Economy of Force-the Cavalry Connection

As the army reorganizes under the Army 86 concept, the divisional armored cavalry squadron will lose its tanks and become alight reconnaissance unit. The reduction of combat power in this critical unit will have far-reaching implications for the heavy division. The absence of a credible economy-of-force unit in the division may well be the fundamental flaw in the Army 86 heavy division. This article addresses the critical relationship of economy forces to the principle of mass and the capability of the Army 86 heavy division to wage decisive combat. The elimination of the main battle tank from the divisional cavalry organization so reduces the effectiveness of the squadron that its defensive capability against Warsaw Pact armored units is questionable. This article proposes some alternative organizations that will increase available combat power and overall unit effectiveness. “I have travelled a heap of late, and had occasion to retire into some very sequestered regions, but nary hill or holler, nary mountain gorge or inaccessible ravine, have I found but what the cavalry had been there, and ‘just left.’ And that is the reason they can’t be whipped, for they have always ‘just left,’ and took a horse or two with’em.”’ Bill Arp, Confederate humorist The organization and functions of cavalry have long been subjects of doctrinal debate. It would seem a safe observation that the last time there was general agree ment, the source of the cavalry’s mobility was fueled with oats rather than diesel fuel. We have organized cavalry with gun jeeps and armored cars, light tanks and armored cars, specialized scout vehicles and standard personnel carriers, varying combinations of light and medium tanks and assault vehicles, mortar squads, infantry squads-the permutations are almost endless. With all our experience, we haven’t gotten it right yet reconnaissance troops, tank troops, combined arms platoons, H-Series, J-Series, 3x5 platoons, conceptual cavalry platoons, and scout platoons. Where are we going, and where will it end? To organize cavalry units, one must first define what it is that cavalry does. The task then becomes to structure the force to accomplish its mission. This twwk.ep process is not as straightforward as it would seem; cavalry units (troop and platoon) have been reorganized no fewer than four times (including the impending Army 86 reorganization) since 1970. Either the armor community has improp erly defined the role of cavalry, or it has been unable to determine the proper force structure to execute the functions of cavalry. 42 cavalry squadron. Several implkjing publications have since been fielded by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), including a coordinating draft of anew FM 17-95 Cavalry, which details the employment of the light squadron. Like Bill Arp, I too have travelled a “heap” of late and have found support for the light squadron to be almost nonexistent among my contemporary armor officers. In my opinion, a consensus exists that there are fundamental flaws in the organization and doctrinal concept of the light cavalry squadron. Almost 10 years ago, General (then Major General) Donn A. Starry asked some very basic questions about Cavalry. What is cavalry? What does it do? Why do we have it? The Cavalry Scout Ad-Hoc Committee (CSAC) was formed at the Armor Center to address these issues. For 18 months the committee labored, and produced a superbly-documented study defining the doctrine of cavalry combat. Not surprisingly, the study concluded that cavalry performs two basic functions: reconnaissance and security. Cavalry “finds the enemy with the least force possible” and provides security with “a force tailored to leave the largest residual of combat power in the main body.” General Starry concluded that cavalry “should be a force uniquely tailored to satisfy the definition of economy-of-force... Cavalry is an ‘economy-of-force’ force”.4 hrganization of the divisional armored cavalry squadron into the “tankless” light cavalry squadron under Division 86 stems principally from the following: “The heavy division [will], as a rule, operate as part of the heavy corps, and the corps [possesses] an armored cavalry regiment that, in its Corps 86 design bas] considerably more combat power than [has] the current regiment. With this additional combat power in the corps regiment, the divisional cavalry squadron [will] no longer be called upon SO frequently for economy-of-force mission^".^ If one defines cavalry as an ‘economy-of-force’ force, then the above statement presents the doctrinal commun-motley handful that Geary multipled into the rebel hordes that haunted [Secretary of War] Stanton”.6 By defeating Banks at Winchester, Jackson precipitated McDowell’s withdrawal from the approaches to Richmond in order to pursue the Valley Army. As a result, McClellan’s forces were isolated on the Peninsula, and Lee and Johnston were able to concentrate their efforts successfully against this threat to the Confederate capital. Jackson’s campaign bought the Confederacy time to reorganize and counterattack Maellan’s stalled forces, ending the Peninsula Campaign and, in affect, prolonging the war for three more years7 Deception, both intentional and unintentional, was the key to success in the campaign. There were no elaborate River Figure 1. Disposition of forces in the Shenandoah Valley, 31 May 1862.

plans and feints, it was simply “hit and run.” The Valley Army possessed such a mobility advantage over the Union forces (Jackson’s infantrymen boasted of themselves as “foot cavalry”) that the Federals were unable to gather timely intelligence as to Jackson’s movements. Therefore, they were unable to prevent the piecemeal engagement of their numerically superior forces. Deception is the key to surprise. The lessons of the Valley Campaign are timeless. Jackson was a brilliant, aggressive leader who out-thought and out-fought his opponents. Superior tactical mobility was fundamental to his success as commander of an economy force. The Valley Campaign teaches that an advantage in maneuver is, perhaps, the greatest combat multiplier of all. The Mobility Dilemma An ancient adage states that to execute its economy role, a reconnaissance unit must possess a mobility advantage over line units of roughly five to one. Technology has pushed the cross-country speeds of main battle tanks (MBT’s) to the point that the primary limiting factor has become the ability of the crewmen to withstand the physical punishment of riding in the vehicle, not the mechanical system itself. The helicopter is the only current system that can sustain the requisite mobility advantage without crew-damaging physical punishments. Should we then convert all cavalry units to air cavalry? Air cavalry has more than proved its worth in training in Europe, particularly in countering the “quick-breaking battle” characteristic of the offensive armor battlefield. Air cavalry may well be the next transition point for the reconnaissance I Figure 2.3d Cavalry Group operations, 17-18 November 1944. arm, but for now the limitations of current rotary-wing &craft in poor weather and limited visibility dictate that the cavalry retain its ground orientation.s The mobility dilemma arises from the question of how to insure a mobility advantage for cavalry units having the same equipment as infantry and tank battalions. In my opinion, the problem is a matter of perception. We tend to think of tactical mobility in terms of road marches and assaults over open ground. In these situations, ground cavalry has forever lost the advantage of the horseman over the foot soldier. Fortunately, the subject is far more complex than a mere question of speed. Reconnaissance and security missions are generally executed in areas where the battlefield has not yet deve loped into the more familiar linear form characteristic of major battles. In this ill-defined environment, cavalry retains most of its mobility advantage over other types of units simply through its organization. Scouts and tanks, operating as a team, yield a clearer picture of the battle field than any other type of unit can obtain. The commander who “sees the battlefield” more clearly, reacts more quickly and maneuvers his forces more effectively to engage the enemy. Cavalry employs scouts to locate the enemy and to determine his strength and disposition, and combined arms in order to fight through or around him. In short, cavalry units gain a mobility advantage because they waste less time developing the situation. The 3d Cavalry Group’s operations along the Franco-German border in November 1944 clearly illustrate this principle. On the night of 16 November, Task Force Polk (3d Cavalry Group and attachments) began moving across the Moselle River toward the German frontier. The 3d Squadron, operating on the left flank, aggressively pushed toward the border, its advance marked by several sharp engagements. Employing two reconnaissance troops (Troops A and C), the tank company (Company F), engineer and tank destroyer (TD) platoons in the lead. “...the squadron pushed forward early in the morning. Troop C... proceeded to MACH thence across the German border. The 2d Platoon... reaches MAIMUHLE while another platoon advanced to PERL. Heavy enemy small arms and artillery fire forced the reconnaissance troops to withdraw. The tanks were then brought up and blasted their way into MAIMUHLE. Troop A, reinforced with tanks and TD’s...encountered stiff enemy resistance in the vicinity of MANDERN, but the town itself was by-passed and the force fought its way to MERSCH-WEILERg” During the day’s action, 53 German prisoners were taken and 15 enemy confirmed killed. By nightfall, the lead elements of TF Polk were continuing their reconnaissance inside the Third Reich. Cavalry maintains the initiative through superior tactical mobility. The CSAC Study’s recommendation for a cavalry platoon organization which included four MBTs, caused concern that the platoon would be unable to carry out its reconnaissance role. “The current main battle tank, the M60A1, lacks the mobility and stealth to accompany the couts.” The scout either becomes a fighter, providing his own support, or spends all his time finding trafficable routes for the tanks. These concerns certainly merit some consideration. Given the quantum improvements in the MI A brams, the mobility argument loses most of its validity. The tank, however, remains large and heavy and is incapable of negotiating small bridges and other restrictions. The presence of the MBT in the divisional cavalry does, however, offer commanders one unarguable advan- 44

Lack of stealth is a specious argument against the MBT, deriving from the erroneous assumption that cavalry platoons ought to perform reconnaissance in the same manner as scout platoons. Stealth certainly plays a role in cavalry operations (as it does in all military operations), but generally it is not the paramount consideration. Scout platoons perform reconnaissance by stealth in order to survive, but cavalry platoons are organized to fight for intelligence. The fight for intelligence is violent, offensive in nature, and highly fluid. It requires high tactical mobility, aggressive maneuver, and sustained, all-weather com bat power. Only one weapons system so dominates the battlefield as to provide the edge needed to win the intelligence fight: the main battle tank. Economy of Force - Catalyst for Decision Mass is a prerequisite for the execution of decisive combat. No armed force, either in history, or at present, is so large as to be able to be strong everywhere. There are always areas where, because of scarcity of assets, the commander must accept risk in order to gain the decisive advantage. This principle is applicable at every level of command from platoon to army group. Economy of force @ I

N. L Walford, R. A. Longon: Edward Stanford, 1911, pp. 56, 139. Rosenburg, Ralph G. LTC. “Increased Combat Power.” ARMOR. November-December 1980, pp.3@34. 4 Starry, Donn A. ‘‘Modem Armor Battle III Cavalry.” ARMOR. March-April 1975, pp. 58. Romjue, John L A History of A m y 86. Ft. Monroe, V i i a: U. S. Army Training and Dochine Command, 1981, Vol. I and?. p. 7. fi Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall m the Vallev. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Compan Battreall, R. R. E l. and Ri’ggins, Joe L MAJ. “Flying Tanks.” ARMOR. July-August 1980, pp. 5659. “ US. Department of the Army. Headquarters, 3d Cavalry Group (Mechanized). After Action Report, (1 August 1944-9 May 1945). Washing. ton: The Adjutant General, p. 144. 9 Bunce, Peter L. SSG. “The Reconnaissance Dilemma” ARMOR. March-April 1976, pp. 1820: 1’’ Bemhardi. Frederich von, GEN. Cavalry. Trans. MAJ. G. T. M. Bridges. New York George H. Doran Company, 1914, p. 40. Inc., 1976 pp. 32332.5: 24@241.

was commissioned in Armor from the University of Kentucky in 1970. He has held various positions in both regimental and divisional cavalry units in the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, and USAREUR. He recently served as the XO. 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Schweinfurt. Germany. Major Dials is a graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the United Kingdom Long Armour-lnfantry Course, and the Armed Forces Staff College. 46

The Regimental System and the Trainer The newly introduced “Regimental System” is one of the most exciting programs that has entered the manning arena of the US. Army and may be the most important transition to date. With the highly-trained and sophisticated force we currently possess, it seems that the regimental approach to organizing the Army for training and future wars is the ideal way to employ today’s tough, combat-ready Army. It is generally said that soldiers fight for their country, flag and way of life. This is certainly true as a group, but when viewed from the pragmatic foxhole position of the individual soldier, he tends to fight hardest for those he knows, trusts, loves and, if necessary, dies with. Consider almost any Medal of Honor winner who “rallied” his unit to fight against seemingly impossible odds at the risk of his own life, or the soldier who threw himself on a hand grenade that landed in the midst of his comrades. In either case, the soldier didn’t think of America or his mother’s applepie when placing his own life in jeopardy. He thought of the lives of his comrades. To put it simply, an army fights for its country; soldiers fight for those they respect and trust; from their commanders to their peers. (See ‘Determination in Battle,’by MG T. S. Hart, ARMOR, MayJune 1980. Ed.) This can be taken one step further and applied to a unit as a whole. In other words, through time and intimacy with a specific unit there exists three entities a soldier will fight for: his country, his comrades-in-arms, and his unit (including its particular traditions). Soldiers must be motivated through their emotions to fight harder and longer than the enemy if success is to be realized. This translates to a term we all understand-Loyalty. The idea of loyalty is so simple that it sometimes eludes us as a basic reason for why things are done. Currently, a soldier during a 20-year period, serves in an average of 6 to 8 units. This translates into approximately 3 years of service with each organization. Each unit has its own way of doing things from standing operating procedures to customs and traditions within the unit. It usually takes the newly joined soldier 6 months to “learn” a unit. This means 3 to 4 years of time during a 20-year career that a soldier spends just becoming familiar with, or acclimated to his new “home.” The regimental system as currently envisioned should solve, or at least significantly reduce the acclimation problem. A soldier in an armor regiment should serve with that regiment for a longer period (6 to 12 years) before having to leave that organization for a nominative assignment, or due to promotion. Thus, assignment to a regiment will allow a soldier to stay with a parent unit regardless of where he physically serves. He will also know before rotation between regimental battalions how his unit trains, what the regimental mission is, and how it will be exe cuted. But what should be done to enhance the regimental system during initial entry training (IET)? A proposal has been made that would give each regiment responsibility for training its own replacements. This idea must first be examined by asking how: A regiment will conduct a training program for IET (i.e., basic training, advanced individual training, one station unit training) that is standardized throughout the army? A regimental unit is going to train its own replace ments during wartime when every man is needed to man the combat battalions within the regiment? A unit, that has a continuing training mission for its already seasoned members, reverts to the all important basics (the foundation) and devotes men, money, and resources to train IET soldiers? We ensure that all recruits receive the same level of MOS training as his comrades before him? We ensure that all commanders interpret an MOS producing program of instruction as it was intended and that modifications or adjustments are not made to the training program based on local conditions, or the local commander’s opinion? The answers to these, as well as other questions, rests with the training center as it presently exists. Fort Knox and the 1st AIT/OSUT Brigade, Armor, will be used as an example. However, the following scenario could be applied to other training brigades as well. Training IET soldiers to become qualified 19E/K armor crewmen or 19D cavalry scouts has developed over the years into a “fine art.” Currently the US. Army has the best trained IET soldiers, produced by the most sophisticated training systems in the world. Examine what is already available to ensure standardization and quality of training for CMF 19 soldiers: An independent Test and Evaluation Branch that tests all soldiers to the same exacting standards required by field units. A multi-million dollar complex containing numerous classrooms equipped with instructional aids simulating basic-level armor technology; A committee of instructors who teach approximately 50 percent of all armor and cavalry subjects on a technical level and who teach the same way every time. A trainee Personnel Branch dedicated to accomplishing all IET soldiers’ administrative needs. Rather than sacrifice an established system that works, we should consider how it can best be modified and used to meet tomorrow’s needs today under the Regimental System. Currently, there are sixteen basic armor training companies and nine basic reconnaissance training troops organic to the 1st AIT/OSUT Brigade, Armor. These companies and troops presently supply all CMF 19 replacement/personnel for armor and cavalry units deployed worldwide. The Regimental System once initiated will not change the total number of replacement personnel needed, but will realign existing manpower into more efficient units. Logically, then, instead of dismantling a proven training system, it should be realigned to support the new Regimental System. Considering the annual projeded regimental replacement requirements and the number of personnel each OSUT company/troop graduates each year, it would be appropriate to align each OSUT armor company or 47 resmenm nes mom tne very Degruung. umentiy, a SOI-dier is trained by professional soldiers who know only that the students they graduate from training may end up with them in future units. Basic psychology should enhance this proposed alignment because when people do some thing for themselves, they tend to do a better job. Second, the cadre assigned to each training company should be selected by the regimental command sergeant major and approved by the regimental commander. The %to Syear assignment rotation of cadre trainers can still be used and will fall within normal career progression patterns. Therefore, the personnel chosen to be the regimental training company troop drill sergeants and tankhack commanders belong to the regiment and will feel personally responsible for the quality of training. Selected personnel can be trained to assume their duties by using insti-estamimea regmenw mil ensure complete ana stanaara-ized training, as well as provide for quality assurance. The Regimental System is a “Better Mousetrap” for a myriad of reasons. What is remarkable is the fact that we will be adopting anew concept system that has minimal implementing costs and offers countless benefits. If implemented, the proposed system would not cause disruption either to field units, or the training base. All the requirements needed to improve training and increase efficiency already exist. As an old Army axiom states: “If it works-do it”. This proposal will work.

Command Sergeant Major 1st AIT/OSUT Bde, Armor We Need Realistic NBC Training Warsaw Pact forces can be expected to employ NBC weapons on a terrifying scale, and their use to neutralize NATO strong points, communications centers, road and rail lines, and airfields is emphasized in Soviet tactics. This is designed to gain an insurmountable advantage for the Soviets in the opening phase of the battle. Presently the Soviets are believed to be employing chemical weapons in Afghanistan, and it would seem that they may be refining their NBC tactics and equipment. On the other hand our attitude toward NBC training is somewhat lax. Oh sure, commanders say that their command is high on it, but can they really bank on that training to pay off? Most of the time we take a ho-hum attitude toward this part of the training schedule. There is too much simulation with nonexistent troops and equipment, lack of support for the training schedule, and leaders do not enforce the training. Ask your officers and senior NCOs how often they have participated in NBC training with the unit. How often has guard duty, charge of quarters, staff duty noncommissioned officer, details, and compensatory time, thinned the ranks of your troop so that only a few of the soldiers get the training? Also, doesn’tit seem that the same soldiers are always there, while the same ones are always gone? Add these factors up and you can see why NBC training is not stressed as it should be. In the short term, we can always cover up for our deficiencies, but we are only short-changing ourselves if we do. Our lack of good quality NBC training may cause us to lose the “First battle of the next war,” especially if NBC weapons are used. In order to defeat the threat, we must train like him. Soviet troops are accustomed to spending long periods of time in NBC conditions. “NBC conditions” means just that! They employ real, diluted chemical agents in their exercises. Casualties occur, but, the Soviets believe in the motto, “Hard in Training, Easy in Combat.” Warsaw Pact forces use real equipment in exercises to give their soldiers maximum training benefits. Chemical alarms, detectors, decontamination kits, Geiger counters, and markers are used extensively in all FTXS. Their soldiers are given training in identifying agents, marking them, working around and in them, and a variety of other tasks to make them competent in an NBC environment. Also, unit-level training is given high priority. Decontaminating vehicles, equipment, and personnel are done during these exercises. The greatest difference between their NBC training and ours is that they do it more realistically. There is no substitute for realistic combat training. How many times have you participated in an NBC exercise? Does your squad/platoon/troop know how to go through a decontamination point? Do your chemical personnel know how to set one up? How well can your crews decontaminate their vehicle and other equipment in order to continue with the mission? If you can honestly say “yes” to those questions, congratulations! You may survive your first chemical attack and still kill the enemy. Our soldiers need to be taught the fundamentals of NBC warfare and the fact that they must learn to live and fight in an NBC environment. They won’t reach that level if NBC training is not the most demanding training we can make it. 48

The Case for Professional Reading 1111 iec OB SP thi an ne kn fa( to en Pa ac de ar tel YO No subject receives more attention from the Army’s officer corps than military professionalism. Professionalism always has been one of the most popular topics of conversations among military people, and the various thoughts and ideas on the subject number in the thousands. Two decades ago, Lieutenant General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, a British Army officer, delivered a series of three lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, on the profession of arms. (His lectures were later reproduced by the U. S. Army and distributed as an official pamphlet.) His was a most telling presentation, and he made a number of excellent points about military professionalism. General Hackett did not define a military professional in so many words because “the man-at-arms is Merent things at different times to the same people,” but he made clear his concept of a military professional’s fundions and duties: to bear arms; to lay down his life, if need be, for the group; to develop his skill in the management of violence to the utmost; and to act as the true subordinate of prop erly constituted authority. In effect, he was saying that mere path-taking does not make a military professional any more than does a fancy uniform. Rather, it is an individual’s mental approach to the profession of arms that determines his professionalism, his desire to develop to the utmost his skill in the management of violence. In many respeds, the U. S. Army provides its officers with ample opportunity to develop a sense of military professionalism-service schools, unit and staff assign- ---.nts, ever-increasing command responsibilities, and var- 1 duties around the world. At some point in their careers, ficers are also given special instruction in effective eaking and creative writing. They are then judged with eir contemporaries on their effectiveness as speakers id writers. But at no time is an officer ever judged on his effective- ‘ss in reading, or rated with his contemporaries on his towledge of current, professional, military thinking. In et, it sometimes seems that the Army goes out of its way discourage professional military reading in the appar- t belief that an officer who reads a great deal-lrticularly a combat arms officer-must be some sort of ademic intellectual and, therefore, should not be consi-red a member in good standing of the profession or ms. This is unfortunate, because there is so much being writ- n today that can stand any officer in good stead, be he lung, old, experienced or inexperienced-material that can add a full measure of richness to his career. If reading is so important, what, then, should military professionals read? First, they should read periodicals. All officers, for instance, should subscribe to and read their own branch journals. Each branch service school publishes one. These journals contain the latest in branch thinking on many and varied professional subjects. They are staffed with well-trained and knowledgeable editors and writers who turn out fine professional products. These journals also provide an excellent forum for the airing of differing professional opinions. However, officers should not restrict their reading to their own branch journals; they should make every effort to peruse other branch journals as well. Thus, an armor officer, in addition to reading ARMOR Magazine, should try to read, at the least, Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Defense, Engineer, United States Army Aviation Digest, and Military Intelligence. They should also look at A m y Trainer and ARMY. Field grade officers, usually have more time to devote to professional reading. Accordingly, they should make it a point to also read MILITARY REVIEW and PARAME TERS. And since they are often concerned as well with the conduct of joint operations, they should look at the periodicals that are produced by and for the other armed services. Three excellent publications are: Air University Review, Naval Institute Proceedings, and MARINE CORPS

GAZETTE.

Officers should consider joining the American Military Institute, and subscribing to their quarterly journal called MILITARY AFFAIRS published for them by the history department of Kansas State University. Finally, in the periodical field, there are several commercially produced publications that deal with military and strategic affairs, that provide valuable sources of information such as: AEI FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE

DEFENSE, and NATO’s FIFTEEN NATIONS. Then there are books, which may be even more important to the military professional. Dozens of excellent military-oriented books are published each year in the U. S. and abroad. The service school libraries issue periodically updated reading lists, and these lists are usually available on request. In most cases, unit and post libraries may use 49 armies, feeling that these should be read afterthe "starters" have been allowed to do their work. Company Grade Officers Alger, John I., The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War. Baynes, J. C. M., Mor&. Baynes, J. C. M., The Soldier in Modem Society. Brodie, Bernard, From Crossbow to H-Bomb. Dupuy, R. Ernest and William H. Baumer, The Little Wars of the United States. Foner, Jack D., The United States Soldier Between Two Wars. Griffith, Paddy, Forward Into Battle. Hicken, Victor, The American Fighting Man. Higham, Robin and Carol Brandt, The United States Army in Peacetime, 1775-1975. Hittle, James D., The Military Staff. Keegan, John, The Face of Battle. Leckie, Robert, The Wars of America. Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage. MacDonald, Charles B., Company Commader. Macksey, Kenneth, History of Land Warfare. Marshall, S. LA., The Officer as a Leader. Montgomery, Bernard Law, A History of Warfare. Pyle, Ernie, Brave Men. Weigley, Russell F., History of the United States Army. Williams, T. Harry, The History of the American Wars from Colonial Times to World War I. Field Grade Officers Aron, Raymond, On War. Bell, J. Bowyer, The Myth of the Guerrilla. Borklund, Carl W., Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara. Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age, Collins, J. Lawton, War in Peacetime. Dupuy, Trevor N., The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Foner, Jack D.. Blacks and the Military in American History. Gavin, James M., War and Peace in the Space Age. Goodpaster, Andrew J., For the Common Defense. Howard, Michael, War and the Liberal Conscience. Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense: Strategic 're grams in National Politics. Janowitz, Moms, The Professional Soldier: A social and Political Portrait. Osgood, Robert, Limited War Revisited. Preston, Richard A., Men in A m. Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modem World. Taylor, Maxwell D., Swords and Plowshares. Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism, van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War. Military Classics Caesar, Julius, The Battle of Gaul (anew translation by Anne and Peter Wiseman). Clausewitz, Karl von, On War. Delbruck, Hans, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History (three volumes translated into English as of this date). Douhet, Giulio, The Command of the Air. Earle, E. M. (editor), Makers of Modern Strategy. Fuller, J. F. C., Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History. Fuller, J. F. C., A Military History of the Western World (three volumes). Herodotus, The History of Herodotus (two volumes). Jomini, Antoine, Summary of the Art of War. Liddell, Hart, B. H., The Great Captains Unveiled. Liddell, Hart, B. H., Strategy. Livy, The War with Hannibal. Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Art of War (two volumes). Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Prince and the Discourses. Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660-1 783. Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, (two volumes). Saxe, Maurice, Comte de, Reveries or Memoirs on the Art of War. Spaulding, D. L, et. al, Warfare. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Upton, Emory, The Military Policy of the United States. Vegeiius, Flavius Renatus, The Military Institutions of the Romans. Willoughby, C. A., Maneuver in War. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War (two volumes). ALBEFtT N. GARLAND Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.), Infantry Fort Benning, GA Recognition Quiz Answers

1. AMX-13 DCA (French). Twin 30-mm self-propelled antiaircraft gun; crew, 3; maximum road range, 300 km; maximum road speed, 60km/hr; combat weight, 18.9 tons; power-to-weight ratio, 14.53 hp/ton. 2. RATEL-20 (S. Africa) (1FV)This 18.7 ton armored vehicle is crewed by 3 men and carries 7 passengers at a maximum road speed of 105 km/hr. It is diesel engined and is armed with a 20-mm main gun, a 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun and a 7.62- mm AA machinegun.

3. T-59 (China) (MBT) Essentially the same as the USSR T-54 MBT. It has a 4-man crew and weighs 39.7 tons loaded. It has a 14.44 hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 48-km/hr maximum road speed, 400-km maximum road range, and a 520-hp diesel, and is armed with a 100-mm main gun, two 7.62-mm machineguns and a 12.7-mm AA machinegun.

4. TYPE 74 (Japan) (MBT) It has a 4-man crew and weighs 41.9 tons loaded. It has a 53-km/hr maximum road speed, 19.7 hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 500-km maximum road range, 750-hp diesel, 105-mm main gun, 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun and 12.7-mm AA machinegun.

5. MTLB (USSR) (Multipurpose Vehicle) It has a 2-man crew and carries 9 passengers as an APC. and weighs 13.1 tons loaded. It has a 20.16 hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 61.5- km/hr maximum road speed, 6-km/hr maximum water speed, 400-km maximum road range, 240-hp diesel, and a 7.62-mm mac h i neg u n.

6. AMX-1OP (France) It has a 5-man crew; mounts 2 HOT launchers on power-operated turret, and weighs 15.2 tons loaded. It has a 20-hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 65-km/hr maximum road speed, 600-km range, and 276-hp diesel. Prepared by SSG David L. Merryrnan, Intelligence NCO, Threat Branch, DCD, USAARMC, Ft. Knox, KY. Following are corrections for May-June 1983 Recognition Quiz Answers: (1) M48 is an M48A1. (3) M47 is an M46. 50

Officer Personnel Actions Clarified This is the final article in this series. Officer Evaluation Reports The following notes were compiled from the after-action reports submitted by promotion and selection boards, from members of the DA Secretariat who run the boards, from branch assignment officers, and from OPMD experts on the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). 0 Boards check Part Ij, “Reason for Submission,” because it tends to indicate the flavor of the report. The longer the rated period, the more weighty the evaluation. 0 The Duty Description (Part 111) is extremely important. Remember that the single armor officer on any board may not even see all the armor files! Even if he does, he has only one vote. It is important to explain to board members from other branches exactly what the officer does because they may not have as good an appreciation for what the duty entails as does the commander. Be spe cific, especially if the officer is working in his additional specialty. It is suggested that some statement about the officer’s function, the number of people he leads or supervises, and the types and number of vehicles for which he is responsible be included. 0 Negative comments have a negative impact. If some thing needs to be said, then say it, but say it clearly. There are no magic words for writing OERs. Negative comments on professional ethnics hit hard, but deservedly so. Make qualitative statements on how the officer performed his duties (e.g., “best platoon leader in my company”). 0 Cite what the officer’s key duties were, and explain how well they were performed. Some raters are still trying to put potential remarks in the performance narrative (Vc). This results in an administrative nightmare and the report may miss aboard. 0 It is definitely not necessary to fill up the performance narrative or potential blocks. Be concise. 0 Do not leave remarks open for interpretation. Be precise. 0 Platoon leaders do not command ground platoons in armor, they lead them. Statements such as “He commanded his platoon in an outstanding manner” detract from the rater’s credibility. Only make comments in part Ve, “Potential narrative,” that are appropriate to current grade and duty. It is a waste of time and OER space to recommend the rated officer for attendance at an advanced course or CAS3. All officers will attend OAC and there is no such thing as attendance ahead of contemporaries. All officers in BYG 1976, and later BYGs, should attend CAS3. Gimmicks (underlining, words in upper case, big words that no one understands, trendy words like “stud”) have an amazingly negative effect in the eyes of board members. Boards infer from such remarks that the officer’s performance cannot speak for itself. When,gimmicks are used, the rated officer may suffer. Intermediate Rater comments do not add weight to a report simply because they are present. They are taken at face value. About 10 percent of OERs received have Intermediate Rater comments. The Senior Rater’s part is viewed in its entirety to obtain a single idea of what the rating says. All three elements must be considered together. By matching the same words with different profiles, entirely different evaluations emerge. Many company grade officers perceive that the box checked in the Senior Rater’s profile is the most important aspect of the rating. It is definitely not. Again, all three elements must be viewed together. The use of small type makes reading difficult. Remember that aboard member will read the OER on a microfiche reader. Senior Raters, please check the OER for neatness, spelling, and grammar. A poorly prepared OER makes an unfavorable impression. 0 Senior Raters, when counseling officers on their OERs, at the very least give them an idea of what your profile looks like. Many officers are surprised when they finally see the senior rater’s profile. 0 If several OERs are written by the same Senior Rater, for officers of equal rank (e.g., all captains), and they are received at DA on the same day, then all the potential evaluations are computed and the same profile is entered on all the reports (i.e., the same profile totals, not the same box checked). The Senior Rater’s profile cannot be inflated. There are still some Senior Raters who believe it can be inflated, and they think they are doing their officers a favor by putting them all in a high block. This could not be more incorrect. When all or most rated officers occupy the same block, regardless of its location, that only means they are running with the pack. This type of rating has little credibility, and the rating is normally not taken at face value. The rater also surrenders his capability to single out his most outstanding officers. If, when starting the profile, and there are only a few rated officers in the profile, your rating philosophy should be explained, e.g., “Although I have placed Captain Jones in block 111, this does not imply anything negative. I intend to put the top 20 percent of all captains I will rate in the top three blocks.” If it is felt the profile has become disporportionate, Branch recommends the Evaluation Officer at MILPERCEN (DAPC-MSE) be contacted either in writing or by telephone (AUTOVON 221-9570) to discuss restarting the profile. They will provide the necessary guidance to insure it is done correctly. Raters are cautioned not to try to adjust the profile on their own unless they restart. In other words, do not fill lower blocks just because it is felt that too many officers are in higher blocks. By the way, that constitutes substantive cause for an officer to appeal the report. Branch needs feedback on how it is serving Armor Officers; please let us know.