Operational Contract Support: A Nonlethal Enabler

Strategic and Operational Implications Pre-deployment training for the critical duties of a contracting officer representative (COR), commander’s emergency response program (CERP) project purchasing officer (PPO), and field ordering officer (FOO) is available at multiple bases and posts worldwide. The Expeditionary Contracting Command’s subordinate contingency contracting teams (CCTs) are subject-matter experts in providing this training and serve as enablers in nonlethal mission analysis, planning, and execution in support of the commander’s mission. Commanders and their staffs take eight operational variables into account as they plan and execute operations. According to U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, “Even, a tactical unit will use the operational variables as away to define their operational environment, which often corresponds to their area of interest (AI).”1 Nonlethal mission analysis and planning must account for the operational variables, which include political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. The CCTs provide expertise and resources that, if properly used, can affect several of these variables. Rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan local, regional, and national economies provides legitimacy to these young democratic governments. It also influences the population, which is the “center of gravity,” by creating jobs and a means to earn a legitimate income, free from corruption or the influence of the insurgency. The U. S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) Manual 09-27, Money As A Weapons System Handbook, states, “Warfighters at brigade, battalion, and company level in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment employ money as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents. Money is one of the primary weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations.”2 Iraq and Afghanistan will develop into independent and self-reliant governments or they will descend back into the chaos that ensued prior to the 2006 surge in Iraq and ongoing operations in Afghanistan. One critical step in building strong governments at the local, regional, and national levels is a functioning and stable economy. The CCT enables the building of these economies. CALL, Graphic Training Aid Cards, and CCT Resources In CALL Handbook 09-27, Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System, General David Petraeus states, “Money is my most important ammunition in this war.”3 The frontline soldiers that pull the trigger on this weapons system are the contingency contracting officers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prior to deployment, the CCT assists the deploying brigade combat team (BCT) by providing the aforementioned training. Additionally, the CCT assists in the mission analysis for the operational contract support and use of CERP money by the PPO. Using these funds in Afghanistan is important and will become more so as we attempt to influence the center of gravity and build an economy. Properly trained CORs and PPOs will be vital assets in conducting 34 this mission. Recommended training tools include the following publications, which are available through local CALL representatives or training and audiovisual support centers (TASC):  CALL Handbook 09-27, Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System.4  CALL Handbook 09-48, Developing a Performance Work Statement in a Deployed Environment.5  CALL Handbook 08-47, Deployed COR (Contracting Officer Representative).6  CALL Handbook 09-16, Field Ordering Officer and Paying Agent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.7  CALL Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 70-01-001, Contracting Basics for Leaders Smartcard.8  CALL GTA 90-01-017, CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program.9  CALL GTA 90-01-016, The Deployed Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Smartcard.10 Lessons Learned from COR, PPO, and FOO Training The 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division pre-deployment COR, PPO, and FOO training overview provided lessons learned, which are discussed below in an “issue, discussion, and recommendation” format. This training exercise was conducted on 24-26 August 2009 at Fort Drum, New York. The lessons learned from this pre-deployment training focus on supporting a BCT’s nonlethal training and mission analysis on arrival in theater. Ultimately, the training provides them with another tool to counter insurgent groups or networks in future areas of operation and areas of interest. Issue: Command Influence Discussion. Command influence is an important factor in successfully integrating into the BCT’s pre-deployment preparation. COR, PPO, and FOO cannot be viewed as an additional duty by the chain of command. At a minimum, the BCT executive officer, S9, and S4 should be present for training, which enables them to understand the duties and responsibilities of their respective CORs, PPOs, and FOOs, and how they enable BCT mission accomplishment. These programs are responsible for multiple colors of money and greatly affect a BCT’s operating expenses while in theater. Commanders need to ensure this training is fully integrated into the BCT’s pre-deployment mission analysis to produce the requisite number of CORs, PPOs, and FOOs as dictated by ongoing and projected contracts and CERP projects. The BCT must have a firm grasp on the contracts that it will assume upon relief in place/ transfer of authority (RIP/TOA). Command influence will ensure that these important tasks are completed and the BCT will experience a reduction in contract-specific tasks and training during a turbulent RIP/TOA phase. Recommendation. Upon redeployment, the BCT should contact its supporting CCT in garrison to establish how this training can be incorporated into a BCT’s Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and reset phase. There are many opportunities while in garrison for the CCT to train and appoint CORs to manage BCT-specific contracts. During command post exercises, the BCT S4 should integrate the CCT into the sustainment cell to assist the BCT S4 in building a contract support plan within the service and support annex (Appendix 9 of Annex I, according to FM 5.0, Army Planning and Orders Production).11 Finally, the BCT needs to identify who will make up their contract management cell within the sustainment cell. Upon identification, these individuals and their alternates should attend the Operational Contract Support Course located at Fort Lee, Virginia. This course will provide them with the knowledge of how to manage the CORs, PPOs, and FOOs. Issue: Division G8 involvement Discussion. The division G8, as the resource manager, should be incorporated into the COR, PPO, and FOO training to explain how requirements generated by the BCT S4 are funded by the G8. This will give the appointed CORs, PPOs, and FOOs a common understanding how different colors of money are obligated within division headquarters and allotted to subordinate BCTs. Ultimately, this will result in a reduction in the amount of time a BCT spends deciding what money can fund specific contracts or projects and enable more timely execution of these contracts. Recommendation. The CCT and G8 should be in constant communication and coordination during a BCT’s pre-deployment training. This unity of effort between the G8 and CCT will result in the BCT understanding how the current edition of CALL Handbook 09-27, Money as a Weapons System, can be an enabler in a forward-deployed location.12 Issue: Contracts and Projects as a Nonlethal Enabler Discussion. The United States has been engaged in ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan (OEF) and Iraq (OIF) from 2001 and 2003, respectively. Lethal operations have had an effect in capturing dedicated insurgents, but there remains a certain percentage of the population, or center of gravity, that can be influenced through the many different colors of money that “Warfighters at brigade, battalion, and company level in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment employ money as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents. Money is one of the primary weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations.” 2 35 exist in the Department of Defense’s arsenal. Money as a Weapons System should be read from cover to cover by the BCT commander, deputy commander, executive officer, S3, S4, fires and effects coordination cell (FECC), staff judge advocate, and civil military operations officer to obtain a thorough understanding of how money can be a nonlethal enabler during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.13 For example, the Sons of Iraq program was funded using CERP funds to provide security for their muhallas. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) funds influenced Iraqis to leave the Iraqi insurgency, turn against al-Qaeda in Iraq, obtain technical skills, and be hired by local and national firms, thus helping to rebuild the Iraqi economy. Recommendation. The chain of command and aforementioned staff sections need to read and understand how Money as a Weapons System can enable their nonlethal operations.14 Integration of Money as a Weapons System into nonlethal training and planning down to the individual COR, PPO, and FOO levels will produce technically and tactically competent personnel in the proper uses of different colors of money.15 Conclusion The proper use of money as a weapons system will enable commanders to influence the economic variable, one of the eight operational variables described in FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency.16 In the counterinsurgency plan, the economic variable should minimize damage to existing economic systems and support economic development.17 Economic development can result in job training and creation of new businesses. Job training and new businesses impact the recruitment efforts of the insurgency and decrease its ability to influence neighborhoods or villages. Steven Metz, author of New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st-Century Insurgency stresses the importance of the economic variable and its inclusion into the overall counterinsurgency plan: “Economic assistance and job training are as important to counterinsurgency as political reform. Businesses started and jobs created are as much ‘indicators of success’ as insurgents killed or intelligence provided. Because the margins for economic activity tend to widen during conflict, counterinsurgency should attempt to make markets as competitive as possible. Because economies dependent on exports of a single commodity or a few commodities are particularly vulnerable to protracted conflict, counterinsurgency operations need to include a plan for economic diversification. A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy should offer alternative sources of identity and empowerment for the bored, disillusioned, and dis-empowered. Simply providing low-paying, low status jobs or the opportunity to attend school is not enough.”18 The economic variable must be part of the counterinsurgency plan in Iraq and Afghanistan. Long-term economic viability, low unemployment rates, and diversified markets will empower the population to reject the insurgency. The mission analysis conducted in support of the economic variable, should be enabled by the contingency contracting team. Notes 1Headquarters, Department off the Army (HQDA), U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 2009, p. 1-3. 2U. S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 09-27, Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 2009, p. 1. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5CAC, CALL Handbook 09-48, Developing a Performance Work Statement in a Deployed Environment, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2009. 6CAC, CALL Handbook 08-47, Deployed COR (Contracting Officer’s Representative), Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2008. 7CAC, CALL Handbook 09-16, Field Ordering Officer and Paying Agent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 2009. 8CAC, CALL Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 70-01-001, Contracting Basics for Leaders Smartcard, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 2008. 9CAC, CALL GTA 90-01-017, CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program), Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 2008. 10CAC, CALL GTA 90-01-016, The Deployed Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Smartcard, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 2008. 11HQDA, FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, GPO, Washington, DC, January 2005. 12CALL Handbook 09-27, Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 15Ibid. 16FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency. 17Steven Metz, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,” Parameters, U. S. Army War College, Winter 2007-08, pp. 20-32. 18Ibid. Major Christopher L. Center is currently a team leader, 619th Contingency Contracting Team, Fort Drum, NY. He received a B. A. and an M. A. from Norwich University. His military education includes the Army Acquisition Basic Course and Army Acquisition Intermediate Contracting Course, Civil Affairs Qualification Course, Armor Captain Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Infantry Mortar Leader Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including observer controller, Operations Group (Tarantula Team), National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; commander, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 71st Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY; squadron maintenance officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (1/11 ACR), Fort Irwin, CA; XO, D Company, 1/11 ACR, Fort Irwin; tank platoon leader, A Troop, 1/11 ACR, Fort Irwin; and mortar platoon leader, HHT, 1/11 ACR, Fort Irwin. “The United States has been engaged in ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan (OEF) and Iraq (OIF) from 2001 and 2003, respectively. Lethal operations have had an effect in capturing dedicated insurgents, but there remains a certain percentage of the population, or center of gravity, that can be influenced through the many different colors of money that exist in the Department of Defense’s arsenal.” 36