed it to the BNRF commanders, the brigade commander should require a briefback from his commanders.

Once the B N m commander returned to his unit and he and his staff formulated the BN/TF plan, he conducts what could be called a two-stage rehearsal with his CO/TM commanders. Once the CO/TM commanders are given the OPORD, they participate in a rehearsal in the form of a briefback led by the BN/TF commander. This briefback, lasting only as long as absolutely necessary, would continue until the BN/TF commander,was confident that his CO/TM commanders fully understood his concept. The second stage of this rehearsal would take the form of a second briefback to the BN/TF commander, after the COEM commander had developed his own plan back at his unit. Yuri felt that this second briefback could be at either the BN/TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) or at the COKM's location. In either case, the second briefback would ensure that the required synchronization of the B N E F plan had reached those who would execute it on the ground.

Now that he had discussed the conduct of the rehearsal itself, in detail, Yuri focused his attention on the single most important problem facing the development and conduct of an effective rehearsal: the requirement for sufficient time to carry it out. The availability and management of this most critical asset was a problem for his own army, as well as the Americans. It was clear to Yuri that perhaps the best way to deal with this problem was to solve it as high up the organizational chain as possible. Yuri agreed with some of the data taken from the U. S. Army's NTC that suggested this process should start with the brigade. The brigade-level tactical plans should include as much planning time for the BNmF as possible. While Yuri was very much aware that the tactical requirements of the battlefield never allowed the commander the amount of planning time he desired, it was this reality that should dominate the planning process at each unit headquarters.

He remembered something that was drilled into him while he was studying at the academy. A unit headquarters should complete ' its plan and issue the OPORD within one-third of the total time before mission execution. This would ensure that each lower echelon would have as much time as possible to prepare. The one-third/two thirds rule, as the U. S. Army called it, should be the guide for all tactical plans. The question to ask now was, how much time was enough time? Yuri wished he had the answer to that question. He was sure that some of his own graded exercises would have gone better had he known the answer. Yuri's research confirmed that some exercises required more time to plan and rehearse than others. Also, some may argue that, by design, a defensive operation requires more preparation time than an offensive one. In fact, one of the few references Yuri found for the conduct of a rehearsal concerned the improvement of battle positions and preparation of subsequent battle positions in FC 17-16-1. Each of these two tasks, however, included the caveat that units conduct rehearsals if time allowed. Yuri was confident that his research, and his answers to the first four of the division commander's questions, gave him sufficient background to make some recommendations concerning his own division. The amount of effort that the U. S. Army spends identifying the requirement for rehearsals, as opposed to the time that some BN/TFs actually conduct them, still amazed Yuri. He felt that his own unit might be guilty of the same neglect. To check the status of his unit, the commander should first conduct a detailed review of the current rehearsal procedures, if any, used in his unit. Once he has done this, he should correct any details or procedures, as necessary, as soon as pos-ARMOR - sible. When the commander is satisfied with these procedures, he should ensure that unit SOPS incorporate them.

After accomplishing this, the details of how to plan for and conduct rehearsals should be sent to the doctrine writers to be incorporated into the proper manuals. Once units conduct these self-examination procedures at all levels, proven and agreed upon rehearsal procedures could become doctrine and be used by the entire force. Once a commander completes these tasks, he would know that his unit is ready for combat and the stage for his plan is set.

Yuri smiled again when he remembered a statement he read, quoting an American BN/TF commander. After an NTC rotation, he "was amazed at how well we performed when we rehearsed the plan.".

Without the operation "proofing" a rehearsal provides, deficiencies in the commander's plan, ranging from poor vehicle positioning to the inadequate coordination of combat support assets, could doom a good plan to failure.

Captain James M. Warford was commissioned in Armor in 1979 as a distinguished military graduate from the University of Santa Clara, Calif. He has served as a tank platoon leader, and a support platoon leader; and has also commanded D/l-66 Armor, N2-66 Armor (COHORT), and HHC 2-66 Armor. He is currently assigned as a Small Group Instructorfleam Leader for the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Ky.