Battalion Tactical Operations Center

“The command and control [C2] system is defined as the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to directing and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. The term system is deceptive. It does not solely mean an arrangement of equipment such as a communications system. The C2 system is an organization of resources the commander uses to help plan, direct, coordinate, and control military operations to ensure mission accomplishment. The result is combat effectiveness.”1 The above statement defines the purpose and intent of a tactical operations center (TOC) in a forward deployed environment. The TOC must meet certain basic criteria for any battalion to be successful. According to U. S Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, the TOC should, at a minimum, include staff and liaison personnel to help the commander exercise control; communications and related equipment; spaced-based systems; and network/automation equipment, such as phones, computers, and printers, to support day-to-day activities.2 There are many important factors, such as mounted/dismounted patrols, lethal and nonlethal targeting, Iraqi Security Force (ISF) integration, route clearance, and managing all other lines of operations (LOO), all of which contribute to a unit’s deployment success. There is, however, one area that appears to be underemphasized and will negatively affect the entire battalion if left unattended or ignored. This area, which falls under the broad fields of interest of a commander, is the TOC’s functionalities.3 This article provides a general outline and discusses the fundamental principals of TOC operations as employed by the 2d Combined Arms Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, during Operation Iraqi Freedom V. These areas are addressed as they pertain to the TOC layout, tactical operations, administrative operations, and personnel management.

The TOC Layout Before any unit can conduct successful combat operations, a fully functional TOC must be established. There are several factors the battle captain, or battle noncommissioned officer (NCO), must take into consideration during the planning phase. The first consideration is standing up the “pit” crew, which consists of the radio telephone operator (RTO), the command post of the future (CPOF) operator, an S2 operations soldier, a battle captain, and a battle NCO.4 We recommend two CPOF systems be used in the TOC, one manned by the CPOF operator and the other by the S2 operations soldier. The best layout for the pit is to establish a horseshoe formation that facilitates good command and control (see Figure 1). We placed the battle captain and NCO in the center of the horseshoe, which allowed for efficient communications between all elements and an overall view of the situation. The CPOF operator and RTO were positioned next to one another and adjacent to the battle NCO, which allowed for efficient battle tracking. To complete the operations center, we used a projection screen that displayed CPOF imagery on a wall; the patrol tracker and the rolling battle update brief (BUB) on television screens; and commanders critical information requirements (CCIR) on a wall. Adjacent to the pit was the effects cell, the S4 desk, and the S1 desk. The TOC was reconstructed with shorter walls, which allowed for better communications, good command and control, and situational awareness when significant actions (SIGACTS) occurred.

Tactical Operations Like all units preparing for combat operations, it is crucial to train pit crews on all battle drills prior to assuming TOC duties and responsibilities in theater. Common battle drills include reacting to contact improvised explosive device/explosively formed projectile (IED/EFP) attacks; indirect-fire attacks on forward operating base (FOB), combat outpost (COP), or joint security stations (JSS); precision small-arms fire (PSAF) attacks; killed in action (KIA) procedures; mass casualty (MASCAL) events; impromptu offensive operations; time-sensitive targets (TST), or contact involving nonorganic units transiting the unit’s operating environment.

Several steps were taken to train our unit and plan for various situations that might occur. The first step was to learn from adjacent units with recent experience in theater. Our battalion TOC personnel visited every battalion TOC on the FOB to collect battle drills. Each drill was analyzed, tested, and improved (if necessary), and incorporated into our unit standard operating procedures (SOP) manual. The standard procedure for battle drills began with the battle captain, NCO, or RTO announcing, “attention in the TOC,” quickly followed by the “five Ws:” who; what; where; when; why?

The battle captain and NCO directed assets and communicated with the unit in contact and higher headquarters. The RTO was responsible for monitoring all traffic from the unit in contact, relaying it to the battle captain and NCO, and logging all information on DA Form 1594, “Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officers Log.” The CPOF operator also recorded all information that came over the radio and compiled the SIGACT report while the event was occurring.

The S2 automatically pulled a past enemy situational template (SITEMP) for the area so we could accurately prepare for any follow-on attacks. This tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) was very important because there were different follow-on scenarios for different sectors in our operating environment. For example, in one portion of our operating environment if a unit was struck by an EFP/IED and was dismounted on the ground for more than 20 minutes, they would receive PSAF. Having the ability to go back 2 months and analyze attacks in specific areas is crucial to the decisionmaking process for current SIGACTs, which is why the S2 also has CPOF. The S2 was also charged with communicating with tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) assets at brigade level.

It was also beneficial to include the S1, S4, and battalion medical officer (MEDO) in battle drills. The S1 had various reports, such as casualty reports and Purple Heart submissions, which had to be completed and submitted within a specified timeframe. The S4’s primary responsibility was to coordinate recovery assets and begin the 14-line report process for battle-lost equipment. The MEDO, who has the responsibility to coordinate with the combat support hospital and mortuary affairs, also served as an important addition to the battle drill. Including each staff section in battle drills greatly increases the TOC’s ability to respond to SIGACTs.

Once potential battle drills were identified, we developed specific duty descriptions for each soldier operating in the TOC. Each of these duties was refined through multiple theater-specific vignettes. Full rehearsals were conducted for each battle drill once the pit crew understood its task. Once the vignette and training scenario were complete, we conducted after-action reviews, which helped identify deficiencies in our plan and mitigate confusing instructions. Below is an example of one vignette we used for training purposes: Situation. 2d Platoon, D Company, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor (2/D/2-69 AR), is conducting a standard route security pa- “There are many important factors, such as mounted/dismounted patrols, lethal and nonlethal targeting, Iraqi Security Force (ISF) integration, route clearance, and managing all other lines of operations (LOO), all of which contribute to a unit’s deployment success. There is, however, one area that appears to be underemphasized and will negatively affect the entire battalion if left unattended or ignored. This area, which falls under the broad fields of interest of a commander, is the TOC’s functionalities.” 22

— Figure 1 S6 Plans area Effects/ S2 Fusion Cell HCT/ TPT

CAT II Interpreter S3, SGM

Projection screen BTL CPT/NCO

S2 CPOF trol on Route Oilers. Their patrol consists of 4 M1151s, 18 PAX, and 1 interpreter. There is a general support (GS) air weapons team (AWT) in the area and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) status is green. All routes in Operating Environment Panther are Amber. 2/D/2-69 AR will follow Airport Road, Route Brewers, Predators, Pluto, and Oilers. Dealer X-Ray: “Panther X-ray, this is Dealer X-ray, Dealer White contact IED on RTE Oilers vic MB 498 858. Currently assessing casualties; BDA [battle damage assessment] will follow.” Battle captain calls, “attention in the TOC,” and disseminates all known information using the basic five Ws. At this point, enough information exists to begin movement: the battle captain brings quick reaction force (QRF) to REDCON 1 to standby at the gate for further task and purpose and requests all available ISR assets (S2 operations monitors); the S2 pulls enemy SITEMP in that area; recovery assets go to REDCON 1; the status of friendly elements in sector are identified and their availability to provide assistance (to include nonorganic units) is confirmed.

Dealer X-Ray: “Casualty update follows: 2 urgent surgical, 2 urgent, 1 walking wounded. We have established security, request ETA of AWT.” The battle captain must immediately determine if the unit can self-recover and conduct internal casualty evacuation (CAS EVAC), and to which FOB the wounded will be taken. There are several simultaneous actions required, which include providing battle roster numbers, which are needed ASAP to identify the wounded soldier; processing casualty reports; obtaining the wounded soldier’s medical file to confirm medical history/ medication allergies; processing the serious incident report (SIR), which is due to brigade no later than one hour following the incident; and making contact with the medical facility where the wounded will be transported, ensuring it is prepped and ready to receive casualties.5 Dealer X-Ray: “We are unable to self-recover, but need to get 3 urgent surgical soldiers to the 86th combat support hospital. We cannot stay on the scene.” At this point, the battalion should designate another unit to overwatch the damaged vehicle. There are three possible courses of actions: have QRF secure the site; redirect an in-sector unit; or provide overwatch with an AWT until additional forces arrive. By this time, the TOC should have enough information to begin the SIR. This information should include the number of wounded soldiers by battle roster number; a sequence of events; the direction of travel; order of march; the location of each soldier in the vehicle; countermeasures, to include Dukes and Rhinos and their distribution within the patrol; and actions taken by the unit in contact. Recovery assets and operations should also be monitored. The battle captain and NCO must balance the need to maneuver forces with the requirement to complete administrative information. The above vignette presents a very complex and difficult event in terms of command and control. The key to success is to push information and assets to the unit in contact. At a minimum, a unit in contact needs rotary wing support and friendly units moving to its location. We found that a contact situation will calm significantly as soon as an AWT arrives on station.

Once the TOC crew completed the training vignette, it moved toward preparing for tactical operations. Under tactical operations, any TOC must be prepared to conduct deliberate, hasty, and QRF combat operations.

Deliberate operations will primarily be synchronized through the battalion’s planning cell; however, there are three key areas the TOC crew must supervise and influence to ensure the success of any deliberated operation. These key areas include final synchronization of assets, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), QRF, AWT, and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) coordination; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), weapons intelligence team (WIT), combined explosives exploitation cell (CEXC), and adjacent unit coordination (both CF and ISF); and confirmation of timelines. Most operations in the counterinsurgency environment are executed at the company level, but they are executed with battalion- and brigade-level assets. Hasty operations often result from sensitive reporting, driven by intelligence generated from brigade- or division-level assets, walk-in sources, or requested assistance from the ISF. Common hasty missions include time-sensitive targets to capture or detain high-value targets (HVTs), react to caches, or assist nonorganic units operating in a unit’s battlespace. For synchronization, hasty operations follow the same guidelines as deliberate operations: coordinate with adjacent units, coordinate with higher headquarters for needed assets, and locate any ISF units that may be operating in the area. Our biggest lesson learned was simply ensuring that all needed assets were organized and the location of the target was confirmed based on available intelligence. TOC personnel must have the mindset to set conditions for subordinate unit success.

“Several steps were taken to train our unit and plan for various situations that might occur. The first step was to learn from adjacent units with recent experience in theater. Our battalion TOC personnel visited every battalion TOC on the FOB to collect battle drills. Each drill was analyzed, tested, and improved (if necessary), and incorporated into our unit standard operating procedures (SOP) manual.” The final tactical operation that the TOC must be prepared to execute is a QRF mission. This is a fast-paced mission, but the TOC must still ensure the QRF’s success by identifying its launch criteria, staging location, and reaction time. The battalion must also identify a secondary QRF, a heavy QRF (if required), and a recovery team. Although every unit knows the importance of having a QRF, in case of an emergency, few take the time to synchronize all assets needed to successfully accomplish this mission. A good lesson learned is unfortunately a likely scenario.

Although information and questions arise immediately, tactical patience is prudent prior to fully committing all assets. For example, the battalion QRF may not be the nearest friendly force. Using the battalion QRF for post-blast analysis may not be the most efficient use of friendly forces if another unit is available to provide assistance.6 Proper management of assets and the use of tactical patience by the battle captain and NCO will facilitate a post-blast analysis without causing a unit to maintain security for extended periods of time, or cause a unit to leave the objective to execute this task. Below is a standard QRF mission: “Panther X-Ray, this is Cobra X-ray, Cobra Red contact EFP, one vehicle mobility kill, three WIA [wounded in action], request QRF.”

In the early months of deployment, our initial reaction was to immediately launch QRF. However, once they arrived and dealt with the immediate needs of the situation, a post-blast analysis was required to determine the type of IED, initiation system, emplacement techniques, and so on. In these situations, EOD is notified and has to be escorted by another patrol, which may or may not be prepared to start point (SP). If the vehicle cannot be recovered, another patrol is identified, or a unit is pulled from the objective to perform escort duties.

The primary mission of the unit in contact will always be CASEVAC; however, a unit cannot leave unsecured equipment on the battlefield. In a contact situation where soldiers are injured, the vehicle will most likely be a mobility kill. Another unit is now needed to recover that vehicle, bringing three units onto the battlefield and significantly lengthening the amount of time on the objective. TOC personnel must manage all other required actions following contact, allowing the unit in contact to take care of its soldiers. After our first QRF mission, we conducted an AAR to identify and correct noted deficiencies, which resulted in: Issuing fragmentary order (FRAGO) in case of IED/EFP contact. If a unit made IED/EFP contact and needed assistance, we would FRAGO any element in our operating environment to the contact site, which reduced response time to the unit in contact, thus affording options and time needed to synchronize all necessary assets with the QRF before they were launched.

Establishing a battalion recovery QRF. Although the brigade had a recovery QRF available on request, it took a great deal of time, thus making it beneficial to establish the asset at battalion level. We kept a recovery team on standby at all times with a 30-minute response time; a wrecker and M88 were also on standby to react to the needs of heavy and wheeled units.

Immediately requesting EOD assets. On detonation of any IED/EFP attack on coalition forces, or on detonation of any large device, such as suicide vest or vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), we immediately requested EOD assets, which were ready to SP approximately 30 minutes after the initial request. Providing them with a warning order (WARNO) to initiate movement significantly reduced reaction time. We found that the required information to receive EOD assets was almost always available with the initial contact report. EOD will need vital information such as the composition and frequency of the escorting unit, type of incident, grid of attack, link-up point, and current situation report (SITREP). A good pit crew will gather all of this information without specifically asking the unit in contact to provide it. The changes to our QRF management allowed us to maximize our efforts with efficient allocation of forces, minimizing the number of soldiers on the objective, and reducing the risks associated with flooding the objective with coalition forces.

Administrative Operations Setting up a unit TOC for tactical success should be the foremost priority; however, administrative operations should also be tightly monitored to ensure daily efficiency. There are several basic areas that a battalion-level TOC operations cell is required to monitor, which include monitoring reports, trackers, and daily patrols and general taskings from brigade, such as FOB force protection, FOB QRF, and third-country national (TCN) escorts. Tracking day-to-day patrols can be challenging, especially if the battalion is operating out of two COPs, three JSS, with three maneuver companies forward deployed from the FOB, three based on the FOB, and an average of 20 patrol elements in sector throughout any given day. We used a simple tracker that showed patrols 24 hours ahead, tracked by a patrol number, which was hyperlinked to each patrol’s concept of operation (CONOP) slide, unit, call sign, mission, patrol composition, SP and return point (RP) times, and whether or not the patrol was a combined patrol with Iraqi army, Iraqi Police, or National Police (See Figure 2). While deployed, our unit received numerous taskings via brigade and battalion FRAGOs, which required a system to Figure 2 manage. We created a simple matrix that tracked each tasking by company and was hyperlinked to the FRAGO for reference. The battle NCO updated the tracker daily and forwarded it to the companies and staff to ensure accountability. This tracker was a great benefit to the battalion and prevented missed suspense times/dates (See Figure 3). We used color codes in the unit-designation boxes to represent task statuses: green = complete; yellow = in progress; red = missed suspense; and grey = not applicable to a particular unit.

Shift work and power generation are two systems that, when improperly managed, create an inefficient and sometimes non-mission capable TOC. These two systems are often overlooked by deployed units, until the system fails. Since operations run 24 hours a day, it is imperative to select the right individuals to perform each TOC duty. These individuals must be intelligent, quick witted, and have the ability to handle a great deal of stress. We ran two 12-hour shifts, with shift changes at 0700 and 1900 hours, which were hours of low enemy and friendly activity during a normal day. The pit-crew shifts were staffed with three soldiers, one NCO, and one officer; the three soldiers rotated between CPOF and RTO duties, which provided flexibility for chow rotations, rest periods, and facilitated block leave. Each staff section, including the S1, S2, S4, S5, and S6, had representatives in the TOC 24/7.

Although we operated in a hard-standing building with a dedicated power source, power failure is very common, especially during summer months in Iraq. We found that using a 3K generator was sufficient as a backup supply for essential TOC operations. A 3K generator produces enough energy to power radios, blue force tracker, projection screens, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and backup lighting. We added a “loss of power” battle drill to our training requirements, which enabled us to provide backup power to the TOC within 2 minutes of a power loss. Running an efficient combat TOC in a forward environment may not be the most glamorous position, but it is vital to the battalion’s success. Posting battle drills where every soldier, NCO, and officer in the TOC can constantly see them and reference them instills a firm understanding of how the TOC will operate during contact. This system also improves the pit crew’s efficiency, connects them to high standards, and results in better support to subordinate units in the operating environment. Emplacing systems to monitor daily patrols and taskings, and training and preparing the TOC to support combat operations, creates a 90-percent solution to running an efficient TOC. Using training vignettes daily for the first 2 weeks, followed by weekly vignettes, will keep pit crews efficient and successful. Experience and lessons learned from enemy contact will refine the pit crew’s reaction and drive necessary changes to systems.

Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 31 May 1997. 2Ibid.

3Broad fields of interest are the areas that the commander oversees during operations and include personnel (G1/S1), intelligence (G2/S2), operations and training (G3/S3), logistics (G4/S4), civil-military operations (G5/S5), and signal operations (G6/S6).

4The CPOF is a linked system designed to promote situational awareness and standardized reporting of all significant activities throughout the area of operations. 5Once coordination is made with the receiving combat support hospital, the battalion S1 and medical officer tracks the status of individuals.

6A post-blast analysis, conducted by EOD assets, is crucial to the collection of actionable intelligence and is required for all IED/EFP attacks on coalition forces. Captain Edward M. Custer is currently a student at the Engineer Captain Career Course, Fort Leonard Wood, MO. He received a B. S. from Bowling Green State University. His military education includes Engineer Officer Basic Course, Advanced Search Course, Airborne School, Air Assault School, and Sapper School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include operations officer, 2d Battalion, 69th (2-69) Armor, 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team (3HBCT), 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Forward Operating Base Rustimiya, Iraq; XO, E Company, 2-69 Armor, Fort Benning, GA; and platoon leader, E Company, 2-69 Armor, Baquba, Iraq, and Fort Benning. Captain Douglas K. Serota is currently a student at the Maneuver Captain Career Course, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B. S. from Auburn University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Leaders Course, Airborne School, and Ranger School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3 and scout platoon leader, 2-69 Armor, 3HBCT, 3ID, Fort Benning; and platoon leader, C Company, 2-69 Armor, 3HBCT, 3ID, Fort Benning.

— 25 Document Date Task Suspense B 1/504 Aco Bco Cco Dco Eco Fco HHC

FRAGO 194 to 07-07 19-Jan-08 NLT 20 FEB 08 all companies will ensure all assigned personnel receive the cold weather awareness briefings, Appendix 169 to Annex I, & chlorine awareness briefing, Appendix 170 to Annex I, to protect the force by increasing awareness of cold protective measure, chlorine protective measures and emergency actions down to the lowest level. Companies will utilize their trained field sanitation team (FST) or medical personnel (68W) to conduct classes. NLT 20 FEB 08, company CDRs, XOs, or 1SGs report completion to the BN MEDO. POC for this action is...

FRAGO 21 to 08-01 18-Feb-08 All companies, NLT 221700FEB08 will mark all company containers IAW the attached guidance (Appendix 26 to Annex I). Reference the company spreadsheet for information needed (Appendix 27 to Annex I). Excluding Renegade all updates will be returned to POC. POC for this action is...

FRAGO 19 to 08-01 16-Feb-08 All companies will submit FRG newsletters to S1 NLT 27 FEB 08 to facilitate the timely processing of newsletters to each company FRG leader in the rear. POC for this action is...

FRAGO 19 to 08-01 16-Feb-08 All companies will submit to P1 NLT 27 FEB 08 the name and achievement of one (1) lieutenant per company for P6 achievement AAM and one nomination for the Pink Panther Award.

FRAGO 19 to 08-01 16-Feb-08 All companies will conduct 3ID redeployment safety briefing (LINK) and report completion to S1 NLT 28 FEB 08 to facilitate discussion on safety topics relating to the battalion's upcoming redeployment. Briefings may be squad size with leadership facilitating the discussion. POC for this action is...

FRAGO 19 to 08-01 16-Feb-08 All companies, the next Panther OPD is 021430MAR08 at the Rustamiyah D-FAC VIP room. The OPD is mandatory for all 2-69 AR officers; Cobra has an exemption for one officer at COP 927. The OPD will be executed in two parts. Part I is an adaptive leadership presentation (one platoon from each company will brief one slide for 5 minutes) Part II is a lessons learned presentation (each company commander will brief one slide for 5 minutes ̛ one lesson learned during tactical phase ̛ issue/discussion/ recommendation formation). Companies will submit slides to S3 training officer NLT 291700FEB08.

FRAGO 15 to 08-01 12-Feb-08 All companies, NLT 01 MAR 08 identify soldiers on OIF V awards roll up matrix and submit combat badge recommendations for soldiers who have not received a combat badge while in theater to the S1 section. All companies utilize 3-3 BCT multiple submission SOP at - LINK - of the 2-69 AR shared folder. POC for this action is...