Safety vs Realism in Night Training

“When does realistic training merit taking unwarranted risk? ...” Safety vs Realism in Night Training by Rosalene E. Graham One of the most difficult challenges facing the armor leader and crew is the conduct of night training using night vision devices (NVD), which present certain risks if training is to be realistic. Doctrine prescribes that “unit training simulate as closely as possible the modem battlefield’s tempo and scope.”1 Training must be under realistic weather conditions. And there must be increased emphasis on night training because the force that can operate at night as it does in the day by fully using cover, concealment, suppressive fires, and night vision equipment can easily defeat the force that does not.2 The use of night vision devices allows the armor crew greater freedom of movement, but the effect of adverse weather and low ambient light levels and the associated risk to our tank crews must be assessed and understood. The US. Army Safety Center (USASC) at Fort Rucker, AL investigated two fatal accidents in which the driver used the AN/WS-2 night vision viewer. One accident occurred in severe weather conditions with no ambient light during rain and lightning. The second accident was under almost zero illumination. In both cases, the driver told the tank commander (TC) that he could not see to drive, but theTC in both cases elected to continue because of the training exercise schedule. Although the TCs had confidence in the night vision device’s capability under all low light conditions, the NVD’s capabilities were exceeded. In both cases, the TCs were killed. And in both cases, the chain of command indicated that it believed the devices would perform in the low light conditions encountered. The question that arises from these accidents is this: Under what conditions should an armor crew modify realistic training because conditions are not conducive to safe training? The Army accepts the inherent risk of war and must train to minimize that risk. The point where training realism must give way to the safety and welfare of the soldier and his equipment is not well defined. When does realistic training merit taking unwarranted risk? No one is suggesting that realistic training must cease. In war, the battle doesn’t cease for safety considerations. The purpose of battle is to win with minimum losses, and losses are expected. The purpose of training is to win the battle, and any loss hinders that preparedness. Therefore, the armor leader must be able to make risk management decisions and choose to either continue training or to modify training to reduce the associated risk. Assessing Risk Risk is a safety term coming into vogue. Risk is the potential for realization of unwanted, negative consequences of an event.3 The leader must determine the desired safety level and evaluate the acceptability of the risk. The level of risk accepted is usually based on mission necessity, compliance with all regulatory requirements, training benefit, public opinion, past experience and other criteria. In determining acceptable risk levels, one must remember that society’s or the public’s acceptance of risk drops quickly if even one or two lives are at risk. The drop in public acceptance occurs, even though the probability of loss may be The armor leader has no formal guidance about what constitutes an acceptable level of risk in realistic training scenarios involving extreme low ambient light or severe weather conditions. The armor leader, based on past experience and good judgment, evaluates the risks associated with the operation against the training and other benefits to be gained. This evaluation forms the basis of the risk acceptance or management decision. Generally, the higher the risk to be accepted, the higher in the chain of command the risk acceptance decision is made. In making a risk management decision involving the use of passive night vision devices in an extreme low light environment, the leader would assess the facts known to him, to include: 0 The passive night vision device used on the M60A3 and MI tanks is the AN/WS-2, which requires ambient light for operation.5 0 Light from lightning is not sufficient. When weather is severe or no ambient light is present, the viewer will not function well enough for the driver to operate his tank safely. The AN/VVS-2 does not mag-smali.4 july-august 1985 23

“Armor leaders must recoqnize that niaht vision devices have limitations ...” nify an image. Objects difficult to see during the day are difficult to detect with the NVD. With sufficient ambient light, objects can be identified at a great distance and an armor unit can fight at night or during periods of reduced visibility effectively. 0 Depth perception and distance estimation are effected by night vision devices. 0 Color discrimination is absent when night vision devices are used. 0 The use of infrared will assist the AN/VVS-2 in no-light conditions, but can be easily detected. The armor leader must recognize that night vision devices have limitations. Accidents have occurred b e cause the driver has been unable to see while using the AN/WS-2. The army leaders manual etatea: “We must teach our soldiers how to think and solve problems while under stress.”6 Driving a tank almost blind because of ineffective night vision devices is definitely a stressful situation. When should the crew be given the flexibility to cease or modify operations? At the point in time when the training ceases and crew and equipment survivability becomes the overriding issue, a risk acceptance decision must be made and must have been planned for. Who makes this decision? Is the crew allowed to use initiative in reducing their risk or is that a decision for their chain of command? The crew could accept the risk and voluntarily continue the mission. Or better, they could take other actions - such as putting out a ground guide, stopping movement, changing to infrared, or breaking radio silence for instruction. When voluntarily reducing their risk by any of these actions, they often must answer for their decisions later. This dilemma leads to armor crews accepting unequal risks and gaining unequal benefits due to the variety of risk-reduction steps taken. A preplanned policy is necessary within armor units on prodecures and acceptable crew performance when light and weather conditions may cause the night vision device’s capabilities to be exceeded. The individual crew can best assess the effectiveness of their NVD under training conditions and should advise their leaders. However, if they are not aware of what is an acceptable methoa 01 reauang mew IISK, me decision may be inappropriate. A preplanned policy gives the armor crew guidance and allows for training flexibility. S-aW Armor leaders must recognize that night vision devices have limitations and cannot be relied on in adverse weather and during periods of no ambient light. Risk decisions become necessary under adverse conditions when survivability becomes an issue. Individual crews must be able to tell their leaders the conditions they face, but someone in the chain of command other than the individual crew must accept the risk associated with realistic training under adverse environmental conditions. Training plans and SOPS must contain policies to allow for contingencies and flexibility. Armor crews must be permitted to employ defined flexibility when survivability becomes an overriding factor. Footnotes lFM 1005, Operations, 20 Aug 82, p 14. 71-1, The Tank and MechanitedZnfantry Company Team, 30 Jun 77, p 1-10. 3W.D. &we, An Anatomy of Risk, New Yo& John Wiley & Sons, 1977, p 463. ‘J.V. Grimaldi, Safety Management, Home wood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.. 1984, p 228. 6TM 11585524910, Operator’s Manwl, View ers, Driver’s, Night Vision, Aug 82, p 1-2. 6FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 31 Oct 83, p 199. ROSALENE E. GRAHAM is a safety and occupational health specialist at the Systems Division, Directorate of Systems Management at the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, AL. 24