To Mark Or To Commit fratricide

? As I listened to the order being read in the task force's tactical operations center in preparation for the upcoming night attack, my mind raced with all the work that was ahead of me and my M1 company. I thought aboutthe problems that the hours of darkness would bring in this, my first night attack. But I did not consider the problem of vehicle identification at night, and before the sun would rise, twenty-five percent of my company team would learn (the hard way) how important friendly vehicle identification was during the hours of darkness. The order we received was for the battlefields of Fort Hood, Texas. Our task force, two armor companies and two mechanized infantry companies, was honoring its operations prior to deployment to the NTC. The OPFOR against which we were maneuvering consisted of two battalions (one mechanized and one armor). MILES usage was the standard, not the exception, for all personne and vehicles. All deployed forces had M l sand M113-series vehicles. The S2 informed the orders group of numerous OPFOR sightings during the day in the intended area of operation. He cautioned us that there was a strong possibility that reconnaissance elements were still active in our sectors. He also gave us the most recent intelligence on enemy activity in the objective area. The concept for the night attack called for two companies to maneuver abreast in adjacent sectors, but they would attack separate objectives (see accompanying map). One mechanized infantry company was to cross the line of departure (LD) several hours prior to the main task force. Its mission was to conduct a zone reconnaissance in force, to determine the location of any enemy obstacles, and if possible, to create breaches at several points. The second mechanized infantry company, reinforced with an additional antitank platoon, was the task force reserve. The distance from the LD to the objective was only seven kilo-by Captain Keith E. Blakeman meters. The boundary between the two attacking companies was an improved dirt road which was easy to identify even in darkness. My company was on the right, or the northernmost company. My right boundary was a very prominent ridgeline that was also very easy to identify in the dark. The objective was an imposing mountain that I was sure we could see in the dark. The concept was simple enough, in theory, to be successful. The order went into extensive detail on visual and pryotechnic signals we were to use if we encountered enemy obstacles. The mechanized infantry platoons received detailed instructions on lane markings and guide recognition techniques. Prior to departing from the TOC, I spokebriefly with the commander of the adjacent company who would be on my left during the attack. We agreed that orientation and navigation to the objective would present little or no problem to the accomplishment of the mission. We also discussed, with the task force S3, the need for unit markings to identify the individual companies in the dark. The S3 told us that he saw no need for individual company markings because of the identifiable boundaries. On my return to the company area, I began inspecting the company's precombat checks and began to prepare my company operations order. One aspect of the task force continued to concern me: How would we identify friendly vehicles in the dark? I intended to resolve that problem within my company through specific instructions to my platoon leaders, even if the remainder of the task force was not going to be identifiable in the dark. I was not so much concerned with individual vehicles becoming lost during movement; I wanted some way that my platoon leaders could use so that they could identify the company's vehicles and thus better control their platoons' movements. Tactical security presented the primary problem that I had to consider in marking my vehicles for night operations. Other problems "... How would we identify friendly vehicles in the dark?..." that I faced were: the ease in identification at 300 to 400 meters distance, the need for alight source that we could see without infrared or passive devices, and the assets I had available in the assembly area. The two light sources that I knew were available in sufficient quantities were flashlights and chemical lights. Flashlights with filters could provide enough options in colors and design to make them useful, but mounting them in shielded locations proved difficult. Chemical lights provided the needed size as well as color options to meet the marking requirement. Operation security (OPSEC) posed a dilemma: I could move totally blacked out and arrive at the objective without knowing exactly what the status of m y force was or where they were; or I could mark my vehicles so that we could identify each other from 300 meters and amve with my force intact. I chose to risk identification from the flanks and rear by an enemy who might already be within 300 meters. Figures l a and l b show the locations on the vehicles that my soldiers selected for marking their vehicles. The location in Figure la shielded the marker from the front. The rear marking locations in Figure l b shielded the lights from all directions except the rear. By taping various colors and patterns on the sides and rear of our vehicles, we could identify platoons and the vehicles of key leaders. Because we covered all but two inches of the chemical light, the brightness was not sufficient to disclose the vehicle's location at great distances. Once we had marked our vehicles, 20 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare had put out all of the orders, and completed our final checks, LD time was upon us. Our move from the assembly area to the LD was orderly and without incident. As my company progressed unopposed through its sector, I moved laterally within our boundaries and easily identified the three separate platoons. I had no idea where the lead elements of the adjacent company were, and radio communication with the company commander of that unit told me that he was not absolutely sure either. Then, my lead platoon reported a section of vehicles moving across our axis at a 90-degree angle and at a range of 500 to 750 meters. Again, I frantically contacted the adjacent commander and questioned him about the location of his platoons, but before he could contact his leaders, the brilliant flash of a Hoffman charge in the distance produced spots in my eyes. Five or six vehicles from my company returned the single shot, and when my night blindness finally dissipated, I could see the vehicle that had fired the first shot: it was illuminated by its MILES kill light. Within seconds, our brilliant volley was returned by a large volume of fire from our left: the adjacent company was firing on us! It thought that we were an enemy reconnaissance element. The adjacent company’s lead platoon had become misoriented, crossed the company boundary, and had been traversing across our sector. The misoriented platoon leader saw our vehicles and fired on them. My platoons then returned fire, which drew attention from the adjacent company’s two remaining platoons. These two platoons believed that they were being attacked from their flank and also began firing! After a great deal of heated conversation with the adjacent company commander, we finally regained control of our platoons and they ceased their fire. In a 30- to 45-second period, I had lost four vehicles. The adjacent commander had lost three. I believe that if the entire task force had used visual recognition markers, we could have avoided the entire incident. From that point on in our training, to include trial at the NTC, our use of chemical lights as markers proved to be beneficial in command and control at all levels. To mark or commit fratricide? Do we really have a choice? Captain Keith E. Blakeman was commissioned in the Regular Army from the Marion Militarylnstitute in 1979. After attending AOB, he was assigned to 1 st Armor Training Brigade, Fort Knox, KY, where he served as a training officer and executive officer. Upon transferring to Korea, Captain Blakeman was assigned to 2d Battalion, 72d Armor, where he served as a platoon leader, executive officer, and platoon motor officer. Upon returning to CONUS, Captain Blakeman was assigned to 3d Battalion, 10th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division. He served on general staff as assistant S3 at brigade level. Prior to departing 1st Cav, Captain Blake-mancommandedan M1 company at 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry. He is a recent graduate of AOAC and is currently attending Combined Arms Services School at Fort Leavenworth. ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 21