Integrating Effective Electronic Warfare into Battalion/Squadron Operations

Author’s note: In this article, the terms “nonlethal fires/effects” and “nonkinetic effects” are used interchangeably to describe radio frequency jamming (electronic attack) primarily executed by airborne assets. The author generalizes some concepts and descriptions to maintain the proper classification level for this publication. During Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, coalition forces continue to disrupt adversary operations by employing components of airborne electronic warfare (EW). Many times, ground commanders must reject traditional kinetic courses of action (COA), due to lack of positive enemy identification or collateral damage risk, in favor of nonkinetic effects. Because they find it difficult to observe, orient, decide, and act based on lack of information concerning the enemy’s physical movement, today’s battalion and squadron commanders must place increased importance on exploiting, controlling, and manipulating information routes of travel. Their ability to understand enemy information routes of travel leads to identifying key command and control (C2) nodes to determine critical vulnerabilities and provides a glimpse into the adversary’s playbook to successfully plan and execute future offensive operations. EW Operations: Vetted/Advocated/Doctrine This article primarily focuses on offensive operations bound by a scenario in which the battalion/squadron area of operations (AO) affords a moderate to high degree of space and time. This is not to say integrated nonlethal fires would not contribute to successful operations in a more geographically constricted, urban-type environment, but time and space allow a greater degree of electromagnetic (EM) spectrum deconfliction, exploitation, and manipulation, all at a decreased risk to blue force C2. Although current guidance states EW integration is not planned or executed below brigade/regiment levels, battalion/squadron commanders should take advantage of current capabilities and guide their S3s to push for more tactical EW integration to more effectively achieve brigade/regiment commanders’ operational objectives.1 Nonlethal fires, either synchronized with lethal fires or integrated with maneuver elements, act as force multipliers and provide significant contributions to both offensive and/ or defensive operations.2 Comparing EW effects to more traditional land-based mission types, such as scouting, screening, and blocking, may remove the veil of mystery and uncertainty surrounding EW integration into ground operations.

EW Operations for Scouting Battalion/squadron commanders can effectively use EW’s electronic warfare support (ES) component as an airborne scout reconnoitering adversary information routes of travel. ES missions differ from traditional signal intelligence (SIGINT) missions primarily due to the time-critical nature and immediate purpose of the information disseminated from the airborne asset(s) to the intended recipients.3 Current airborne ES platforms, such as the U. S. Air Force RC-135V/W (Rivet Joint) or the U. S. Navy EP-3E (Aries II), offer a deeper, wider look into the battlespace and are significantly less hindered by terrain than ground-based systems. True, if one were to research these platforms, the word “reconnaissance” would be prevalent, but as reconnaissance is primarily an S2 task, battalion/squadron commanders should not be so quick to dismiss the capabilities these platforms bring as an S3 enabler. Operational commanders task ES missions; S3s lead planning and ensure full integration and support across the staff.4 Tasking these assets to provide tactical-level data on adversary information routes of travel effectively enables commanders to gain a clearer picture of enemy command, control, and communications (C3) to conduct more decisive offensive operations by penetrating and operating inside the enemy’s observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop; and commanders gain the ability to identify both centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities in the adversary’s organizational structure.5 Integrated ES allows commanders to map out key enemy nodes or points of information departure, as well as primary, secondary, and sometimes tertiary information avenues of movement. Near-real-time (NRT) tactical reports find, fix, and aid in tracking adversary activity. The most tangible ES effect on battalion/squadron operations is direct support to maneuver elements conducting (primarily) mounted patrols. Given the right plan and proper coordination, theater-level airborne ES assets can readily provide direct-threat warning down to the platoon level by exploiting the adversary information routes of travel. Additionally, they can simultaneously provide the same data to the tactical operations center (TOC) where the information could be used to re-task other maneuver elements to support, launch a quick-reaction force (QRF), or dynamically re-role other airborne assets in the area for further observation or a kinetic response. To ensure optimal ES to offensive maneuver operations, planners should provide ES platform units basic information, either directly or indirectly, which includes mission objectives, timing and routing (enhanced by graphics products), the operating communications plan (frequencies, call signs, and crypto), and reporting criteria. Armed with this basic information, ES platform aircrews can deliver timely and tactically relevant threat-warning information directly to the headsets of mounted troopers on the ground. When executed alone, ES to maneuver elements provides commanders a deep-looking scout who dominates the high ground and can rapidly locate the enemy, reports his use of the EM spectrum, and maps his information routes of travel.6 However, when paired with electronic attack (EA) asset capabilities, ES becomes the key piece in integrating nonlethal fires into battalion/squadron operations. Optimally, ES and EA assets would be packaged together in a hunter-killer type of combination. Operators in the U. S. Air Force EW community commonly term this interaction as “ES to EA.” These assets continually train tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to find, fix, track, target, and engage targets up and down portions of the EM spectrum. EW Operations for Screening Air Force doctrine emphasizes properly constructed force packages that include EW, which enhances the probability of survival of all forces.7 While stated in the context of airborne forces facing advanced enemy air defense systems, Army battalion/squadron commanders would benefit by including EW in their operations in and around an undefined enemy battlespace. Applying EW for a screening effect, just as ground commanders have employed the cavalry arm for centuries, significantly increases blue force survival by denying the effectiveness of enemy forward observers, thereby disrupting enemy early warning networks. By effectively coordinating with the S2, the battalion/squadron S3 can effectively determine key adversary communications nodes used in early warning networks in a particular AO. By integrating synchronized EW into maneuver operations, enemy information flow from forward observer(s) to attack element(s) will either be severely degraded or denied altogether. Airborne EA assets will employ nonlethal fires on a target at a predetermined time, in response to enemy “on air” activity, or by direct communications with the supported maneuver element. Two factors should be considered when determining the point at which nonlethal fires will be employed: the adversary’s assessed communications network complexity; and the adversary’s ability to direction find (DF) blue force communications. The risk associated with predetermined timing is that it relies on rigid adherence to the mission timeline, which could be affected by numerous delaying factors. Applying nonlethal effects based on enemy “on air” activity may prove to be too little, too late, where as just a simple mike click or key tone of a hand-held telecommunications device may actually convey all the information needed for enemy attack element(s) to engage blue forces. In the current fight, the direct communications between the supported maneuver element and airborne EA assets would be the most effective way to ensure nonlethal fires are delivered on time and on target. In a major combat operation (MCO) scenario, however, this method may not be ideal because the adversary will most likely have sophisticated DF capabilities, which would aid in finding, fixing, and engaging blue forces. EW Operations for Blocking Battalion/squadron commanders should look to integrating EW if they intend to deny, degrade, or disrupt enemy informa-The U. S. Navy and Marine EA-6B Prowler provides a flexible tactical airborne electronic attack option for mounted combat patrols. With proper coordination, formations as low as platoon level can communicate directly with the Prowler for immediate nonkinetic effects. 51 tion flow across portions of the EM spectrum. Combining ES and EA to limit, or totally block, enemy information transfer is essentially the same as posting a forward ground-based scout element and positioning a heavier blocking force along key routes of travel. The scout element relays key data of the oncoming enemy to the blocking force who, in turn, engages the enemy to prevent further movement. Using ES assets to find and fix key enemy frequencies, then rapidly passing them off to EA assets for targeting and engagement, will, at best, shut down enemy information transfer by denying information reception. The true blocking effect is gained through the enemy’s inability to receive information, up or down echelon, leading to disruption of the enemy’s C3 network. This disruption causes confusion and degrades the adversary’s ability to act on transmitted information, leading to critical delays in execution. It affords maneuver elements the advantage of conducting controlled, coordinated, and decisive operations with a lesser degree of risk. Using EW for blocking effects is not an “all or nothing” affair. Prior coordination between the S2, S3, and S6 shape mission objectives that determine what enemy information is allowed to pass or, in simpler terms, what frequencies would not be targeted for engagement. For preplanned EW blocking effects, the battalion/squadron would formally run these requests up the chain to place identified frequencies of interest on the theater joint restricted frequency list (JRFL).8 However, ES and EA assets typically assume any frequency not on the JRFL is cleared “hot” to engage, provided existing rules of engagement (ROE) have been satisfied. In the event of a dynamic targeting scenario, direct communications with supporting ES and/or EA assets provide a close air support-like effect. ES and EA assets can rapidly respond to immediate requests by shifting sensors and adjusting nonlethal fires in response to details provided by maneuver elements. This may be in response to an enemy ambush on friendly forces beginning when the maneuver element transmits a contact report. Typically, the airborne ES asset will re-prioritize and retask its sensors to the reported location and scout for enemy “over the air” activity. If conditions are met, the ES asset quickly passes targeting information to the EA asset for immediate engagement. Close coordination between sensor and shooter, as well as the supported maneuver element, allows instant feedback on success or failure of intended effects and quickly provides for necessary adjustments.9 Furthermore, this hunter-killer team will seek to target second-order enemy EM activity to disrupt any organized enemy reinforcement or undo a well-planned enemy withdrawal or retreat. A crucial third-order effect would be the airborne ES and EA platforms’ ability to deliver on-time, on-target, nonkinetic effects to prevent an organized enemy counterattack. The U. S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines continue to deliver nonkinetic effects by airborne platforms to the supported ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. EW serves as a critical enabler in most, if not all, offensive operations. When translated into more familiar mission types, such as scouting, blocking, and screening, battalion/squadron commanders may be more inclined to request certain types of EW effects to increase the chances of mission success and reduce risk to soldiers conducting ground-based operations. As stated earlier, an effective EW campaign is most likely achieved when the AO affords time and space. Integrating EW in a more constricted AO requires quite a bit more coordination and acceptance of risk to blue force communications. Battalion/squadron commanders should embrace both electronic warfare support and electronic attack, and strive to integrate and synchronize them into operations. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 28 November 2003, p. 1-15 (Figure 1-2). 2Ibid., p. 2-8, paragraph 2-27. 3Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, GPO, Washington, DC, 25 January 2007, p. I-11, paragraph 10. See also HQDA, FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare in Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, 25 February 2009, p. 4-18, paragraph 4-73. 4FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare in Operations, p. 4-15, paragraph 4-50. Although this particular paragraph provided guidance on synchronizing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with EW operations, the fact that S3 should ensure full integration across the staff is required for effective ES integration. ES asset capabilities should not be seen as a particular directorate’stool (S2 in particular) not meant for use by other staff directorates, but should be considered as a total command enabler. 5Colonel John Boyd, U. S. Air Force, retired, Patterns of Conflict, Briefing, December 1986. 6Author’s note: The enemy must be “on-air,” which means he must be transmitting and pushing data over a frequency for ES assets to identify, locate, and exploit. ES assets have no capability against an enemy who is radio silent. 7Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5.1 Electronic Warfare, GPO, Washington, DC, 19 November 1999, p. 39. 8JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, p. II-1. 9FM 3-36, Electronic Warfare in Operations, p. 4-15, paragraph 4-49. Major Bryan M. Kitchin is currently serving as chief, Airborne Reconnaissance Operations Branch, Command and Control/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations Division, Directorate of Air and Space Operations, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, VA. He received a B. A. from The Citadel and an M. M. S. from American Military University. His military education includes Air Force Command and Staff College and Squadron Officer School. His military assignments include assistant director of operations, Rivet Joint Weapons Instructor Course, U. S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis Air Force Base, NV; officer in charge, Rivet Joint Tactics Development, 55th Operations Support Squadron, Offutt Air Force Base, NE; and flight commander, Weapons and Tactics Flight, 343d Reconnaissance Squadron, Offutt Air Force Base. He is a 10- year electronic warfare officer with more than 450 combat flying hours. The USAF EC-130H Compass Call provides ground commanders a high powered broad area or spot location, multi-frequency airborne electronic attack option. Longer on-station durations afford battalion/squadron commanders persistent electromagnetic screening or blocking effects for multiple maneuver elements within the AO. 52