SOMEWHERE BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TOMORROW

SOMEWHERE BETWEEN

YESTERDAY AND TOMORROW

by MAJOR LAMAR M A D D E N HOSSER 48 i the uend of our developments and the strategic situation of the Free World point toward the need for developing greater mobility in the ground forces. That we may lack the depe of mobili? required was a o n g lv suggested by our forma NATQ Chmander, General hlanhew B. Ridgwap. In a Statement to the pres in Paris, 29 September 1952, G e n d Fbdgwap said, "If we are jumped to-murrow 01 next week, or in thecom-ing months, we will have to to the maximum the mobilirp we have 011 sea and in the air. We do not have a mobile land m e . We will fight with what we have on the ground We do not have an adequate ma-ing force-adequate mobile reserves EO support for either one. If we are assailed tomorrow we are going to have a very bad time and take some severe and punishing blows" This is a sobering tbaught and it has not reaived the consideration it deserves. Less than a decade aft= winning a great war with an army conceded to be the mos& mobile military force of all time we arr warned that we now lack this essential cbmamac * inourdefense Wemust 111 concede that we arc not naw as strong in numbers of fighting units as we were at the end of the war. We might even go so far as to has faced thearmy to accept a 4- ex number of completely mob& divi-dans than is desirable. But the ml back them up. WT adequate logistical f0mrWhy'-admit that the expense of maintain-mg - * fanainpeacerhne Qtpc ofour pesent di&ulty is tbe faa thlt postwar developments have so rreknted the pace of war and so greatly altered our traditional concepts that we have not yet caught up organirationally. The power of COLI-temporary weapons calls for greater 'on on the ground and this vidaals in turn demands increased mobili of the component parts of Just so far, the road ahead is well de6ned. But as we consider means of achieving this additional mobility, the path disappears again into the Fog of Peace. We must sift and analyle, weigh and compare many The advocates of airborne warfare, for innapce, tell us that the " d r t i o n s of possible future wars be like nothing previously expezienced." Whole armies are to be tmqnmed and maintained by air. Tbacwill be no targets invulnerabk to airborne attack. Any point on the globe of sufficient strategic value can, it is said, be seized by airborne a m k We are said to be relieved fmn the necessity for slow, painfid. apensive overland attacks. Instead. we will move directly to the assault on t a r p of state&ic importance: flying over the defenses, we hit at the nerve centers of production and the brains of the enemy government. k this the trend of warfare in our -? Many recent peace develop ments seem to bear out the aerial Bedim Airlift in whicb we and OUT dies kept a city of millions supplied with every necessity and some lux-uria for a penod of months would seem to show that the scope of the airborne thcorg is not an exaggeration. Hawcpcr, we must consider :r separation of units and indi-the 6Jting force. diverjpt views thearia The accOmpliShmcLlt of the AIMOl+-Augurt, 1953 Dissipation of strength, be it Znfantry by pkc-al attack or Armor by parcelling it out in Battalion d Company pkages, is a danger to onr Defense e#&. A re-exrtnu'rrrrtiorr of onr pILd, a - look at tbe present, and a glimpse into tbe fntnre may seme us ueU. what the result ht have been if jet intercepters, by antiaircraft units 6ring guided missiles, by counter-bombing of the crowded airfields. by atomic bombing of the sup ly bases on the ground. S o one who saw that bridge of plans From Frankfort to Berlin (the Germans called it the '*.%r Bridge") could help but be inspired. and no one who saw i: could help but doubt that it would be possible in war. Up to the present moment, no airborne force has ever been launched into combat under conditions.where we did not have nearly abso1u:e control of the air. The airborne forces have never yet had to fight in the air they are incapable of doing so, it must follow that airborne operations are not practicable until the attacker controls the skies. It may be said that we could always seize temporary control of certain selected airways in order to deliver the airborne and air-transported force DO its target. But there is the problem of sustaining it. How are we to supply it with food. ammunition and rcplacemena? Any serious failure of the resu ly plan its eventual destruction for, like a city under siege, when supplies are exhausted it can no bnger fight. Airborne organizations depend largely u p fight= ?ircnft for antitank defense and f a su artillery in a mdirhal pund farce. It is unlikely that this much needed close air support would be thiroperation had Yeen opposed by and by an active and mob' I f e enemy before reaching their target areas. If of an airborne farce can o n y PP mean sions which would be &bZ CLZz until the! enemy fighter

A U M O R ~ U I ~ W S ~ ,

1955 I were at least partiall! neutralized. Unlike traditional infant?. the airborne t'ooper cannot count on the accurate fires of Corps and -h> =L- tillen. He is not yet backed up by air-transported tanks. Once on the ground. he is no more mobile t h the naditional infanq. In fact. he is less so, because he carries with him only a few jeeps and Zh-ton trucks for his towed guns. The airborne soldier is entirelv dependent upon his brothers-in:arms wh-feet are firmly pIanted on the ground. He cannot exist indefinitely on his own. There has been only one airborne campaign in histop- wherein all other branches were excluded-the German seizure of the island of Crete. In this action the parampen were supported only the Luftw4e. and there was to be no linkup with other forces. They dropped, seized and held the naw could no hger operate in the adjacent wztas, the force had to proved a k b m e a n s , it is W g t h a t airborneopaationsinthefutucewill remain spacrcll opaatians and that thepwill be c o n d u c t e d in conjunction with overlandatcacL n~mostserik-ingexampkof this ppeofb0Uk was Field hlarshal hlontgommy's plan to Kize the cmaJing5 over the waterways of Sonhern Holland in depth by airborne forces and to push through with acmoced units to link scribed by General Bradley as. "tbe most imaginative operation of the entire war.* It failed because the weath-an island, after which they were sup be withdrawn. In spite of vastly im-pbed by th k MW. when up the resulting chain of airheads-operation hlarket Garden. It was de er prevented close tactical air w p p and made the resupply limired and inaccurate. Tbough it failed. it was sound in conception because it exploited the capabilities of both airborne infanq and armor-each sep arately and both in combination. Our +bmne forces held in spa-tegic resen-e are an imponant element in our national defense owing to the speed uith which + can be shifted tions. Once there, however, tbey must fight on the ground and on the p n d it is overland mobility that \ision does not poses .+side from its immobiliv. once committed. there is at least one otha fatal weakness: the airborne division has no adequate antitank defense. General Gasin d a to the etfce-tivenes af tank against an airborne force. He says, '.lirbome troop arc at a great disadvantage in open corn- m fighting agains a m - " and a@. 'Armored units are parocularly s-ah-able against au-bome troops-.' Tbe Genenl then mentions tbe new bazooka and coacludes t h it has made t f o r m a s a - 'tanLs in their the ha\ily anaored Knights d .+- COCPt" In juaice to General Gain. it must be noted that d these re-mvks Irere made befar Kora-before the %azooka Shapedchuge" ad-Morte!shdmettbeirgreatdisap pinanent For Wheu the oew ba-zoolu was rusbed to Kaa with a great enth- f a n b ill the pres itwasfotmdthuthcughtbesizeof thep)cceJehadbeenincrrzad.it was d a weapon of very c b n range and inaacurate. The Nodl Kacm 49 to any threatened theater of opera-counts. This. the pre5eIlt airborne di- t i n a a s t h e e c PofG€mlaand t b t d t h u w campips with cities and aha met Jide e&ctive rcciancc fmm the air. We were amsapedy able to use and tactics which wae E acrmllyalreodyobsoheandwe into our premt orgal+h?s and mined ourselva to dcvelup some habits-which have been carrkd arta tactia. Had the e n e m y s d air force been brought to bear against our ground opesations, a great many ofourmostsurressful moves would have proved impossible. Not just the 1@ improvisations of the famous Red Ball Express but the usual, SOP Qpe, movements of OUI mocorired di-VisiODs would have been a h e d . It will, no doubt, come as a shock to same that only one in three of our wadme divisions was sa. we were free to u h = excellent road net that e.xistd and to shift divisions-even oI1 OCCaSiOnS tion from the air. This condition did no: exist while the Germans had an air force. i t will not exist at tbe bt armies-with litth kar of intarup ginning of world war m. The pre5alt ipfanpy division is brlL of OUI amy is &try. Th individual foot soldier in the infanay not a mobile o r p h i u n , yet the divkion is ovabdcd. As General

S. L A Marshal hasobsend, "The soldiercannotbea 6ghtez andapack animal atone and the same time any more than a field piece can be a gun and a supply vehicle combiwct" Cer-taialy a machine could be used to &ere him of much of his cumbat that the macfkes exist and that the infanap has than, "the machine bas so far failed to reduce by a single pound the load a soldier is required to carry in war." But fundamentally it is the organ-izacion itself whicb is th Limiting factor. I am not d e m n g to the re-frigemion units, the mobile showas, because thesecan belrrdacedpQal away when the situation demands What I do point to as restrictivefac-toKaretberegimentaltanLcom-penis, and the tank badion which are SinIply an embarnrrm#u to the infplcry divirion. I dare a s a t that even the infantry dement of the division isnow too large. Therraretoo Ioad. somehow, rcgvdlezt of the fact w aredraggsd~amdneno; vrvicedubsandtbeliL, mvly mca in the infantryregimenm and it is this bulk-this shea ova- -which destroys its mobility. -?e divish began to p w to its paest +ent size in Wald W P I, ahq fa the &Is& time. armies fd it neceeyto tie their Banks to insunwuatab continental barriers The race to the sea and the resulting unbroken lines from the Alps to the Atlantic came about because the mobile capabilities provided by aurk and train made it possible to and the German commanders found it na.ersary to extend to the limit of ? E p l m g trenches and, h 2 they were generally unsuccessful, massed attaclu were the order of the Mdanization cameabout between the wars This iDcreased mobility stin there was now the additional capability a€ penetration because the deadly hy. Bulk became nec day. forced c o d to fill the space between geographical barriers but raga-lVgelY-eb-* The infantry division was COIISC. m d h ~ p and heavy artillery bu-quently augmented by the addition o€ a n t i d units, the aarhment of GHQ tank ba& and the like Afm the last war the division a b sorbed a& these units and there is now a need to d d e r the larger strategic situation to determine the use tulwJsofallthismass. Atomic weapons have now reached such a point of development that a penetration is passibk at any place. We cannot now hope to block a con-tinwrusfrontaaoJsEuro .Thereis broken be, if by the use of atomic weapons that line can be penetrated at will. What we must now strive for is con-. Mobility has come beck into warfare and battles of tbe future will be battles of maneuver. W e must maintain contact with the many because by becoming close- 1 en& we make it ditficut for enemy to use his most destnr-tive taajcal weapons, without de-ccntnted as to& a tempting target audves. Add thewhik we must little need now to estab'sh pe an un-rtralring his own troops. In so doing cemainmobikinorda toreact quick-wc must not karw SO heady m- v - w r t , 19s k 1y to any move and tooarpbitw mva uscdthtloomic.~pOas agPDizcdisW*dthisoortot au-t. 'Ih mobile capabilities Tbe infantry 2s it is now o€ourememybough about the p" ent massive divish The mass de shuctive contcmpanry weapons will bring a h mobility. The pendulum must change do fit fronts and unbken liner which are &ti% we will develop a d m?E ddea~ed~volmaintlin swirrgsandtactia V e I O ~ t t . Instead of arntintlous rhspasianintbe&Battkswill be W a l by the maneuvexing of small task forces or combat teams, each too d l to be a suitable atomic tar yet powerful enougb in tams of powaandspecdtosuikeswift,pow-aful blows at the enemy's dispared foms, or to force tbe enemy to cml-centfate so that 0 w . m mas desmlc-tive armaments caa be proStaMy an-played. Penetrations made by the use of these pew weapons must be exploited quickly if me are to squeeze the fullest advantag out of the W- forsuchmissions~tedantnrks, t h q ~ c X U l k d d y t o t b C + createMenon and T mwetooJbwly b bebedlptarnup blaste&rrToexpbitfully z c wehavemad~wemust be able to move rapidly aos~country with us bugrange weapons olpabk vision as it is n00 organized and as these. Can we utilize airborne troops to exploit atomic ksions? We CCT-ta,inly can and p z b l y will, but the weaknessat the ?irborne awpa once he is on the ground will also force us to employ other & troopI for his protsaion. If neither the tnditiona infantry nur airborne forca, as prrsently or-ganired, are compktely adaptable to warfare in OUT &y,k arma any more so? Let us try to be & e v e in the examinah of OUT own branch. Let LIS try tow the truth and not simply a justi6catior1. is, not armor at all, but ARMoI-Jdy-Au#mst, 19s whichailuprobo;i and bridges partialy and debris b ausedbythc bp desboped new indisprsedform?tiauwhileovrping of covering the intavening spoc& It is dlogid to apct our infantry di-equipped to carry a l t missions nrh VahreOf-day io mobility d its IkiWity. Tmc, rbcprmorpovidaanardleDtshidd Ig?inatbebLad*oftk ~ ~ a n d t h i s r d a t i v e i r p munity must not be a d o d d But fssenriruy, it is cbc abilily 00 movT disprsedanddaacartnteits6rc thatrmLr-tbCrrnrof- d t b e h l f i t b d t h e - ' Z - e n impasi~?-m escablisb contillwus b o ass the face a€ a caarinent. then we must rdy u p aur a t d i ~ ~ k -

ConcarKate tsnpooll without p k is ahraction W& CUI only be per-ly ovaland rad to callvcaoantraein ourtroap5. forwdbymountedfaas.Anwrap p" to be more adaptable thn any of the aba bnnches of the Armv to fight the hdbanksd the Am& Age. But even umor is not yet rody to take the lad in wdmg out the techniques of tnmrraw. It is not nady because at this moment it is Still sflintaed and rcancrrd in pigmy-packers throughout the other forces. It is much doser toyesterday than to Inordertobeprrpuedinadvzace tamorrow. for the type! of warfaxe we know to be possible now, annor needs a l a b - tory-a militvg kbontory in which the old. We have t'=rhen-x several nsandnuwr-proving OUT equipment. We have no facilitiesfortestingtrticr Tbevmor of the U. S. h y is, for tbe most pan, scatted througbout the infantry divisions. We have only fwo real armored divisicms. The remainder, of armor has The su-come about because we were lost in the Fog of P a c e sanewhae between ous baards constantly m g and im-armored in name d y , am tniping infantry rrplacanarts! yesemlay and fmimxmw. when news- p a p told us that pplu were as & lete-as the bqck-built-foriwo, m many of us bebed than. We lost OUT most outstanding and moQ successful armored kader after the war. Today, no o&a of &ent stature has taken his place as an advocate of armor. We have rightly become cost an&ous in the last eight yean, but we seem to have became SO QRIsdous of cast that we have not yet begun to adjustaurforrer tothe techxhl and . . tr a€ OUI day. We have = ken toLlllrrowaru 51

. - Fort Hood is the only uaining site in the United Soops at this time where an annored dicision has adequate f a d - ties to carry our irs training mission. and with the a d d i t i d area this post bmmes the lyges pemammt 12- d post in the world. The House approved the aaion laa SovCmba. In addition to&&g* 6liIlg langcs and larger impact areas for the 9omm and giant l2Omm tank the post’s extended bouduies will alkw la ;Lmorrd soldiers m pncda saam aussings and parrjcipate in other water aaining when Belm Lake - e d a-virmal highway of death. and roofed with tough amor plate. brought bock the wounded and sound sokfim and some of the dead. They rumbled up to the hill’s remaining defenders in daylight. under direct view and fin from the Cornmu-nka. Mortar.shck artillery d machine gun aad riae bullets pounded the only one was seriously damaged. The camea backed up to caves and bunkers to load on the .hecicans. They retumed with Engineer teams that blasted bunkers and caves before the Chinese could occupy them. A anier holds about 25 men. but the number empbyed in the operation is security information. Maj. Cm. Anhur T ~ d e a u , corn-rnander of the Seventh, said: This action proved without doubt the t r a m d o u s value of the T18 armored prsonnel carrier.’’ Tbe full-na~lred v ~ h i ~ l e ~ , sheatbed carrim llthAmoNadM.ldooAmmdaum M8.b The Ekventh Armored Division Ar-sociation will hold in annual convention and reunion in New Yo& City on August 14th and 15th at the Rawevelt Hotel. Details may be obtained by writing Slr. Kenneth W. Hanlon, 1 18 Thorw Street. Jersey City. N. J. R J 0 b d X i i t l k h P B y . A ~ Ah& Soudull Freeman, out-Lu of the cop-. and pu&aer prize winner. passed amv on June 13th at the age of 67. famow author. editor and educator will be missed by many Amor o & x s who were looking fonvard to reading more 9 ivash-biographical material on ington. Among the best se ers here at AFKMOR werc his hmous books U s

Lirutcnats. He served our M- lioa well. A R M O r 4 I p A w r t , 1953 shells, appconrmoly W.o0O poolds of coppr axe oycd md mdt aw.iLMe fa abcr urgrm neak Otber a~ingr dt. be nid. the Iron oitiac rorating budr require Iy) machining tion w h r h is chr-Oilite band is formed to exact diwo-sioos in a spa?l pco and is a prr-cisioa product. Spclll iron powder is poured in arnouno into a large hand- Z g press. Aftrr forming. dw parts are placed in a heat mating furnace rhich fuses cbe meal particks together. Tbe bands are tkn irnmcRed in a lubricant which is up bv che porous metal. under prrssw. fncdon or bat the lubricant comes out to ease MV frictioa points within rbe gun bir- d: r o e r i a i c o f m ~ b a a c k T h cdooei Josrpb I. G w . Editor-Cenexal klanagcr of the Conbor Forca .hmd. rrrmth, plsped away fran a ban attack. colonel Gmac bad becn Editor 04 tbe IlffaYeW . I d sina 1940, and the Cornbor F a u s )d SiDa it annwoccd publicaciolr in Julv. 1950. CdoDdcrCav d t e d cran west Point. dass of 1923. I-k retid from active &my duty in 1%. The Bridsh Atmy & b i d itr new l2Omm moilless a n t i d gun ~centlp and said it was capable of stopping the logst errisdng tank. abmt one third less than the 1,- pounder it uill rcplce. It resembles a The gun weighs almost one

TOP COMMAND CHANGES

I,

1.

THE

THE ROMMEL PAPERS

THEROMMELPAPERS. Edited by B. H. Wl Hd.- 545 pp. with Illustrations. Harcourt Brace and Company, New York,N.Y. - $6.00. Reviewed by Mai. 0.n. Orlodo W a d Rommel was not only a great soldier, but an able writer. Intending The E -

. -- to write his memoin. when time permitted, he took advantage of m- opportunity to dictav memoranda 2nd to prepare a manuscript as the events in his campaigns unfolded. Through the eyes of‘this competent soldier. an armored commander in the thick of it. we see the collapv of the French armies. as his division. one of the spearheads thrust from he Rhine to Cherbwg. We see his crcssing of the .\lase. ‘the battles around .has and Lilk. the crossing of the Somme. the SOmme-Aisne breakthrough. and the capture of Cberbourg. We accumpany him to Africa and feel the ebb and Bow of battle in his doubt the ability. but oertainl~ the he h l d bave been in the criticpl stages of bade. We sec him in Fic-tor)’ and defeat. always the mobile-minded soldier. Tunisia we f o h his pa^ in Italy in 1943. written from his realrds b\. his son. Then comes his pan in the prep-ntion for tbe invasim~. the aoa channel attack, and tbe breakow at St. IA. written most a b his asto-ciate. General Fria Bayed&. courage and the luck of berng wbac

Finallycamathetragicend, written by Ranmeli son, Manftsd lodhst,insummuy,Rammel'srr- f l e d m s 00 milimy leadership md Afrkamrcaospax. standing. scattered through the Th result of the ewlation by Pad Findlay makes for clear under-whole book are appropriate extracts hwr kttas to his wife, "Lu," throwing still more light on the characta of tbe man, which otherwise would have been lost to the reader. The editor, Liddell H a has acted as a most &em analytica agent in providing appropriate background, commcllts and c o w throu h- out the text. He is comet in %is opinion that "No commander in his-my bas written an account of his campaign to match the vividness and value of RLnnmerr" Sane readas have the habit of u n & b g passa%a in books which y appeal to them. The Popcrs are some of those that are of *t interest to be underlined:+ "Prejudice against innovation is ical chancterttic of an m- &% which has grown up in a it was that the Prussian Army was defeated by N a p o h . This attitude was also evident duxh this war, in Gaman as well as British &er cirdes, wbere, with their minds fixed 011 corn licated theories, people brt ibe a& to came to tenns with reality. Amilitarydocninehadbeen worked out to the last detail and it ? lkming quates from The RommeI wellaied and proven system. Thus was now Rgvdedas the d t of alldtprywirdom.Tbeonlymili-tary thinking which was aaxptabk was that which fouowed their stand- ?rdired & Everything outside the rules was rrgarded as a gamble: if it sameaid then it was the result oflucLandaccident Thisattitude ideas, the consequences of which are inakulable.% "However praireworthy it may be tradition in the field of sol- &a, it is to be misted m T h e best form of 'welfaxe' for the poopd is first-class training, for this TI& reverse took us completely “The pail of the hour moved the British to tremendous exertions, just of mind creates 6xed preconceived ofmilitargcommand'* saves u"Mcmarg O I S U a l t j & " S by SLpPris."'

A R H O R ~ ~ Y - W S ~ ,

1953 as always in a molprpt of exmane CmbedaKWhich is an eIfectivt rtmcoftenomprrdtowtbe difference between th Pmfcssor of Earnomiaandthebudnesmon,as jud@ by their fioancia suc~e8. Thebtsiwssmanmaynot b e o n t b e s a m e i n t e n ~ p as the p b , but he bases his ideas on real facts and puts the whk power of his will behind their realiza-lion. The profesx, on the other hand, o f t e n h a s a h ity and although p a ps hamg more ideas, is neitbcr able nor anxious to carry them out; the fact that he hasthemisenougb.Andsothe businesJ Inan has tbe greater 6nancial SUCCeSCwe =It isbctter to anow an incident to 80 unavenged than to Bit beck at the innocent."' On pag~ 307 Liddell Hart cam-mcnts: '%& sides, indeed, succec sively pmndad an ob+ koon in tbe cost and futility of the 'direct appmd'-the a&aJne spirit ult-guided a9. rubthy at mind." "Weatberbsccbe tioafau brebahpaitionandannyfan days htcr." Ranrma's advice to tk beal thought he-eF T O i * daytearliaandsa.~ tr a n n y . a statesmen.' "But the delay had enabled tk AmaiaDstoagapheIomtarnofa dcfamx d they fought bock skillfully and bitter&..- very slrillfull?r elceCured"'0 Ba?crki&quaktgFkanmd." Tlle.--hadbeen " - r i l e m ? i n d e f r n c c ~ t h e tank is tbc a n t i d gun,- Gaural Ba-s dacripioa of tbe air aprkofAmcnan . kmkrrartbe 25th OC July. in ocdcll support d tbcir eroaps, appeuhg 00 page 489. isabnepicccof&sxiptkwriring. we. 011 an si& would have M vay lit& advantag ovef the French a d Britisb in 1940. even u-ith cur u+te lank and airurns iftbac V l a S h a d n a b e c a m r l r k A k equally up-to-date organisation, uainingandtacticddoarinc. "There was a poTtlcul?rcLque that stiu fought bitwdy against an?' drrs-ticmodemna ~ t D n o f m e t b o d s d c h g fast to th axiom that the m- fvray must be rrgarded as tk most important cor;nifuent oc any arq.-" 'Respea for the opinion of this or that great soldier must never be allowed to go so far that nobod?- dam to discuss it"1a The greatest &om must be made in the field of training to counteract w senicesand arms ofthe sen-ices. It happens agam and again that the air force or army begus to play its own private pohtical game."" Liddell Hart. tbe editor, has u-rit-Den an oupeaadingdescripion of the content of the book. His masterly i n b

' is a mwW to aop dl w the repamtist tendeDcles . dtbevari-

RUNDSTEDT

ClEllTHER BlDMEWTRlTT I Orher ce!views: No roldier sbarld, and no a sddier will fail to read The Ronrmcl Papers after reading Hart's induction. It sbould be read. then A-read, and then read again. la connestion with amtem- p a ? judgment on the ability of commanders. Liddell Hart comments, substantially. that h w has a habit of wwecting the superficial ,dg ments that temp0rmil.v keep com-pv u-itk -. His comment on Rommel's Kction on 'Rules of Desert Narfare" is most comprehensive: "The Rules of Desert Warfare' is a masterly piece of military thinking, while the whole narritive is sprinkled with sage reflections, dten with a fresh turn-about concentration in rime rather than in space: h u t the effrtc: of speed in outu-eigh-ing numbers: about flexibility as a means to surprise. about the security provided by audacity about the rml-tifyin3 conventions of the 'quarter-- master' mind: about creating new sandards and not submittin nom; about the value of ratber than direct reply to the me-my's moves: about the u-ay that air inferioriy requires a radical revision of the rules of x d opeiati-about the unu of indlscrimi-nate CepNak and folly of brutality: about the basic inucpebency of UII- 0th quotations from the innoduc-tion are: . T b e outnanding feature of Rommel's numerous successes is that thy were achieved with inferiority of resources and without any command of the air. "Save for his many narrow escapes from dath, or capture in battle. he owed less to luck than many commanders who have attained fame." "In the history of war great ideas have been less numerous than great generals, but have had a more far-reaching etfect. *'-All the great capains posses4 in high degree this faculty of grasp ing instantly the picture of the gound and the situation; of relating bne to the &r and the pact to the whole. Rommel most clearly had this Here and there throughout the Rommel Papers some light is thrown on the destruction of enemy tanks. This &odd provide a means for testing the oft-repeated slogan. "The best tank destroyer is a tank." The question in my mind has always been. Whose tank?' Can we economically always afford to have a tank that will be the best tank destroyer? principled arpediency." faculty." Here the Allies met and defeated the Cm.1 of the crop of the Germam .%I'D! The Papers throw light on questions concerning civilian control of operations. The book should be on the ''must" reading list for all members of the Congressional Armed Senices Committees, from here on out. It should be read by Presidents. Prime IIinisters, and Dictators. In conclusion I see in The Romnrel Papers illustration after illustration of his abiliv to use with great skill and effect the means placed at his disposal. I also see that he pOSseSSed oursranding ability 00 capitalize bn the weakness as well as the strength of the enemy. at the same time being an advocate of maintaining "the decency in the soldier code." I feel that in our system of training in the schools. as well as in the field. not enough variety b introduced into the forces representing the enemy. on matters pertaining to equipment. training. strength, and characteristks. Certainly you fight differently against an enemy who does not seem to mind if he is surrounded, and fights on, as against one who gives up and surrenders or withdraws when y w a p pear in his rear. Certainly it is costly to stick to main highways and advance on each defended village by way of the main roads, and lose men and equipment the same way in

A R M O R ~ U ~ ~ ~ U ~ U S ~ ,

1953 each attempt. Ses. The Romnzc Papers is not only worth readin! but it is interesting reading. Th book should be used extensively i the Branch Schools the Sen-ice if': Colleges and the Sational N'ar GI lege. They will find therein matte! pertaining to tactics stratw. an plitics. For'those who have finishe their formal education. and are jl volved in responsible positions i the government. both militan- an political, a study of this book migl warn against repetition of mistake and make for fewer errors in tk future. *All foocaorn reftr to pagc referent in The Rommel P.rpm.

'P. 203. -7. 2Q4. 'P. 126. 'P. 24

'P. 244. 'P. 188. 'P: 292. 'P. 362. 'P. 39

*"P. W. =P. 451. L?. >I-. q.

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