Air Defense in the Covermg Force Area

“... Half an hour before, at 7 A. M., the order had come from the Kompaniechef to be prepared to move at 0800 hours, but to remain meanwhile in positions of observation. These were on the high ground southeast of Wolfenbuettel, and Klaus was a Zugfuehrer, in charge of his own and three other Leopards in 16 Battalion of 3 Panzeraufklaerungsregiment... Half an hour later, the position was very different. The whole of his company was advancing, in the usual tactical order, with two platoons moving to the next tactical feature about 1 kilometer ahead, supported and covered by the other two in fire positions... ‘Ganz schnell vorwaerts!’ came a sharp radio order to him as his four tanks moved carefully forward to the ridge a half a kilometer ahead, jinking from side to side as they went so as to provide a difficult target.

Suddenly the world was full of express trains shrieking past. Enemy armor-piercing shot! He fired his smoke protective shells at once and changed direction, telling his platoon to conform, to seek the cover of a small copse ahead to the left. The sky appeared to fill with huge predatory helicopters bearing strange markings, and worse, with rockets issuing from their undercarriages. The Leopard next to him stopped, smoke pouring from it. One crewman scrambled out, another got to the turret and fell back, a shattered trunk. Of all the absurdities, there occurred to Klaus at this very moment a phrase which had been hammered home to him and his classmates at the Panzerausbildungsschule so often and so emphatically. “The great thing about the Leopard tank, which makes it superior to all Allied, as well as Soviet tanks, is its agility. It gives you protection through speed...” Klaus thought, “Protection through speed, eh? Was fuer Quatsch ist das!” What rubbish! He jumped to the ground and ran. A moment later the whole Leopard exploded in a shambles of twisted metal, equipment, human wreckage, and indescribable mess of war.”

The Third World War General Sir John Hacker... The armored cavalry regiment is a powerful battle formation.

However, it has its ‘Achilles Heel.’ As illustrated, covering force units are woefully short of organic air defense artillery support. Currently, American armored cavalry regiments are authorized only one ADA platoon, consisting of 24 Stinger crews. Th carcity nf this combat multiplier, combined with the ACR’s numerous ADA demands, force the regimental commander to position his Stinger crews only with his most vulnerable/critical and least recuperable assets. Additionally, the prime mover of these crews is the M998 HMMWV. While a great improvement over the M151A2, the HMMWV provides only limited cover for the Stinger crew. Consequently, limited regimental ADA assets are deployed across the CFA but are generally too few in number, and too vulnerable, to totally meet all the ADA needs of the regiment. Given the scope and demands of the cavalry mission, this shortcoming could prove extremely costly in a conflict with a modern and highly sophisticated enemy force. The obvious solution to the regiment’s dilemma is to outfit it with an ADA battery fully capable of the forward support mission.

The reality of this situation is that fielding of this battery will be delayed until the mid-1990s, due to fiscal constraints and production difficulties. The immediate problem, then, becomes “how does the ACR solve DOTTD UNES c c - r ELEMENTS LOCATED ON THE SAME iNsTAwtloN

F.. m 12 M113A3a 26 AH-18 9M113A3s haackmboatbw) 3 CEVS

UH-25 OH-58s 41 MlAls 29M99Bs 30 M3Als 6 M1099 5 FIST-Vs its forward ADA problem under its current TO&E?”

CFA in Defense Criteria In searching for an answer to the covering force area air defense problem, the response must adequately consider the following requirements: flexibility, command and control (C’), suitability of firing positions, cover, mobility, and probability of kill.

Flexibility refers to the element’s capacity to pcrform all missions quickly and effectively. If required to perform an air defense task in conjunction with its primary function, the two requirements must minimally conflict.

Command and control is critical, due to the integrated nature of ADA operations not only within the regiment, but also with the corps. It is essential that CFA air defense elements receive timely airspace management and early warning information in order to fully realize their potential on the battlefield. Vehicular cover must be sufficient to protect the crew from the hazards of the CFA.. This cover may be due to the construction of the vehicle or a combination of the vehicle and engineer works. Firing positions provided by the CFA air defense asset must enable it to defend its associated formation from rotary wing air attack. Specific attention must be focused on locations that offer good to excellent observation and field of tire, concealment, and communications. The mobility criterion dictates that the vehicle must be capable of keeping pace with the M1M3 family of vehicles.

Finally, the aerial effectiveness of this element’s weapons must be scrutinized. In the CFA, the primary threat to the ACR is rotary wing aircraft employing high speed, low-altitude attack profiles. The designated air defense element in the CFA must have a weapon with sufficient: range and kill probability to destroy the target with the first or second round. It is only through an optimum combination of the previously cited characteristics that the AGR will establish an effective and credible CFA air defense ability. Due to the combined arms nature of the ACR, a regiment has a wide variety of options to consider in meeting this challenge.

Figure 1 shows the current garrison organization of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The major combat systems for each organization are listed below its unit symbol. This chart clearly indicates that the ACR has numerous candidates capable of providing some degree of air defense in the CFA. The options fall into two basic categories: those elements capable of providing air defense through their system’s organic weaponry, or those systems serving as platforms for Stinger crews or weapons. To provide forward area air defense through such weapons as the Bradley’s 25mm or the Ml’s main gun has some advantages. However, the disadvantages greatly outweigh its merits. To rely on the organic weaponry does not significantly disrupt troop internal operations. It does, however, pose the following problems.

First, weaponry organic to the M1 and M3 lacks the range to nullify hostile air attacks before it reaches its ordnance release lines (ORL). Consequently, the M1M3 system may destroy its target but still fail in its air defense mission. And second, the target array presented to a cavalry troop facing a hostile ground force supported by close air support (CAS) will appear overwhelming. These M1W3 crews face a significant but not insurmountablc challenge. To add a third dimensional task merely serves to complicate and mtensify the situation. A system specifically devoted to countering an air threat would greatly enhance the cavalry troop’s probability of success m this scenario.

MlAl

-64.67.40.51.42.82

In the CFA

MlAl

.69.67.57.58.49.89 (Note: Ratings in each column are on a scale of 1-10. Percentages at top of each column represent weight given to each factor.) Fig. 2 The matrices in Figure 2 compare various systems in the air defense role. Each category is weighted in accordance with its relative importance to this mission. The matrix at the top of the chart compares systems with organic weaponry in the air defense role. The lower matrix contrasts various platforms with regard to their ability to accommodate the air defense mission and Stinger crews and/or weapons. From this comparison and the previous analysis, it is evident that the "platform" option to the CFA air defense dilemma is the superior solution. Of the various platforms available, the GSR M113A3 is the clear favorite. This platform, though, is not capable of accommodating a Stinger crew. Rather, each GSR Mll3A3 could be allocated two or three Stingers per track for use by the GSR crew.' This solution permits the ACRs Stinger platoon to remain forcused on its established priorities while extending the regiment's air defense depth forward. Blackhorse STUNAR:

The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's solution to the forward area ADA challenge is to place Stinger under armor. Known as STUNAR in ADA battalions, this concept places Stinger crews into M113 armored personnel carriers. These APCs then deploy with armored or mechanized maneuver formations. While the 11th ACR does not have the resources to place Stinger crews into its own APCs, it does have an option that achieves the same result. This solution, which is proving successful, is to equip ground surveil- lance radar (GSR) crews with Stinger weapons. Once trained in the use of the weapon, the APCequipped GSR crews will provide credible and effective forward area air defense. Ground surveillance radar teams are attached to cavalry troops for the surveillance of critical areas in the covering force.

employed along the FLOT, GSR crews are usually found well forward of friendly battle positions or along flanks. In order to maximize the capabilities of the GSR system, crews are located in areas that afford clear observation and fields of fire.

these crews operate primarily at night or during periods of limited visibility. The Stinger weapon, on the other hand, is principally a "daylight" system. Stinger gunners require weather conditions that offer excellent visibility, for two reasons. First, the crew must visually detect the aircraft before engaging. Consequently, the range fan of the weapon is directly dependent on the ability of the crew to spot the target. Second, the Stinger crew normally must positively identify its target before engaging. Clear atmospheric conditions greatly aid this task. Thus, it is clear that GSR and Stinger systems will rarely be used simultaneously. The GSR/Stinger crew's primary and secondary missions, therefore, do not readily con- flict. The overriding consideration in the GSWStinger concept, however, is that the surveillance mission remains the primary task of the crew. It is imperative that the cavalry troop commander understand that he is not receiving a Stinger crew, per se, but rather a GSR crew with air defense capabilities. With this point clear, the GSR/Stinger crew is free to maximize its contribution to the cavalry troop. The GSR/Stinger crew, when doctrinally employed, extends air defense coverages deep into the covering force area while offering the troop commander the unique opportunity to focus the capabilities of this valuable asset at the critical moment. Air defense artillery operations within the 11th ACR are centralized under the control of the MAN- PADS platoon leader and coordinated through the regimental airspace management element ( pendent of the ADA platoon and is under the control of the squadron S a. Positioning of GSR crews is solely a function of their GSR mission. The ADA platoon monitors GSR activity through the squadron tactical operations center (TOC). Based upon current GSR positions, the ADA section leader, who supports the squadron and is located at the TOC, determines the Stinger coverages of the GSR crews and integrates them into his own squadron ADA plan. Subsequently, this information goes to the platoon headquarters and the RAME so that a coherent regimental ADA scheme can be developed. Similarly, the ADA section leader passes early warning and airspace management information to the GSR crew through the squadron TOC. This relationship between the GSR and ADA platoons retains the necessary communication links to diminish the possibility of fratricide and increase the Stinger probability of kill, while allowing the squadron to retain independent control over a valuable intelligence and air defense asset. The benefits of this air defense plan are threefold. First, to deploy Stinger weapon systems with GSR crews provides maximum early engagement for the regiment as a whole, and the cavalry troop in particular. Second, it allows the regiment to execute an ADA plan that has significant depth. And third, it permits the squadron and its subordinate cavalry troops considerable flexibility in the use of forward air defense assets. The overall benefit to the regiment cannot be overstated. By tilling the forward area air defense gap, this GSR/ADA marriage has shielded a serious ACR vulnerability and greatly strengthened its general ADA posture.

Note 'These missiles originated from the Regiment's Stinger Platoon. Each Stinger crew had one weapon round substracted from its basic load of six missiles. The reallocation left the Stinger platoon with 120 missiles and pushed 24 missiles forward to the GSR platoon.

Captain Steven W. Karaffa is a 1985 graduate of the University of Notre Dame. He was the MANPADS

Platoon Leader/Regimental Air Defense Officer for the 1 lth Armored Cavalry Regiment and codeveloper of the BLACKHORSE STUNAR concept before leaving the Army to pursue a civilian career.

First Lieutenant Timothy J. Perez is the S2 for the 4th Squadron (Air Cav), 1 lth Armored Cavalry Regiment.

He was previously the Surveillance Platoon Leader, 51 1 th Military Intelligence Troop, 11th ACR, where he helped develop the BLACKHORSE STUNAR concept.

He is a 1986 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute.