Armor in Low-Intensity Conflict

Armor came into existence to fulfill a tactical role on the high-intensity battlefield.' Since WW 11, this role has been well understood and continues to drive the development of armor organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine. Since 1945, however, wars of low-intensity have increased in frequency. Unlike high-intensity warfare, armor's role at the lower end of the spectrum of war has not been so well understood. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have gained experience with employing armor in low-intensity conflict (LIC). In each case, the cxpectation of armor's role on the low-intensity battlefield was different from the tactics finally hammered out in the field. For example, the planners in the U. S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam originally saw no need for tanks with forces deploying to that country. When tanks first arrived in Vietnam in March 1965, it was by accident. In fact, when informed that American tanks had been deployed, Maxwell Taylor, Ambassador to Vietnam, was upset that such equipment, "not appropriate for counterinsurgency operations," had been sent.? Despite the planner's apprehen-sions, once armor had proved its value, the number of armor units in Vietnam steadily increased. By the end of the war, 24 percent of the combat maneuver battalions in Vietnam were either mechanized infantry, armor, or armored cavalry. 3 This article will focus on the doctrinal issues that emerged from the American employment of armor in Vietnam. A later article Will consider the Soviet experience with armor in Afghanistan and will draw rclevant implications from both the U. S. and Soviet use of armor in LIC. There is little theory and even less doctrine that addresses armor in LIC. J. F. C. Fuller, the grand old theorist of armored warfare, did not ignore the employment of armor in conflicts short of full-scale war. In fact, he claimed that armor could be most useful in policing the most remote corners of the British Em- I ARMOR - 9 1

The Marines were the first U. S. troops to use tanks in Vietnam. Below, Marine M48s are ferried ashore. At right, 3d Marine Division riflemen, still carrying the M14 rifle, hitch a ride on a tank in action in 1966. pire. Perhaps his greatest contribution, however, was in pointing out that we must see and develop the traditional arms in accordance with their tactical functions on the battlefield, which he listed as finding, holding, hitting, protecting, and smashing! The true value of combined arms at any level is apparent through an assessment of the ability of each arm to fulfill these functions. Terrain and the nature of the enemy will affect this ability at any level. Armor doctrine in LIC must be evaluated within the framework of Fuller's tactical functions. As America became involved in its first major challenge in LIC, this was not well understood. Difficult terrain and an elusive enemy argued for breaking apart the combined arms team. Our experience in Vietnam affirms Fuller's analysis of tactical functions and the value of the combined arms throughout the spectrum of war. The first U. S. tank unit to move to Vietnam was actually a platoon from the 3d Marine Tank Battalion. This platoon was part of the Marine battalion landing team sent to Da Nang in March 1965. These were the tanks which Ambassador Taylor deemed inappropriate for counterinsurgency operations. Many senior officers, including Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, shared Ambassador Taylor's views. When the 1st Infantry Division was scheduled for Vietnam deployment, General Johnson decided that it would deploy without its two organic tank battalions or mechanized infantry. The chief believed, 'The presence of tank formations tends to create a psychological atmosphere of conventional combat..."' Eventually, armor units did deploy to Vietnam and they quickly proved their value. As a test case, General Johnson approved the deployment of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry with its tanks. In November 1965, at Ap Bau Bang, Troop A, 1/4th Cavalry, demonstrated that the firepower of an armor unit was a valuable asset in defeating determined Viet Cong attacks. With this positive example, the Army approved the requests of MG Frederick C. Weyand, commander, 25th Infantry Division, to take his mechanized units to Vietnam! The decision to deploy cavalry squadrons, tank battalions,. and mechanized infantry in support of the infantry divisions was sig- 10 ARMOR - nificant. Even more significant was the decision to send the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. As early as 1965, General Westmoreland, commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), requested the cavalry to provide highway security along Route 1. With the arrival of the 11th ACR in September 1%S, it became the largest U. S. armor unit to serve during the war. With substantial armor forces in Vietnam, the question was how to use them. Previously, armior was doctrinally riveted to the potential high-intcn-sity battlefields of Europe. The first manual to mention "operations against irregular insurgent forces," was FM 17-1, Amtor Operatiom, published in 1963. The three pages devoted to the sub.ject offered little practical advice. FM 17-95, 77te Armored Cavalr?, in CoiatterirtsitrRertc?! published in 1960, made no mention of unconventional warfare. In 1962, however, the Combat Development Agency at Ft. Knox produced a study titled, Role of Aniiorcrl Cavalry in Coiutteritsiiei. This farsighted report suggested that a properly modified ACR might be used to conduct offensive operations to include encirclement, raid, pursuit, ambushes, and counterattacks. The official manuals, however, obviously focused on high-intensity warhe. The early armored units in Vietnam, "literally had to invent tactics and techniques, and then convince the Army that they worked."' By 1966, U. S. advisors in Vietnam began to confirm some of the assertions in the Ft. Knox study. The May-June issue of Anitor Magazine contained an articlc by

Raymond Battreall, the senior armor advisor in Vietnam, titled, "Armor in Vietnam." LTC Battreall observed that armor is of little use for reconnaissance; it is best employed in offensive operations to strike, encircle, or sweep. In these operations, armor provides the necessary firepower to destroy the enemy. The author further noted that the M113 was used essentially as a main battle tank. Clearly, this observer believed that the function of armor was not that of finding, but of hitting. "The first units to arrive suffered from a lack of adequate doctrine. A "no tanks in the jungle I' attitude prevailed at MAW headquarters. 'I jungle" attitude prevailed at MACV hcadquartcrs. In 1965, the 1/4 Cavalry held its tanks at the squadron base? Senior decision makers, General Westmoreland among them, believed the Vietnamese terrain was unsuitable for tanks. In fact, a survey later showed that armored vehicles could traverse 46 percent of Vietnam year round? It took six months to convince General Westmoreland that tanks could conduct combat operations." With the deployment of additional armor units in 1966, the pattern of An M48 of the 11 th ACR moves through a rubber plantation near Ben Dong in the fall of 1966. When first deployed, the 11th ACR was used frequently for route security. The Army did not begin to doctrinally address these issues until almost a year after U. S. armor units deployed to Vietnam. The first units to arrive suffered from a lack of ade-quale doctrine. A "no tanks in the 1 ARMOR - 11

Aerial view of tracks left near an 11th ACR command post, above, give some indication of the number of armored vehicles used in Operation Cedar Falls. The operation was intended to eliminate enemy troops and supplies in the so-called "Iron Triangle" northwest of Saigon. offensive employment began to emerge. Although rc-quested the 11th ACR to provide route security for Highway 1, the 11th ACR was soon involved in frequent search and destroy missions. In executing Operation Atlanta to clear Highway 1, the regiment conducted search and destroy, route security, reconnaissance, and base security missions. Thirty-nine percent of the missions mentioned in the after-action report were search and destroy. Significantly, the report mentions only four reconnaissance missions out of 70 operations. Almost from the moment they arrived, the regiment's squadrons were used as regular combat maneuver battalions rather than in the traditional cavalry role. The tank battalions that deployed to support the infantry did fulfill their traditional function of providing firepower. The firepower of the tanks was in great demand and, as a result, the tank companies and platoons were farmed out to the infantry. In one notable case, a tank platoon from the 1st Bn, 69th Armor, was under the operational control of the 173d Abn Bde and operated 250 miles from its parent battalion." In combat operations, tanks often led the way through the jungle because they could protect the infantry. They crushed their way through the antipersonnel mines and booby traps so deadly to the foot soldiers. However, the tanks also protected routes and bases. In fact, the tank battalions were more often used defensively than offensively. In the after-action report of the 1st Bn, 69th Armor, for the quarter ending 31 July, 1966,60 percent of the missions mentioned consisted of either base or route security. By 1967, the U. S. buildup provided considerably more armor units. In January, the U. S. Army began large-scale offensives with Operation Cedar Falls. The target of Cedar Falls was an extensive enemy base area in the Iron Triangle, northwest of Saigon. Two mechanized infantry battalions, a tank battalion, and a divisional cavalry squadron helped seal two sides of the triangle. The 11th ACR (-) attacked west from the point of the triangle to cut the area in half. Then, from all sides, the U. S. forccs began to close in and conduct search and destroy operations. Although Cedar Falls failed to bag many insurgents, it did destroy a large enemy logistics base. Perhaps even more significant was the demonstration of the value of mechanized forces in low-intensity conflict. Mechanized infantry battalions, often fighting mounted in their M113s, provided to some degree the same advantages of fuepower, mobility, and protection as other armored units. BG Richard T. Knowles, commander, 196th Infantry Brigade, sang their praises. "Mechanized infantry has proven to be highly successful in search and destroy operations. With their capability for rapid reaction and (their) firepower, a mechanized battalion can effectively control twice the terrain as an infantry battalion."12 Colonel William

W. Cobb, commander, 11th ACR, claimed the operation demonstrated the tactical flexibility of his unit." 12 ARMOR -

Operation Junction City, in February 1966, further demonstrated the utility of mechanized forces. This operation called for the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions to establish blocking positions in the shape of a large horseshoe in War Zone C, northwest of Saigon along the Cambodian border. Once the blocking positions were established, the 11th ACR and a brigade of the 25th ID attacked north into the open end of the horseshoe. The targets were the headquarters of the communist insurgency (Central Office of South Vietnam, (COSVN), the VC 9th Division, the lOlst NVA Regiment, and the enemy bases within the area. The operation went as planned and brought on several engagements. When the smoke cleared, the bases were destroyed, the VC 9th Division was battered, but the COSVN escaped. The engagements in which mechanized forces took part pointed to their function on the battlefield. The battles of Prek Klok I1 and Suoi Tre emphasized the firepower and ability of mechanized forces to react. At Prek Klok 11, the VC attacked the 2d Bn, 2d Infantry (Mech), during the night of 10 March. The firepower of the U. S. units, asssisted by air and artillery, made it a rather one-sided affair; the VC lost 197 men, the defenders lost three.14 At Suoi Tre, the 3d Bn, 22d Infantry and the 2d Bn, 77th FA came under heavy night attack at Firebase Gold. The VC hammered the firebase with mortars and assaulted with infantry waves. The next morning, the situation appeared desperate. A relief column consisting of the 2d Bn, 34th Armor, and the 2d Bn, 22d Infantry (Mech), was dispatched. By 0915 hours, "...the mechanized infantry and armor column broke through the jungle from the southwest. With their 90-mm guns firing canister and all machine guns blazing, they moved into the advancing Viet Con& cutting them down. Shortly after, the enemy began to withdraw."" As impressive as these actions were, they pointed to some significant problems. Prek Klok II and Suoi Tre were defensive victories. Junction City had attempted to find, fq and destroy the enemy. Although numerous insurgent bases were destroyed, the enemy simply moved into Cambodian sanctuaries. Essentially, a very large encirclement operation failed to find or fuc the enemy. The VC were destroyed only to the extent they were willing to offer themselves up to destruction. Mechanized units again demonstrated they could conduct combat operations in a counterinsurgency environment. They could react quickly and bring substantial firepower to bear whenever they could make the enemy fight, but they could not materially assist in finding or fiing the enemy. A key problem with the tactical offense in counterinsurgency is to find and fvr the enemy. Even if found, unless fvred it will be impossibile to destroy him. 11 is the inability to Fvr the insurgent which grants him the initiative. Referring to the enemy in the Cedar Falls and Junction City operations, General Bernard Rogers noted, "It was a sheer physical impossibility to keep him from slipping away whenever he wished, if he were in terrain with which he was familiar... generally the case.r16 Encirclement still appeared the best means of f i n g the insurgent, but large-scale operations were not the solution. Large-scale offensive operations were rarely attempted again. At the same time in which Cedar Falls and Junction City took place, a team of officers and civilians conducted a comprehensive study of armor operations in Vietnam. The Mechanized arid Aniior Combat Operations in I/iebiam (MACOV) study was a multi-volume report which covered doctrine, tactics, organization, mobility, and related Operation Junction City ARMOR - 13 matters. The study confirmed the pattern of offensive employment that had begun to emerge in 1966: that cavalry squadrons were most often used as combat maneuver battalions. The study emphasized that the advantages of mobility and firepower were so great that foot infantry was often cross-attached to mechanized infantry. Cross-attachment was frequent among all the combat arms. In this way all the arms could complement the functions of the others. The very fact that the armored cavalry was a balanced combined arms team encouraged its employment as a regular maneuver battalion. The functions that the combat arms fulfilled in Vietnam made for inherent strengths and weaknesses in their employment. Helicopter units attempted to find, airmobile infantry attempted to fm (block and encircle), while mechanized units provided their armor-protected firepower to hit. Invariably, artillery and tactical air assets finished or destroyed the enemy. The strengths in this arrangement lie in minimizing American casualties and playing to the U. S. technological advantage. The weakness in this tactical doctrine was that it often handed the initiative to the enemy. Most of the offensive contacts took the form of meeting engagements. Once contact was made, the maneuver force attempted to fur the enemy while calling in all the available artillery and tactical air assets. In order to safely use these indirect fires, units would, at best, not press the light, or, at worst, withdraw. The attempt to finish or destroy the enemy by artillery and air often resulted in breaking contact. This is one key reason why the enemy retained the initiative - he could escape. Another problem with using indirect fires to finish the enemy was that of their destructiveness. In LIC, \ ‘\. \

IAYIJGM MOVEMENTsrigon (20 mi.) 1 roes)

U W M AlRuFr................. the counterinsurgency force has a vested interest in limiting the destruction in a nation they intend to save. As U. S. forces attempted to restrict the employment of indirect fires, they weakened the system upon which their tactical offensive doctrine was based. The most effective use of this doctrine was in cordon search operations, in which the devastating fire of artillery was not needed. A classic cordon search that demonstrated the potential function of armor within the combined arms team occurred at Chanh Luu in August 1968. Chanh Luu was a suspected VC supply base, which had been presiously searched without result. The 3d Squadron, 11th ACR, drew the mission to conduct a cordon search of the village. The squadron was task-organized with I and K troops; two tank platoons from M Company; Band D Companies, 2d Bn, 16th Infantry; and was further supported by the 5th Division, South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The plan called for a deception effort, a quick cordon by U. S. units, and a search by ARVN troops. The deception effort aimed at convincing the enemy that a nearby village, Binh My, was the target. False messages and troop movements supported the deception. On 8 August, K Troop was 25 kilometers from Chanh Luu. Starting its move at O600, K Troop had, by 1600, moved to Firebase Normandy I1 and picked up D Company. Mounted in K Troop’s M113s, the force moved north in the direction of Binh My. At 1400, B Company was airlifted northwest of Normandy I1 and also began a sweep away from the real target. I Troop, with: the two tank platoons, began a sweep from Firebase Normandy I south, away from Canh Luu. At varying times during the night, all four elements turned back to converge on Chanh Luu. By 2300, the cordon was established. At 0700, elements of the 5th ARVN division airlanded, advanced h ARMOR - 14

"Organization of combined arms at the lowest level is the best means of applying combat power. For this reason, to the extent armor can contribute to low-intensity warfare, armored cavalry is its best weapon. 'Ion the village, and conducted the search. Sporadic fights erupted, and, later that night, the VC attempted to break through the cordon. The firepower of the mechanized units defeated every attempt, and, by 10 August, the village was declared clear. The results were impressive: 22 VC killed, including one NVA general, 122 VC prisoners, and a good deal of equipment and supplies captured.17 In this case, intelligence found the enemy, and the cn-circlement fvred him. It was a prime example of how mechanized forces can function within the combined arms team to fq hit, protect, and contribute to the destruction of the enemy in LIC. Despite the doctrinal problems, mechanized forces were effective in Notes The author considers armor to consist of those forces that tight mounted: including tank units, armored cavalry, and mechanized infantry. General Donn A. Starry, w d

Combat in Vie-The Ayr Company, Salem, Nf. 1982. p. 55. A total of 93 ground combat maneuver battalions served in Vietnam. Of that number. 71 were infantry. 10 mechanized infantry. 3 tank battalions. and 9 cavalry squadrons. Shelby L Stanton. Vietnam m e r Of Bat&, Galahad Boob. New York. 1986. p. 333. J. F. C. Fuller. "Tactics and Mechanization," m N Journal, May 1937. p. 461. 2 Starry. op cit.. p. 56. 13 Ibid. p. 63. ' Ibid. p. 65. Vietnam. Normally, within the combined arms team, armor functioned to protect U. S. troops and hit the enemy. Its ability to quickly bring tremendous firepower against the enemy is undeniable. Armor's ability to do more to fvr and destroy the enemy was not so much the result of terrain, but the product of the functions it served within the doctrine. The tactical doctrine evolved from a number of influences, the desire to save American lives and to avail ourselves of our strengths among them. The doctrinal lessons are clear. The combined arms team is a winner at all levels of war, but we must find the right balance of functions. Only in this way can the arms truly complement each other and bring to the battlefield the synergistic ef- ' bid. p. 57. Department of the Army, d and Combat QpmImns in Vietnam (MACOV). 1967. pp. 1-15. lo Starry, op cit.. p. 57. LTC T. S. Riggs. "We Need A Few More Tank To...." - ' MayJune 1966. LTG Bernard W. Rogers. Cedar Falls-ion Citx A T u r n P a

Washington. D. C.: Department of the Army. 1974. p 77.. 12 l3 Starry. op cit., p. 95. l4 R O S E. op cit.. p. 121. Ibid. pp. 139-140. l6 Ibid, p. 157.. l7 LTC John W. McEnery. "Mainstreet." Jan-Feb 1969. pp. 36-39. fect, which is their primary value. There is still little written doctrine on armor operations in LIC. Clearly, this doctrine must stress the utility of combined arms, encirclement, and small unit operations. LIC is a company and battalion commanders' fight. Organization of combined arms at the lowest level is the best means of applying combat power. For this reason, to the extent armor can contribute to low-intensity warfare, armored cavalry is its best weapon. Following Vietnam, the Soviets began their own experience with armor in LIC, which reaffirmed these lessons. A later article will examine the Soviet experience with armor in Afghanistan and discuss implications relevant to both U. S. and Soviet experience with armor in low-intensity conflicts. Major Michael R. Matheny taught history at the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Ft. Knox, KY, and at West Point. He is a graduate of the CGSC and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He has served as a tank company commander and as a tank battalion S3 with the 3d Infantry Division in Germany. He is currently assigned to G3 Plans, 1st Cavalry Division, Ft. Hood, Tx. 75