Counterinsurgency on the American Plains: Examining the Army’s Pacification of the Plains Indians

Counterinsurgency on the Examining the Army’s Pacification

American Plains: of the Plains Indians by Anthony J. Saccavino

The American expansion westward began with the establishment of the first colonies on the Atlantic coast and continued on through the granting of statehood to Alaska and Hawaii. The period from 1860 to 1890, however, was one of the bloodiest in American history and rife with large-scale killings perpetrated by the Plains Indians, American soldiers, and settlers on the Great Plains and western mountains. The bloodshed was largely the result of increased pressure on resources, such as grazing lands and game herds, caused by a large influx of gold seekers following reports of gold strikes in the Black Hills and Rocky Mountains. Pressure was equally applied by settlers, drawn into lands previously reserved for Indian use by the Homestead Act of

1862. This national act “…opened the prospect of cheap farm-steads throughout the national domain; whatever the agricultural deficiencies of the Great Plains, more conventional agricultural lands were taken up, and consequently the homestead policy made the so-called ‘Indian country’ beckon.”1 As pressure increased, the native plains dwellers became increasingly combative toward the emigrants and the Army was forced into along-term program of pacification. This program, which started well before the Civil War, was not managed by a specific doctrinal structure; instead, it developed over time and was influenced by both European and North American wartime experiences. It should also be noted at the onset that the conflict between the Plains Indians and settlers was rooted in the differing cultures of the two groups. While the results of campaigns and outbreaks of violence were affected by the personalities of the individuals leading them, the larger conflict was essentially societal in nature. John Gray describes the nature of the issue in anthropological terms, “The real differences that rendered the white and red cultures so utterly incompatible were far deeper — so profound as to remain hidden in the subconscious. The red man’s ideal was to exploit nature…from these, bone deep, but opposite poles stemmed a thousand incompatibilities.”2 These differences manifested themselves in the combat tactics of both groups as well, with the Indians using what would become classic hit-and-run guerrilla warfare techniques and the Americans relying on forceon-force engagements. For the purposes of this article, the term “insurgency” is used to describe the type of warfare enacted by the Plains Indians against both settlers and the U. S. Army. In a similar vein, “…the term counterinsurgency embraces all of the political, economic, social, and military actions taken by a government for the suppression of insurgent, resistance, and revolutionary movements.”3 While extensive archeological evidence has proven that the Indians inhabited the North American continent long before the European arrival, for the sake of clarity the terms “settler” and “army” will be used collectively to refer to those soldiers and settlers whose ancestry lay outside North America (such as Europe and Africa). Conversely, the term “Plains Indians” will be used to refer collectively to the inhabitants of the Great Plains, Black Hills, and other regions affected by America’s westward expansion. The Army faced many challenges in conducting campaigns against the Plains Indians, including deficits in troop strengths, training constraints, doctrinal questions, and shortfalls in equipment and supplies. Following the Civil War, Congress mandated a drawdown of the armed forces to prewar levels. For the Army, this represented a maximum allowable strength of approximately 54,000 troops. On the surface, this would appear to be sufficient until one takes into consideration the sheer number of problem sets that those same troops had to confront. As Robert Utley describes it, “…the opening of new areas of settlement and launching of the transcontinental railroad had dramatically enlarged the western needs, now too, reconstruction duties would absorb up to one third of available manpower.”4 The use of soldiers for peacekeeping duties during the reconstruction era lasted until approximately 1876. By that time, volunteer infantry and cavalry regiments, which had been created to backfill the gaps caused by redeployment of regular forces eastward, were in large part replaced by regular troops, again. In some instances, volunteer forces continued to be used on an ad hoc basis, particularly when local sentiments demanded citizens do their part. Generally speaking, the training and quality of enlisted soldiers following the Civil War was poor. After an initial indoctrination period, which lasted approximately 2 to 3 weeks, recruits were shipped off to their duty stations where on-the-job training was conducted. For example, “…recruits received only the most basic instruction during their short time at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, the cavalry’s recruit depot. Training in marksmanship, horsemanship, and skirmishing — any practical lessons that Indian fighting might involve — was virtually nonexistent. For- “The bloodshed was largely the result of increased pressure on resources, such as grazing lands and game herds, caused by a large influx of gold seekers following reports of gold strikes in the Black Hills and Rocky Mountains. Pressure was equally applied by settlers, drawn into lands previously reserved for Indian use by the Homestead Act of 1862.” 28 mal military training of recruits consisted mostly of elementary drill aimed at making a grand appearance at dress parade. After a week or two, at most, of close order drill and fatigue duty, they were sent directly to their units.”5 This resulted in both lost time and effectiveness at the unit level as these individuals had to be trained in the finer points of real soldiering versus parade ground soldiering. While some of the post-war recruits, particularly those who were recent immigrants from Europe, came from honest backgrounds, or had wartime experience in either the Civil War or European wars, there were significant disciplinary problems, such as desertion within the ranks, due to the overall quality of enlisted troops. Unlike many Civil War-era soldiers, who enlisted out of patriotism and represented the broad spectrum of both Union and Confederate societies, those who enlisted following the war, generally did so because the Army offered meals, a steady paycheck, and, in some cases, a place to hide. Donovan describes the issue as thus: “As mediocre as the soldiers’ training and fighting ability was the caliber of their character.” One general officer said, “The enlisted personnel consisted largely of the dregs from the Union and Confederate armies and of recent immigrants from Europe.” One 7th Cavalry private, at the age of 16, abandoned his six months’ pregnant wife to enlist, claimed that “some of the hardest cases that I ever came across are at present serving in this company.”6 Training deficiencies were initially mitigated at the unit level through programs of acclimatization, centered on long marches and rides, to build both stamina and teach field skills. Exercises with experienced scouts acting as aggressors were also frequently used to teach tactical skills such as small unit maneuver and skirmishing techniques. By the late 1870s and early 1880s, the Army managed to revamp its basic training program for new recruits, to include more instruction on common tasks required for service on the frontier. Emphasis on marksmanship was finally stressed as well, “When target practice finally was given an important role in training, the Army took it up enthusiastically and marksmanship became as much stressed as it had become slighted.”7 The presence of an experienced noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps within the Army also facilitated a continuity of effort for the Army’s campaigns on the Great Plains. The majority of the Army’s NCOs were Civil War veterans who had chosen to make the Army a career. They were able to impart critical training in tactics and field craft to newer soldiers who, in many cases, were serving as mentors. As Rickey describes, senior troops were sources of knowledge for all things related to soldiering: “From their conversation, the neophytes soon learned about a wide variety of subjects not included in any book of drill or regulations. …After spending a year or two in a company, most men seem to have made a satisfactory adjustment…except for those who chose to desert, the majority…served out their enlistments as regular soldiers.”8 Unlike training for the enlisted men, the quality of training for officers, and overall experience levels, was better; however, more emphasis was placed on the study and refinement of European-style tactics than on practical skills for war on the plains. The root of this emphasis on European tactics was the U. S. Military Academy at West Point where the curriculum emphasized the study of Napoleonic tactics and the philosophy of Baron Antoine-Henry de Jomini. Most of the credit for West Point’s emphasis on Jomini can be traced to the influence of Dennis Hart Mahan, who graduated from West Point in 1824 and joined its faculty in 1832. According to Weigley, “Jomini’s interpretation of Napoleon became the foundation of teaching strategy at West Point …the cadets encountered his teachings in Dennis Mahan’s explication of the art of war in the senior course, which formed the principal introduction to the subject, for Mahan’s ideas were formed upon Jomini’s.”9 In addition to scholastic emphasis on European warfare, under General Sherman’s postwar leadership, the Army also undertook a systematic program of strengthening the service’s artillery and engineering programs, as well as infantry and cavalry study programs, based on the European tradition. “He created opportunities for officers to observe foreign armies and report on their practices. Under his patronage, Lt. Col. Emory Upton traveled around the world and set forth his findings in The Armies of Asia and Europe.”10 While useful in a general sense in the professionalization of the Army’s officer corps, none of those programs was of help in developing a solution to the Plains Indian problem. The program at West Point was not entirely without merit, however. Small unit tactics and skirmishing were taught to the officers, as was marksmanship. Some of Mahan’sown writings and lectures did address the problem of warfare on the plains from a practical standpoint: “Mahan’s Out-Post and Colonel J. B. Wheeler’s, A Course of Instruction in the Elements of the Art and Science of War for the Use of the Cadets of the United States Military Academy, endorsed the use of winter operations, night marches, and dawn raids to surprise enemy encampments.”11 Those concepts, along with attacks against villages, became the backbone of the Army’s strategy for combat against the Indians. Compounding poor-quality troops and improperly educated officers was the issue of inadequate equipment and supplies. The end of the Civil War found the U. S. Army with warehouses full of uniforms and equipment, much of it cheaply made and unsuited to the wear and tear of frontier service. As a result, troops in the field frequently had the appearance of irregular forces, wearing combinations of uniforms and civilian dress or “Most of the credit for West Point’s emphasis on Jomini can be traced to the influence of Dennis Hart Mahan, who graduated from West Point in 1824 and joined its faculty in 1832. According to Weigley, ‘Jomini’s interpretation of Napoleon became the foundation of teaching strategy at West Point … the cadets encountered his teachings in Dennis Mahan’s explication of the art of war in the senior course, which formed the principal introduction to the subject, for Mahan’s ideas were formed upon Jomini’s.’ ” 29 combinations of hats, shirts, trousers, and boots from different uniform series groups. This was the case through the late 1880s, when khaki canvas uniforms were made standard throughout the Army. Rations also followed the same course of distribution as uniforms. Civil War stocks of canned meats were reportedly still in use well into the 1870s. Distance between posts also affected regular resupply efforts and many outlying detachments were forced to supplement meager rations with locally grown vegetables and fresh meat from hunting expeditions. Both were practices that took considerable time and available troops away from security patrols and pacification campaigns. Weapons, on the other hand, did enjoy regular improvements. Most significantly was the shift from paper to metallic cartridges. Unlike paper, metallic cartridges were sturdy and waterproof, hence more suited to the harsh frontier environment. Breechloading rifles and repeaters also provided a much needed edge against the Indians because they allowed a greater possible rate of fire due to shorter reload time requirements. Against moving targets, such as running Indians, this was a critical factor since Army marksmanship training was primarily focused on shooting at static targets with emphasis on methodical precision. While the majority of Plains Indian-owned firearms were cheaply made single-shot rifles and shotguns, generally referred to as “trade guns,” some better quality rifles and repeaters made it into their hands. These rifles were likely obtained through capture in battle or via unscrupulous traders. According to Utley, “The improved firearms that suddenly appeared in the hands of the blue-coats at the close of the Civil War took the Indians by surprise. The Sioux, for example, suffered bloody repulses at the Wagon Box and Hayfield fights of 1867 because of the deadly fire.”12 Also highly effective were the Army’s Hotchkiss guns, which “provided the most popular and effective artillery piece for western service…it could be fired rapidly and accurately at ranges up to 4,000 yards. Above all, it was light and compact enough to be taken almost anywhere on a wheeled carriage. …The Gatling gun gave less satisfaction…the Gatling fired 350 rounds of rifle ammunition per minute. …Gatlings ‘are worthless for Indian fighting,’ [General] Miles declared…the Gatling easily fouled with the refuse of black powder cartridges and jammed with overheating; rather than have his march slowed, Custer refused to take a Gatling platoon …to Little Bighorn.”13 The Army also had the advantage over the Plains Indians when it came to transport. Unlike its opponents, who were limited to travel on foot and horseback, the Army used wagons and mule trains to keep its troops supplied while in the field. Also frequently used were railroads and steamboats to deploy large groups of soldiers over great distances, “At the end of a rail journey, infantry customarily marched to their ultimate destination, but wagon transportation was not uncommon…Lieutenant Frank D. Baldwin charged and captured an Indian village...using his wagon-borne Fifth infantrymen in a combination horse and wagon attack that won him his second Congressional Medal of Honor. River steamers were used to carry regular troops on the Colorado, Red, Yellowstone, Missouri, and other navigable western rivers. The slow and tedious upstream travel often compelled soldiers to spend a week or ten days crowded on the decks.”14 As the Army began to suffer significant defeats, such as the Fetterman Massacre, allegations of Plains Indians possessing superior firepower in the form of Winchester repeaters began to appear in an effort to excuse poor tactical performance. While the Winchester was a well-designed and popular firearm prevalent throughout the West: “The number of warriors who boasted such weapons was greatly exaggerated. Most, if they owned a gun at all, had to content themselves with old trade muskets of doubtful utility or captured military arms. Too, ammunition was difficult to obtain, and few Indians became better marksmen than their soldier opponents. Nevertheless, enough repeaters found their way into Indian hands, largely through traders, to prompt speculation on the changing nature of Indian warfare.”15 Unlike Western society, in which warfare was a learned skill, taught to a relatively small percentage of society, conflict was an integral part of the Plains Indian way of life. Because they were essentially nomadic in nature, they required a huge area to support themselves. As a result, when tribes met, it was usually in combat over scarce resources or during raids on each other’s camps to capture slaves or horses. Those instances were governed by an unofficial code of conduct however, which stipulated that combat be conducted fairly. According to Utley, “…many of the western tribes shared certain fundamental characteristics. Whatever their environment, they lived close to it, finely tuned to its vagaries, able to exploit such food and other resources as it contained… They cherished the freedom, independence, and dignity of the individual, the family, and the group. With some notable exceptions, they exalted war and bestowed great prestige on the successful warrior.”16 This emphasis on independence and public democracy led to critical miscommunications, especially with respect to treaty validation between the Plains Indians and U. S. Government. Whereas, the soldiers and settlers viewed representatives to the treaty committees as being empowered to sign for all, the Plains Indians viewed the process differently. Generally speaking, they viewed treaties as being valid only for those individuals and their immediate families who signed them. Indeed, “The U. S. government never seemed to understand that the ‘chiefs’ who put pen to paper rarely represented their tribes completely, in the “ ‘The Sioux, for example, suffered bloody repulses at the Wagon Box and Hayfield fights of 1867 because of the deadly fire.’ Also highly effective were the Army’s Hotchkiss guns, which ‘provided the most popular and effective artillery piece for western service… it could be fired rapidly and accurately at ranges up to 4,000 yards. Above all, it was light and compact enough to be taken almost anywhere on a wheeled carriage.’ ” 30 way of traditional white representatives. Indians who did not sign a particular treaty felt no compunction to follow the treaty’s dictates, much as the government expected them to. Since the government needed someone to sign each treaty, in some cases, government representatives anointed a chief if one did not exist… Faulty interpreters also ensured failure. Compounding the U. S. government’s deceitful tactics was the fact that adherence to treaties was arbitrary.”17 Indeed, beyond competition for resources from the settlers and the perceived invasion of their territories, the most notable cause of strife was the repeated violations of treaties. “In nearly every case, the pressures from the settlers — their demand for land, for boundaries, for rights of way, for minerals, for buffalo hides — touched off a conflict. The cycle repeated itself endlessly: an advance guard of settlers or soldiers moving into Indian country, usually in violation of a U. S. government-Plains Indian treaty; Indian attacks (often including arson, murder, and mutilation; a frantic call for protection and military reprisal; and a brief, bloody war that always, if not sooner than later, ended in an Indian defeat and another long step in the United States advance of the frontier.”18 The so-called Plains Indian wars were, in actuality, along series of incidents and responses, instigated by both sides. Some campaigns were extremely short, while others can be characterized as either long or consisted of flare ups of such regularity that they constituted single events. It has already been noted that conflict with the Indians began with the first European landings. However, the tensions between the groups reached an apogee during the 30-year period between approximately 1860 and 1890, during which time there were few periods of relative peace. The list of noteworthy campaigns against the Plains Indians includes:  The Apache Wars (1861-1886).  Sioux Uprising in Minnesota (1862).  Navajo Conflict (1863-1864).  Plains Wars of the 1860s: Cheyenne-Arapaho War and Sand Creek Massacre (1864-1865); Red Cloud’s War (1866-1867); Hancock’s War (1867); and Cheyenne Winter Campaign (1868-1869).  The Modoc War (1872-1873).  The Nez Percé War (1877).  The Ute War (1879).  The Sioux Wars: The Black Hills War (1876-1877); and Ghost Dance Campaign (1890-1891).19 For the most part, the U. S. Army’s campaign strategy evolved into a combination of attacks against villages and withholding promised rations and other supplies to ensure compliance and rendition of warriors to prison facilities in Florida. The main thrust of all the campaigns involved attacks on villages. As a practice, this actually began shortly after initial European contact was made with the native inhabitants of the Americas. The practice was refined by the Union Army during the Civil War as an effort to destroy support for Confederate forces. As a result of the sea-sonally nomadic lifestyle of the Plains Indians, villages were not permanent, with locations changing with both seasons and movements of animal herds. The temporary structures that made up the villages represented the sum of all of the possessions of a given tribe (sans animals) and destruction usually resulted in the survivors becoming dependent on government largesse for survival. “The [typical] surprise attack on the village was total war. In such encounters, women and children were always present. They mingled with the fighting men, often participating in the fighting, and in the confusion and excitement of battle were difficult to identify as noncombatants. In engagement after engagement, women and children fell victim to Army bullets or were cast upon a hostile country, often in winter, without food or shelter.”20 This policy resulted in public outcry in the eastern part of the United States, as well as across Europe. Charges of genocide were levied against and denied by the Army frequently. Yet that was precisely the unofficial spirit which drove the western campaigns. For many settlers and soldiers, the era of North American Indian society was over and the only acceptable options to offer the Plains Indians were to assimilate or perish. Indeed, some politicians called for outright extermination. One such was Governor John Evans of Colorado. Following an outbreak of violence in 1864, the Governor called for the following: ‘I again appeal to you to organize for the defense of your homes and families against the merciless savage. …Any man who kills a hostile Indian is a patriot.’”21 To his credit, the governor did point out the potential for increased violence, if friendly Plains Indians were killed by accident, but closed his proclamation by noting that, “Eastern humanitarians who believe in the superiority of the Indian race will raise a terrible howl over this policy, but it is not “As the Army began to suffer significant defeats, such as the Fetterman Massacre, allegations of Plains Indians possessing superior firepower in the form of Winchester repeaters began to appear in an effort to excuse poor tactical performance. While the Winchester was a well-designed and popular firearm prevalent throughout the West: ‘The number of warriors who boasted such weapons was greatly exaggerated.’ ” 31 time to split hairs nor stand on delicate compunctions of conscience. Self-preservation demands decisive action and the only way to secure it is to fight them in their own way. A few months of active extermination will bring about quiet, and nothing else will.”22 Evans’ proclamation was echoed in the U. S. Government’s actions with respect to its observance of many treaties enacted with the Plains Indians. By way of example, one particular treaty, which was made with members of the Oglala Sioux tribe, was first offered with the most unacceptable terms possible such as rights for settlers to trespass at will and confinement of the Oglala to a specific region (a reservation). Following the Oglala’s rejection, the treaty was modified in a Machiavellian manner in which contradictory clauses were deliberately placed into the text so that the government would retain its legal advantages in dealing with them. Gray describes the treaty as, “Here is a solemn treaty that cedes territory admittedly unceded; that confines the Indian to a reservation while allowing him to roam elsewhere; and that guarantees against trespass, unless a trespasser appears! The Indian was given to understand that he retained his full right to live in the old way in a vast unceded territory. …The treaty does indeed say precisely this. The fact that it also denies it was no fault of the Indian. It was the [Peace] Commission that wrote in the contradictions. There can be only one explanation — they designed one set of provisions to beguile and another to enforce.”23 Also, according to Gray, the aforementioned treaty was nullified shortly after President Johnson left office by the Army, wherein General Sherman approved the following policy change for dealing with Indians found outside of reservations: “Outside the well-defined limits of their reservations, they are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the military authority, and as a rule will be considered hostile. At that moment, the unceded Indian Territory became white territory, and Indians who continued to roam there were officially labeled ‘hostiles.’”24 Treaties between the government and Plains Indians during this period always included provisions for the care and management of the Indians and their reservations. This came in the form of designated “Indian agents,” who were responsible for ensuring that food, clothing, tools and stipends were disbursed. Lack of serious oversight into the management of the reservations facilitated a great deal of corruption and malfeasance on the part of the agents. While not frequently raised to the public eye, one such incident resulted in the resignation of President Grant’s secretary of the interior, Columbus Delano, in 1875. More often than not, corruption went unchecked. According to Utley and Washburn, “Few government agencies lent themselves more readily to patronage politics and corruption than the Indian Bureau and none achieved a worse reputation. …Despite some notable exceptions, most Indian agents were deplorably unqualified.”25 As a means of controlling the Plains Indians, the reservation system was without par. By forcing them to become dependent of the government for subsistence, they lost their independence. Indeed, the reservation system has been credited, along with its adjunct village attacks, as destroying both the spirit and means to resist against the combination of settlers and the Army. Utley and Washburn describe the lasting effects of the system thusly: “By the 1880s, the reservation system had, in effect, deprived the Indians of the ability to hunt or make war — the two pas-times that consumed most of their energies and, more important, shaped their social, economic, political, religious and military institutions.”26 Those individuals who resisted reservation life faced three choices. The first was to go north to Canada or south to Mexico. Canada however was dealing with its own Plains Indian issues in much the same way as the United States and Mexico only offered more inhospitable deserts to the north and unwelcoming established populations to the south. The other recourses were acceptance or continued fighting. Continued fighting generally had two outcomes, death or rendition. In an effort to move troublemakers away from potential followers, a policy of rendition was enacted in which particularly dangerous troublemakers who were captured were removed from familiar territory entirely and sent to Florida. The site selected for this early version of Guantanamo Bay was Fort Marion. According to Utley and Washburn, “Early in 1875, the government decided upon a tough new tactic to break the resistance of the Plains Indians. The most dangerous warriors would be sent — without benefit of trial — to Fort Marion, a seventeenth-century Spanish prison in St. Augustine, Florida.”27 Village attacks, population of reservations, forced treaties, and rendition were all by-products of military campaigns. Over the course of the 30-year period covered by this article, a distinct pattern emerged in which campaigns were predicated by uprisings which, in turn, were reactions to patrols and campaigns and other American actions. Among the more notable campaigns were the Navajo Conflict, Modoc War, and the series of Sioux Wars. “…one particular treaty, which was made with members of the Oglala Sioux tribe, was first offered with the most unacceptable terms possible such as rights for settlers to trespass at will and confinement of the Oglala to a specific region (a reservation). Following the Oglala’s rejection, the treaty was modified in a Machiavellian manner in which contradictory clauses were deliberately placed into the text so that the government would retain its legal advantages in dealing with them.” 32

These three conflicts are representative of the overall conflict between Indians and Americans, in that they represent typical campaigns and their outcomes. While the buildup to the so-named “Navajo Conflict” was typical in nature, in that it resulted from a steady increase in pressure from both sides, the actual campaign was relatively short. Starting in July 1863 and ending in January 1864, the campaign also had the significance of being one of the only major Indian campaigns of the Civil War fought by federal troops. The stated cause of the need for action was a combination of repeated incidents by both soldiers and Plains Indians, including an attack by approximately 1,000 Navajos on Fort Defiance, which led to the Army’s decision to relocate the Navajos. “In April 1863, General James Carleton informed the leading Navajo chiefs of his plans to deport the tribe onto the Bosque Redondo Reservation, along with the Mescalero Apache. Those of the 12,000 Navajo who refused to leave would be treated as hostile.”28 Like other campaigns, the focus was on attacks on villages with the attendant destruction of crops and livestock to starve the Navajos into submission. Unlike other campaigns, however, the Navajos eventually got their land back because the Bosque Redondo Reservation could not support the combined tribes. “In the spring of 1868, [the Navajo chiefs] were allowed to present their case to President Johnson in Washington, D. C. On 1 June 1868, the tribe won permission to return to its homeland. Anew treaty set aside 3.5 million acres of reserved lands.”29 By contrast to the Navajo experience, the Modoc War resulted not only in the complete removal of the Modocs from their traditional home in northern California, but the death of General Canby. General Canby was shot in the face by Kintpuash, the Modoc chief, during surrender negotiations, “When Kintpuash could not get Canby to promise to remove all the soldiers and allow the Modoc to remain in California, he drew a pistol and shot Canby in the face then stabbed him. (Edward R. S. Canby thus became the only U. S. general killed in the country’s Indian wars.).”30 When captured, Kintpuash was hanged and General William T. Sherman ordered the surviving Modocs to be deported east “so that the name of Modoc shall cease.” The Army escorted the 155 surviving Modoc to no homes in Indian Territory. …Their brief rebellion turned out to be the last Indian conflict in the California-Oregon border region.”31 The Modoc campaign was fought primarily against groups of Indians in fortified mountain caves and redoubts instead of against villages. During campaigns of this nature, lightweight cannons, such as Hotchkiss guns, were particularly effective weapons. The Sioux War was actually more of a series of linked campaigns than an actual war. It began in 1862 with a bloody uprising in Minnesota. It flared up from 1876-1877 in the Black Hills and then again in 1890-1891 at the height of the Ghost Dance movement, which ended at the battle at Wounded Knee creek. Gray describes the Sioux conflict as being emblematic of the struggle between the Plains Indians and the U. S. Army. According to Gray, “The Sioux-Cheyenne War of 1876, in which General George Armstrong Custer figured so prominently and disastrously, epitomizes in a brief time all of the facets, both good and bad, that characterized the centuries-long conflict between the two cultures.”32 The first significant event in the conflict was during 1862 in Minnesota. The uprising was purely the result of frustration. A small group of Santee Sioux, hungry and frustrated at not being able to find game, and angry at intrusions by missionaries and diversion of promised annuities into the pockets of unscrupulous government representatives, vented their anger by killing five settlers. This, in turn, galvanized the tribe into continued “Early in 1875, the government decided upon a tough new tactic to break the resistance of the Plains Indians. The most dangerous warriors would be sent — without benefit of trial — to Fort Marion, a seventeenth-century Spanish prison in St. Augustine, Florida.” “Among the more notable campaigns were the Navajo Conflict, Modoc War, and the series of Sioux Wars. These three conflicts are representative of the overall conflict between Indians and Americans, in that they represent typical campaigns and their outcomes.” 33 action and, “In a week of bloody horror, fully eight hundred settlers died violently in atonement for the wrongs done to the Santee, and but for the successful defense of Fort Ridgley and New Ulm, many more might have perished.”33 Following a largely successful counteroffensive by the Army, some 20 to 30 Santee warriors were hanged, but the chief instigators were able to flee to the relative safety of the Black Hills where they linked up with other groups of Sioux and continued to aggress against settlers and soldiers. The Black Hills were the locations for arguably the two most well-known battles of the Indian Wars. The first was Custer’s battle at Little Bighorn Creek, and the second at Wounded Knee Creek. The root cause for so much conflict occurring in the Black Hills can be summed up in one word — “gold.” As early as 1874, the Army began sending reconnaissance patrols into the Black Hills as a cover for surveyors and prospectors, likely in an effort to inject cash into the country’s economy following the post-Civil War recession that peaked the year before. As Donovan describes it, “…by early August, the nation’s newspapers were headlining sensational reports that the Hills had proved to be a veritable paradise with ‘gold in the grass roots.’ If there is any purpose a financial depression can serve well, it is to escalate rumors of a gold strike into a full blown rush.”34 The gold rush in the Black Hills put the U. S. Government in a difficult position. It was obligated to uphold its treaties with the Sioux, protecting them against trespass, yet it also had to protect its citizens from the angered Plains Indians and reinvigorate its economy. By undertaking a calculated policy of no action against the miners, which incited the Sioux into rebellion, the Government was able to take steps to lay claim to the Black Hills. Among these steps was a campaign to attack villages in the vicinity of Little Bighorn Creek, which was, from the Army’s perspective, tragically unsuccessful. Instead of destroying villages and subjugating the Sioux, nearly all of the 7th Cavalry Regiment was exterminated by unforeseen numbers of very angry Plains Indians. This loss resulted in both an appropriations bill to increase the size of the Army’s tactical footprint on the plains by nearly 2,500 troops and renewed calls to bring an end to the Plains Indian problem once and for all. The solution came in the form of a year-long series of campaigns, which began in 1876, and resulted in the majority of the Sioux becoming ostensibly pacified and, for the most part, living on reservations. As was typical of the time, the Sioux reservations were mismanaged and starvation began to occur. Unlike past instances, however, instead of groups leaving reservations and going on the warpath again, anew factor developed, a religious movement called the “Ghost Dance.” The Ghost Dance movement was first and foremost a form of religious empowerment that provided to its adherents a belief that, among other things, they could not be killed by the soldiers. As word about the new religion percolat-ed through the Army and government, senior leadership moved quickly to put a stop to it. Messages, such as that from Indian agent Daniel Royer, were wired to Washington stating, “Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy. …We need protection and we need it now,” only served to speed the deployment of troops. 35 The conflict culminated in a battle at Wounded Knee Creek in December of 1890, which resulted in approximately 200 Indians killed in action. While there were some very small mopping-up actions throughout January of the following year, such as the surrender of the last of the movement’s leaders, Kick- “As was typical of the time, the Sioux reservations were mismanaged and starvation began to occur. Unlike past instances, however, instead of groups leaving reservations and going on the warpath again, anew factor developed, a religious movement called the ‘Ghost Dance.’ The Ghost Dance movement was first and foremost a form of religious empowerment that provided to its adherents a belief that, among other things, they could not be killed by the soldiers.” 34 ing Bear, on the 15th, Wounded Knee is largely regarded as the final battle of the Indian Wars.36 Victory on the battlefield was largely the result of “…four fast firing Hotchkiss guns [which] opened up, and in less than an hour, two thirds of [the Sioux present] had been wiped out.”37 The focus of the Army’s counterinsurgency programs was not to keep Indian activity from affecting American territory, it was to pacify and force Indians into living in controlled environments of the reservations. While designed to provide sustenance by supplementing farming with both food allotments and stipends, the corruption endemic to the reservation system inspired many Indian tribes to embark on insurgencies as reactions to government control. The methods that they employed were in effect guerrilla warfare tactics, such as ambushes and swift strikes against soft targets like patrols and settlements. The initial Army responses were poor ones and only over time were effective measures developed. Because a lack of formal doctrine to deal with rebellions existed up to the 1920s, tactics, such as village attacks, came out of the wartime experiences of Civil War veterans and the employment of European-style small-unit tactics taught at West Point.38 As Birtle describes it, “…while the Army had never developed a formal doctrine for Indian, it had gradually evolved a theory that blended conventional with unconventional techniques to attack the social and economic resources upon which Plains Indian power rested.”39 Anthony Saccavino is currently a worldwide atrocities analyst, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC. He received a B. A. from University of Massachusetts and an M. A from Norwich University. His military education includes Airborne School, Defense Language Institute (Russian and Spanish), Military Intelligence Noncommissioned Officer Course, and Contemporary Insurgent Warfare Course. He has served in various positions, to include operations officer, Production Management Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency; analyst, Multinational Forces, Iraq; and as a U. S. Army military intelligence soldier, Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, and the United Kingdom and Germany. “The conflict culminated in a battle at Wounded Knee Creek in December of 1890, which resulted in approximately 200 Indians killed in action. While there were some very small mopping-up actions throughout January of the following year, such as the surrender of the last of the movement’s leaders, Kicking Bear, on the 15th, Wounded Knee is large ly regarded as the final battle of the Indian Wars.” Notes 1Russell Weigley, The American Way of War, A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1973, p. 156. 2John Gray, Centennial Campaign, The Sioux War of 1876, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1988, p. 2. 3Andrew Birtle, U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860- 1941, Center For Military History Publication 70-66-1, 1998, p. 3. 4Robert Utley, Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and The Indian 1866-1891, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NB, 1984, p. 12. 5James Donovan, A Terrible Glory, Custer and the Little Bighorn, The Last Battle of the American West, Little, Brown and Company, New York, NY, 2008, p. 121. 6Donovan, A Terrible Glory, p. 122. 7Don Rickey, Forty Miles A Day on Beans and Hay, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1963, p. 86. 8Rickey, Forty Miles A Day on Beans and Hay, p. 86. 9Weigley, The American Way of War, pp. 83-84. 10Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 44. 11Birtle, U. S. Army Counterinsurgency Operations and Doctrine 1860-1941, p. 61. 12Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 71. 13Utley, Frontier Regulars, pp. 72-73. 14Rickey, Forty Miles A Day on Beans and Hay, p. 241. 15Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 71. 16Robert Utley and Wilcomb Washburn, Indian Wars, Mariner Books/Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 2002, pp. 148-149. 17Donovan, A Terrible Glory, p. 20. 18John Bowman (Editor), Facts About the American Wars, H. W. Wilson Company, New York, NY, 1998, p. 297. 19Ibid., p. 296. 20Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 51. 21David Copeland (Editor), The Greenwood Library of American War Reporting, Vol. 4, The Indian Wars & The Spanish American War, The Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2005, pp. 63-64. 22Ibid., p. 19. 23Gray, The Centennial Campaign, p. 15. 24Ibid. 25Utley and Washburn, Indian Wars, p. 290. 26Ibid., p. 291. 27Ibid., p. 205. 28Bowman, Facts About the American Wars, p. 314. 29Ibid., p. 316. 30Ibid., p. 324. 31Ibid. 32Gray, Centennial Campaign, p. 7. 33Utley and Washburn, Indian Wars, p. 203. 34Donovan, A Terrible Glory, p. 17. 35Bowman, Facts About the American Wars, p. 335. 36Ibid., p. 336. 37Ibid. 38Joan Jensen, Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1991, p. 1. 39Birtle, U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Doctrine 1860-1941, p. 60. 35