By Night as By Day

Not all armor battalions train adequately for night operations. Some conduct night training only during major field exercises and as apart of gunnery training. Others conduct some night training the year round, but in an unorganized fashion. Few, if any, battalions have as good a night training program as their day training program. Several unique night operations factors contribute to this situation. One of the most important and difficult to correct is safety. Armor and wheeled vehicles moving quickly in limited visibility are always hazardous to themselves and to dismounted personnel. In each night training exercise, there is the risk that someone will fail to see a dangerous situation developing. Nothing can do more to inspire confidence in a unit’s ability to conduct safe night operations than frequent, organized, night training. Another factor is morale, which we can attribute to fear of the dark. While not actually scared of the dark, many tankers become apprehensive as the sun goes down. The tank commander is continually tense, waiting for the sickening drop as his tank falls off a cliff, which neither he nor his driver saw. The platoon leader is sure that the slope rising ahead is Hill 431... or is it? These worries, and others, contribute to a certain reluctance, usually not admitted, to conduct night training. Also never admitted is the reluctance to conduct night training while in garrison.. Unless the soldier perceives night training as valuable and time efficient, he is probably not going to want to leave his home and family on a weeknight and then have to go to work the next morning. Mechanized units in Germany have the additional problem that much of their training is conducted in Maneuver Rights Areas (MRA) where track vehicle movement at night is prohibited. As a result, units conduct night training on an infrequent basis. Yet, our analysis of warfare tells us that successful night operations will be critical in the next war, and this has led to new tank thermal sights, passive night driving sights, ground surveillance radar, (GSR), etc. Even so, our current night training practices limit our effectiveness. We do not train to the full potential of our equipment. Nor do we practice the techniques that will maximize our ability to operate at night. For example, many of our manuals tell us to use ground GSRs during periods of limited visibility to guide advancing units. But how Many armor or mechanized infantry companies have practiced with their sup- 16 ARMOR - I porting GSR teams the commands and procedures necessary to successfully employ this technique? Probably not very many. Proficiency in the skills peculiar to night combat, and confidence in our ability to conduct night operations, is missing. If we can achieve the former, it will lead to the latter. If we become accomplished small unit night fighters, brigade-level and higher commanders and staff will be able to plan and execute night operations much as they do by day. wasted time on weeknights. Judicious use of TEWTs and Jcep-Xs for the leader training will avoid lengthy after-operations maintenance on track vehicles. Combine those tasks requiring track vehicles wherever possible. Limit training to two or three hours a night, and give compensatory time the next day. Supervised by the CO or XO, platoon leaders can train their platoons in individual tank and platoon techniques and in the tactics of night fight-We need to develop a night training program for small units, with emphasis on the performance of tasks by squads, crews, and platoons. It must be a year-round program, incorporating training not only in Major Training Areas (MTAs) training, but also in garrison and Local Training Areas (LTAs). The program must lead to competence in using our night fighting equipment, allowing us to practice the appropriate tactics and techniques. Above all, the result must be to instill confidence in our ability to fight at night. The training program should begin with a diagnostic phase. This should be conducted in two parts - a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT), and afield test. Both need only be about two hours long to effectively measure the unit's ability to fight at night. The company commander should first issue the platoon leaders an OPORD late in the afternoon. He should observe their scheme of maneuver; do they recon, plan sup porting fires/illumination, and how do they pass the order to their subordinates? After dark, they should go through the operation on the ground. The critique should cover areas of strength/weakness and what training needs to he conducted to sustain strengths and correct weaknesses. An exercise of this type will quickly evaluate the leader's ability to navigate in darkness, his use of the control measures peculiar to night operations, his planning night fire support, and his general understanding of night operations. One platoon at a time should run the field test. The platoon should move to the test site and arrive after dark. The initial task should be to establish a night defensive position. An "enemy patrol should attempt to penetrate the platoon position, testing its security. Foot, wheel, and track '' enemies" should approach the position to test target acquisition. They should attack the platoon to test its fire control and distribution. Next, the platoon should advance, using all the movement techniques. Radio listening silence, mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) 4, and buttoning-up should be imposed at various times. Finally, the test should end with a night tactical road march. After the exercise, critique the platoon in general terms to give focus to the training to come. Follow-up training should center around short exercises designed to train the crew or platoon in one or two tasks. Careful preplanning and preparation will be necessary to avoid morale problems resulting from ing. Each platoon should train once every two weeks. Intersperse leader training with platoon training to coordinate and define the actions of the platoons.. Task selection night training is very important. Tank crews and platoons will probably already have ample night gunnery training. Therefore, unless you identify a specific problem, stress other areas. Each crew must be able to perform at night all those tasks they perform during the day. The onset of darkness makes many of these tasks more difficult, requiring that the crew or platoon practice so that there will be no loss of efficiency at night. Some of these specific tasks are: night movement techniques, particularly if the crew is in MOPP or buttoned-up; target acquisition; I ARMOR - l7 1 use of visual signals; selecting firing positions; camouflaging; install-inghetrieving mines; mounting/operating night observation devices (NOD); and small arms firing. Other techniques specific to night operations, or performed in a significantly different manner at night, include: use of GSR to control movement and/or acquire targets; night control measures; use of remote sensors to detect movement; use of range cards at night; navigation; occupation of a night defensive position; fire support planning; and security. The above lists are not all-inclusive. Instead, they detail many of the things we will have to be able to do if we are to successfully operate at night. Nor should we limit this training to the line platoons. The scout, mortar, and support platoons must all practice thcir specilic night tasks. The battalion tactical operation center (TOC) should practice setting up and moving at night. The TOC is frequently lax in noise and/or light discipline. An example of a night training period using the ground surveillance radar (GSR) follows: When planning training for the quarter, set aside specific nights for night training. During the writing of the training schedules, assign specific tasks to each block of night training based on previously assessed weaknesses. In the case of using GSRs to guide unit movement, coordination is made for the GSR team to link up with the unit at 1300 hours on the training day. The GSR team briefs the unit on the operations and capabilities of the radar team. Following this, a coordination period works out guide movement signals and commands. The unit practices during daylight, then everyone goes to supper. After the meal, the GSR team, tank platoon leader, and his tank commanders move to the local training area using the company’s jeeps, and two jeeps borrowed from the battalion Stinger section. Thc procedures learned and rehearsed during the day are then exercised so that each tank commander has the opportunity to work with the GSR team and to receive commands via radio and pyrotechnics. At the end of the training, hold a short critique and return the group to garrison. Then conduct post-training operations, and release the unit. Compensatory time already scheduled for the following morning can be based on the time of return that night. Once the battalion is well into its night training program, it may consider conducting a period of reverse cycle training (RCT). Reverse cycle training occurs when the unit trains at night and is off-duty the next day. This has the double advantage of vastly increasing the amount of night training and of allowing the soldiers’ bodies and personal schedules time to adjust to working at night. However, some inherent factors make the conduct of RCT difficult: First, the lowest level at which RCT training is practical is the battalion level. This is because the basic day-to-day communications with other units, higher headquarters, and post/community agencies, (all on day schedule), must continue. The battalion staff can do this by operating split shift - heavy on personnel administration and logistics during the day, and heavy on training at night. Additionally, any RCT is going to have to be carefully worked into long-range planning calendars to avoid conflicts. This is best done by placing the entire battalion on RCT at one time, which is reflected on both brigade and division calendars. In this manner, both brigade and division can provide their most important support; i.e., managing other commitments and requirements to keep the battalion free of distractions during the day so that it does not end up working around the clock. Other considerations to be taken into account are soldiers’ medical, finance, and personnel appointments. You must make two decisions before planning a RCT. The first is cycle length. Anything less than two weeks will not allow soldiers’ bodies and schedules to adapt sufficiently to maximize the training benefits; while anything more than four weeks will probably be too difficult to schedule, may cause family problems, and will accumulate so many small problcms from personnel not being available during the day as to be unworkable. The second decision is the hours of training. This will depend on several factors, chief of which is the hours of darkness. For example, in some areas of Germany in summer it is only dark from 2300 to 0500, while in winter it is dark from 1600 to OYOO. Other factors affecting choice of duty hours are: training to be ac- 18 ARMOR - complished, maintenance and preparation time, and whether you desire to have battalion duty hours overlap with community activity or the military unit’s normal duty hours. Once you make these decisions, you can conduct planning and preparation in detail. As an example, a battalion commander takes command soon after his unit returns from the National Training Center (NTC). After-ac-lion reviews from the NTC note night fighting as a weakness, with night movement techniques and control of maneuver at company level being especially poor. After some training in individual and crew night fighting tasks, the battalion commander decides the unit needs RCT to gain the required level of platoon and company night maneuver expertise. There happens to be a two-week block of time open a month before the battalion’s ARTEP at Ft. Pickett, VA, so the battalion commander decides to go with that rather than have to wait seven months for a longer block of open time. At the same time, since this is the first time any battalion in the brigade has conducted RCT, he is concerned about coordination and communication with other units and agencies. Accordingly, he chooses 1500 to 0300 as the duty day during the RCT period, with a typical daily company schedule being: 1500-1700 Preparation for train- 1700-1800 Dinner 1800-2200 Training 2200-2300 Midnight meal 2300-0300 Training ing/maintenance In this manner, each company gcts eight solid hours of night training each day, with some overlap between the battalion’s schedule and those agencies/units on normal schedules. In order to have a progressive night training progam that will solve those problems identified at the NTC, the battalion commander designates the first week for platoon training and the second week for company training: Platoon Week Monday - Driving techniques, Tuesday - Traveling overwatch, Wednesday - Occupy battle posi- 7hrrrsday - Movement to contact, Friday - Maintenance. traveling. bounding overwatch. tion, fight from battle position. move between battle positions. Companv Week Monday - Bound by platoon, tacti-Tuesday - Movement to contact Wednesday - Night attack Thursday - Night active defense Friday - Maintenance cal road march By varying which day each platoon and company conducts maintenance, the training areas required can be minimized. RCT will be of great benefit in providing night fighting expertise if conducted as outlined above,. However, don’t regard it as a cure-all to correct basic weaknesses in night fighting abilities. You must integrate RCT into an organizcd, progressive, program designed to achieve proficiency at night operations. This must be the 1 ARMOR - I!.. To correct basic weaknesses in night fighting abilities. RCT must be integrated into an organized, progressive program designed to achieve proficiency... This must be the same type of planned, prepared, p e rf o rma n ce - o rien-tated training that we conduct by day. same type of planned, prcparl performance-orienlated training that we conduct by day. Then, and only then, will battalions, brigades, and divisions be able to plan and conduct the night operations which will be vital to winning the next war. Captain James K. Greer was commissioned from West Point in 1977. He is a graduate of the Ranger course and the AOB. He served as a platoon leader and XO with the 3d Bn, 5- 33 Armor, Ft. Knox; as a project officer for the XM1 FSED Test at Ft. Knox, and as XO, D Troop, 10th Cavalry, Ft. Knox. He was chief, M60A3 Mobile Training Team in Egypt, and attended the Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, VA before being assigned as S3, Special Troops, V Corps, FRG. Later, he was CO, E Troop, 1-10 Cavalry; CO, HHC 1-68 Armor, FRG. Following a tour as an instructor at USMA, he is attending the CGSC at Ft. Leavenworth. 19