Cultural Awareness and Understanding

Current global operations highlight the need for soldiers to have a better understanding and cultural awareness of host-nation countries worldwide. This subject is under discussion to some degree by senior Army leaders; however, it is not yet a priority for junior leaders. For decades, the U. S. Army has focused on war fighting skills and its ability to kill enemy combatants and win battles and wars. The armor branch’s mission, in the scope of tankers and scouts, is to find, close with, and destroy the enemy. A nation’s army, sharpened through training, is the most lethal and highly skilled warrior force it can be. As scouts and tankers, we should focus all efforts on drill and training to produce an effective fighting force that can defeat the enemy through firepower, shock effect, and pure warrior skills; what I term as “distracters” are less of a priority than sharpening our skills to defeat and kill the enemy. According to Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5160.41, Defense Language Program, it is DoD policy that: “Foreign language and regional expertise be considered critical competencies essential to the DoD mission and shall be managed to maximize the accession, development, maintenance, enhancement, and employment of these critical skills appropriate to the Department of Defense’s mission needs. …Military units deploying to, or in transit through, foreign territories shall be equipped, to the greatest extent practicable, with an appropriate capability to communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or transit. The commanders of the combatant commands shall determine what is appropriate based on current situation and circumstances.”1 This, my brethren, is the future. It is a well-known fact that we are asked to perform a myriad of missions and assigned various tasks in the current operating environment. We are also asked to accomplish missions that involve diplomacy, to which anyone who has sat through a local Iraqi council meeting can attest. However, it is difficult to be diplomatic if we do not understand local culture sensitivities throughout our areas of operation. As an Army, we recently did a lot of catching up on cultural awareness, specifically in Iraq. General George Casey’s implementation of an in-country insurgency academy was a step in the right direction. More importantly, cultural awareness training, now mandated for units prior to a rotation in country, is also helpful, but these initiatives only skim the surface of how we can prepare. In my experiences, this training is highly lacking and is only an introduction to becoming a true regional cultural expert. In a recent article by Ullrich Fichtner, he discusses the “crash course” method of instruction in the U. S. Army’s efforts to catch up on its lack of cultural understanding: “The group of instructors sitting around the conference table is responsible for the new Army’score issue, cultural awareness, or the art of handling multiculturalism and practicing tolerance and respect for foreigners. The people sitting around the table have served as diplomats and intelligence agents in Israel and Jordan and as military attachés in Syria. Their job is to give these young soldiers a crash course in how to deal with other cultures, in general, and Islam, in particular.”2 This is not the way we should conduct business or prepare for future wars. As a nation, we are aware of who might be our future enemies, as well as the locations of the world’shot spots. There should be more of an emphasis placed on educating our soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers in cultural studies of identified regions in which we, as an Army and a branch, might operate. I understand the mountainous piles of work placed on today’s combat formations and I know that today’s company commanders have many more requirements and deadlines compared to the same position 30 years ago. This is exactly where command emphasis comes into play and where a push from Army leaders must bring cultural awareness and understanding training to the forefront. The Army is taking steps to document and categorize soldiers with foreign language proficiency through a self-assessment survey, which is a result of the changes directed by DoD. However, this is only one step and barely skims the surface of its true intent, which is to become, at a minimum, not only culturally aware in our lowest formations, but also to strive to achieve cultural expertise. Knowledge of a foreign language helps in this regard, but it does not constitute cultural awareness. As an example, you can learn a foreign language sitting in a classroom, but your knowledge will be limited and will not reflect cultural nuances that can only be experienced through immersion or interaction with a local populace. I am by no means an Arabic culture expert; however, I eagerly shared my limited knowledge (cultural awareness) with the soldiers in my command. It was a constant challenge to explain the Iraqis’ conduct and reasoning to my soldiers who were trained in discipline and Army values. Justifying lateness, dishonesty, and other corrupt behaviors that we, as a military culture disdain, was a definite challenge. What is viewed as normal behavior in an Arabic culture, or more specifically, the Iraqi culture, is not viewed in the same light through the eyes of a soldier. Contrary to popular belief, and from an isolationist viewpoint, Americans are not held in high regard in some cultures — most of these cultures do not like us because we are Americans. This view of Americans by other cultures and our own prejudices can be mended and abridge of understanding built by interaction and cooperation. We, as an armor force, were truly unprepared for the culture shock faced in Iraq. Factually speaking, we made cultural mistakes that set good-willed efforts back. An article by Tom Regan of the Christian Science Monitor points out that we realized our mistakes and are attempting to fix the problems.3 Another example of our past failures is in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap: “Language skill and regional expertise have not been regarded as warfighting skills and are not sufficiently incorporated into operational or contingency planning. As a result, there is insufficient effort under the current ‘requirements’ determination process to prepare for support of deployed forces. Much language talent resident in the force (Active and Reserve Components and civilian) is unknown and untapped. Language skill and regional expertise are not valued as defense core competencies, yet they are as important as critical weapon systems.”4 This quote highlights the fact that language skills and regional expertise are as important as critical weapons systems; a more common term is “combat multipliers.” These skills help commanders shape the battlefield and ultimately win wars. A maneuver battalion commander has a fires-and-effects cell (FEC), an S2 intelligence cell, and usually a tactical air cell (TACAIR) in a combat environment. These are all combat multipliers in a battalion, that help a unit win; therefore, regional and language experts should be as important as combat assets. The armor branch must undertake language study and cultural awareness/understanding training to be successful in future endeavors. During 2005, DoD established a goal for 80 percent of junior-level officers to demonstrate a proficiency in a foreign language by 2013. According to “In Foreign Language Proficiency, Generals Should Lead by Example,” in Digital Journal, proficiency in this case was identified as level 1+ which is a very elementary knowledge of a language.5 Further investigation (11 May 2007) led to examining the current ten Army division commanders’ foreign language proficiencies — only two of the ten speak a foreign language, all are educated and have advanced degrees.6 “In Foreign Language Proficiency,” also mentions that, “Generals in World Wars I and II commonly spoke at least one additional language, usually German or French, and often both. Major General Fox Conner, Pershing’s G3 and mentor to Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshall, spoke French so well he served in a French unit on an exchange program.”7 Understandably, it takes time to implement changes, but this clearly indicates that changes are not yet realized at higher levels of leadership, which is also because the current group of senior officers is not being affected by the changes. It is obviously difficult to redirect senior officers for language study (successfully undertaken, it takes a minimum of 6 months “It is a well-known fact that we are asked to perform a myriad of missions and assigned various tasks in the current operating environment. We are also asked to accomplish missions that involve diplomacy, to which anyone who has sat through a local Iraqi council meeting can attest. However, it is difficult to be diplomatic if we do not understand local culture sensitivities throughout our areas of operation.” — 35 Continued on Page 50

Solving the void of cultural awareness and understanding in our formations is not simple. As mentioned before, it starts at the top; priorities must be placed on training our soldiers, at all levels, in understanding various cultures. A basic understanding of culture must begin with language and may lead to interaction during training with foreign nationals or, optimally, a cultural immersion in the target language country. Recently, commanders began sending junior-level soldiers to study language at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, California, in preparation for future deployments. These soldiers are primarily assigned to combat formations and are infantrymen, tankers, scouts, and artillerymen. This is quite a shift from sending only linguists or cryp-tographers for language study. Language study at DLI not only teaches languages, but immerses a student in the culture through various means. It is difficult to release a group of soldiers from your ranks during deployment training; however, these soldiers will be a tremendous asset to the unit and during deployment. We attempt, as much as possible, to not hinder other schooling opportunities, such as Sniper School, Air Assault School, Ranger School, Warrior Leaders Course, and noncommissioned officers courses. The same effort should be applied to cultural awareness/understanding schooling opportunities. As a caveat, DLI does a wonderful job of implementing cultural studies into language training. The school is well aware that language study alone does not constitute cultural awareness. The U. S. Army, as a whole, needs worldwide cultural awareness and understanding because it is not just in the business of killing a faceless enemy. Our ignorance of other cultures and the impact of misperceptions of what we perceive as “normal” actions will undermine our mission success and waste resources through failures. The tip of the spear is the soldier who interacts with local nationals while conducting daily operations. That soldier’s actions will likely have a tremendous impact on the unit’s overall success, just based on what he or she does or says. Based on recent DoD directives and studies (2005 to present), it takes time and resources to implement programs, which explains why cultural awareness/understanding and language proficiency is stressed at the Army level, but is not yet a priority at the junior level. More importantly, it takes effort to prioritize this type of training; there are those who think it is a waste of time and just one more thing added to an already-overfilled plate. This thinking will take time to transform. The reality is we can no longer afford to focus only on warfighting skills and killing the enemy; we are tasked to do more. We took on peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and there were arguments about the military’s role during these operations. Judging by our current doctrine, we accepted that role and will continue to accept it into the foreseeable future. Consequently, we should accept our global role and teach our soldiers to be diplomatic, proficient in foreign language(s), and culturally aware. The battlefield is evolving and the armor branch has an obligation to prepare its warriors for that evolution — we will continue the spearhead tradition by leading the charge in this new task. Notes 1Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5160.41, Subject: Defense Language Program, U. S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 21 October 2005, paras 4.1 and 4.1.3, pp. 2-3. 2Ullrich Fichtner, “The U. S. Army Learns Mistakes in Iraq, Spiegel Online, 18 December 2006, URL: http:/www.spiegel. de/international/Spiegel/0,1518,455165,00.html. 3Tom Regan, “Pentagon Studies Examine ‘Mistakes’ in Iraq, Afghanistan, The Christian Science Monitor, 16 August 2006, URL: http://csmonitor.com/2006/0816/dailyUpdate.html. 4Department of Defense, Defense Language Roadmap, U. S. Department of Defense, January 2005, p. 3. 5“In Foreign Language Proficiency, Generals Should Lead by Example,” Digital Journal, Open Source Media, 11 May 2007, URL: www.digitaljournal.com/article/180520/In_Foreign_ Language_Proficiency_Generals_Should_Leade_By_Example. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. Major Klaudius K. Robinson is currently a student, 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey. He received a B. A. from Florida Southern College, Lakeland. His military education includes Airborne School, Air Assault School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and Tank Commander’s Certification Course (M1A2SEP). He has held various command and staff positions, to include S3 (Air), Task Force 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Baqubah, Iraq; S1, 1st Battalion (ABN), 509th Infantry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA; and airborne armored scout platoon leader and XO, D Troop, 1st Battalion (ABN), 509th Infantry, Opposing Force, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk. “Contrary to popular belief, and from an isolationist viewpoint, Americans are not held in high regard in some cultures — most of these cultures do not like us because we are Americans. This view of Americans by other cultures and our own prejudices can be mended and abridge of understanding built by interaction and cooperation. We, as an armor force, were truly unprepared for the culture shock faced in Iraq.” 50 —