Employing Tanks with Collective NBC Protection

by Major F. I?. Thomas, 8th Canadian Hussars NATO forces can initally expect to conduct defensive operations against more numerous Warsaw Pact armored forces. As the only kinetic energy tank-killing system presently available, tanks have a key tactical role to play in any antitank battle. Moreover, in view of the apparent closing of the technological gap between NATO and Soviet main battle tanks (MBT), the crews of Western tanks can no longer rely on the qualitative edge of their equipment to ensure success in armor engagements. The greater efficiency on the part of NATO tank crews must now be the factor that gives an edge to the performance of NATO tank units.

Unfortunately, not only does the USSR have numerical superiority in tanks, but its forces also have a massive offensive chemical capability. The use of chemicals by the Warsaw Pact would force NATO troops to wear individual protective ensemble (IPE). Chemical collective protection offers an alternative to the wearing of IPEs, particularly the mask.

There can be no doubt that wearing a chemical mask degrades efficiency, as anyone who has worn one can testify. Most masks are not compatible with tank optical and weapon systems. Eating, drinking, and even breathing is made more Figure 1.

Loader assists driver in removing chemical suit before re-enty. difficult. The mask in its present form restricts vision and speech. Crews member lose their personal identity behind their masks. Improvements to masks are being made but, at present, the ability to fight the tank without the requirement to wear masks improves the efficiency of that fire unit. Therefore, equipping tanks with collective NBC protection that permits the removal of masks enhances the tactical performance of NATO units and may be the factor that gives such elements an edge over their more numerous opponents.

There is another important reason for equipping tanks with collective NBC protection. The interior of a tank may never be successfully decontaminated once contaminated by either a vapor or liquid agent. "Vehicle NBC systems cost a certain amount of weight, armored volume, and power. The main justification for them could be the virtual impossibility of cleaning the inside of a tank once it has been contaminated by either modern chemical agents or radioactive liquids or dust."' Collective NBC protection provided by the overpressure systems found on most present-day tanks can prevent contamination by agents in the form of vapors, provided the tank operation is closed down and correct crew entry drills do not permit the induction The danger has been demonstrated in tests that show vapors and liquids can be trapped in various crevices and fittings for days, thus constituting along-term hazard. Collective NBC protection is necessary to prevent interior contamination. Because most tanks, at least in NATO's central region, are equipped with collective NBC protection, it is important for armor officers, and indeed any officer involved in armor operations, to consider the command decisions and staff problems associated with the use of tank collective NBC protection in a chemical warfare environment. Some major decisions are required, although some, at first glance, appear quite simple. Each decision will require staff action both before and after the commander makes his choice as to the course of action to follow. The first major decision is whether to operate tanks equipped with chemical protective systems with hatches open or hatches closed. This question is more important than it first appears because present collective NBC protection systems require the hatch to be closed to provide guaranteed protection.

Operation with hatches open requires the crew to wear masks and risks the possibility that contaminants could get inside tanks. There are, however, some limitations to operating closed down that might make commanders hesitate before deciding.

Crews have reduced vision, which affects tactical handling of the tank and even straightforward movement.

Reduced visibility results in slower target acquisition, slower speed of engagement, and more chance of being surprised, both by hand-held antitank weapons systems and those on helicopters.

Figure 2.

Dotted line defines safe area on tank deck aml turret. Before a commander accepts these limitations, he would want to know the chemical threat. In this decision, and in discussion of others that follow, the importance of chemical intelligence will be obvious. Intelligence staffs must make assessments of the chemical threat, with its implications in terms of indicators and intelligence collection plans. They must quickly disseminate this information to those who need to know. For example, rail-loading tanks while buttoned up at night is quite a task. Yet formations such as Canada's 4th Mechanized Brigade Group, located well to the rear, could expect to be the target of a chemical attack with a persistent agent. The reaction time lost loading closed down would have to be weighed against the risk of being surprised with hatches open. Chemical intelligence is required. Reserves closer to the Warsaw Pact penetrations can also expect to be targets. An alternative to closing down the tanks of these reserves may be to move them so frequently that they are difficult to target for chemitxl attack. In addition to the chemical intelligence required to use this alternative, staffs will have the additional problems of finding space, not only to place such reserves on the ground, but also the roads on which to move them. Resupply of such frequently-moved forces brings further staff headaches. Of course, the threat from conventional artillery closer to the main battlefield may force closed down operations even if the threat from persistent agents has lessened. However, closeness to the enemy doesn't mean that there is no chemical threat. The potent combination of firepower and cross-country mobility represented by armored units make them a worthwhile chemical target at any time. The commander of such a valuable asset must deliberate carefully before taking the risk of operating with hatches open.

A commander operating his tanks with hatches closed faces another decision. "When should crews exit this collective NBC protection?" The dimensions of this decision are best understood after examining what is involved in leaving and then reentering a tank with collective NBC protection. The Patterson exit and reentry drills' used by Canadians can be broken into three distinct phases: exit and maintenance phase, replenishment phase, and reentry phase. These drills were developed to allow two crewmen to exit protection to bomb up the tank and carry out necessary maintenance.

To exit, the turret is traversed to eleven o’clock, which allows the driver to enter the loader’s compartment. All the crewmen put on full individual NBC protection. The driver and loader then exit through the loader’s hatch, taking with them their personal weapons, detector kits, and decon mitts. Once the hatch is closed, the remaining crewmen decontaminate inside around the hatch seal. Once outside, the loader checks for liquid contamination. If he finds liquid contamination, he establishes a SAFE AREA (See Fig. 2). He prepares it using decon apparatus, which is stored in an outside bin. He also decontaminates the area around the pistol port. There is a 30-minute waiting time to allow the decontaminate to take effect. Obviously, the two crew members outside must take care not to contaminate this SAFE AREA. While the loader is carrying out these decontamination tasks, the driver disposes of the disposal bag and dismounts to carry out his checks, as well as erase vehicle tracks if required. Once the loader has finished spraying the decontaminate, he would check the turret machine gun optics and radio antennae. After the 30-minute waiting period, the decontaminate on the SAFE AREA is washed off. Natural camouflage would have to be removed from this area by both crewmen. The echelon with ammunition and other supplies may well arrive before the SAFE AREA is ready. Then a protective sheet may have to be laid to keep uncontaminated stores from touching agents on the turret.

Resupply is done first. Stores that cannot fit through the pistol port are then placed on the SAFE AREA or protective sheet, if uncontaminated. Ammunition is passed up to the pistol port in its protective canister with its end removed. The loader holds the open-ended canister to the pistol port, and the crew member inside would pull the round from its canister by the base clip. When everything that can fit through the pistol port has been passed through, the port is closed and decontaminated on the inside. Stores placed on the SAFE AREA of the turret are then passed in, checked for contamination, and decontaminated if required. Handling these stores requires decontamination of the gloves of all crewmen. Once all the stores have been passed inside, the loader’s hatch is again closed and crewmen on the outside prepare to reenter. First, they have to replace camouflage. Imagine the problem of avoiding the SAFE AREA at night while doing this! Chalking the SAFE AREA helps. Cam0 nets, if being stowed, must be decontaminated and wrapped in protective sheets because contamination can linger for weeks. Once these preparations are complete, the driver stands beside the SAFE AREA and removes his overboots and IPE, except for mask and gloves.

As he removes his overboots, he puts on his clean combat boots on the SAFE AREA. When finished, he is standing on the SAFE AREA. The loader repeats this procedure. The suits and overboots go on the back deck where the echelon retrieves them. Crew members assist each other, as shown in Figure

1. The loader’s hatch is opened, and the driver enters first. Gloves are thrown over the side. The loader repeats this procedure. Once both are inside, the interior of the hatch is again decontaminated with the decon mitt, which is then discarded through the pistol port. The loader and driver put on new IPEs. The crew remains in complete IPEs for 15 minutes to allow the overpressure system to purge any vapor hazards. Once tests prove there is no danger, the crew can take off masks.

There are certain characteristics of this drill that a commander must consider before he allows crews to exit chemical collective protection in a likely contaminated area or with their vehicle contaminated. Tests established that it took 60 to 75 minutes from time of exit to time of reentry when taking on 30 main armament rounds and only 15 jerry cans of POL? Exit and reentry drills take time. Moreover, these drills must be done in a safe location. As seen in the illustration, removing suits for reentry leaves crewmen vulnerable, not only to follow-on chemical attack, but also conventional fires. Contaminated crewmen cannot enter the armor protection of their vehicle when shells start falling. Remember that some camouflage has been removed during replenishment, possibly rendering the tank visible. The discarded suits taken away by the resupply echelon must be replaced, either by the echelon or from spares in the tank. Although in the short-term these problems with replacement suits may not affect tactical commanders, the logistics of discarding IPEs will have an impact on armored formations and their staffs. The time taken to do the drills, and the requirement for a safe location, will force a commander to carefully consider the reasons to have tank crews leave collective protection in a chemically contaminated environment. Some likely reasons are resupply and replenishment, the need to un-Figure 3.

Artist’s sketch shows how technology mignt simplify resupply under NBC conditions. dertake urgent repairs, the need to dismount personnel for local protection, the need to undertake chemical surveys, evacuation of casualties, and the requirement for commanders to attend verbal orders groups or to perform reconnaissance before giving their own orders. Examination of these reasons leads to the conclusion that there are alternatives open to commanders rather than have crews go through these time-consuming entry drills and contaminate precious suits.

Personnel outside the tank could do the urgent repairs, provide the local protection required, do all the tasks associated with replenishment, and conduct the chemical survey required. The question is, where would these people come from? In the short term, a commander might have to have the infantry accompanying the tanks undertake these tasks, or personnel from the supply echelon. Such personnel can only perform these additional tasks at the expense of their primary function. Staff officers would be required to advise commanders on who exactly to use if they want to keep tank crews inside and have outsiders do these jobs.

If, however, armored units had more men just to undertake these tasks, then tank crews would not have to exit, except in emergency. The British writer, Brigadier Richard Simpkin, in his books on armored warfare, advocated the provision of a multi-purpose support vehicle, which would contain a three-man crew, six assault troopers, and a medic!

In addition to providing basic recovery and serving as an ambulance, this tank support vehicle, if established on the basis of one per troop, could supply the manpower for these external tasks.

Swedish armored battalions equipped with the S-tank have two extra soldiers per troop, carried in squadron echelons to undertake the extra tasks associated with an arctic environment? The same could be done for employment in a chemical environment.

If a commander decides to have crews exit, then staff will have to advise as to a safe location. Again, the importance of good chemical intelligence is evident. Figure 1 shows the vulnerability of the crews. Exiting for orders is a problem that can be resolved by use of the radio and passage of appropriately protected traces (overlays) through the pistol ports in the same manner as ammunition. Staffs and commanders in formations with collectively equipped AFVs will have to factor in the time needed to exit and reenter protection when calling commanders to personally attend orders groups.

In addition to the straightforward solution of adding more people to the organization to perform tasks outside the tank, technology is also making this emier. Armored ammunition and POL vehicles alleviate the need for anyone to be outside for replenishment. Figure 3 is an example, and it is only one." Externally-mounted chemical detectors, or detectors' dispersed from AFVs, may eliminate the need for anyone outside to undertake chemical survey. Finally, disposable suits may solve the problem of replacement suits required for reentry. Technology is well on the way to helping commanders and staffs with the question of exiting protection, but yet another question surfaces. A commander may have to decide whether to move contaminated tanks into uncontaminated areas. Some of the factors that he must consider are: 0The operational need for the contaminated tanks 0The type of chemical agent on the tanks 0The impact on other troops in the area of using contaminated tanks 0The time required to decontaminate these tanks using available resources.

The importance of operational need requires no elaboration. If the commander's battle depends on employment or these tanks, then he will use them contaminated.

However, staff officers must be prepared to advise commanders on the consequences of moving contaminated tanks. Some of the major consequences are: 0 Unprotected troops must be warned 0 Degradation of lighting eficen-cy brought on by wearing masks 0 Contamination spread by these "dirty" tanks must be marked and warnings passed 0 Requirements for additional decontamination brought about by spread of this contamination must be established.

Company commanders, unless they are desperate, are not going to appreciate contaminated tanks moving into their area at night, forcing them to don masks perhaps in the middle of a tire fight. The infantry used to say that tanks on their position brought unwanted artillery fire. Now tanks may also bring the unwanted requirement to put masks on.

The primary reason tanks may have to move contaminated is the time that will be required by the limited supply of conventional decontamination resources. Conventional decontamination involves spraying on decontaminate and then washing it off. Containers or vehicles to hold both are required, as well as time. Those who have been involved in decontamination exercises can testify that even a company-sized group takes considerable time. The inherent decontamination capabilities of the M1 with use of the tank's turbine engine, described in an ARMOR article, will relieve armor commanders of the need for outside decontamination?

Such units, decontaminating themselves as suggested in the article, could be available much more readily. Future tank designs may well have to con-INFLATABLE PLASTIC

Figure 4 ENTRANCEWAY

Simplified Collective Protection Equipment (SCPE) sider this bonus, derived from use of the turbine engine. Of course diesel-engined tanks could have add-on decon pods, which could also serve as additional armor. Technology can and must relieve commanders and staff of the requirement to move contaminated tanks. If contaminated tanks have to be moved, the use of marker dispensers on these "dirty" tanks, like those the Russians employ on their chemical reconnaissance vehicles, would reduce the requirement to deploy marking parties. Warnings would still have to go out, and staff will quickly have to develop a contamination control plan. As anyone who has been involved in plotting downwind hazards knows, more than the immediate route can be affected, even if contaminated vehicles are restricted to one track. The longer the distance, the bigger the problem.

Casualties in a chemical warfare environment can be classed as "conventional," in that wounds were inflicted by conventional means, or "chemical," in that the casualty has been affected by a chemical agent. When employing tanks with chemical collective NBC protection, there should only be conventional casualties among tank crews unless a tank has been unlucky enough to have its overpressure system damaged. The problem of handling casualties in a chemical environment is difficult enough without adding the complication of AFVS. NATO members have scarcely come to grips with the problem. For example, do you send a medic inside the collective NBC protection of the tank - after proper entry drills -where he can work with his mask and gloves off, or do you move the casualty oubide to more sophisticated treatment? Putting a casualty into the Canadian NBCW Casualty Bag while inside a Leopard tank is a problem in its own right. Commanders will have difficulty deciding what to do about casualties. Another decision armored commanders will face is when to rest tank crews. Rest will be a very real problem for crews forced to remain closed up for longer periods.

Simpkin's book, H i i i t t Factors in Mechanized lVurJm, devotes a whole chapter to the subject of waiting periods under NBCW threat? He cites the need to avoid dehumanization and boredom, as well as the requirement to maintain physical and mental fitness. His solutions include chemo-therapeutic and psychological support and, of course, training. A less extreme solution may be the provision of collective NBC protection in the form of shelters, such as that in Figure 4, which could be inflated inside structures to serve as a crew rest area. Armor commanders will seek staff advice about wltere these shelters should go and wlten they are to be used.

The provision of rest for crews of costly AFVs raises the question of relief crews. Although it goes against the grain of armored soldiers in every army, the employment of tanks with, collective protection may force the use of more than one crew per tank in order to obtain maximum efficiency from the expensive combination of firepower and mobility that is called an MBT. No airline today assigns only one crew to an aircraft. Simpkin's ideas on application of aircraft servicing to tank operations has considerable validity when developing concepts that provide more than one crew per tank."

Some of the decisions commanders must face are reiterated: 0 Operate hatches open or closed? At lei?, the Soviets use a truck-mounted jet engine's exhaust to neufralize chemical contamination on tanks. Units move in column through the decontamination site, car-wash style. 0 Exit from collective protection? 0 Move contaminated tanks? 0 Tank crew casualties?

Tank crew rest and relief? No matter what the commander decides, there will be staff problems associated with the operation of tanks with collective NBC protection in a chemical warfare environment. Some of these staff problems are: collection. analysis, and dissemination of chemical intelligence; chemical attack detection and dissemination of warning; determination of safe areas for exit and reentry; advice on decontamination resources available; advice on time required for decontamination; advice on routes on which to move contaminated tanks: advice on impact of using "dirty" tanks on other troops; marking of routes contaminated by "dirty" tanks; contamination control of hazards spread by moving contaminated tanks; organize relief and/or rest of tank crews inside collective protection; how to deal with casualties of crews inside collective protection; and how to pass orders and traces to commanders inside tank collective protection.

Technology can provide some staff assistance in the form of improved monitors, automatic dissemination of warnings, dispersible markers, on-board decontamination systems, or at minimum, systems organic to tank or tank subunit, local protection gas dispensers, disposable suits, packaging to fit through pistol ports, and radio-transmitted traces. Tanks equipped with collective NBC protection should be able to undertake active monitoring without the crew exiting. In addition to monitors mounted on the exterior which could be read or heard in the interior, there is also a need for the tank to project monitors some distance through a dispenser in order to obtain readings for less well-protected follow-on infantry or support echelon elements. (It could be as simple as a balloon carrying a small detector).

Reconnaissance helicopters, as a matter of course, should have detectors which pass on warning automatically to troops that they are overflying as well as those that they are working with. Monitoring technology is only one area in which development can only make the decision involved in operating tanks with collective NBC protection easier.

At present, commanders must decide how they will face the problems that accrue based on what they have in their units and their staff. Collective NBC protection may give NATO tank crews the edge in fighting efficiency that they need to win, but only if their commanders and staffs remain alert to the implications of operations in a chemical warfare environment. Notes 'Simpkin, R E, Human Factors in Mechanized Warfare, Oxford, 1983, p. 117. 'These drills are socalled after Captain D. C. Patterson, the Australian armor officer who developed them while attending a course at the Canadian NBCW School. ARMOR - 3Patterson, D. C., Preliminary Report Field Trial Crew CW Drills Leopard C1 Tank, 10 August, 1983, p. 2. 4Simpkin, R. E., Tank Warfare, London, 1979, p. 193.

501sson and Thomas, "The Swedish Armor Battalion," ARMOR, March-April 1979, pp. 27-29. 'Squitier, J. E., "Inherent M1 Decon Capabilities," ARMOR, January-February 1986, pp. 19-21. '"Future Battlefield Logistics Vehicles," International Defense Review, 7/06. p. 941. 'Canadian Forces videotape "Exercise Trial Chace II" CFB Petawawa, October. 1984. 'Simpkin, Human Factors in "Simpkin, ibid, p. 70.

Mechanized Warfare, op cit, p. 28. Major F. R. Thomas is a member of the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's). He is a graduate of the Pakistan Army Command and Staff Course, the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff Course, and the UK Long Armour Infantry Course.

Major Thomas has served overseas with Canadian Forces Europe in West Germany and with the United Nations in Cyprus, Syria, and Israel. He is currently assigned to the Directorate of Military Plans at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. He has previously written several articles for ARMOR.