COIN Kinetic Targeting at Battalion Level

Counterinsurgency environments are very complex and demanding for the Soldiers operating in them. As battalion task forces employ across their respective areas of operation, they each face unique struggles with equally unique ways to deal with them. However, there are some commonalities. This article entails those commonalities, providing observations and techniques to kinetically target the enemy that I developed over two years’ experience as an intelligence officer in Iraq. “Targeting” at the battalion TF level involves incorporating lethal and nonlethal resources and methods to destroy the enemy and influence the civilian populace, with the intended endstate of defeating enemy activities and denying sanctuary. The intelligence officer (S-2) plays a key role in targeting. He analyzes past enemy activities, identifies trends, determines enemy intent and makes recommendations to best target individuals or events. “Kinetic targeting,” however, is primarily the TF S-2’s responsibility. This process involves identifying individual targets, creating targeting packets on them, capturing them and detaining them. To perform this process, you must understand who the enemy is, what motivates him, how his cell network is constructed, how to create a targeting packet, how to plan and coordinate the raid, and what the detention process is. Enemy and motivation Two categories define the enemy: leaders and active kinetic fighters. Active kinetic fighters represent most captured targets. Unemployed, uninformed, anti-American, recently released detainees and Islamic fundamentalists make up this group of men. This group’s major motivation for attacking coalition forces is their feeling that the current power or government is failing to provide them their essential needs: power, water, sewage and sanitation. Another motivation to join the insurgency is unemployment. The unemployment rates in Iraq and Afghanistan often exceed 50 percent (estimated). Many of these men did not seek employment because they always seemed to get by. However, as the free-market economy in their countries grows, so does their need to have money. Those who cannot afford to pay for essential needs and to support their families are potential recruits for enemy leadership to pay to conduct attacks on U. S. forces. Islamic fundamentalists make up a small group of the active kinetic fighters in COIN. They are typically foreign fighters from “radical” countries confronting Americans in the name of Muslim jihad. These Islamic fundamentalists frequently assemble in places where they feel they have sanctuary. An increase in attacks in non-active locations is the key indicator that foreign fighters are operating in the area. The number of attacks in the AO will suddenly increase and then suddenly stop. Typically, by the time you receive information that “outsiders” are conducting attacks in your area, they have often already left. Cell-network construction The insurgent cell is a group who works together to plan and conduct independent attacks and operations. Their plan is to destroy and undermine the current coalition-force-supported government. A doctrinal template of an insurgent cell can logically be constructed because any insurgent cell of this nature has certain role requirements. The cell must have a leader (commonly referred to as the “organizer”) and he is usually, but not always, the financier as well. The leader meets with up to four individuals at a predetermined location. These meeting places can be the leader’s house, business, other safe house, cafe/restaurant, mosque or by telephone. The leader may or may not meet with all these men at the same time. These men will be the only people who deal directly with the cell leader. The four men/positions who directly report to the cell leader represent intelligence collection, operations, logistics and recruiting:

• The intelligence-collection representative is responsible for identifying the best locations and times to conduct attacks. He will have a group of observers – “scouts” (very low level) who may do nothing more than observe and report when coalition or local security forces pass by.

• The operations representative is responsible for planning the attacks and training the attackers. He will meet either directly with the intelligence-collection representative or with the cell leader and intelligence person at the same time.

• The logistics representative is responsible for providing the weapons and resources for the cell to conduct an attack. He will have access to multiple weapon caches and dealers. He will deal directly with the cell’s financier to pay for these supplies.

• The recruiter will also deal directly with the financier to pay for financially motivated recruits. The recruiter will target specific types of recruits in specific locations using various methods of recruitment. Types of recruits are:

• Islamic fundamentalists, recruited at religious gatherings and facilities like mosques – although often a religious leader such as an imam will be the recruiter in this case;

• The unemployed, recruited from low-income neighborhoods as they gather on city streets looking for employment;

• Former military, recruited through a network of their former military associates;

• Outsiders (foreign fighters), who will typically have pre-established lodging to use as a base of operations, possibly the recruiters’ home; and

• Young members of the immediate family, the last source of recruiting for cell operatives but possibly the most common. In many Muslim cultures, family loyalty is their greatest security against cell mem-COIN Kinetic Targeting at Battalion Level by MAJ Jeremiah Pray Counterinsurgency professional development: 20 bers providing information to coalition and local security forces. No matter the source of recruitment, all the operatives will have to meet at a predetermined location (safe house) to receive the mission and collect the necessary supplies. The operations representative and the recruiter are the only members of the cell required to be there with the operatives. From this point, the operatives are able to conduct the attack. The operations representative may or may not participate in the attack based on the attack’s level of sophistication and the op-eratives’ experience. Cells are typically three- to six-man groups that are family-related in some way to one another. It is very important to note that one person may assume multiple roles in the cell. The leader may also be responsible for any of the intelligence, operations, logistics and recruiting duties – or all four duties. Targeting packet At battalion TF level, the S-2 creates most of the targeting packets. Occasionally a target comes from “higher,” but these make up only about 10 percent of your total targets. This is because no one understands the area better than the TF that owns it; and more importantly, no one deals with an area’s population more than that TF. The key to the targeting process is human-intelligence sources or tactical informants. Human information drives the overwhelming majority of all planned raids. The human-intelligence collection team can be an incredibly useful resource at the battalion TF level. While not typically assigned directly to a battalion TF, tactical human-intelligence teams are most useful at battalion level. At battalion TF level, the HCT can participate in targeting meetings, and the maneuver companies can help move them throughout the sector to meet with sources. Often the reports the HCT generates are the only evidence the TF has on a targeted individual. Maneuver-company commanders know that it is through HCT reports that they receive information for future raids. HUMINT sources primarily come from three places: “walk-ins,” detainees and local security forces. Walk-in sources are those individuals who come to the gate of any forward operating base claiming they know something. The typical procedure is an intelligence representative will pick them up and question them. Reward typically motivates HUMINT sources. They know that if they provide useful information to coalition forces, either money or contracts will reward them. Occasionally, these sources will provide information that leads directly to a target. Mostly, however, these sources will have information on small munitions caches or potential “bad” individuals but tend to lack specifics on names, places and even offenses. Detainees typically provide better information than “walk-in” sources, but to exploit these sources, the battalion TF must be very proactive. The targeting process does not end after pushing the detainee to the detention facility. The TF must work directly with the interrogators to help explain the captured individual’s significance, the information leading to his capture and the additional information you are trying to gain from him. The THT can assist and “sit in” on the interrogations to help direct the line of questioning. The best and most reliable sources come from the local security forces. With a good working relationship of information-sharing and providing needed resources, local security forces can provide excellent information for potential targets. Just as with any aspect of HUMINT, the right personality is the key to collecting information. 21

Although HUMINT is the primary method for collecting targeting information, it is not the only means of collection. Other collection assets such as signals intelligence offer excellent tools and resources. Raid Kinetically, the raid is one of the most effective TF-level operations. It serves the obvious purpose to capture suspected enemies but also serves the purpose to deny the enemy sanctuary through information operations. Even if the intended target isn’t captured, the IO message that “if you are a bad guy, coalition forces will come and take you from your house in the middle of the night” is spread throughout the city. Most raids we conduct are “cordons and knocks” for two reasons:

• The enemy threat level typically indicates that he will not resist; and

• The intelligence is not always exact and the targeted individual may be a few houses to the left or right. If the wrong house is raided, but no “harm” is done and the occupants are treated with dignity and respect, they will often lead you to the right house. Operationally, raids are the safest kinetic missions we do in the TF. Casualties sustained while conducting raids are typically far less than other combat missions, possibly due to U. S. dominance during limited visibility. To conduct a raid you need two things: a target and a location. Typically, the targeting process gains the target. Key to that process is determining the best way to identify the target’s location to the raiding element. The three most common ways to identify a target location provided by HUMINT (from least- to most-preferred) are:

• The source provides a hand-drawn map/map reconnaissance;

• The source obtains the grid with a Global Positioning System; and

• The source leads the raiding element on a recon or to the raid. The problem with hand-drawn maps and source-map recons is that many in the populace do not often deal with maps and cannot exactly pinpoint the target location. Conceptualizing a city from above on a map is very unfamiliar to them. The Falcon View imagery program can be used to help identify target locations and when constructing operational plans. If the source is unwilling to do the recon with the raiding element, this may be the best information you will have, but be prepared to expand your search and cordon several houses/ blocks to the left and right. The hand-held GPS is a valuable tool in the targeting process. If possible, the battalion TF should purchase several easy-to-use units for their sources to obtain grids. The only problem with this technique is the source needs to be trained in manipulating the GPS unit and understand that he needs to be as close to the target location as possible. He should also obtain a detailed description of the house to assist the raiding element in identifying the target location. By far, the best way to identify target locations is with a source-led recon. Obviously, the source’s identity needs to be protected, so he is given a disguise (coalition uniform, neck gaiter to cover his face, sunglasses and helmet). If the source is willing to lead you to the target, there is a greater chance that his information is credible. Detention process Once captured, the target transports to the FOB for the detention processing. Once the detainee(s) is brought back to the FOB, the S-2 shop will surge on the paperwork for the detention packet. Detainees are pushed as soon as possible (typically within four hours from capture) to the detention facility. This allows the capturing unit to continue with its tactical missions. Any further questioning of the detainee can be done through coordination with the detention facility in a controlled environment. After a raid (or series of raids) is conducted, it is important to gain an assessment of the effects on the insurgents and the community. Often a raid target is focused at a specific individual or enemy event (suspected June 21 rocket-propelled grenade shooter or suspected Aug. 15 improvised-explosive-device maker). If tactics, techniques and procedures for attacks stops completely, there is a good chance the perpetrator was captured, or someone close enough to the perpetrator was captured (same cell), which has the same effect of stopping that type of attack. It is important to assess the community’s reaction as well. If the raid target is innocent, the community’s innocent members will feel that coalition forces indiscriminately target people and detain them for no reason, and the community will begin to look to the insurgency for security. To circumvent this, engage the local community leader, who, after the target is detained, will often feel more comfortable talking about what or who he was involved with. Sometimes this leader will “vouch” for an individual who has been detained. If evidence on that detainee is weak, it may be more beneficial to release him to the local leader. The local leader will then be responsible for the target’s actions. COIN operations are fluid and constantly changing environments. The observations and techniques I developed worked well for me; however, they may not work in every COIN environment. The fundamentals of understanding who the enemy is and what motivates him, how his cell network is constructed, how to create a targeting packet, what is required for a raid, and how to detain a target once he is captured are what TF S-2s have to develop. What worked for me may not work well in other areas, but for TF S-2s preparing to deploy, these techniques are a good “starting point” for preparing for their mission. MAJ Jeremiah Pray is deployed to Afghanistan. He has served as a rifle-platoon leader, anti-tank platoon leader and anti-tank company executive officer, battalion intelligence officer and company commander. His military schooling includes Command and General Staff College; Infantry Officer Basic Course; Airborne, Air Assault and Ranger Schools; Military Intelligence Officers Transition Course; and Military Intelligence Captains’ Career Course. He is a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduate of San Diego State University. Acronym Quick-Scan AO – area of operations COIN – counterinsurgency FOB – forward operating base GPS – Global Positioning System HCT – human-intelligence collection team HUMINT – human intelligence IO – information operations TF – task force THT – tactical human-intelligence team 22