and Major N. Winn Noyes The Battle of Brice's Cross Roads: An Application of the Principles of War

The Battle of Brice's An Application of th, by Captain. );,,! J In March 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was promoted! I to the newly established rank of lieutenant ' general and given command of all Union armiesl r / \\, \ \ ',IV--'; \ in the field. Grant's strategic plan was simple enough: "To use the greatest number oftroops practical and to hammer continuously against the armed forces?f the nemy an his resoures," In implement. mg thlS plan, hlS strategy m the eastern and-I"'" western theaters would be quite similar. In the ' east, the Army of the Potomac would maneuver I against Richmond, counting on the probability I that General Lee would maintain his Army of Northern Virginia between his union adversary and the Confederate capital at Richmond. In the west, General Sherman would maneuver his army group - the Army of the Cumberland, Army of the Ohio, and Army of the Tennessee -against Atlanta, opposing General Johnston and his Army of Tennessee. Hence, Richmond and Atlanta would provide the anvil for Grant's L hammer. (See Map 1) The similarities ended with the provision of logistical support for these two massive under· takings. Washington and Richmond were only 100 miles apart; therefore, a logistical base could always be established in Washington or Baltimore with their radiating rail nets, and the Union Navy could support armies along the eastern coast. But in the west, in moving on Atlanta, Sherman had to maintain a precarious ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 26

Cross Roads: e Principles of War James P. Faust supply line to Nashville, Tennessee - a distance in excess of 470 miles, along a single railroad. \ Boldly exploiting this logistical vulnerability was Confederate General Nathan B. Forrest. Between 1862 and 1864, he preyed on Union supply depots in central Tennessee and displayed no sign ofletting up. In fact, shortly after Grant's promotion, Forrest was returning from another raid which had carried him north to the banks of the Ohio River. This raid rekindled Sherman's obsession with the need to stop "that devil For· rest," as he called him. Sherman even promised a promotion to major general for any member of his staffwho killed Forrest, 2 a disgusting aberra· tion. Later, Grant swore that he would "follow Forrest to the death, even if it costs 10,000 lives and breaks the Treasury."·3 Sherman didn't succeed in breaking the trea sury, but Forrest did cost him the 10,000 soldiers many times over. Forrest's elusive genius had allowed him to escape capture from anyone put in the field against him. Early in 1864, the most recent victim had been General Samuel D. Sturgis, who pursued Forrest as far south as Ripley, Mississippi, before giving up the chase. "I regret very much that I could not have the pleasure of bring- -------ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare------- 27

Map 1: Grant‘s Strategy - Spring, 1864 Sherman’s campaign against Atlanta hinged on along logistic tail, vulnerable to Confederate raiders. To secure this supply line, Grant sent Sturgis to find and destroy Forrest’s troops in Mississippi and Tennessee. ing you his hair,” he wrote Sherman, “but he is too great a plunderer to fight anything.like an equal frce.” Shortly after making this bold statement, Sturgis got another chance to deliver Forrest’s hair. Sherman had decided to send another force against Forrest, and Sturgis was chosen to command it. In his orders to the District of Memphis Commander, General C.

C. Washburn, Sherman said that the force “should be alight, movable column, but not too strong. It need not exceed 6,000 men.”5 Sherman had recently embarked on his Atlanta Campaign and had no intention of allowing Forrest to wreak havoc on his fragile line of communications. Protecting it was Sturgis’ mission. The force to be commanded by Sturgis was assembled in Memphis. (See Map 2) Instead of the 6,000 recommended by Sherman, Washburn assembled 8,500 of his best equipped and most seasoned men. The 3,300 cavalry and 4,800 infantry would be supported by 22 pieces of artillery, 250 supply wagons and 25 ambulances, stockedwith enough medicines, ordnance and rations for 20 days6 The column met with a series of misfortunes, beginning shortly after it departed Memphis on the first of June, 1864. It rained almost daily, leaving the roads nearly impassable, particularly for the artillery and the obese supply train. There was a lack of forage along the route of march, causing an almost total dependence on the supply trains, which were quickly being depleted. This combination of problems had a synergistic effect - the barren condition of the countryside made the large supply train necessary; the large supply train further churned up the already muddy roads and the churned-up, muddy roads increased the caloric intake needed to keep the men and horses slogging along. So when the battle actually commenced, the men and animals were hungry, exhausted, and demoralized. On 9 June, Forrest was at Booneville, deciding whether to move against Sturgis’ force or to make another raid into Tennessee. Seeing that the Union column was not going to turn back, Forrest decided to move against it and immediately seized upon his plan of action: “I know they greatly outnumber the troops I have, [8,500 to 3,4001” he told Colonel Rucker, “but the road along which they will have to march is narrow and muddy, they will make slow progress, the country is densely wooded, and the undergrowth so heavy that when we strike them they will not know how few men we have.”7 He then followed up with a correct interpretation of his adversary’s tactics, and also an evaluation of his own: “Their cavalry will move ahead of the infantry and should reach the crossroads [Brice’s] three hours in advance. We can whip their cavalry by that time. As soon as the fight opens, they will send back to have their infantry hurried up. It is going to be hot as hell, and coming on a run for five or six miles over such roads, their infantry will be so blowed we will ride right over them.”a Map 2: Sturgis Moves on Forrest The Union troops traveled by rail from Memphis to Grand Junction, Tennessee, then slogged down muddy rural roads to Ripley, Mississippi, before falling into Forrest’strap at Brice’s Crossroads, just outside Guntown. 28 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

Forrest moved immediately with his escort and Lyons’ Brigade (see order of battle) to open the fight. On the night of 9 June, he issued orders to his subordinates “to move as rapidly as the ‘jaded’ condition of the horses would allow, intending to concentrate a t Brice’s Cross Roads (see Map 3) before the enemy.” In addition, he ordered his lean wagon train to the rear and southward from Booneville, east of the railroad to Verona, and one regiment of Bell’s Brigade (Barteau’s 2d Tennessee) to Ripley to gain the rear of the enemy, with orders “to attack and annoy the enemy’s rear and flank.”9 The Union column encamped at Stubb’s Farm, 14 miles south of Ripley, on the night of 9 June.lu At 0500 hours the next morning, Grierson’s cavalry moved out with Waring’s Brigade in the advance, followed by Winslow’s (see order of battle). The indolent infantry didn’t begin moving until 1000 with the following order of march: Colonel Hoge’s Second Brigade, Colonel Wilken’s First Brigade, supply train, and Colonel Bouton’s Third Brigade. The column was stretched out along the road for more than five miles, hardly prepared for battle.” Sturgis was completely ignorant of Forrest’s dispositions or intentions. From the time the expedition left Memphis, Forrest had used local residents, “deserters,” and escaped slaves and prisoners to spread misinformation as to the composition and disposition of his forces. Sturgis was forced to rely almost exclusively on these planted sources and later wrote, “it was impossible to gain any accurate or reliable information of the enemy.”12 The Battle At a point one mile south of the crossroads, the Union vanguard met Lieutenant Block and a few men from the 7th Tennessee. After a brisk skirmish, Grierson deployed Waring’s Brigade on the left at Guntown Road (see Map 4). Captain Tyler simultaneously joined the fight with two companies of Kentuckians, followed closely by the rest of Lyon’s Brigade. As Grierson was deploying Winslow’s Brigade to the right of Waring, - // f \\ I / + \\ /I # -7 It I I I. Map 3: Movement to the Crossroads Grierson‘s cavalry were several hours ahead of McMillen’s infantry force. giving Forrest time to take on the Union cavalry before the infantry could reinforce them. Forced to hurry into battle, the Union infantry arrived at Brice’s Crossroads exhausted and demoralized. - cavalry back towards the crossroads. Being outnumbered 3,300 men to 800 men and 10 pieces of artillery to none, Lyon halted his attack. His troops began to build hasty fortifications out of fence rail. At this moment, the Federals had probably their best opportunity to win the battle, had they attacked, but when the Union commanders saw the Confederates tearing down the fence, they incorrectly assumed that the rebels were preparing for a major assault. Lyon enhanced this misconception with continuous feints. Although the major attack did not materialize, Lyon kept the enemv under a constant and in-undergrowth and the positioning of his troops, Lyon was able to keep his men concealed. At approximately 1130 hours, Colonels Rucker and Johnson arrived with their respective commands. Rucker’s troopers were moved to the left of Lyon’s, while Johnson’s were placed on his right. Forrest quickly dismounted these forces and the amount of lead flying into the dispirited Union cavalry increased. Meanwhile, the rapid-firing (Spencer) carbines of the troopers in blue quickly began to run low on ammunition and Grierson repeatedly sent back word to have the infantry hurried up. With the arrival of Rucker and Johnson, Lyon attacked and threw the Union tense- fire. Because of the dense Forrest had two-thirds as many ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 29 bugle sounds, every man must charge...”23 At about 1500 hours, all was ready. Both sides had enjoyed a 30-minute lull, and Forrest had completed his final preparations. The brief rest proved to be the calm before the storm as Forrest’s troopers attacked with the impetuosity which had characterized them so Qften before. McMillen reflected, “they attacked me along my whole line and outflanked me on both flanks at the same time.”24 As the Union infantry was forced back, Barteau and his 250 men arrived and assaulted their rear with the bugler galloping along the line sounding the charge at long intervals, as if several regiments were a t t a k i n g. This rear assault proved to be the coup de grace for Sturgis’ Army. The encirclement was so complete that Barteau reported “one of the Confederate artillery fell among my men.’’26 During the assault, Colonel Bouton arrived with his brigade and the indolent supply train. As the wagons began to assemble in afield near the bridge (see Map 4), they came under hostile fire. The vanguard of the wagons attempted to cross the bridge a second time (this time much faster and in the opposite direction) and met the tail of the train just arriving which, needless to say, created a great deal of confusion. The Pursuit In the meantime, the Federal in-fanty, as if by signal, broke simultaneously and fell through a hastily assembled blocking force, the 72d and 95th Ohio and 200 dismounted men from the 10th Missouri. As the panic-stricken mob ran through this line, they arrived at the bridge only to find an indiscriminate mass of wagons, artillery, caissons, ambulances, and broken, disordered troops. To compound this confusion, the “hand-rolled” Confederate artillery and some captured Union artillery began firing double-shotted canister into this seething mass.27 Bouton organized his brigade into a second blocking position between Dr. Agnew’s house and Stubb’s farm, with the 55th U. S. posted on the left side of the road and the 57th U. S. and Lambert’s artillery on the right side. There, “... The Union mob reached Ripley and attempted a reorganization, but had barely stacked arms when Forrest hit them again..... just south of the bridge, the 72d and 95th Ohio and the elements of the 10th Missouri fell through this line.2a As Forrest continued to crowd the rear of his routed enemy, his innate military genius (he had no formal education) was surfacing, as it had done so many times during the war. “Come on men,” he urged his troopers, “in a rout like this, ten men are equal to a thousand.”29 He had told Morton the previous morning that “the way to whip an enemy is to get ’em skeered and keep the skeer on ’em.’’3o Forrest was never satisfied with simply defeating an enemy, but was bent on their destruction. Forrest continued to keep the “skeer” on the Federal troops until his own force was exhausted to the point of near ineffectiveness. At 2000 hours, Forrest allowed his men to rest and sent forward the horse-holders, (In those days, if the cavalry was fighting dismounted, one man in four would remain in the rear and hold the horses -they were the horse-holders.) as they were the closest thing to a reserve that he had left. This lessened pressure, however, did not slow down the retreating column or ease the prevailing confusion. Colonel Bouton found Sturgis at the Stubb’s House at 2300 hours on the night of the tenth. “For God‘s Sake,” he pleaded with Sturgis, “Don’t let us give up so.” “What can we do?” replied Sturgis, not really expecting an answer, “If Mr. Forrest will let me alone, I will let him alone.”31 Forrest had no inclination to leave Sturgis alone. He woke his sleeping troopers at 0100 hours on the 11th and continued the pursuit in force. At 0300 hours he hit the enemy rearguard of cavalry at the south prong of the Hatchee; this line quickly gave way. Here Forrest found that “they had abandoned the balance of the wagon trains, all their wounded, and 14 pieces of artillery.””2 A private in Forrest’s command wrote, “this slough was knee-deep in mud and water; logs lying here and there and on top of every log were Yanks perched as close as they could be, for there were more Yanks than logs - reminded me of chickens at roost.”33 Four miles east of Ripley, continuing the pursuit, the 7th Tennessee and Forrest’s escort met another line of enemy, but it was only a “feeble and ineffective resistance.” Two miles east of Ripley the Federals made another stand that was followed by another “characteristic retreat.”35 At 0700 hours, the Union mob reached Ripley and attempted a reorganization, but had barely stacked arms when Forrest hit them again in the rear and both flanks. The Union defenses quickly caved in, leaving “another piece of artillery, two caissons, and two ambulances.”36 From this point on, the Federals offered no serious resistance, but retreated in “the most complete disorder, throwing away guns, clothing and everything calculated to impede their flight.”37 As the remnants of the Union force reached Colliersville, it was obvious to any observer that they had suffered a major defeat. Their march down the road had taken more than a week, but the return took only two nights and a day. The official reports from both sides revealed that Forrest had indeed won a decisive victory. Confederate losses were 96 killed and 394 wounded; Federal casualties were 223 killed and 394 wounded.38 Even more significant was the count of prisoners: Forrest captured 1,608 men along with 16 guns, 1,500 stands of small arms, and 176 wagons, including a vast supply of harnesses, quartermaster, medical, and other equipment and supp1ies:lg The Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads illustrates the decisive conclusion to an engagement where a victor’s plans visualized the application of the principles of war. On the other hand, we see the vanquished commander’s complete disregard of them or, at least, ineptitude in their application. ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 31

The Principles of War Applied Objective General Forrest’s overall objective during these latter stages of the war was to harass Sherman’s communications and try to divert as many Union troops as possible from Sherman’s front in Georgia. With Sherman taking the initiative and sending Sturgis against Forrest, it would seem that Forrest would be forced to forfeit his objective, at least for the time being. However, Forrest realized that if he could destroy his adversary, he could force Sherman to divert more troops, not only to replace the Sturgis expedition, but also to reinforce the other garrisons protecting his rear throughout central and eastem Tennessee, North Alabama, and northwestern Georgia. These garrisons had to be reinforced not only against the forces led by Forrest, but also to neutralize the aura of invincibility attached to Forrest’s name. This aura of invincibility, present throughout the Union forces in the west, was certainly enhanced by the victory at Brice’s Cross Roads. Sturgis’ objective was simply to kill Forrest. It appears apparent that Sturgis had developed inadequate plans to do this. He didn’t know how to find Forrest, or even what to do with him if he found him. This lack of planning ensured that when the two forces met, the terms of engagement would be choreographed by Forrest. Offense During the course of the battle, the Confederate officers were the only leaders initiating any offensive operations. As the battle first opened, both sides were faced with the same problems - to get the balance of their forces up while holding off their opponent. To accomplish this, the Confederates relied on probing attacks and feints. The Federals, on the other hand, were content to remain in defensive positions. These offensive movements, and the subsequent paralysis of the Union troopers, allowed the Confederates to keep their adversary off balance and fixed in position.

UNION: Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis Cavalry Division 1st Brigade 7th Indiana 4th Missouri 2d New Jersey 19th Pennsylvania 2d Brigade 3d Iowa 4th Iowa 10th Missouri Provisional Regiment 7th Illinois 7th Wisconsin Battery Infantry Division 1 st Brigade 114th Illinois 93d Indiana 72d Ohio 95th Ohio 9th Minnesota Company E, 1st Illinois Light Artillery Section, 6th Indiana Battery 2d Brigade 81st Illinois 95th Illinois 108th Illinois 113th Illinois 120th Illinois Company B, 2d Illinois Light Artillery 3d Brigade 55th U. S. Infantry (Colored) 57th U. S. Infantry (Colored) Battery F. 2d U. S. Artillery (Colored) BG Benjamin H. Grierson COL G. E. Waring, Jr. COL John P. C. Shanks LTC Gustav von Helmrick COL Joseph Karge LTC Joseph C. Hess COL Edward F. Winslow (1 800 men, 6 guns) LTC John W. Noble MAJ A. R. Pierce LTC Frederick W. Banton CPT Augustus M. Goodrich (including Battery X, 1 st Illinois Light Artillery (1 500 men) COL William L. McMillen COL Alexander Wilkin (2.000 men, 6 guns) LTC John T. King COL Dewitt C. Thomas COL Charles G. Eaton LTC Jefferson Brumbock LTC J. F. Marsh CPT John A. Fitch CPT John M. Mueller COL George B. Hoge (1.600 men, 4 guns) COL Franklin Campbell COL Thomas W. Humphrey LTC Reuben L. Sidewell MAJ Cephas Williams COL George W. McKeary CPT F. H. Chapman COL Edward Bouton MAJ E. M. Lowe LTC Robert Cowden CPT C. A. Lamberg (1,200 men, 2 guns) When the time was right for the after crossing. thev were Drevented final assault, Forrest’s Tmpetuous violence of action had so much impact that the Union force melted way. For all practical purposes, all Union resistance ended at this time, while Forrest maintained offensive action throughout the pursuit as well. Mass Although Forrest could not rely on numerical superiority to destroy his enemy, he was most successful in massing his fires. He could thank his selection of the battlefield for that advantage. Upon arriving on the battlefield, the Union column was first channelized by the bridge over Tishomingo Creek. Secondly, Y l - from deploying properly 6y the Confederate positions surrounding their perimeter. Consequently, the fires had to originate from a common point outward. The Confederates, on the other hand, were firing from perimeter positions, their fire converging on a common point. As the Union line constricted toward the bridge, this advantage, of course, multiplied with every backward step as maneuver room became smaller and smaller. The maneuver area became so small, in fact, that by the time the last elements arrived at the bridge they found “an indiscriminate mass of wagons, artillery, caissons, and demoralized troops.” 32 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

Economy of Force Although Forrest never fielded as many troops as his opponent, he did not let the Union leaders discover this. Using a series of feints and by shifting forces from one point to another, he kept his opponents so intimidated that they would not attack. Grierson reported that he had succeeded in “repulsing... three distinct and desperate charges.” He said that the enemy was in large numbers, with double lines of skirmishers and line of battle with heavy supports.’’ At the time, he actually had 3,000 men facing not more than 2,000 Confederate troopers. Maneuver On the night of 9 June, Forrest realized that a fight with Sturgis was imminent. Faced with the problem of consolidating his scattered forces, one can easily see from the map (see Map 3) where he would draw his forces together. (What better place for a consolidation than at across road?) On the other hand, the Union column was traveling down a single, narrow road, bordered by largely impenetrable foliage. Because of this and the dismal weather, they were not allowed any freedom of movement. This constricted situation continued upon arriving at the battlefield: the Union troops were compressed into a small area. Their movement was restricted by Tishomingo Creek to their rear, the Confederate positions to their front and flanks, and by the lethargic wagon train blocking the approach road and the bridge. In contrast, Forrest enjoyed total freedom of movement and could easily transfer troops from one point to another, which he did with maximum efficiency. Unity of Command Once Forrest arrived on the field, he personally took command from Lyon and went about the business of issuing orders and positioning arriving units. His physical presence inspired his troopers - reminding one Confederate private of the “God of War.” Forrest and his command had been through many successful campaigns together (in fact, he had personally recruited most of them), and his leaders were hand-picked. They could anticipate CONFEDERATE: MAJ GEN Nathan Bedford Forrest Buford’s Cavalry Division BG Abraham Buford 3d Brigade 3d Kentucky 7th Kentucky 8th Kentucky 12th Kentucky 4th Brigade. 2d Tennessee. 15th Tennessee 16th Tennessee 19th Tennessee Rice‘s Battery Morton‘s Battery 6th Brigade 8th Mississippi 18th Mississippi 7th Tennessee Johnson’s Brigade (of Roddy‘s Div) 4th Alabama Moreland’s Regiment William’s Battalion Warren‘s Battalion COL H. B. Lyon (800 men) LTC Gustavus A. C. Holt LTC L. J. Sherrill LTC Absalom R. Shacklett LTC W. W. Faulkner COL Tyree H. Bell COL C. R. Barteau COL Francis M. Stewart COL Andrew N. Wilson COL John F. Newsorn CPT T. W. Rice (4 guns) CPT John W. Morton COL E. W. Rucker COL William L. Duff LTC Alexander H. Chalmers COL William Duckworth COL W. A. Johnson COL Alfred A. Russell (2700 men) (4 guns) (700 men) (500 men) his order, even when they had received none, and could interpret implied orders when not explicitly stated. The Federal command was quite confusing. To begin with, Grierson deployed his cavalry ta open up the battle. When Sturgis arrived on the field (about the same time as Forrest), he quickly left to hurry the infantry and even stopped at the bridge to attempt to untangle the mess there. These duties could have and should have been assigned to staff officers. Meanwhile, Colonel McMillen had to assume field command and begin deploying the arriving infantry “without any exact knowledge as to the position of the enemy.” Security A difference in the confidence level of the opposing commanders is directly related to what they knew about each other. From the moment the Union expedition was being assembled in Memphis, Forrest knew the size, composition, and mission of his adversary through a network of spies outside, as well as inside, the city. Residents along the route of march also provided valuable information as did frequent raids on the column. In contrast, Sturgis was forced to rely on misinformation planted by Forrest. Forrest used local residents, escaped slaves and prisoners, as well as his spies to spread misinformation, forcing Sturgis to know only what Forrest wanted him to know. These methods, in addition to his effective feints and irresistible pursuit, led Sturgis to report after the battle that Forrest had 15,000 to 20,000 men during the battle and pursuit. The fact remains that Forrest had no more than 3,4OO4O at any time during the battle. Simplicity General Nathan B. Forrest is credited in military circles the world over with his famous prescription for tactical success, to get there first with the most. I can think of no standard operating procedures which has so much military significance expressed in SO few words. His orders to his divided ARMOR. The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 33 command on the night of the ninth "to move as rapidly as the 'jaded' were characteristically succinct: condition of the horses would a]- ".,. Forrest was able to enjoy the luxury Of full confidence in the decisions, actions, and reaC-low, intending to concentrate at Brice's Crossroads before the enemy." He ordered Barteau "to attack and annoy the enemy's rear and flank." He didn't tell his subordinates what routes to follow or even what to do when the enemy was contacted. Forrest was able to enjoy the luxury of full confidence in the decisions, actions, and reactions, of his junior leaders. He could count on their initiative because he had selected, trained, and observed them in combat many times before... tions of his junior leaders... Summary The Battle of Brice's Crossroads is a masterpiece of strategy and tactics. Marshal Foch used the battle as a text for a lecture at Chau- m n t. ' As we have seen, the Confederate victory and subsequent Union rout can directly be related to the fact that Forrest intuitively applied each and every principle. Sturgis, on the other hand, violated many of the principles. Aside from possibly the Battle of Nashville, the Battle of Brice's Crossroads is the only decisive victory of the Civil War in which one force was totally eliminated as an effective fighting force. The battle remains the definitive example of how a force can defeat an opponent over twice its size. Footnotes 'Shelby Foote, The Civil War. a Narrative. Vol. I (New York, 1974). p. 14. 'William C. Oates, The War Between the Union and the Confederacy, (Dayton, 1905).

p. 475. "U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion - A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1889). Serial Number 78, pp. 121, 142. (This work is hereafter referred to as U. S. War Ilepartment.) 'U. S. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. 698. 'U. S. War Department, Serial No. 78, p. 82. W. S. War llepartment,Serial No. 77, p.218. 7John A. Wyeth, Life of General N. B. "Ibid., p. 400. W. S. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. 223. "'E. Hunn Hanson, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Vol. I11 (New York, 1914). p. 400. "US. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. 103. 'Toote, p. 367. "'US. War Ilepartment, Serial No. 77, p. "Ibid., p. 129. "Hanson, p. 421. l"U. S. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. Forrest (New York, 1899). p. 400. 129. 163. l7Ibid., p. 208. '"Hanson, p. 421. 'W. S. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. ""Ibid., p. 208. "Andrew Lytle, Bedford Forrest and His "John M. Hubbard, Notes o f a Private (St. "Tbid., pp. 110-111. 24U. S. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. 211. "'John B. Lindsley, The Military Annalsof Tennessee, Confederate (Nashville, 1886). p. 617. '"Southern Sentinel (Ripley, Mississippi, 27 June, 1935). "Lytle, p. 300. ""U. S. W a r Department, Serial No. 77, p. 165. Critter Company (New York, 1960), p. 299. Louis, 1913). pp. 110-111. 213. "Lytle, p. 301. ""Ibid., p. 302.:"US. War Department, Serial No. 77, p.:'"Ibid., p. 224. ""William Witherspoon, Reminiscences of a Scout, Spy and Soldier of Forrest's Cavalry (Jackson, 1910). p. 68.:"U. S. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. 224. 214. Bibliography Battles and Leaders ofthe Civil War, based upon the "Century WarSeries,"ed. by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buell. 4 vols. New York. 1884-1887. Foote, Shelby, The Civil War. 3 vols. New York: Random House, 1974. Hubbard, John M., Notes of a Private. St. Louis, 1913. Jordan,Thomasand Pryor, J. P., The Campaign of Lieutenant General N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry. New Orleans and New York, 1868. Lindsley, John B., The Military Annals of Tennessee, Confederate. Nashville, 1886. Lytle, Andrew N., Bedford Forrest and His Critter Compony. New York, 1931. Official Report. The War of theRebel1ion:A Compilation of the Offrcial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 vols, plus atlas. Washington, 1881-1901. Citations are to Serial Numbers in accordance with the table on pages iv and v of the General Index Volume (Serial No. 130) rather than to the separate series, volumes and parts. Oates, William C., The War Between the Union and the Confederacy. Dayton, 1905. Sherman, William T., Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. 2 vols. New York, 1875. Witherspoon, William, Reminiscences of a Scout, Spy and Soldier of Forrest's Cavalry. Jackson, 1910. Wolseley, Field Marshall Viscount Garnett, "General Forrest." Article in United Service Magazine, Vol. I1 (New Series). London, 1892. Wyeth, John A., Life of N. B. Forrest., New York, 1899.:'"bid., p. 224. Tbid., p. 124, 224.:"Ibid., p. 224. "Ibid., p. 95,230,231. Tbid., pp. 95,226228. 40U. S. War Department, Serial No. 77, p. 95. "Foote, p. 368. I was commissioned in 1977 from Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning. After completing Armor Officer Basic Course, he was assigned to the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) where he served as a tank platoon leader, company executive officer, and com-panycommander. Hethenat-tended the Infantry Officer Advance Course and is pres-entlyassigned toAuburn University at Montgomery as a Assistant Professor of Military Science. This summer, he will attend Cornell University for advanced civil schooling. ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 34