Augmenting the HBCT Armored Reconnaissance Squadron to Meet Operational Needs

Throughout history, the U. S. Army has relied on cavalry organizations to carry out full-spectrum military operations ranging from offense and defense to counterinsurgency and stability operations. Cavalry units are unique in their ability to carry out reconnaissance and surveillance missions, as well as customary military operations.1 This is due to their enhanced mobility, which allows them to maneuver around the enemy and exploit weaknesses. Wide-ranging mission sets enable cavalry units to be extremely flexible and adjust their organizations and doctrine to fit the current operating environment (COE). The cavalry’s flexibility was merged with improved armor protection and increased firepower, from the beginning of World War II to the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, to meet the challenges of increasingly complex areas of operation (AOs). However, when this augmentation trend reversed in the late 1990s, cavalry units became less than well equipped to carry out assigned missions. The armored cavalry squadrons born of modularity are not organized to succeed in the COE because ground commanders need them to perform more than reconnaissance and limited security operations as doctrinally assigned. This article briefly describes the trends of organization and doctrine in cavalry units during the past 70 years. In that time, increased firepower, mobility, and armored protection proved critical to success in combat. This article shows how cavalry units organized under current doctrine require augmentation to their combat power to be successful in the COE. The experience of 3d Squadron, 7th U. S. Cavalry (3-7 CAV), 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (3ID), during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) V, provides an example of how reorganizing contributed to a high degree of success in the COE. Perhaps doctrine can be reexamined to properly resource cavalry units as they are actually employed, rather than how they are envisioned. 17

Adapting Cavalry Capabilities to Meet Operational Needs The trend to make cavalry units more robust through additional firepower and armor protection started during World War II and continued into the 1990s. The historical antecedent for this trend can be found in cavalry units prior to World War I. During that time, horse-mounted cavalry carried out a complex mission set, including offensive and defensive missions. Their significant advantage in mobility over foot soldiers made them ideal to carry out reconnaissance, pursuit, and exploitation. New battlefield technologies that emerged during World War I, such as motorized and mechanized forces, neutralized the cavalry’s advantage and increased its vulnerabilities.2 In response, the cavalry mission narrowed to one of reconnaissance and limited security operations.3 From World War II through Operation Desert Storm, this was gradually reversed as cavalry units received and effectively used armored vehicles with increased firepower. Also, the Army increasingly called on cavalry organizations to carry out their pre-World War I missions of offense, defense, reconnaissance, and security while providing them with the capability to execute those missions successfully. The Army reversed the trend to make cavalry units more robust with the advent of Force XXI and digitization in the1990s. The increased prominence of sensors and improved situation awareness led to decreased emphasis on survivability and firepower. Once again, the cavalry mission was reduced to reconnaissance and limited security operations and organizations were stripped of much of their combat power. This became apparent during the invasion of Iraq as 3-7 CAV, the division cavalry squadron for 3ID, screened forward of the main advance to identify the enemy. Cavalry training made the squadron successful at finding enemy forces; robust organization made it successful at fixing and finishing them. After the invasion, 3-7 CAV reorganized, due to modularization, as the recon squadron for 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3ID; however, even with much of its combat power gone, the expectation to find, fix, and finish the enemy continued. This is indicative of the divergence between a cavalry unit’s doctrinally dictated organization and how commanders actually use cavalry units in the field. 3-7 Cavalry in OIF V Currently, heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) consist of two combined-arms battalions (CABs), an armored reconnaissance squadron (ARS), a fires battalion, a brigade support battalion (BSB), and a brigade special troops battalion (BSTB).4 The ARS contains a headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT), three ground reconnaissance troops, and a forward support troop (FST) in an operational control (OPCON) relationship from the BSB. Each ground reconnaissance troop features two scout platoons, each equipped with five M1114 up-armored HMMWVs and three M3 cavalry fighting vehicles (CFVs). Each troop also has its own 120- mm self-propelled mortar section with a fire direction center (FDC). They frequently receive a fire support team (FIST) OPCON from the ARS HHT with a Bradley fire support vehicle (BFIST).5 Such was 3-7 CAV’s organization prior to augmentation in January 2007 — with one exception: a shortage of armored HMMWVs, which meant the scout platoons trained with M1025 HMMWVs instead of the authorized M1114s. As early as summer 2006, the 3-7 CAV squadron commander discussed an increase in the squadron’s combat power with the brigade commander.6 They agreed that 3-7 CAV would receive three tank platoons, including one from each of the CABs and a third pieced together using tanks and crews that belonged to the brigade’s four tank company XOs. These additional assets officially transferred in January 2007, providing 2 months of integration training prior to the home station mission readiness exercise. However, because the augmentation was anticipated, each troop in the squadron trained in advance to operate with an additional tank platoon. During gunnery in October 2006, a tank platoon from one of the CABs was attached and participated in a modified Table XII with each scout platoon. The scout platoons screened forward, identifying and engaging wheeled and lightly armored targets. After identifying the heavy armor threat, the scout platoons used CFVs to suppress while the tank platoon moved forward, engaged, and destroyed the enemy. This scenario was later used by the CABs to train integration between their scout and tank platoons. The early attachment of the three tank platoons from the CABs provided the BCT with enhanced capabilities during training and the home station mission readiness exercise. The 3-7 CAV squadron commander highlighted the advantages of this additional combat power: “Originally, we were planning to deploy and operate as a brigade. The augmentation of the tank platoons was to provide greater flexibility for the BCT. That extra combat power would allow us to fight for information and also serve as an extra maneuver element for the brigade.”7 Receiving additional assets well before deployment made it easier to identify and resolve issues encountered once deployed. The pre-deployment training with attached tank platoons resolved issues ranging from materiel support to conducting combined combat patrols. If the brigade commander had waited until 3-7 CAV deployed to determine if it needed additional combat power, we likely would not have received any at all; shortly after our advanced party arrived in Kuwait, we learned we would not be working for our parent BCT. On arrival in theater, 3-7 CAV was assigned to 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, Multinational Division-Baghdad (MND- B). The squadron assumed responsibility for the Adhamiyah District on the east side of the Tigris River. The predominately Sunni area became famous as the area enclosed by the “safe neighborhood” wall and infamous as the AO of 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, a mechanized infantry battalion that suffered more casualties than any unit its size since the Vietnam con- “…horse-mounted cavalry carried out a complex mission set, including offensive and defensive missions. Their significant advantage in mobility over foot soldiers made them ideal to carry out reconnaissance, pursuit, and exploitation. New battlefield technologies that emerged during World War I, such as motorized and mechanized forces, neutralized the cavalry’s advantage and increased its vulnerabilities.” 18 flict. One of their soldiers was posthu-mously awarded the Medal of Honor for shielding his HMMWV crew from a grenade blast with his own body.8 The importance of our additional combat power was immediately apparent — this highly volatile area would require all of the resources our squadron could bring to bear. The squadron’s first goal was to deny the enemy freedom of maneuver within the AO, which required as close as possible (ACAP) to 24-hour coverage. It would be impossible for six scout platoons operating in such a large area to provide this level of coverage. The additional tank platoons meant more than just another maneuver element to cover the battlespace — they proved critical in missions, such as route security, where their thermal sights and crew-served weapons denied local insurgents the ability to emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While HMMWVs and CFVs could, and did, carry out this mission, tanks proved to be a much more intimidating deterrent to insurgent activity. Even with three additional tank platoons, we required additional dismounts, which we gained from our FST. Our platoon received three soldiers (two light wheeled vehicle mechanics and a petroleum supply specialist) to serve as HMMWV drivers, which freed up three cavalry scouts for dismounted operations. While three additional dismounts do not seem like much, they meant the difference between one large squad of seven and two teams of five that could maneuver by bounds on the ground. These soldiers also proved to be some of the best in the platoon and their capabilities enhanced platoon recovery operations. With improved dismount capability, our platoons were much more effective at engaging the local populace and gathering information while maintaining local security. This improvisation parallels what cavalry units did during World War II to fulfill the complex mission set with which they were faced — they also pulled soldiers from different units to augment combat power and enhance capabilities. Developing troop intelligence cells provided another important addition to the ground reconnaissance troops in 3-7 CAV — they contained a tactical human intelligence team (THT), a tactical psychological operations team (TPT), and two or more cavalry scouts or fire support specialists, all led by the troop fire support officer (FSO). The THT and TPT assets were provided to augment capabilities at the squadron level. However, squadron leaders saw an advantage to pushing them to the lowest level possible. The troop intelligence cell collected information while on patrol with the platoons, and it also analyzed information from patrol debriefs and from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources to develop targeting in the troop AO. With such enhanced capability, the troops could gather their own intelligence and develop it through the troop intelligence cell. This improved the troops’ ability to swiftly act on targets that operated in and out of their AOs. By December 2007, 3-7 CAV succeeded in lessening the violence in Adhamiyah enough to establish a Sons of Iraq (SOI) local security program. The close relationship cultivated by platoon leaders and troop commanders with the SOI improved security and further decreased violence. By early 2008, the squadron AO expanded and doubled its original size; adding a Stryker rifle company from 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment, enhanced its combat power, further emphasizing 3-7 CAV’s significance as another maneuver element. In March of that year, elements of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army attacked Iraqi army (IA) checkpoints surrounding Sadr City in eastern Baghdad in response to an IA offensive in the southern city of Basra.9 In response, the 4th Infantry Division commander determined an armor-heavy force would be needed to drive off the insurgents, restore the IA to its checkpoints, and further improve security in Sadr City. He tasked 3-7 CAV and several other armored units with providing security support for checkpoint improve- “The additional tank platoons meant more than just another maneuver element to cover the battlespace — they proved critical in missions, such as route security, where their thermal sights and crew-served weapons denied local insurgents the ability to emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While HMMWVs and CFVs could, and did, carry out this mission, tanks proved to be a much more intimidating deterrent to insurgent activity.” 19 ment. Without heavy armor assets, the squadron would not have been able to accomplish its mission in the IED- and sniper-rich environment of Sadr City. The use of covert IED interdiction, such as small kill teams, was not possible because the local populace harbored insurgent forces. The only viable option to protect checkpoint improvement operations was an overt, heavily armored force. The squadron’s success is attributed to the brigade commander’s decision to increase 3-7 CAV’s combat power; however, when redeployed, 3-7 CAV lost its augmentation. The restructuring sought to simplify Army reset and a multitude of company- and battalion-level changes of command, and facilitate training tanker core competencies. This is indicative of the divide between doctrine and operational reality. Just as we did after World War II, we eliminated proven organizational modifications in the interest of simplifying logistics support.10 Modifying Cavalry Doctrine to Match Reality A schism exists between current cavalry doctrine and the reality of the current operating environment. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, limits the role of reconnaissance squadrons by stating, “Although they possess sufficient armament and firepower for self-defense, they were not overendowed with weapons systems and armor protection for a distinct reason. The historical principle is that reconnaissance units that are sufficiently equipped to fight are routinely used for fighting instead of performing reconnaissance. … When reconnaissance units engage in direct combat missions, reconnaissance ceases.”11 The manual’s instructions reflect the current doctrinal adherence to the theory that cavalry organizations exist only to gather information. Their lack of armor and firepower provide them with improved stealth and speed, but these virtues must not be confused with the ability to survive incidental contact with the enemy. Our current organization harkens back to the jeep-heavy platoons of World War II with their moderate armor augmentation. Army leaders at that time realized that when reconnaissance elements operate forward of their main body, they will likely make contact with the enemy. In his article, “Fighting for Information,” in the MayJune 2008 edition of ARMOR, then Major Daniel Davis states, “Trying to develop the situation out of contact is a worthy goal, but one is rarely afforded the luxury to do so.”12 This is especially true in the counterinsurgency environment, in which we are currently operating, where units are encouraged to live in and amongst the populace. In addition to the ability to fight for information, cavalry units need capabilities to ensure mission success for every operation they are tasked to carry out. In historical examples, and again in the current operating environment, the Army tasks cavalry units to carry out offensive and defensive operations in an economy-of-force role, as well as reconnaissance and security operations. This is due to large AOs and the complex missions the Army is currently executing. Up until now, mission success is attributed only to forward-thinking leaders who ensure these units are properly equipped to carry out a wide range of missions. To ensure future cavalry units receive necessary assets, we must consider what their optimal organization should look like and adjust doctrine accordingly. Ideally, the HBCT ARS will incorporate ground, aerial, and sensor capabilities to answer the BCT commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). According to FM 3-90.6 The Brigade Combat Team, “The HBCT is best employed against enemy mechanized and armored forces because it offers the best protection of the three BCTs.”13 Therefore, the ARS must also be able to survive chance contact with these types of forces. Consequently, the HMMWV, even in its current armored state, is not the preferred platform for this mission. As FM 3-90.6 also states, “The HBCT does not deploy rapidly, although its soldiers can draw from prepositioned supplies worldwide.”14 Thus, we should not concern ourselves with ensuring that this formation remains lightweight or rapidly deployable overall. Therefore, the addition of three tank platoons would provide each ground reconnaissance troop the ability to fight for information with minimal impact on transportability. One possible substitute for the HMMWV is the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV). The M-ATV reportedly offers protection from explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), which range from advanced forms of rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and high-explosive antitank (HEAT) tank rounds to IEDs encountered in the Iraqi theater of operations. It also provides off-road capability similar to that of the original HMMWV before the addition of armor.15 As for aerial reconnaissance, a habitual support relationship should be established with an attack reconnaissance company from the combat aviation brigade assigned to the parent division. This is in addition to the squadron’s current unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capability. In the likely event the HBCT deploys separately from its parent division and combat aviation brigade, the same relationship should be “Our platoon received three soldiers (two light wheeled vehicle mechanics and a petroleum supply specialist) to serve as HMMWV drivers, which freed up three cavalry scouts for dismounted operations. While three additional dismounts do not seem like much, they meant the difference between one large squad of seven and two teams of five that could maneuver by bounds on the ground.” 20 extended to a similarly sized attack reconnaissance element in theater. These aviation elements should not be attached or OPCON to the ARS, since the means to logistically support aviation organizations are far outside the capabilities of the ARS. Efforts are currently underway to augment cavalry organizations with a wide array of sensors. While advanced versions of ground sensing radar (GSR), UAS, and small unmanned ground vehicles (SUG-Vs) will undoubtedly enhance the ARS’s facilities, they cannot replace the abilities of human observation and judgment. Furthermore, sensors cannot establish the relationships that produce HUMINT. These three types of changes in ARS organization require minimum enhancement of the unit’s support capability. In his article, “Reorganizing the Recon Squadron to Enhance Heavy Brigade Combat Team Capabilities,” Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Broadwater proposes, “At a minimum, the tanks should have nine tank mechanics (three of them noncommissioned officers), one additional M88, three M978 fuelers, one M977 cargo heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), and two palletized load systems with drivers assigned to the squadron’s FSC to accomplish its mission.”16 The aviation assets would require no additional squadron support capabilities and, as with previous fielding initiatives, new vehicles and sensors should be accompanied by operator and maintainer training. The light wheeled vehicle mechanics currently assigned to maintain HMMWVs could easily retrain for M-ATVs. These few changes will not add any burden to squadron support, yet they will go along way to improving survivability and the ability to fight for information in the current and future operating environments. While current cavalry doctrine states that reconnaissance ceases once contact with the enemy is made, it does not. While the specific tactical mission task ceases, the unit’s mission of maintaining enemy contact and providing timely and accurate information on the enemy’s composition, disposition, and location for the higher unit commander continues through contact. As throughout history, it is the ability to survive contact with the enemy and continue to fight for information that makes cavalry organizations valuable to the current operating environment. Cavalry units have been continually modified to fulfill an expanded purpose or to meet the needs of the current conflict. Cavalry organizations conduct and will continue to conduct operations beyond the scope of current doctrine. Therefore, we must seek to officially modify their organization, doctrine, and training to match and properly resource this need. History has proven that organizations capable of fighting for information and carrying out offense and defense in an economy-of-force roll remain effective information gatherers. Perhaps they are even more effective based on their ability to survive chance encounters with the enemy. Doctrine should be modified to match this reality. To maintain the status quo is to do so at the expense of situational awareness and ultimately soldiers’ lives. Captain John Gassmann is currently assigned to 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 4th BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. He received a B. A. from the University of Kansas. His military education includes Maneuver Captain Career Course, Maneuver Officer Basic Course, Cavalry Leader Course, Scout Leader Course, and Ranger School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3-7 CAV), Fort Stewart, GA; XO, B Troop, 3-7 CAV, Fort Stewart; platoon leader, A Troop, 3-7 CAV, Fort Stewart; and assistant S3, 3-7 CAV, Fort Stewart. This article would not have been possible without the knowledge and assistance of Dr. Robert

S. Cameron, historian, U. S. Army Armor Center. Not only did he take time for an interview, he provided me an advance copy of his forthcoming publication, To Fight or Not To Fight? Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom. My deepest heartfelt thanks go to him. “By December 2007, 3-7 CAV succeeded in lessening the violence in Adhamiyah enough to establish a Sons of Iraq (SOI) local security program. The close relationship cultivated by platoon leaders and troop commanders with the SOI improved security and further decreased violence.” Notes 1I use the term “cavalry” liberally throughout this article. When referencing cavalry units, I am referring to all units carrying a cavalry regimental lineage and those organized to conduct reconnaissance. This refers to all cavalry organizations. 2Dr. Robert S. Cameron, To Fight or Not To Fight? Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom, manuscript (pending publication), U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, 2009, p. 1-2. 3Ibid., p. 1-1. 4Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 4 August 2006. 5HQDA, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, GPO, Washington, DC, 20 September 2006. 6Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey D. Broadwater, Telephone Interview with Author, 25 August 2009. 7Ibid. 8Michelle Tan, “Specialist who dove on grenade nominated for Medal of Honor,” Army Times, 13 December 2006. 9Jomana Karadsheh, “Clashes in Baghdad’s Sadr City Kill 20,” CNN.com, 9 April 2009, available online at http://edition. cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/09/iraq.main/index. html#cnnSTCText. 10Dr. Robert S. Cameron, Correspondence with Author, 24 September 2009. 11FM 3-20.96, pp. 1-9 and 1-10. 12Major Daniel L. Davis, “Fighting for Information,” ARMOR, May–June 2008, p. 29. 13FM 3-90.6, p. A-1. 14Ibid. 15Dan Lamothe, “Oshkosh to make new M-ATV, Pentagon says,” Army Times, 1 July 2009. 16Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey D. Broadwater, “Reorganizing the Recon Squadron to Enhance Heavy Brigade Combat Team Capabilities,” ARMOR, September-October 2007, p. 41. 21