Exercise Big Lift: An Example in Strategic Deployment

The United States is moving into a “new” post-war era as it winds down combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to one estimate, 90 percent of U. S. forces will reside in the contiguous United States by 2013.1 This shift in force projection will have major political and strategic ramifications for U. S. national-security policy. Any hint of retrenchment by the United States may give our allies cause for alarm and may embolden potential adversaries, who may doubt our resolve and perhaps interpret our actions as a neo-isolationistic shift in U. S. support to our allies and our commitments. As the change in posture of U. S. forces takes shape, relying on strategic airlift and sealift capability will be key to meeting national interests. The need to respond when and where needed, as history shows, can develop in the most unlikely places, against adversaries nobody expects. Iraq’s sudden and unprovoked invasion of neighboring Kuwait Aug. 2, 1990, caught the world off-guard and presented the United States with an unexpected war. Five days later, U. S. Military Airlift Command launched the first airlift mission of Operation Desert Shield.2 From Aug. 7, 1990, through the last airlift mission flown March 10, 1991, MAC aircrafts and commercial charters flew nearly 500,000 troops and more than 538,000 tons of cargo in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.3 The United States’ swiftly putting boots on the ground in-theater sent a powerful message to Iraq – one ultimately backed up with the forceful eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait just six months later by the coalition the United States had assembled. Pre-war logistical planning called for sealift to move supplies and equipment too heavy or large to go by air. However, the lack of in-theater storage, a relatively small amount of pre-positioned material, the long distances involved and the urgency of critical supplies resulted in a high demand on airlift, with 95 percent of cargo going by air vs. the planning figure of 85 percent.4 Success also hinged on the synergy designed to meld airlift and sealift so troops and equipment could marry up in theater efficiently. Ultimately, U. S. Transportation Command would move more troops and supplies during the first three weeks of Desert Shield than moved during the first three months of the Korean War. By the sixth week, MAC had surpassed the tonnage flown during the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49,5 in which more than 2.3 million tons of supplies reached the blockaded German city.6 Exercise Big Lift Tensions between former wartime allies had existed since before the guns went silent across Europe in 1945. In August 1961, East Germany, with backing from the Soviet Union, constructed the Berlin Wall to stop the chronic “brain drain” of skilled labor from East Germany to Western Europe and beyond. The crisis in Berlin in August 1961 was just the latest in a string of incidents that occurred within that still-occupied city at its nadir. Coincidentally, in October and later in November 1963, relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies over the right of access to West Berlin and East Germany’s status as a sovereign state repeatedly came to the forefront during this period. A series of convoy harassment and delaying incidents in October and November 1963 along the autobahn between West Germany and West Berlin only furthered the belief that the Soviet Union was out to harass the allies regarding their access to their respective sectors in West Berlin.7 The Cold War era only heightened tensions amidst dramatic change for the United States. In October 1963, desirous to prove it possessed a global-deployment capability, the United States set out to accomplish what hadn’t been done before: airlift a division-sized combat formation overseas, marry it to pre-staged equipment and have it combat ready in a matter of days. Planners gave the exercise the name “Big Lift,” a name that simply stated what the exercise set out to accomplish. U. S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, speaking at a news conference to announce the upcoming exercise just a few weeks prior to its execution, said Big Lift would “provide a dramatic illustration of the United States’ capability for rapid reinforcement of [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces.”8 The defense of Western Europe represented a sizeable commitment by the United States, with more than 360,000 troops stationed in Europe, mostly in West Germany.9 Chosen for this complex exercise was 2nd Armored Division (Hell on Wheels) under the command of MG Edwin H. Burba.10 Big Lift included the “wheelmen” of 2nd Armored Division, along Exercise Big Lift: an Example in Strategic Deployment by Commander David L. Teska with 2/31st and 2/36th Artillery from Fort Sill, OK, and 6th Transportation Truck Battalion from Fort Eustis, VA.11 Big Lift was truly a joint operation. The Air Force, in addition to handling the airlift, deployed its Composite Strike Air Force comprised of 1,500 airmen and aircraft from several bases across the United States to West Germany for the exercise.12 My father, retired LTC Thomas Teska, served with the U. S. Army in West Germany from 1960-63. At the time, he said that conventional wisdom held that war with the Soviet Union was not a matter of “if” but “when.” No one could conceive, he said, that two sides so diametrically opposed to each other and each maintaining large conventional forces in Western Europe could coexist peacefully. In mid-1963, he and my mother moved to Fort Hood, TX, just in time for then-1LT Teska to immerse in the planning for Big Lift. Having just come from a tour of duty in West Germany, the Army had him conduct U. S. Army Europe driver testing for 2nd Armored Division Soldiers so they could safely navigate West German roads. This included posting European road signs on Fort Hood roads so drivers would get familiar with them in advance of their deployment. Initial deployment To meet the deadline of having all troops in place within 72 hours, the Military Air Transport Service13 used the new jetpow-ered C-135 Stratolifter (a modified Boeing 707 more familiar today in its tanker variant, the KC-135 Stratotanker), the stalwart propeller-driven C-124 Globemaster II and the C-130 Hercules. Troops went by one of two routes – a northern route using C-135s that went from Texas to eastern Canada, across the Atlantic and then on to Germany, or the southern transport route using C-124s and C-130s, which went to West Germany by way of Bermuda and the Azores. Troops who went by C-135 clearly had the more relaxing trip – flight time on the faster C-135s was a relaxing 10½ hours, compared to the fatiguing 20 to 32 hours it took if moving by C-124 and C-130 due to slower speeds and the need for more frequent fuel stops.14 By the time the final C-130 landed at Sembach Air Base with its planeload of 60 troops, MATS had achieved an impressive feat: in just over 62 hours (nearly nine hours ahead of schedule), its 206 planes had airlifted 15,278 soldiers and 459.6 tons of equipment on 236 missions. Crews flew more than 13,000 hours without a mishap. In less than six days, 2nd Armored Division deployed from Texas, married up with pre-staged equipment and was combat ready. Incredibly, only one mechanical issue occurred. A C-124 out of Lajes Air Station had to return to the Azores due to an oil leak. Troops transferred to aback-up plan and continued the trip. The aircraft MATS used during Big Lift represented only 40 percent of its total airlift capability at the time.15 Maneuver operations Getting 2nd Armored Division troops to West Germany was only part of the operation – the major objective of the deployment, after all, was to reinforce NATO forces and defend Western Europe. During the field-training exercise phase of Big Lift, the 2nd Armored, temporarily assigned to U. S. 7th Army and the attached V Corps, VII Corps and the German III Corps, comprised the defending “blue force.” Against the blue force was 3rd Infantry Division in the role of the “orange” aggressor force undertaking an “invasion” of West Germany from the east.16 Once combat ready at the assembly area near Darmstadt, West Germany, 2nd Armored conducted a series of maneuver operations as part of Big Lift’s FTX component:

• Reaction to a threatening situation and border violation; OpEraTIOn BIg LIfT Texas to germany 1963 Troops Missions Hours Miles nOrTHErn rOuTES 9,500 141 non-stop 10.5 5,600 w/ fuel stops 20-30 SOuTHErn rOuTES 5,800 95 w/ fuel stops 20-30 6,000 OpEraTIOn TOTaLS 15,300 236 63 hours 5 minutes Map Key ft. Hood & surrounding air force bases fuel stops ramstein, germany rhein-Main, germany figure 1. Operation Big Lift mission statistics and route map. 47

• Offensive operation, including assault river crossing;

• Mobile defense, including local counterattack;

• Rear-area security;

• Heliborne operation; and

• Chemical and nuclear warfare.17 Most of the equipment the 2nd Armored Division needed to fight the notional war, primarily M48 Patton tanks and M59 armored personnel carriers, was in place upon arrival, stockpiled after the Berlin crisis two years before. This idea of stockpiling heavy equipment would eventually develop into the system of permanently “prepositioning of material configuring in unit sets,” or

POMCUS.

At the conclusion of Big Lift’s maneuver phase, 2nd Armored returned its equipment to the pre-stage sites, then troops airlifted back to Texas. By Dec. 5, the division’s last element had returned from Germany. MATS would repeat its ability to deploy a division-sized troop contingent overseas by airlifting 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to Okinawa, Japan, for Exercise Quick Release in January 1964.18 At the time, Big Lift was big news as the largest troop movement by air ever attempted. The Army even made a short film – “The Point of the Spear” – for its documentary series “The Big Picture.”19 TIME magazine in its Nov. 1, 1963, issue highlighting Germany and the defense of Europe, and featuring West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard on its cover, gushed that Big Lift was “the biggest, fastest troop lift ever attempted” and was one “whale of a show.” Criticizing Big Lift Big Lift did have it critics. GEN Paul L. Freeman Jr., USAREUR commander at the time, bluntly referred to it as the “big hoax,”20 and GEN Howell M. Estes Jr., commander of MAC 1964-1969, wrote in the Air University Review’s September-October 1969 issue that true combat airlift did not (in 1969) yet exist. GEN Estes went on to state that the role of modern combat airlift is to “airlift combat forces and all their battle equipment in the size and mix required – with the greatest speed – to any point in the world, no matter how remote or primitive, where a threat arises or is likely to erupt.” At the time, the C-141 Starlifter was just entering service with the Air Force and the C-5 Galaxy was on the horizon, and both aircraft had the capability to provide the global combat airlift the United States needed. Big Lift, despite having moved a large number of troops from one continent to another totally by air, failed in his eyes to validate that combat/strategic airlift had matured because it was primarily an exercise in moving troops, and not the troops and their equipment, and had at its disposal well-prepared airbases in West Germany.21 Many Western European leaders were concerned at the time at what Big Lift presaged for the defense of Western Europe, and the U. S. commitment to it and the NATO alliance. Namely, the United States might learn from Big Lift that it could defend Western Europe from bases in the United States without the costly expense of maintaining a large troop presence in Europe. Put another way, might the United States start reducing the size of its contingent of forces in Western Europe, thus leaving its NATO allies vulnerable to Soviet aggression and intimidation? Conversely, it was also thought that the Soviets would view such a retrenchment as a sign of a wavering of U. S. resolve to the defense of Western Europe. Former U. S. President and NATO leader Dwight D. Eisenhower himself had said as much in an article in the Saturday Evening Post. “I believe the time has now come when we should start removing some of those troops,” Eisenhower wrote. “One American division in Europe can ‘show the flag’ as definitively as several.”22 History, of course, tells us that did not happen. The United States maintained a robust and active military presence in Europe well into the mid-1990s. Starting in 1969, the U. S. military regularly began exercising the strategic airlift of forces to West Germany known as Exercise Redeployment of Forces to Germany, or REFORGER. This exercise was conducted until 1993, four years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and two years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. REFORGER’s combining CONUS-based units with pre-staged equipment maintained at POMCUS sites in West Germany harkened back to the concept exercised during Big Lift. Since the Vietnam conflict, the United States has relied exclusively on strategic airlift to deploy troops around the world. The bulk of our equipment and supplies, if not already in place, goes by sea aboard cargo ships operated or contracted by the Navy’s Military Sealift Command or via one of MSC’s 30 pre-positioned ships.23 Big Lift not only established that the United States could deploy forces from CONUS to Western Europe on short notice, but it marked a dramatic shift in national-security thinking. The United States clearly sent a message to its allies and potential adversaries alike that the time might someday come when America, for reasons of domestic and economic necessity, might not maintain a large overseas presence to support commitments to its allies around the world. Today, our political and military leaders, in an era of ever-shrinking budgets, know well that issue will resurface again soon as the United States – the Cold War long over and its two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan all but concluded – will turn to strategic mobility as the key to remaining viable and engaged on the world scene. (Editor’s note: For this article, the author not only relied on the expertise and experience of retired LTC Thomas E. Teska, who – as noted – took part in Big Lift in Germany in the early 1960s, but on LTC Greg Penfield, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS; and LTC Tom Magee, U. S. Army Reserve.) Commander David Teska’s current assignment is senior Reserve officer, Coast Guard Sector, San Diego, CA. He previously served as emergency-preparedness liaison officer, 8th Coast Guard District; action officer/command duty officer, U. S. Transportation Command; assistant planning officer, 8th Coast Guard District; and Marine casualty investigator/command duty officer, Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, St. Louis. He deployed with the U. S. Coast Guard to Bahrain for Operation Desert Storm with Maritime Interception Operations in April-July 1992. His military schooling includes the U. S. Naval War College, where he obtained a certificate of Naval Command and Staff in November 2006; graduate of the Naval War College’s Naval Command and Staff program through the College of Distance Education, November 1996; U. S. Army Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Fort Sill, OK, July 1987; and commissioning as a second lieutenant in the U. S. Army Reserve at Texas Tech University, May 1984. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Texas Tech University and a master’s of science degree in journalism from the University of Kansas. notes 1 Donohue, Patrick J., BG, and Womble, Frank, retired LTC, “Getting There is Half the Battle,” Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 149, No. 3, October 2011. 2 Matthews, James K., and Holt, Cora J., So Many, So Much, So Few, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic De- 48 ployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U. S. Transportation Command, 1996. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Tine, Gregory C., MAJ, “Berlin Airlift: Logistics, Humanitarian Aid and Strategic Success,” Army Logistician, Vol. 37, No. 5, September-October 2005. 7 Ausland, John C., Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis 1961-1964, Oslo, Norway: Scandinavian University Press, 1994. 8 Goldman, David I., “Operation BIG LIFT,” http://www.army.mil/article/28749/ Operation_BIG_LIFT/, accessed Nov. 11, 2011. 9 Kane, Tim, Global U. S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003, accessed Nov. 11, 2011. 10 In 1962, the Fort Hood-based III Corps was assigned to the Strategic Army Corps. The 2nd Armored Division, along with the 1st Armored Division and 4th Infantry Division, also became part of STRAC. 11 BIG LIFT, 2nd Armored Division Information Office pamphlet, Fort Hood, TX, 1964. 12 Parkinson, Ralph, MAJ, EXERCISE BIG LIFT, U. S. Army Europe Medical Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 3, March 1964. 13 MATS became MAC in 1966. A major reorganization of the U. S. Air Force in 1992 resulted in the inactivation of MAC and the Strategic Air Command. From these two organizations came the melding of the Air Force’s worldwide airlift capability to that of its tanker force in into the Air Mobility Command. 14 “The Big Lift,” TIME, Nov. 1, 1963. 15 BIG LIFT, 2nd Armored Division Information Office pamphlet. 16 Ibid. 17 Parkinson. 18 Ulannoff, Stanley M., MATS: The Story of the Military Air Transportation Service, C141 Heaven, http://c141heaven.info/dotcom/matsbook/mats_ chapter_04.html, accessed Dec. 1, 2011. 19 “The Point of the Spear” is available for viewing on YouTube at http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=3QX9lH_XrW4. 20 Quoted in Goldman. 21 Estes, Howell M. Jr., GEN, “Modern Combat Airlift,” Air University Review, September-October 1969, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aure-view/1969/sep-oct/estes.html, accessed Nov. 16, 2011. 22 Quoted in “West Germany: The Heart of Europe,” TIME, Nov. 1, 1963. 23 Military Sealift Command Prepositioning, Washington, DC: U. S. Navy Military Sealift Command, http://www.msc.navy.mil/pm3/, accessed Nov. 28, 2011. acronym Quick-Scan COnuS – continental or contiguous United States fTX – field training exercise MaC – Military Airlift Command MaTS – Military Air Transport Service MSC – Military Sealift Command naTO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization rEfOrgEr - redeployment of forces to Germany pOMCuS – prepositioning of material configuring in unit sets STraC – Strategic Army Corps uSarEur – U. S. Army Europe 49 Fighting an Uphill Battle continued from page 25 notes 1 Dempsey, Martin, GEN, “Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again,” ARMY, March 2011, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2011/3/Documents/Dempsey_0311.pdf, accessed Aug. 18, 2011. 2 Subrahmanyam, K., Hazari, K. K., Verghese, B. G., and Chandra, Satish, The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning, Feb. 25, 2000, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/india/kargilrca.html, accessed May 6, 2010. 3 Ahuja, Pratul, and Ganguly, Rajat, “The Fire Within: Naxalite Insurgency Violence in India,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2007. 4 Goswami, Namrata, “India’s Counter-Insurgency Experience: The ‘Trust and Nurture’ Strategy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2009. 5 Since 1983, more than 60,000 Sri Lankans have been killed and another 300,000 have migrated, many to India. 6 Mishra, Prankaj, Temptations of the West: How to be Modern in India, Pakistan, Tibet and Beyond, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006. 7 See Mishra or Goswami. 8 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. 9 Ibid. 10 The Kargil Committe Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. Indian strategists called the Pakistani approach “salami slicing,” where Pakistan would seize a small parcel of land, knowing Indian would not risk nuclear war to contend it. The LOC was established in 1972 as part of the Simla Agreement to provide a buffer between India and Pakistan. 11 Clinton, William Jefferson, My Life: The Presidential Years Vol. II, New York: Vintage Press, 2005. Clinton said that sometime in June 1999, Prime Minister Sharif called him to persuade him to intervene, but Clinton initially refused because India did not want outside intervention. 12 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning, and Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, New York: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2003. 13 Kanwal, Gurmeet, Heroes of Kargil, New Delhi, India: Army Headquarters, 2002, and The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. 14 Musharraf, Pervez, GEN, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, New York: Free Press, 2006. He also claimed that the Pakistani NLI was not to cross the LOC and he did not know the extent of the attack until May 7. 15 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. 16 Acosta, Marcus P., High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the Future, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. 17 Ibid. 8 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. However, Musharraf claimed that in the Kashmir, exchange of fire and artillery were almost everyday occurrences. 19 Ibid. 20 Kanwal. 21 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. 22 Acosta. 23 Schofield. 24 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. The high percentage of artillery deaths wasn’t necessarily unusual since most casualties in World War II were from indirect fire. 25 Acosta. 26 Kanwal. 27 Acosta. 28 Mishra. 29 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. 30 Acosta. 31 Most frontal attacks only require three friendly Soldiers to every one of the enemy in a prepared defense. Because of the region’s steep cliffs, the attackers required many more. 32 Kanwal. Although movement was “slow and painful,” the Indians learned how to fight the NLI. After eight days, there were 150 casualties. Also see Acosta. 33 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning and Acosta; however, Musharraf claims Indian casualties were twice as high. 34 Schofield. 35 Sagan, Scott D., editor, Inside Nuclear South Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 36 Schofield. 37 Guha, Ramachandra, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, New York: HarperCollins, 2007. Also see Musharraf. 38 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. 39 Schofield. 40 Guha. 41 Schofield. 42 Palit, D. K., MG, War in Hight Himalaya: Indian Army in Crisis, 1962, New York: C. Hurst & Co., 1991. 43 The Kargil Committee Report: From Surprise to Reckoning. 44 Gates, Robert, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense, Fort Leavenworth, KS,” May 7, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech. aspx?speechid=1465, accessed May 8, 2010. He cited the British colonial army before World War I as a prime analogy.