A Hybrid Solution for a Hybrid Threat

Implementing a Variation of the Regimental System by MAJ Cory W. Wallace In his Jan. 14, 2014, address to the stu dents at National Defense University, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey said, “We’ll have to embrace change or risk irrele vance.”1 This brief, cautionary statement captures the challenges associated with maintaining an agile and ef fective ground force when combating an amorphous and technologically advanced hybrid threat2 with an Army re duced in both size and available re sources. In other words, the Army is getting smaller while its mission con tinues to grow in both scope and com plexity. As GEN Dempsey alluded to, the Army requires a fundamental change at the institutional level if it is to remain glob ally relevant while coping with the pos sibility of shrinking to the smallest fighting force since the beginning of World War II.3 Simply stated, the Army needs to identify an approach to focus the limited available resources on op timizing the effectiveness of its brigade combat teams (BCTs). The best way to accomplish this goal is to improve pla toon training and reduce the person nel turnover through a stabilized hy brid regimental system. Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, Army Force Generation, explains that Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is “the Army’score process and a key component of transformation” and cycles bri gades through three force pools: reset, train/ready and available.4 This process creates “brigade-based combat and support formations of common organizational designs that can be easily packaged to meet the varied demands of [commanders].” In this system dur ing a steady-state rotation, units will spend 27 months in the reset and train/ready pool, followed by nine months in the available pool. If the unit does not deploy during those nine months, it returns to the reset pool and repeats the process. During the reset phase, units experi ence a large emigration of Soldiers leaving to attend schools or to fill the needs of the other units further along in the ARFORGEN process. This person nel outflow degrades the unit cohesion built through the previous 27-month training process and requires money to train new Soldiers on mission-essential tasks and new equipment. Both the budget cuts proposed by the Pentagon to meet the 2015 spending cap and force reductions will decrease the re sources and Soldiers available to train during this time. Further, 27 months is a relatively short amount of time when compared to other countries’ approaches to building cohesive teams. Compared to the Soldier rotation associated with the ARFORGEN system, the British regimental system keeps soldiers assigned to the same units and avoids the personnel turbulence associated with the ARFORGEN model. Following the Cardwell-Childress reforms of the 19th Century, the British army organized itself into regiments based in the regions from which they recruited their members.5 Soldiers tended to stay within the same regiments for most of their careers. The regimental system built cohesive teams that en abled England to become a dominant global power up until the mid-20th Century and conduct expeditionary operations with a small, professional army to the current day. Counterpoint to

While a complete restructuring of the Army to implement an exact copy of the British regimental system would fail to yield a benefit that is proportional to the associated challenges, initiating a hybrid model within the cur rent force structure is feasible and will foster unit cohesion, minimize the impact of the reduction of training re sources and allow the Army to redirect the money saved in personnel costs to unit training funds. ARFORGEN pro vides a unit with 27 months to train for a deployment; however, budget cuts will decrease the resources available to build a cohesive team from new Soldiers replacing those former unit members who depart for schools and to meet the Army’s needs. A hybrid regimental system will reduce personnel turbulence within a unit and allow it to maximize the training in a limited re source environment. This hybrid regimental system will apply only to combat-arms military-occupational specialties. Sustainment and combat-service-support occupational specialties are too diverse and much too prolific throughout every Army duty station, thus making them diffi cult to arrange in a system such as the one proposed in this article. For exam ple, the military police have the re sponsibilities of overseeing military correctional facilities, enforcing the law, investigating criminal cases and providing personal-security details. Accordingly, military-police command echelons range from a company to a brigade throughout Army posts, de pending on that unit’s mission.6 That being said, the hybrid regimental system will offer combat-support and sustainment Soldiers the opportunity to remain within the same BCT if their requests adhere to the Army’s needs. Further, the hybrid regimental system dictates that Soldiers work within the same type of BCT for their entire career (armored, Stryker or infantry) to maximize the technical expertise yield ed through constant training with the same type of equipment. Essentially, the hybrid regimental system will keep a combat-arms Soldier within the same battalion or brigade for about seven to 10 years. Company-grade officers will remain in the same battalion until they complete their company command or key-development assignments. Combat-arms offi cers will attend their respective captain’s career course and return to their parent battalion following gradu ation. After completing both their post-command broadening assignment and Command and General Staff College, officers will follow a career path identical to current practices. Enlisted combat-arms Soldiers will stay within the same battalion until they complete the Advanced Leader’s Course. If possible, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) will have the option of returning to their original duty station following graduation. Upon arriving at their next assignment as a sergeant promotable or staff sergeant, NCOs will remain in that BCT until they retire. Also, NCOs and Soldiers will return to their parent brigade after completing any broadening assignments. The platoon is a privileged echelon within this system because it provides the greatest level of flexibility in con ducting decentralized stability opera tions or executing battalion-level deci sive action. Also, training platoon collective tasks requires fewer resources than training those of larger echelons. In other words, while budget cuts may prevent certain brigades from training at a combat training center, platoons will be able to conduct some form of collective training in a resource-con strained environment at their home station. Effective platoons also foster mission command because commanders be come confident in trusting their subordinates to accomplish a particular mission.7 Specifically, effective platoons provide commanders with “the ability to execute multiple related and mutu ally supporting tasks in different loca tions at the same time.”8 On both the contiguous and non-contiguous battle field, commanders must be able to trust that their platoons can execute their intent if the Army is going to ex cel at conducting unified land operations. For example, Army doctrine recommends that a commander task any element smaller than a platoon to secure a combat outpost.9 The effective platoons produced by the hybrid regimental system will support the task-organization concept defined in Chapter 3 of Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, which allows the Army to “match unit capabilities to the priority assigned to offensive, defensive and stability or defense support of civil authorities task.”10 Simply stated, a smaller Army with fewer resources can execute the same mission of a larger Army as long as its platoons are effective. Neuve Chapelle Many historical examples provide compelling evidence of the regimental system’s potential and justify a reinvesti gation of implementing a permutation of the British model. Given the upcom ing 100-year anniversary of World War I, it is useful to examine the 2nd Battalion of the Scottish Rifles Regiment’sac tions at Neuve Chapelle March 10-15, 1915, as described by John Baynes in Morale: A Study of Men and Courage.11 The unit cohesion and fighting spirit fostered through years of rigor ous training as a team were crucial to the unit’s success. In fact, Baynes be lieves that had 2nd Scottish Rifles not trained as an organic team within the regimental system for an extended period of time before Neuve Chapelle, the Germans would have destroyed the battalion within the first two hours of the battle. In March 1915, Field Marshal Douglas Haig decided to conduct an offensive operation in France’s Artois region to relieve the German pressure on the French army north of the Ypres. The 23rd Brigade, 2nd Scottish Rifles’ higher headquarters, was to conduct a pene tration to allow follow-on forces to ex ploit their success. The decisive point for this operation was the seizure of Neuve Chapelle, a critical German ad vance-supply depot.12 At 4 a.m. March 10, 1915, elements of the regiment moved into the forward trenches and waited for the initial field-artillery barrage to destroy the wire obstacles. Unfortunately, the British artillery failed to achieve this effect prior to the regiment’s attack. During the operation’s first minute, smallarms fire killed both the commander and command sergeant major of Company A and fixed the rest of the com pany in the wire obstacles. Meanwhile, Company B managed to seize a foot hold in the German trenches despite suffering atrocious casualties. The bat talion commander, LTC Wilfred Bliss, ordered the rest of the battalion to ex ploit Company B’s success. Simultaneously, the Germans to the north of the battalion reconsolidated and engaged Companies C and D with enfilade fire. Within seconds of this advance, enemy fire killed both Bliss and his adjutant. Baynes explains that by the time Companies C and D reached the German trenches at 9:30 a.m., “Practically every officer had been killed or wound ed, and the NCOs who took their place had to go on memory [of the original operations order].” Worse, enemy fire had killed one out of every three en listed men by this time. Only two officers, one being the battalion executive officer, were able to continue to lead the advance. Despite these horrendous losses, Baynes remarks, “Time and time again the [chain] of command changed as officers and NCOs were killed. The extraordinary thing is that in spite of all these elements of chaos, the attack continued and retained a certain cohesion.” By 6:30 p.m., the remaining element of the Scottish Rifles regiment reconsoli dated at the brewery on the outskirts of Neuve Chapelle and was “in every way a viable military unit despite being low in strength.” After enemy fire wounded him twice, then-MAJ George Carter-Campbell13 continued to lead the attack until the evening of March 14, when the decimated battalion se cured the last portion of Neuve Cha pelle. They were relieved in place ear ly in the morning of March 15. Baynes clearly states that 2nd Scottish Rifles were able to continue the attack because of one key factor originating from the regimental system: trust forged through years of training with the same team. He explains that before Neuve Chapelle, every man spent at least seven years in 2nd Scottish Rifles. During this time, the men mastered platoon-level tasks through years of demanding training and forged an unbreakable bond of trust with each oth er. Baynes gives full credit to the regimental system, writing, “I am firmly convinced that if some magic power had been able to show everyone in the battalion what was going to happen to him, and had then given him the option of going away or staying to see the battle through, that only a handful would have left.” Every member of the regiment strove to perform at the maximum level – whether at a rugby match against a rival battalion or during com pany maneuvers in northern Scotland. Goose Green To validate the regimental system’s contemporary relevance, this article will now investigate the Battle of Goose Green during the Falklands War. The 2nd Battalion of The Parachute Regiment, known as 2 PARA, a force consisting of 690 men, attacked a pre pared defense occupied by a numeri cally superior Argentine force to seize the town of Goose Green May 27-28,

1982. Due to the distance to their objective, 2 PARA left behind their heavy mortars and other crucial equipment. They began their assault at 2:30 a.m. May 28 and seized their objectives spread widely throughout featureless terrain masked in pitch darkness. After the 36-hour battle that spanned 10 ki lometers, 2 PARA achieved “a victory that defied all odds: 1,500 prisoners were taken in the battle for Goose Green, and some 55 Argentine person nel were recorded as having been killed with less than 100 wounded” (per the Royal Air Force). Similar to 2nd Scottish Rifles, 2 PARA lost their battal ion commander, LTC Herbert H. Jones,14 in the battle’s early portion. Despite this loss, 2 PARA was able to maintain a ferocious operational tempo and de feated a numerically superior enemy in the dead of night. One cannot deny that the values of the regimental system as espoused by Baynes played a critical role in 2 PARA’s success. The 75th Ranger Regiment, arguably the most elite light-infantry unit in the world, is proof of the regimental system’s effectiveness when instituted within the U. S. Army. Many examples of the Ranger regiment’s effectiveness span from Grenada to Operation Ana conda in Afghanistan. The key to the Ranger regiment’s success lies within its focus on the “The Big Five” (small-unit tactics, mobility, marksmanship, physical training and medical training). The small-unit tactics in this case cor respond to the squad and platoon level. Once a Soldier is selected to be come part of the Ranger regiment, he is able to stay within the organization until he either decides to leave or is re moved by his chain of command. The absence of personnel turbulence al lows the Ranger regiment to build a co hesive team that serves as the Army’s premier light-infantry unit. If the regimental system works so well for 75th Ranger Regiment, why not institute a more flexible version within the conventional forces of the U. S. Army? When considering the effectiveness of the regimental system as demonstrat ed by 2nd Scottish Rifles during World War I, the reaffirmation of the system’s Figure 1. 2 PARA’s victory at Goose Green is attributed to the values of the British regimental system. (Photo by British Army photographer. United Kingdom Crown Copyright. Used by permission) Figure 2. 2 PARA Soldiers man artillery in the Falklands. (Photo by British Army photographer. United Kingdom Crown Copyright. Used by permission) relevance in the Falkland Islands and the lethality of 75th Ranger Regiment, the regimental system’s potential is un deniable and serves as a valid solution to maximizing the Army’s effectiveness during these difficult financial times. By implementing a hybridization of the regimental system within the combat arms, the Army can use unit cohesion and effectiveness to mitigate budget cuts and strength reductions from eroding combat power. Just as 2nd Scottish Rifles was able to seize Neuve Cha pelle after suffering 80-percent casual ties, a variation of the regimental system will create effective maneuver elements capable of excelling in challenging operating environments by maximizing the available limited re sources through cohesive teams built through mutual trust15 and a mastery of platoon-level tasks. This result is much more beneficial to brigade com bat teams than the end state currently offered by the 27-month training period associated with ARFORGEN. Cohesion and agility Similar to the difficult mission given to 2nd Scottish Rifles 99 years ago, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review de mands that the Army of the future “will need to be capable of conducting prompt and sustained land combat as part of large-scale, multi-phase joint and multilateral operations, including post-conflict stability operations that transform battlefield victories into en during security and prosperity.” As the Army continues to reduce its size and budget, its mission will contin ue to gain complexity and become more demanding. If the Army hopes to mitigate the tactical and strategic risks associated with executing the same mission with the smallest force since 1940, the institution must develop cost-effective approaches to maximize the effectiveness of training and devel oping cohesive teams or risk deploying unprepared units. The hybrid regimental system allows the Army to do exact ly that. If something isn’t done, we risk repeating Napoleon’s mistakes during the Peninsular War, in which he re duced the size of the French Army in Spain but did not reduce the scope of the mission.16 In the Army’s current force structure, combat-arms Soldiers often find themselves rotating between armored, Stryker and infantry BCTs. This transi tion creates the perpetual need of having to learn the necessary technical skills and unique tactics associated with a type of brigade. Naturally, this situation can degrade the perishable knowledge gained while working with different equipment from a previous organization. New-equipment training programs fail to yield the desired results if Soldiers spend three years in an armored BCT (ABCT) and ultimately move to a Stryker BCT, where they will have to undergo yet another period of instruction on their combat platform and still have the potential of moving to alight organization later in their ca reers. In other words, the hybrid regimental system will stop Soldiers from being merely familiar with their equipment and afford them the time needed to master the technology available within a brigade. More importantly, they will become experts on how to use this technology before deployments. Apiece of equipment is only as effective as its operator; and if its user only has 27 months and few resources to learn how to use it during operations, the equipment will yield mediocre results. By remaining in the same organization for an extended time, both Soldiers and their leaders will master unit stan dard-operating procedures and battle drills. ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, states, “Effective training and leader development form the cornerstone of operational success. Through training, units, leaders and Soldiers achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and adaptability.”17 Echoing this point, Baynes believes that the amount of time 2nd Scottish Rifles spent training together was critical to their success. Each man served in the battalion’s regimental system for at least seven years before Neuve Cha pelle. These men trained on individual and collective tasks until they mas tered how to work as a team. In other words, the regimental system devel oped them into a cohesive unit that re fused to let a team member fail. ADRP 7-0 goes farther to explain that when a unit repeatedly performs a task under varying conditions, it becomes able to “confidently adapt to anew mission or environment.” When con sidering the trust gained from working as a cohesive unit and the confidence inspired by learning how to successful ly complete a task under adverse conditions, we can conclude that the lon ger a cohesive unit trains together un der a variety of conditions, the more efficient it becomes at executing mis sion orders. As Carl von Clausewitz said, “Constant practice leads to brisk, precise and reliable leadership, reducing natural friction and easing the working of the machine.”18 Thus, the hybrid regimental system will consistently stabilize combat-arms personnel within a BCT long enough for them to forge effective platoons, which will in turn allow the Army to meet the di verse requirements dictated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Yet another compelling reason to implement a hybrid regimental system is the recent regional-alignment-of-forces initiative. It is essential that Soldiers become familiar with the culture and language of their respective operating environments if they are to be success ful while conducting unified land operations (ULO) when deployed. GEN Daniel B. Allyn, former commanding general of U. S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), states in his training guidance that “[ULO] challenge us to pro vide a realistic training environment that replicates the complex and uncer tain conditions of future battlefields.”19 By tailoring each division training area to replicate its assigned region with respect to architecture and human con text,20 Soldiers will become familiar with navigating a particular culture and build fundamental language skills. This follows the axiom of “training as you fight,” an ingrained theme within the Army’s culture. Furthermore, ADRP 7-0 states that realistic training allows a unit’s leadership to “assess challenges and employ critical thinking to develop sound, create solutions rapidly.” The longer units train in an environment consistent with that of their assigned region, the more effective they will be when they deploy. Once units master platoon-level tasks and learn to apply them to a particular operating environment, they can provide the Army with cadres of individuals who can train host-nation forces to a higher level of effective ness.21 The cadres’ training will enable them to understand the cultural nu ances of a particular host nation and build better relationships with their multinational partners. While conduct ing defensive support of civil authori ties on American soil, these cadres can also impart their expertise to local law enforcement. Further, they will in crease the effectiveness of their partnership by being able to share stan dard-operating procedures honed to perfection through years of training.22 The hybrid regimental system combats the problem of Soldiers serving in mul tiple divisions and developing only a cursory understanding of their as signed region before moving to a dif ferent organization and having to learn anew culture and language. This is a serious risk of the combination of the ARFORGEN process and the Regional Alignment of Forces Initiative. Under standing a language and culture is a perishable skill. Soldiers are often quick to learn phrases in a local dialect while conducting operations, yet this knowledge rapidly dissipates upon re deployment. By immersing a unit in the same culture in both training and de ployment, the Army will benefit from an enhanced level of cultural under standing when units work with their host-nation partners. Regarding finances, this system will re duce personnel costs and enable the Army to divert the savings into unit training funds. In the FY 2014 Department of Defense budget, the Army re quested $1.8 billion to pay for Soldier relocations. This amount accounted for roughly 5 percent of all personnel costs within the Army’s budget request. The hybrid regimental system will reduce the frequency in which Soldiers move during the course of their careers and thus reduce this financial requirement. The Army can redirect the money saved by reducing the number of Soldier moves into unit training budgets. For example, a combined-arms battal ion gunnery costs $2.5 million. Divert ing even a portion of the $1.8 billion to training would provide greatly in creased training options.23 Focusing training resources on platoon-level training also requires fewer resources to train than higher echelons and thus mitigates the effects of bud get constraints. Units can maximize training time and resources by deploy ing small units (i.e., companies and be low) to a training area while brigades and battalions use mission-command training programs (MCTPs) to stream line staff processes.24 By providing the available training resources to small units, brigades and battalions can avoid the massive logistics and financial requirements needed to deploy entire battalion and brigade headquar ters and to make the resource investment necessary for platoons to master their mission-essential tasks. Finally, the hybrid regimental system not only benefits BCTs, it also provides Army families with a level of unherald ed stability. Remaining in one location for large portions of an Army career will add a degree of normalcy to Army family life and enhance Soldier resil iency. Spouses will be no longer have to combat the persistent bias of employers who are hesitant to hire some one who will only work for them for a short time. Children will be able to at tend the same schools for most of their primary education and not spend their formative years in a state of perpetual migration. All these benefits are just a sample of how stability will benefit Soldiers’ families and help them build upon this vital source of resiliency in their lives. Why system will work This is not the first argument for the implementation of a form of the regimental system within the Army. Chapter 3 of AR 600-82, The U. S. Army Regimental System, stated that every Soldier must affiliate with a regiment in an attempt to harvest the best con cepts of the British regimental system.25 This affiliation served as a dis criminator for a Soldier’s future assign ments. However, it ranked ninth out of 10 assignment criteria. The first was the needs of the Army, while a Soldier’s preference ranked tenth. This initiative quickly lost momentum for two rea sons: the Army reduced its size in the late 1990s and the Human Resources Command rarely reached the ninth cri terion before assigning a Soldier. Further contributing to the demise of changes dictated in AR 600-82 was the simple fact that regiments stationed at unattractive duty stations did not meet the required number of regimental af filiations, thus creating more assign ment challenges for branch managers.26 It is important to elaborate on how the hybrid regimental system will not du plicate the failures of AR 600-82. First, it will only apply only to combat-arms Soldiers and not to the entire Army, thus making it more feasibly imple mented. Next, the proposed changes would not take effect until the Army decides that it has reached the ideal size for its future mission, thus avoid ing a large personnel fluctuation following this program’s inception. For a counterargument, some would cite David French’s 2008 book, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British People c.1870-2000, where French identifies several weaknesses of the regimental system. He believes that the regimental system produces leaders who are not “sufficiently intelligent and educat ed [to the extent] that they [can] solve the many unexpected problems that [confront] them on the battlefield.” French argues that when a leader spends his or her entire career within one organization, he or she falls prey to the groupthink of his or her unit. This deficiency creates a bias when se lecting solutions to problems by privi leging approaches favored by the regi ment over new ideas. Oftentimes, those favoring new solutions are con sidered mavericks, while those who uphold the status quo receive acco lades for their loyalty.27 Unlike the British model, the hybrid regimental system would employ broadening assignments and schools to afford leaders a chance to mentally reset in a different environment. The Army’s professional-education system takes place in centralized locations and exposes students to both a multitude of problem-solving techniques and cur rent Army doctrine. This environment provides students with the knowledge necessary to consider different ap proaches to resolving challenges when they return to their units and will pre vent the mental rigidity of unit-approved solutions.

Further preventing groupthink, the hy brid regimental system will relocate of ficers and NCOs at least once during their careers. They will arrive at their next unit with the knowledge gained from their previous assignment and be able to provide different approaches. This rotation will constantly influence the current unit standard-operating procedures and challenge the forma tion of group thought within a given organization. Others would also argue against the regimental system because it lends it self to leaders forming cliques that in hibit fair and unbiased evaluations of their subordinates. A leader’s personal relationship with both subordinates and peers created through years of working with them could create biased evaluations and sow discord through out the ranks. The perception of the “chosen few” possessing a predestined mandate to lead would deteriorate the performance of those members who feel that they are outside of the elite social circles. Naturally, individuals would fail to see the benefit of push ing themselves or their subordinates to perform at a high level if they believe that a peer will receive a better evaluation given that person’s personal relationship with their rater and senior rater. The hybrid regimental system can rectify this problem in several ways. Lead er rotation, both within and outside of a unit, will provide subordinates new raters and senior raters and will sever personal relationships endemic to the British regimental system. To further combat evaluation bias, broadening assignment and academic evaluations will play a greater role in command se lection and promotion boards. These evaluations provide the best approach to combating rater prejudice by provid ing officers and NCOs an opportunity for a neutral party to evaluate their performance. Also, AR 623-3, The Evaluation Reporting System, states that Soldiers have the right to appeal an evaluation they believe is “incorrect, inaccurate or in violation of the intent of [the] regulation.”28 Finally, the Army can use 360 evaluations of senior leaders within a unit to ensure that the hy brid regimental system avoids problems with cliques and toxic leaders. Conclusion In closing, the hybrid regimental system is the solution to maintain the Ar my’s efficiency and effectiveness while providing for the common defense with a drastically reduced force. Grant ed, implementing such a system will be an extensive administrative task. The ripple effects of such an implementa tion will affect regulations, doctrine and policies. That being said, we as leaders have the responsibility to ask ourselves the following question: Would we rather face difficulty in the administrative realm, or prefer to face the challenges in combat when we send our nation’s sons and daughters to fight without setting the conditions for mission accomplishment? Recent arguments claim that our tech nological advantage will offset the re duction in force. This platitude abates our angst until we face one crucial fact — technology is only as effective as the Soldier who operates the equipment. The Army can provide Soldiers with the most advanced equipment possible; however, that equipment is worthless unless Soldiers have the training to maximize its use while their leaders understand how to implement it into an operation. Putting Soldiers in stable and cohesive units will give them the time and resources to conduct the training they need. Restating GEN Dempsey’s statement, we must embrace change or face be coming irrelevant in the world. While Army leaders cannot control what hap pens in the world, they can influence the quality of force they deploy to the modern operating environment. Technology will not ultimately decide fu ture conflicts. Well-trained Soldiers and competent leaders in a hybrid regimental system will. MAJ Cory Wallace is a student at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Previous assign ments included doctrine reviewer, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth; commander, Troop D, 3-7 Cavalry, 2nd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Di vision, Fort Stewart, GA; commander, Company C, 1-30 Infantry, 2nd ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart; executive officer, Troop D, 2-8 Cavalry, 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; and platoon leader, Troop D, 2-8 Cav, Fort Hood. His military schooling includes Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC), Army Basic Officer Course and Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in arts, philosophy and litera ture from the U. S. Military Academy and a master’s of arts degree in litera ture from the University of Washing ton. Notes 1 Jim Garamone, “Dempsey: Leaders Can Make a Difference in a Challenging World,” Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. aspx?id=121493. 2 ADRP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols (Sept. 24, 2013), defines a hybrid threat as “the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.” ADRP 1-02 is available from the Army Publishing Direc torate (APD), http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp1_02. pdf. 3 The Army had 269,023 Soldiers in 1940. The next smallest troop size was 479,426 Soldiers in 1999. With the proposed troop level of 420,000 Soldiers, the Army will become the smallest fighting force since

1940. For more information, refer to “Active-Duty Military Personnel, 1940-2011,” Information Please Database, http:// www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004598.html. 4 AR 525-29, March 14, 2011, http://www. apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r525_29.pdf. 5 British Army Website, April 21, 2014, http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/ structure.aspx. 6 MAJ Dan Naab, a military-police officer, explained in an interview March 10, 2014, that the Army requires combat-support military-occupational specialties to serve in organizations other than BCTs. If the Army were to include combat-support Soldiers in the proposed hybrid regimen tal system, non-BCT organizations would suffer critical manning and equipment shortages. Differently stated, Naab be lieves that implementing such a system for combat-support Soldiers would fail to yield an adequate benefit in exchange for the massive requirement of necessary changes to regulations and doctrine. 7 Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-0 de fines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the command er’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land op erations.” ADP 6-0 is available from APD, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_ pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp6_0_new.pdf. 8 ADRP 3-0, http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf. 9 Field Manual 3-90-2, March 22, 2013, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_ pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_90_2.pdf. 10 ADRP 3-0, http://armypubs.army.mil/ doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf. 11 John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage, Garden City Park, New York: Avery Group Publishing, 1987. 12 The brigade headquarters tasked 2nd Scottish rifles with seizing a brewery in the outskirts of town to establish a foot hold that would enable the battalion to defeat the German strongpoints located throughout the village. Standing between them and the brewery was 200 meters of wire obstacles, followed by a network of German trenches supported by a vast as sortment of registered artillery and crew-served weapons. Companies A and B were to advance abreast of each other. Once they secured the first line of German trenches, Companies C and D would conduct forward-passage-of-lines and continue the attack (Baynes). 13 Carter-Campbell, who rose in rank to major general, earned the Order of the Bath (CB) and Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for his actions at Neuve Chapelle. 14 Jones earned the Victoria Cross (VC) Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his valor at Goose Green. 15 ADRP 6-0 explains that when exercising mission command, commanders must ad here to six principles. One of these princi ples is building cohesive teams through mutual trust. Further, ADRP 6-0 states, “Trust comes from successful shared ex periences and training, usually gained incidental to operations but deliberately developed by the commander.” ADRP 6-0 is available from APD, http://armypubs. army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/ adrp6_0_new.pdf. 16 In his essay “The Accursed Spanish War: The Peninsular War, 1807-1814,” Richard Hart Sinnreich explains that the withdrawal of 20,000 veteran troops to fight in Russia, coupled with losses from battle and disease, decreased the French force in Spain from 300,000 to 200,000 in 1812. This massive troop reduction left the French unable to secure their lines of communications, thus leaving them vul nerable to attack from irregular forces. Duke Wellington was able to push the French out of Spain following the collapse of their logistic system. Sinnreich’s essay is included in Peter R. Mansoor’sand Wil liamson Murray’s Hybrid Warfare: Fight ing Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 17 ADRP 7-0, Aug. 23, 2012, http://army pubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/ pdf/adrp7_0.pdf. 18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, New York City: Oxford University Press, 2007. 19 GEN Daniel B. Allyn, FORSCOM Leader-Development Guidance, electronic file, Washington, DC, 2014. 20 In a draft concept paper regarding the “human context of Army operations” (2014), retired COL Clinton J. Ancker III, director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS, de fines the human context as “[t]he totality of the physical, cultural, psychological and social aspects that influence human behavior during the conduct of operations in peace, conflict and war.” Ancker further explains, “The ends of every operation possess a human objective to influence not just the attitudes, but the behavior of people who live in a cultural context, of ten very different from our own.” One should note that the human context is not synonymous with the human domain. This latter entity concerns enemy forces, local populations or host-nation govern ment forces. 21 MAJ Joseph Byerly, a former CLC in structor, suggested that this article include the benefit of trained cadres in sup port of the regional alignment of forces during a telephone conversation March 9, 2014. 22 In his essay “Small Wars and Great Games: The British Empire and Hybrid Warfare, 1700-1970,” John Ferris explains how British cadres trained and organized local forces throughout the British empire in the 18th and 19th centuries to augment their deployed forces. In one example during 1817-1819, “120,000 Anglo-Indian soldiers crushed the Mahrattas and their irregular cavalry by using hybrid forces to master all of India outside the Punjab.” What is remarkable is the fact that prior to 1817, only 56,000 British Soldiers occu pied India. Their trained cadres were able to organize a combined force that more than doubled the initial troop levels in India. (Ferris’ essay is included in Mansoor’sand Murray’s Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present.) 23 According to Mark Weaver, an ABCT ex ecutive officer, in discussion with the author April 19, 2014. 24 CPT Sean McEntee said in discussion with the author April 16, 2014, that the cost of MCTP cadre certifying an entire brigade headquarters in a standalone exercise is $700,000. Most divisions certify multiple brigades at the same time, thus drastically reducing the total cost. 25 AR 600-82, Washington Headquarters Services, March 15, 2014. 26 COL Scott Efflandt, executive officer to U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s commanding general, provided the background of the regimental initiative in an email conversation dated April 13, 2014. 27 David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People c. 1870-2000, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 28 AR 623-3, March 31, 2014, http://www. apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r623_3.pdf. ABCT – armored brigade combat team ADP – Army doctrinal publication ADRP – Army doctrinal reference publication APD – Army Publishing Directorate AR – Army regulation ARFORGEN – Army Forces Generation BCT – brigade combat team CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course FORSCOM – (U. S. Army) Forces Command MCTP – mission-command training program NCO – noncommissioned officer ULO – unified land operations Acronym Quick-Scan