The Battle of An Nasiriyah The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Team in Urban Operations

On 23 March 2003, the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) attacked to seize a corridor through the Iraqi city of An Nasiriyah to create a second axis of advance for the 1st Marine Division as it attacked north toward Baghdad.1 Intelligence estimations forecasted an attack in name only; multiple sources predicted a jubilant welcome by the local population and the mass capitulation of Iraqi forces near the city. In spite of these optimistic intelligence reports, An Nasiriyah became a fiercely contested urban battleground, making 23 March one of the bloodiest days in Iraq. This article examines the battle at the battalion and company levels to identify the relationship between key moments in the fight. While this brief account cannot begin to provide the necessary critical analysis of the battle, it is however intended to provoke professional discussion and encourage further study of this complex and confusing urban operation. An Nasiriyah is a sprawling city of more than 250,000 residents occupying approximately 10 square kilometers in southern Iraq. The city’score is wedged between the Euphrates River to its south and the narrower Saddam Canal to its north. A modern four-lane highway, Highway 7, runs north through the eastern portion of the city toward Al Kut and provides one of only two improved crossing sites of the Euphrates River in southeastern Iraq. The other site is in a less populated area several miles west of the city where Highway 1 crosses the river and heads north to Baghdad. First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) planners identified the strategic importance of An Nasiriyah, but wanted to avoid urban combat in the early stages of the war by sending its 1st Marine Division across the Euphrates River at the Highway 1 bridge as it advanced from the Rumaylah oil fields toward Baghdad. The division commander, on the other hand, believed that limiting the division to a single axis of advance would create a chokepoint at the western bridge and slow down his rate of advance. Seizing a corridor through An Nasiriyah would open up a second axis and allow the general to protect the right flank of his main effort by fixing the Baghdad infantry division in their defensive positions around Kut with one of his regimental combat teams (RCT).2 The 2d MEB was a latecomer to the An Nasiriyah mission. Originally comprised of just two infantry battalions and tasked with rear security in southern Iraq, the brigade commander championed for a more active part in the invasion for his Camp Lejeune-based Marines. Changes to the war plan in the months immediately preceding the invasion gave the 2d MEB a more prominent role in support of the 1st Marine Division’s advance near An Nasiriyah. Re-designated Task Force (TF) Tarawa, the MEB was now to travel north and conduct a relief in place with the U. S. Army’s 3d Infantry Division (3ID) at the western Euphrates bridge.3 The job of securing the eastern crossing sites remained a “be prepared to mission,” which the task force commander was eager to execute. TF Tarawa made an early morning crossing into Iraq on 21 March and moved unimpeded between 3ID and the 1st Marine Division to the Jalibah airfield south of An Nasiriyah. Bolstered by an additional infantry battalion, TF Tarawa now had a full RCT as its ground combat element. Still, RCT-2 was not as robust as its 1st Marine Division counterparts. The Marine Corps assigned the majority of its armored vehicles to the three RCTs headed for Baghdad, leaving RCT-2 with only enough amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) to transport one battalion into battle. The remaining two battalions traveled across the desert in unarmored 7-ton — 21 trucks. A platoon of light armored vehicles (LAV-25) and a company of M1 Abrams tanks from a Fort Knox-based Marine Corps reserve unit rounded out the task force. The RCT-2 commander attached the tank company and AAVs to his first battalion, 1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment (1/2). The remaining two battalions, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (2/8) and 3d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment (3/2), became motorized units.4 The TF commander accounted for this lack of armor in his plan. The LAV platoon and one motorized battalion were to rapidly move north and conduct the relief-in-place mission with 3ID. The mechanized battalion and remaining motorized battalion would defend in sector south of the city to prevent interference with the forward passage of the 1st Marine Division. In the event the “be prepared to mission” was executed, the mechanized battalion would attack to secure the two eastern bridges then defend north of the city. The motorized battalions would then seize the Highway 7 corridor and pass forward RCT-1 through An Nasiriyah.5 The 2d MEB received its mission on the evening of 22 March. The RCT-2 commander and his operations officer arrived at TF Tarawa’s headquarters around 2030 hours to receive an update on the relief in place, which was scheduled for 0430 hours the next morning. “We got the bridges,” the 2d MEB commander announced, referring to the eastern Nasiriyah spans.6 The “be prepared to mission” was now real; TF Tarawa became the MEF main effort at 0600 hours the next day with orders to seize a corridor through the city between 0700 and 1000 hours local time and pass forward RCT-1.7 The RCT-2 operations officer issued a verbal order over the radio to move 1/2 and 2/8 forward in preparation for the morning’s attack and then sped along Highway 1 with his commander to coordinate the relief in place between 3/2 and 3ID at the western bridge. These instructions seemed to confirm the earlier relief-in-place and defense-in-sector missions; however, the mission to attack and seize the corridor between 0700 and 1000 hours was never relayed to the battalion commanders. RCT-2’s mechanized battalion reached its predetermined location by 0600 hours on 23 March and received permission to move forward a few kilometers to a better position. With the tank company in the lead, 1/2 encountered unexpected resistance in the form of sporadic mortar and small-arms fire as it advanced. Still under the impression that the mission was to defend in sector, the tank company engaged several machine gun positions and adjusted indirect fire while the rifle companies cleared potential ambush sites along either side of Highway

7. In the midst of the fighting, a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) sped south along the highway and came to a halt in the middle of 1/2’s tanks. Sometime before dawn on 23 March, a small convoy of HMMWVs, 5-ton trucks, and heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) passed forward of the Marines defending along Highway 7. The 507th Maintenance Company, a U. S. Army Patriot missile repair unit, made a critical navigation error and continued north along Highway 7 through An Nasiriyah. Realizing their mistake only after crossing the Saddam Canal, the convoy turned around and headed back the way they came. This time, the Iraqis were ready for them. The ensuing ambush killed 11 of the 33 soldiers in the convoy and wounded at least 9. An additional seven soldiers were taken prisoner when they surrendered to Iraqi forces.8 The HMMWV now halted at 1/2’s position belonged to the unit’s panicked commander who fled the ambush scene in search of help. It was now approximately 0730 hours, 30 minutes after the attack to seize the corridor was meant to begin. Realizing that U. S. soldiers to his front were in need of help, the tank company commander relayed the bizarre situation to the battalion commander and then led his company north in search of survivors. The tanks located the remnants of the 507th Maintenance Company and, using rotary-wing close air support (CAS) to suppress the enemy, loaded ten soldiers into two AAVs and returned to 1/2’s lines. The rescue was a success, but the mission took precious time and the tanks, already low on fuel, needed to refuel. Still unaware of the mission to seize the bridges, the battalion commander ordered the tanks to the rear. The rescue operation was complete at approximately 1000 hours, the no-later-than time for TF Tarawa to seize the eastern corridor through An Nasiriyah. RCT- 2’s mechanized battalion was still defending in sector more than 10 kilometers south of the Euphrates River and elements of RCT-1 were beginning to arrive on the scene expecting to pass through the city. The 2d MEB commander, impatient with the delay, flew forward to confer with the RCT-2 commander and the 1/2 Battalion commander in person. The disconnect between the MEB and RCT staffs was readily apparent; the RCT-2 commander thought the battalion commander was doing a fine job adhering to his systematic plan of clearing the highway south of the city — the MEB commander thought otherwise. Pulling the battalion commander aside and addressing him personally, the MEB commander expressed the urgency of the situation: “I need you to get up there and seize the bridges by 1500 hours today. I don’t need you clearing houses.”9 “The city’score is wedged between the Euphrates River to its south and the narrower Saddam Canal to its north. A modern four-lane highway, Highway 7, runs north through the eastern portion of the city toward Al Kut and provides one of only two improved crossing sites of the Euphrates River in southeastern Iraq. The other site is in a less populated area several miles west of the city where Highway 1 crosses the river and heads north to Baghdad.” 22 —

The general wanted the bridges secured and he wanted it done fast. Further emphasizing the need for immediate action, the regimental executive officer contacted the 1/2 Battalion commander over the radio and told him that a company from 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance (2d LAR, the vanguard for RCT-1) was headed his way and would take the bridges if his battalion did not. The frustrated 1/2 Battalion commander got on his net and addressed his company commanders: “If we don’t take those bridges now, regiment will give our mission to LAR…it will be a cold day in hell before I allow regiment to send a LAR company to assume our mission, especially when Barbarian 6 (the LAR battalion commander) has had no time to plan or prep for this task like we have! Now press hard for those damn bridges.”10 The Marines of 1/2 had indeed prepared for this moment months in advance. Their battalion commander’s original plan intended to maximize the shock value of armor by having the attached company of tanks lead the assault. One mechanized company would hold the Euphrates River bridge from the far bank of the river while the remainder of the battalion executed a sharp right turn and then continued on to the Saddam Canal bridge using the less populated area east of the city’score. This maneuver avoided the stretch of Highway 7 that ran straight through the city, a danger area dubbed “ambush alley” by task force planners long before the 507th Maintenance Company’s incident. The plan looked perfect on a map, but the morning’s attack was far from perfect. The 1/2 Battalion’s tank company was refueling far to the rear when the 2d MEB commander ordered them to commence the attack. Problems with the single pump at the refueling station required the tanks to gravity feed, a process that would take more than an hour to refuel each tank. The general made it clear that there was no time to wait, the assault must commence immediately. The 1/2 Battalion commander mustered a platoon of tanks to lead the assault while his anti-armor forces engaged a handful of T-55s south of the Euphrates River bridge. The platoon was far less than the 14 tanks originally planned for, but the shortage was not deemed critical enough to delay the attack any further. The 1/2 Battalion commenced its assault around noon, with the tank platoon in the lead, followed by the mechanized columns from A, B, and C companies. The old axiom that no plan survives first contact proved to be more than a hackneyed maxim in the battle of An Nasiriyah. The 1/2 Battalion’s lead element made it across the Euphrates River bridge without incident and assaulted along the eastern portion of the city. The tanks and B Company began to fan out into some open terrain when their attack was brought to an abrupt halt. The maneuver space that appeared so appealing on maps and satellite imagery was in fact a drainage area for the city’s sewage. Three tanks, three B Company AAVs, two anti-armor vehicles, and the battalion commander’s AAV quickly broke through the deceiv-ingly thin layer of earth on top of the sewage and became mired in the disgusting mess. A tank retriever also got stuck as it tried unsuccessfully to extract the immobilized vehicles. Back at the Euphrates River bridge, A Company occupied the northern side of the bridge under heavy, but inaccurate, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms fire as C Company moved forward. C Company was meant to follow B Company to the east and secure the Saddam Canal bridge while the tanks and B Company supported by fire. However, as C Company crested the Euphrates River bridge, there was no sign of B Company or the command element. Unable to locate B Company, C Company’s commander incorrectly assumed that the lead element had skipped the maneuver to the east and attacked straight up Highway 7 to the northern bridge. With two mechanized companies bunched up in an increasingly contested piece of terrain, C Company’s commander decided to deviate from the original plan and advance through “ambush alley” and take the northern bridge by the most direct route.11 Although in keeping with the commander’s intent to rapidly secure the bridges, this decision would have unfortunate consequences for the men of C Company. C Company’s AAVs raced through ambush alley at over 40 mph, making it difficult for Iraqi gunners to target the boxy amphibious vehicles. Their speed also made it difficult for vehicle crews to provide accurate suppressive fires from the 40mm grenade launchers and.50-caliber machine guns mounted in the AAVs’ “upgun” turret system. The company almost reached their objective unscathed; however, as the last vehicle approached the Saddam Canal, an RPG pierced the thin armor, damaging the vehicle and severely wounding the Marines inside.12 The AAV limped across the bridge and came to a rest on the far side of the canal. C Company had accomplished its mission, but now had casualties that required urgent medical attention. These initial casualties were just the beginning of the company’s problems. An Nasiriyah’s defenders, expecting an airborne or helicopter assault to seize the bridges, built an engagement area north of the Saddam Canal to trap invaders. C Company, unsupported by heavy armor, halted in the preplanned kill zone. Within minutes of their arrival, mortar and artillery fire bracketed the mechanized com- “The division commander, on the other hand, believed that limiting the division to a single axis of advance would create a chokepoint at the western bridge and slow down his rate of advance. Seizing a corridor through An Nasiriyah would open up a second axis and allow the general to protect the right flank of his main effort by fixing the Baghdad infantry division in their defensive positions around Kut with one of his regimental combat team.” — 23 pany while small-arms fire poured in from all sides. The company’s organic 60mm mortar section immediately began suppressing the enemy, but the fires from its three small mortar tubes were no match for the Iraqi gunners. Communications troubles limited the fire support team’s (FiST) ability to respond with 81mm mortars or artillery. The company was also without a forward air controller (FAC) to direct CAS; the FiST leader forgot to pick up A Company’s FAC during the initial excitement at the Euphrates River bridge.13 The lopsided indirect fire exchange began to exact a heavy toll on C Company within minutes of crossing the Saddam Canal. An exploding mortar round knocked out one of the 60mm mortars, killing the platoon sergeant, severely wounding the FiST leader, and forcing the remaining two tubes to displace. The team’s artillery forward observer was also killed as he directed counter-battery fires from the 155- mm howitzer battery supporting the task force. C Company was in desperate need of support, if it was to hold the Saddam Canal bridge. As work continued back at B Company’s position to free the stuck vehicles, the 1/2 Battalion commander ordered the company commander to take whatever elements he could and head for the canal bridge. The battalion commander and his operations officer, unable to communicate with either the forward command post (CP) or the main CP south of the city, moved with B Company to a position that afforded better control of the deteriorating situation. The battalion’s radios were alive with chatter as the battle developed, but many key personnel, including most of the battalion staff, could not communicate due to line-of-sight obstructions and electromagnetic interference from nearby high-tension power lines. C Company managed to get a brief transmission through to the battalion commander to inform him the canal bridge was secure. Unfortunately, the battalion air officer, fire support coordinator, and B Company commander and his forward air controller did not monitor the transmission. These key personnel were still operating under the assumption that B Company was the lead element and C Company was somewhere to the rear. The wounded piled up at C Company’s casualty collection point north of the Saddam Canal. The C Company commander determined that evacuating the casualties by helicopter was too risky due to the heavy volume of enemy fire, but without immediate surgical attention, several of the casualties would likely die. One AAV crew took matters into their own hands and sped south through ambush alley to evacuate four urgent casualties. This first AAV took advantage of the element of surprise and reached an aid station south of the Euphrates River bridge without incident. Subsequent attempts were not so fortunate. More casualties were loaded into AAVs and prepared to race back through ambush alley. In the confusion of battle, some Marines mistook these actions as a signal that the company was withdrawing and joined the column. A total of five AAVs lined up on Highway 7 and pointed south. Unable to reach the vehicles by radio to halt their movement, the company commander watched in disbelief as nearly half his remaining combat power headed away from the fight. As the column of AAVs lined up on Highway 7, a pair of Pennsylvania Air National Guard A-10 attack aircraft circled above An Nasiriyah. The battalion air officer, still experiencing communications difficulties and unable to request air support, managed to raise the B Company FAC and told him to transmit a request for immediate air support over an uncovered emergency frequency. The two A-10s responded to the FAC’s request and quickly established visual contact with B Company in the eastern portion of the city. The A-10s also reported a large concentration of vehicles north of the Saddam Canal and requested permission to engage. The FAC still believed that B Com- “A platoon of light armored vehicles (LAV-25) and a company of M1 Abrams tanks from a Fort Knox-based Marine Corps reserve unit rounded out the task force. The RCT-2 commander attached the tank company and AAVs to his first battalion, 1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment (1/2). The remaining two battalions, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (2/8) and 3d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment (3/2), became motorized units.” 24 — pany was the lead element for the battalion and interpreted the report as enemy activity. The FAC was in no position to observe the attacking aircraft, much less their target of choice. Unable to communicate with both the fire support center and the battalion commander, the FAC decided to use type III control and cleared the A-10s to attack. Type III is the least restrictive control method for CAS and is not commonly used by the Marine Corps. Before the battle, the 1/2 Battalion commander specifically forbade the use of type III CAS without his approval due to the high risk of fratricide. The A-10s made several strafing runs on C Company. The Marine Corps traditionally marks it vehicles with large orange panels to aid in identification from the air, but these were replaced before the war with more modern thermal imagery panels. The A-10s lacked the technology to observe the thermal panels and were unable to identify the AAVs as friendly vehicles from the air. Thinking the column of AAVs headed south into the city was an enemy counterattack, the A-10s rolled in again and fired three Maverick missiles at the vehicles. The five AAVs came under simultaneous attack by a torrent of enemy mortars, RPGs, and missiles from the A-10s as they crossed the Saddam Canal bridge. The lead vehicle was damaged, but managed to limp through the city before it was destroyed by several direct RPG hits within sight of A Company’s lines at the southern bridge. The second vehicle in the column became a catastrophic kill almost as soon as it started moving, only the driver and vehicle commander survived. A third AAV became a mobility kill and stranded its passengers in the middle of ambush alley. The remaining two vehicles rescued a few of the survivors and managed to make it back safely to the protection of A Company’s position. Several official investigations into the friendly fire incident conducted after the battle were unable to identify conclusively the effects of the A-10 attack due to the simultaneous engagement of C Company by the enemy.14 Whatever the causes, the results were indisputable at the time: the attempt to evacuate C Company’s casualties was a disaster. The company commander was left with little more than a platoon to maintain the tenuous foothold north of the canal and dozens of his men were dead, wounded, or missing. The tank company commander sensed the precarious nature of the situation after witnessing the surviving AAVs off load their casualties. Refueled at this point and supporting the heavily engaged A Company at the Euphrates River bridge, the tank company commander led two M1s forward to reinforce the northern bridge. The tide started to turn in C Company’s favor with the arrival of the tanks north of the canal. The main gun and coaxial machine gun fire from the two tanks quickly silenced enemy gun positions and relieved the pressure on the small force. The A Company commander, satisfied that the southern bridge was secure and eager to reinforce his peer to the north, violated his orders to remain at the Euphrates River bridge until relieved by 2/8 Battalion and moved out. Supported with tanks, rotary wing CAS, and indirect fire, Company A sped through ambush alley without incident. The remainder of the battalion joined them a short while later and by 1430 hours, the majority of 1/2 Battalion was consolidated north of the Saddam Canal. The motorized 2/8 re-secured the Euphrates River bridge after a brief firefight, and by nightfall on 23 March, the eastern bridges of An Nasiriyah were firmly in the hands of the Marines. With RCT-2’s third battalion, 3/2, still in possession of the Highway 1 bridge west of the city, TF Tarawa held only three pieces of key terrain; the problem of ambush alley persisted and the mission to seize a corridor through An Nasiriyah remained unfinished. That night, RCT-1’s armored reconnaissance battalion negotiated the route under cover of darkness and established a defensive perimeter 10 miles north of the city, awaiting the remainder of the regiment. The following night, a mechanized battalion from RCT-1 seized the stretch of highway between the bridges and finally secured the contested route through the city. RCT-1 was forward of TF Tarawa and on its way to Kut by dawn. TF Tarawa began the tedious task of clearing the city on 25 March. Although some resistance remained, the battle for An Nasiriyah was over. In the final accounting, 33 Americans lost their lives during the operation; more than half of which belonged to C Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. The battle of An Nasiriyah is one of the few modern examples of U. S. forces engaged in large-scale urban operations in a nonpermissive environment. Although well documented, most of the existing work focuses on individual participants and lacks objectivity. The shortage of impartial commentary on the interplay of key events and decisions during the battle detracts from the valuable lessons An Nasiriyah has to offer.15 The controversies of the day stem from the complexity, confusion, and disorder inherent in urban combat. A determined enemy, the timeless elements of friction, and the fog of war also contributed greatly to the events of the battle. The attack to seize a corridor through An Nasiriyah was far from a textbook operation, but it is precisely this quality that makes knowledge of the battle so valuable to the military professional. Notes 1A Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) is a scaleable crisis response force. Larger than the Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) that regularly deploy aboard naval ships, and smaller than the Marine expeditionary force, a MEB is ideally suited for independent missions requiring self-sustainment for up to 60 days. The assistant division commander commands the MEB and its usual ground combat element is a reinforced infantry regiment. 2A regimental combat team (RCT) is a task organized infantry regiment. In addition to its three organic infantry battalions, an RCT usually adds a company each of tanks, amphibious assault vehicles (enough to transport the entire regiment), and engineers. Additional assets are added or substituted as required. An artillery battalion normally provides direct support to an

RCT.

3Richard S. Lowry, Marines in the Garden of Eden, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2006, p. 7. 4The organic 2d Battalion from RCT-2 was deployed with a Marine expeditionary unit during the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. To provide the 2d MEB with a complete RCT, the 2d Battalion from the 8th Marine Regiment was attached to RCT-2. This commingling of battalions is not uncommon in the Marine Corps. 5Karl C. Rohr, “Fighting through the Fog of War,” Marine Corps Gazette, available on line at http://www.mca-marines. org/Gazette/2006/06rohr.html, June 2006. 6Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II, Pantheon Books, New York, 2006, p. 235. 7Lowery, p. 120. 8United States Army, “Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq,” Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 2003, p. 3. 9Gordon, p. 242. 10Personal email from LtCol Grabowski (1/2 Battalion commander) to Richard Lowry as cited in Marines in the Garden of Eden, p. 154. 11Company commanders of 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, “The Battle of An Nasiriyah,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 2003, p. 40. 12Enhanced appliqué armor kits are available for the AAVs to augment the armor protection provided by the vehicle’s thin aluminum hull. TF Tarawa’s AAVs were not equipped with these kits during the battle. 13Gordon, p. 246. 14United States Central Command, “Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident near An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 03,” Central Command Headquarters, MacDill Air Force Base, 2004. 15The author’sown objectivity bears mention at this point. As a minor participant with RCT-1 during the battle, the author has firsthand knowledge of some events as they unfolded or as they were interpreted at the time. Throughout the article, the author attempted to avoid bias by balancing personal experiences with additional primary and secondary sources to achieve a more accurate picture of events. That said, bias is an inherent part of every piece of written work and must be considered when contemplating this article. Captain Steven M. Sutey, U. S. Marine Corps, is currently assigned to the 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Camp Lejeune, NC. He received a B. A. from La Roche College and an M. A. from North Carolina State University. His military education includes Armor Career Captains Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Mountain Leaders Course, and Infantry Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, Marine officer instructor, Duke University, Durham, NC; combined antiarmor team leader, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, Camp Pendleton, CA; and platoon leader, Maritime Special Purpose Force, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, Camp Pendleton. — 25