How We Operate

• Make security and safety your first priorities

• Make security and safety your first priorities.

• Help the Iraqis win ņ don’twin it for them.

• Treat the Iraqi people with dignity and respect. Learn and respect Iraqi customs and culture.

• Maintain strict standards and iron discipline everyday. Risk assess every mission ņ no complacency ņ no comfort!!!

• Information saves lives ņ share it and protect it.

• Maintain your situational awareness at all times ņ we are in an unforgiving environment. ADAPT Maintain your situational awareness at all times we are in an unforgiving

• Take care of your equipment ņ it will take care of you.

• Innovate and adapt ņ situations here don’t lend themselves to cookie-cutter solutions.

• Focus on the enemy and be opportunistic.

• Be patient ņ don’t rush to failure.

• Take care of yourself and take care of each other ņ teamwork. ROCK OF THE MARNE treated with equal vigor, but the security LOO would be the first among equals. Military professionals are most comfortable operating within the security LOO; Task Force Marne was no exception. As of this writing, more than 6,000 enemy personnel have been captured or killed while conducting operations. It is a fact that the enemy facing Task Force Marne was one that responded to brute force. If they shot at us, we shot back. However, this metric means very little in a COIN environment. What really matters is the amount of kinetic activity the enemy conducts and whether or not he is recruiting support from the local populace. The metric that mattered most to Task Force Marne was the number of attacks against its assets. The months of May, June, and July 2007 were the toughest with more than 25 attacks per day; by April 2008, that number was down to less than 2 per day and continued to drop. The decrease in enemy attacks was directly linked to the task force’s ability to drive the enemy from former sanctuary areas, which resulted in lower attack levels in Baghdad, as well as in the Marne’s areas of operation. To accomplish this, the task force devised a three-phased plan that focused operations on joint strengths and used all available enablers at the division level.

The first phase focused on leveraging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, along with conventional and unconventional ground forces to shape the battlefield. The division worked very closely with the U. S. Air Force (USAF) and higher echelon G2 resources to identify, and then eliminate, threat areas such as potential improvised explosive device (IED) and high-value target (HVT) locations. The targeting process for the task force was relatively simple; if a specific area had suspicious activity or appeared to be a potential IED cache site, it was blown up by either indirect-or direct-fire assets. This engagement criteria paid huge dividends as secondary explosions confirmed enemy caches and saved the lives of many soldiers. Value added to the operation was the counter-IED cell the task force created. Implementing this cell was a real accomplishment during phase one as several division staff members focused on identifying enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and sharing life-saving lessons learned with the force. Simultaneously, the task force worked with Special Operations Forces (SOF) to target and eliminate high-value individuals (HVIs) who were either planning or directing attacks against coalition forces. It is important to note that these missions were focused on targeting extremists and not specific religious groups. Synchronized operations between the task force and SOF resulted in more than 100 HVIs being captured or killed.

Phase two of the operation normally consisted of focused, kinetic operations and establishing relationships with the local populace. The key component for success during this phase was building a patrol base, combat outpost (COP), forward operating base (FOB), or joint security station (JSS). As of this writing, Task Force Marne had constructed a total of 59 patrol bases, COPs, FOBs, JSSs, and expanded 13 more. This mindset of living and working with the populace led to the task force owning multiple areas where soldiers lived on a daily basis. Once Task Force Marne soldiers cleared a region of enemy, the focus turned to establishing a permanent presence in the area. When coalition forces began build-Figure 1 Figure 2 “As apart of the new strategy created by the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Task Force Marne’s commanding general, General David Petraeus, focused on living among the population. Platoon, company, battalion, and brigade combat teams (BCTs) became adept at implementing the responsibilities of a warrior, protecting their area while contributing to a local community.” PREPARATION FOR VICTORY

It is All About People; ISF ņ Iraqi Face Intelligence Drives Everything Love Bank ņ Consideration for Every Operation Master Information Operations ņ Inform, Influence, Assess Obligations to the Strategic Soldier ņ Make No New Enemies

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• Task Organize for the Mission “Defeat” IEDs Master Keys to Exploitation and Prosecution of Targeted Persons Constant Adaptation, Innovation, Improvement Teamwork ņ Winning Spirit, Positive Attitude, Empowerment

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— ing a patrol base, many locals asked if they were staying. When soldiers on the ground ensured local citizens they were not leaving, the locals asked how they could help. This was the critical turning point that made soldiers want to provide area security to a population yearning for freedom from oppression. By living and working with the locals daily, leaders on the ground developed a refined Fingerspitzengefuhl (fingertip feel) of the area. Phase three of the operation saw BCTs focused on meeting the needs of the people through a variety of initiatives, which ranged from creating local security groups, such as concerned local citizens/Sons of Iraq (CLC/SOI), to leveraging different funding sites to repair and guard critical infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and government buildings, helping locals create local governing and nahia councils receptive to the people. Local governing councils are a very important part of this process as they serve as a conduit for the people to express their true feelings on future infrastructure development and economic programs.

Creating the CLC/SOI programs, a by-product of the “awakening” of Sunnis in Al Anbar province in 2007, provided the task force a much needed way of thickening its ground force while simultaneously preventing extremist groups from replenishing their diminished ranks. The task force understood that many citizens in their areas of operations desired to protect and serve their local communities. The task force used commander’s emergency response program (CERP) money to cover the salaries of these members, as well as pay individuals for turning in, or pointing out, weapons caches. The CLC/SOI programs, although very successful in helping Iraqis help themselves, were not intended to be along-term, major employment programs. They were designed to address security problems in Task Force Marne’s areas of operations, and be overwatched by soldiers who had liberated the areas from extremists. These prerequisites ensured the total numbers for these programs did not exceed 32,000.

The task force identified early on in the rotation that employment was a key component of the economic LOO, which drove the task force’s concern of shifting CLC/ SOI to other employment opportunities. This issue was addressed as the task force transitioned approximately 25 percent of the CLC/SOI membership into the ISF structure. The remainder of the CLC/SOI population was given priority for moving into a civilian service corps (CSC)/department of public works program (DPW). This program focused on transitioning CLC/SOI into employment or educational opportunities that served the common good. To facilitate this process, the task force’s G9, civil affairs section, worked closely with vocational trade schools located in the Marne’s areas of operations, especially the one located in the Iskanda-riyah industrial complex, to give priority to those CLC/SOI who desired to learn a trade or skill. Workers not interested in pursuing an opportunity at a trade school were given the option to join CSC/DPW groups, which focused on construction work, as well as cleaning vital infrastructure such as markets, canals, and roadways. Regardless of which avenue the CLC/SOI chose to pursue, each had the opportunity to become a productive community member; but more importantly, not to become a member of an extremist group focused on destroying the future of a united Iraq.

As stated earlier, not all of the local population served in the CLC/SOI movement. One of the major reasons for this was the ability of the BCTs and battalions to resource nonlethal lines of operation. For example, battalion commanders could provide “micro-grants” to local businesses that showed promise for future growth and survival. An important success story is the reemergence of fish and poultry farms in the rural areas of the Marne’s operating environment. These farms, with monetary assistance from the task force, reclaimed some of their former status. The forecast for these farms is good as long as they continue to develop capacity and a vision to sustain their gains. All of the aforementioned programs, the CLC/SOI, the CSC/DPW, and micro-grants, kept the window of opportunity opened for the provincial and local governments of Iraq to develop and mature. The division’s senior leaders understood early on the friction at the national level of government. To counter those effects, they realized that the key to winning the hearts and minds of the citizenry in Task Force Marne’s operating areas was to engage the local leadership. It was standard operating procedure for the division’s commanding general, the deputy commanding generals (maneuver and support), and the command sergeant major to engage in “helicopter diplomacy” at least 6 days a week. These meetings were held at various locations throughout the Marne’s operating environment and attendees were invited based on events affecting the task force area. In the span of a week, it was not uncommon for leaders to meet with several tribal sheikhs, provincial governors, CLC/SOI leaders, small business owners, and Iraqi army division commanders. The ability to interface with common Iraqis and important officials enabled division leaders to stay abreast of issues and monitor events daily. These engagements were also essential in establishing good relationships with important government, local, and military officials in the Marne’s battle space. Task Force Marne’s success during its 15-month rotation is attributed directly “Creating the CLC/SOI programs, a by-product of the “awakening” of Sunnis in Al Anbar province in 2007, provided the task force a much needed way of thickening its ground force while simultaneously preventing extremist groups from replenishing their diminished ranks. The task force understood that many citizens in their areas of operations desired to protect and serve their local communities.”

to its soldiers being prepared at the outset of the mission to implement the vision of clear, hold, and build. After extensive preparation, Task Force Marne focused its efforts along five LOO and simultaneously conducted lethal and nonlethal operations, as appropriate. Whether it was eliminating an IED network or helping local markets develop capacity, the soldiers of Task Force Marne seized the initiative and made a positive impact.

The task force’s ability to interact with local government, at the city and nahia levels, proved to be the foundation for all future progress and will facilitate the eventual transition of responsibility to the Iraqi people. While no one knows when the transition will occur, Task Force Marne takes great pride in knowing that it made a difference in the lives of thousands of Iraqis and serves as a positive example for future operations.

Lieutenant General Rick Lynch is currently the commander, III Armored Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. S. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and is a graduate of the U. S. Army War College. He has served in various command positions, to include commanding general, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield, Fort Stewart, GA; commanding general, Multinational Division-Center, Southern Baghdad Area of Operations, Iraq; commander, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment (Mustangs), 1st Cavalry Division, and assistant division commander (Support), 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood. He also served in various staff positions, which include the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept Development and Joint Experimentation, Washington, DC; robotics project officer, Directorate, Combat Development, U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY; chief, Force Development, U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox; and deputy chief of staff, Strategic Effects, Multinational Force-Iraq.

Major T. J. Johnson is currently serving as S3, 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division (3ID), Fort Stewart, GA. He received two B. A. degrees from Ripon College, and an M. M. A. S. from the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. His military education includes the School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Air Assault Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, E Troop (Separate), 1st Cavalry Regiment, Fort Wainwright, AK; division planner, 3ID, Camp Victory, Iraq; XO to the commanding general, 3ID, Camp Victory; and aide-de-camp, Allied Joint Force Command-Naples, Deployable Joint Task Force, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Response Force, Naples, Italy. continued from previous page