Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection

Practical Lessons from the Philippine by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III “I prefer a country run like hell by Filipinos to a country run like heaven by Americans. Because, however bad a Filipino government might be, we can always change it.” — Manuel L. Quezon, First President of the Philippine Commonwealth1 When stripped of ideological blinders, lessons learned from the Philippine war can offer valuable insight into the complexities of localized insurgencies and indigenous resistance to foreign influence.2 The war contained one of the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns in the United States’ history. A critical examination of how its military interventions, civic action, and pacification operations and tactics fit into our joint doctrine of phase IV and V operations will offer additional insight into our current and future counterinsurgency campaigns. It is important to realize that sound counterinsurgency theory, combined with a decent understanding of the conflict at hand, is essential for applying practices from learned lessons to a current or future campaign; what works in one counterinsurgency campaign can easily fail when directly applied to another. Between 1898 and 1941, the U.S. Army transformed from a small-frontier constabulary army to the most powerful military land force in the world. During this evolution, the Army demonstrated how different counterinsurgency and pacification operational methods can be employed in separate geographic regions for a campaign’s overall success. In the end, these methods were skillfully executed through the combined application of force and politics by thinking “strategic captains and corporals” on

Insurrection the ground; some of these methods are worth serious consideration in planning operations for future contingencies. This article discusses the many similarities or parallels between past and current conflicts during phase IV and V operations. There are easily many more dissimilarities or converging factors, which do not translate well for modern application. However, some of the lessons learned from a U.S. campaign that began on foreign soil over 100 years ago are too obvious and important to ignore. Philippine Counterinsurgency Operations 1898-1941 In May 1898, the United States declared a “splendid little war” with Spain that lasted only eight months.3 Although historians have always questioned the reasons for the Spanish-American War, the war was initially a success for the United States. By December 1898, the United States successfully invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico, and portions of the Philippines, deploying Army and Navy forces across the Pacific and Caribbean.4 Although, by the time peace was declared in December 1898, it controlled only small portions of those islands.5 Individual islands, mountains, swamps, jungles, and bodies of water separate the island inhabitants; on Luzon alone the Ilocanos, Pampangans, Panga-sinans, Tagalogs, and Bicols all speak different languages.6 Relations among the tribal groups were often strained; the Muslim, or Moro, population of Mindanao and Sulu, resisted the incorporation into the Christian Filipino polity, often by force of arms.7 The defeat of Spanish forces in the Philippines was due in no small part to the support provided by Filipino revolutionaries, primarily of the Tagolog tribe, who seized the opportunity The four-day battle of Bagsak Mountain on Jolo Island in the Philippines took place from 11 to 15 June 1913.

provided by the Spanish-American War to rise up against their Spanish overlords.8 Unlike Cuba, where the United States had been able to persuade the indigenous rebel forces to disband, the Filipino revolutionaries refused to acknowledge the United States’ authority over the islands.9 Although Spain dominated, it had never replaced the indigenous local cultures.10 A system of local governance and geographic isolation set the conditions for the insurrection that followed the surrender of Spanish forces, as local leaders believed they could administer their own affairs. The Philippine Insurrection The late 19th century witnessed the emergence of a Filipino national consciousness.11 The writings of Filipino nationalists, publicizing the abuses of the Spanish imperial system, advocated self-governance of the islands.12 Following the Battle of Manila Bay, U.S. Army forces occupied Manila where they encountered nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation, which hoped to take the city and declare a Philippine Republic. A political and military stalemate developed that led to hostilities. Although the United States had no intention of getting involved in a protracted guerrilla war, the Byzantine political system of the Philippines led various factions into armed conflict with U.S. occupation forces. Ultimately, due to the disorganized nature of the insurgency, the United States defeated the majority of Aguinaldo’s forces. Despite their combat successes, U.S. commanders were continually frustrated by the dual task of occupying and administering the islands while simultaneously fighting insurgent forces. Troop strength never seemed sufficient for both missions. Some of this inability was due to the peacetime thinking of U.S. commanders and political leaders who were more concerned about budgets rather than applying adequate resources to the conflict.13 Will of the People The United States’ victory over the remnants of the Spanish Empire in 1898 and the subsequent insurrection, fought from 1899 to 1902 by Filipino nationalists, found U.S. military and political leaders faced with the prospect of having to administer an occupied country without an established, legitimate government, while fighting a protracted insurgency. The United States recognized that political, economic, and information affairs would play an important role in achieving the pacification of the Philippines — a point President William McKinley made clear in the winter of 1898.14 Ironically, a military victory was never the aim of Filipino leaders after 1899.15 Instead, they hoped to undermine the will of the U.S. population to continue the struggle by harassing the occupation forces in a protracted struggle.16 The insurgents, through the press and contacts in the United States, were aware of the opposition to the U.S. Government’s forays overseas. Insurrectionist leaders consciously played to this audience, timing their offensives to coincide with the Presidential election of Novem- “In May 1898, the United States declared a “splendid little war” with Spain that lasted only eight months. Although historians have always questioned the reasons for the Spanish-American War, the war was initially a success for the United States. By December 1898, the United States successfully invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico, and portions of the Philippines, deploying Army and Navy forces across the Pacific and Caribbean.” “Unlike Cuba, where the United States had been able to persuade the indigenous rebel forces to disband, the Filipino revolutionaries refused to acknowledge the United States’ authority over the islands. Although Spain dominated, it had never replaced the indigenous local cultures. A system of local governance and geographic isolation set the conditions for the insurrection that followed the surrender of Spanish forces, as local leaders believed they could administer their own affairs.” Spanish Army prisoners, c. 1898. 28 — January-February 2007 ber 1900, in hopes that a disenchanted electorate would replace McKinley with the anti-imperialist candidate William Jennings Bryan.17 The U.S. Army, in helping bring reform to Spain’s former colonies, brought with it both the same progressive ideology that swept the nation in the late 19th century and a can do spirit that previously inspired the Lewis and Clark expedition and helped defeat the Confederacy in 1865.18 The desire to create a friendly ally amidst the colonial enclaves of the Western Pacific forced many U.S. political and military leaders to realize that drastic changes were necessary to transform the exploited oligarchies of Spain’s former colonies into open societies. But the United States also wanted these changes to be a quiet, evolutionary process, one in which the government would provide as much of a level playing field as possible without infringing on anyone’s personal or property rights.19 Although the United States managed to finally subdue the majority of the insurgency in the northern islands, the southern archipelago of Moroland proved tougher. The Sultan of Sulu Moroland consisted of mostly Muslim people on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago who were fiercely independent and never accepted Spanish rule.20 Not only were the Moros different in their religious beliefs, but they differed in their laws, customs, and languages from the people of the Christianized north.21 The Moros were xenophobic and politically a patchwork of feuding clans.22 The United States was faced with an enemy that had no central government or leadership to influence. In developing an effective policy to deal with the Moros, two approaches presented themselves.23 The United States could either strengthen the sultan of Sulu — the titular head of Islam in the Philippines — and rule Moroland indirectly, as the British and Dutch did in their Malaysian colonies, or it could attempt to directly rule.24 Ultimately, U.S. officials opted for direct rule as neither the Sultan nor any other tribal chief had sufficient prestige to rule all of Moroland, and any effort to elevate one Moro leader over his peers would undoubtedly have resulted in civil war.25 U.S. Army officers, with experience from both the Civil and Indian Wars, reasoned it made more sense to establish direct U.S. rule than to uphold some native autocrat.26 Besides, the notion of ruling the islands through a despotic Asian potentate was distasteful to many in the United States.27 After a short campaign to subdue the majority of the Sulu warriors, the United States began a system of rule where the local military governor was given full control of legal and administrative powers. Army officers were not so naïve to believe that they could rule without the assistance of the Moro sultan and the tribal chiefs.28 Working with tribal chiefs, officers established a basic government, while introducing a set of reforms that included medical care, establishing schools, and land reform.29 The United States was successful in pacifying the Moros until December 1941, and in 1946, finally allowed the commonwealth government to successfully concentrate on establishing an independent government following World War II. Summary By and large, the United States did a credible job of pacifying the Moros, using a combination of local tribal control and U.S.- led reform efforts.30 Building on previous experience in the Western frontier and other parts of the Philippines, Army officers applied the well-worn creed of firm-but-fair treatment to establish a paternal regime that attempted to uplift the Moros without completely disregarding their political, economic, and religious heritage.31 Although relations were not always so smooth, some Moros came to regret the departure of the U.S. administration, which they considered more sensitive to their concerns than the Philippine government in Manila.32 But U.S. efforts were successful enough to allow the Philippine government a stable security situation to begin their own administration by 1946.33 Philippine Phase IV and V Operations A Six-Phased Campaign Plan In the 2006 draft version of Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, operational phases have been standardized. Planners are required to develop plans based on a new six-phase model that includes “shaping, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize and enable civil authority as main constructs.”34 A key consideration of these new phases is that they are mandatory for planning only.35 If there is no requirement for a particular phase to occur, then that phase should not be addressed and the next phase considered.36 Standardizing phases will assist in the deconfliction of combatant command and component plans.37 This is the construct under which we will evaluate the later stages of military operations in the Philippine Islands and ultimately compare them to current operations in the long war. Phase IV: Stabilize Following the defeat of Spanish forces in late 1898, the U.S. military faced a new threat from the same insurgents who helped facilitate victory. Unlike the current situation in Iraq, U.S. forces opted for an offensive approach where the military assumed a greater role in the stability of the Philippines following the conclusion of major combat operations. Under the new Joint Publication 5-0, the stability of either the host-nation government or an interagency interim government, such as the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, is a separate and vital component to the termination of operations.38 In the late 19th century, U.S. Army senior leaders turned to principles that had long guided the old Indian frontier constabulary. “Following the Battle of Manila Bay, U.S. Army forces occupied Manila where they encountered nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation, which hoped to take the city and declare a Philippine Republic. A political and military stalemate developed that led to hostilities. Although the United States had no intention of getting involved in a protracted guerrilla war, the Byzantine political system of the Philippines led various factions into armed conflict with U.S. occupation forces.” January-February 2007 — 29

Using the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) construct, U.S. forces secured the Philippine Islands sufficiently enough to allow a quasi-independent Philippine government to assume control. Initially, the U.S. Government understood that subduing the insurgents would require more than military force.39 Commanders understood, and ordered their men to respect the people and their customs; they imposed strict discipline, forbidding looting and wanton destruction, and punishing those who committed such crimes. They paid cash for supplies requisitioned, opened schools, built roads, refurbished markets, and established municipal governments under native officials that were largely based on established Spanish traditions and laws.40 Commanders also realized that information and impressions were more valuable than actual military size. U.S. forces were stretched thin and it was necessary for commanders to leave insurgents with the impression that they faced a more powerful military force than actually existed. “The Filipinos,” wrote Brigadier General Theodore Schwan in the fall of 1899, “are in identically the same position as the Indians of our country have been for many years, and in my opinion must be subdued in much the same way, by making them realize fully the futility of armed resistance, and then win them by fair and just treatment.”41 Field commanders pushed their subordinates to take the offense in the belief that psychological factors would play an especially important role in irregular warfare.42 Finally, the U.S. military was able to use the geography of the Philippines to deprive insurgents of their economic base. The U.S. Navy conducted a blockade of the islands’ unregulated coastal traffic — absolutely essential in an archipelago lacking roads.43 The blockade prevented both foreign arms shipments and ended the inter-island trade necessary for the insurgents to raise funds.44 A critical component of the United States’ successes in this phase was civic action, conducted while engaged in combat operations.45 Building schools and roads, while conducting counterinsurgency operations, was more of a policy of attraction, rather than attrition, in the battle to defeat the insurgency.46 Phase V: Enable Civil Authority The final phase of campaign planning involves enabling civil authorities and disengaging U.S. forces from a conflict, which is sometimes a relatively easy affair, such as the transfer of authority in Grenada and Panama. More long-term examples of U.S. military involvement while enabling civil authorities are the Korean Peninsula and the Philippine Islands. Transitioning from U.S. military rule to civilian rule in the Philippines over a 48-year period serves as an example of successfully executing a phase V operation. The United States established the Schurmann Commission early to help set conditions for Filipino self-determination, and recommended the establishment of the institutions for a civilian domestic government.47 Even though by 16 March 1900, fighting in insurgency territory was still far from over, a second Philippine Commission was established to give the newly formed Philippine executive and legislative branches authority to administer the islands.48 In 499 statutes issued between September 1900 and August 1902, the Taft Commission swept away three centuries of Spanish governance and installed in its place the laws and institutions of a modern civil state, establishing a code of law, a judicial system, and elective municipal and provincial governments.49 The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 extended the protections of the United States’ Bill of Rights to Filipinos and established a national bicameral legislature.50 The lower house was the popularly elected Philippine Assembly and the upper house was the Philippine Commission, appointed directly by the President of the United States.51 Following U.S. practice, the Philippine Organic Act imposed the strict separation of church and state and eliminated the Roman Catholic Church as the official state religion.52 The first elections to the Philippine Assembly were held in July 1907 and the first session opened on 16 October 1907.53 The Jones Act of 1916 carried forward the Philippine Organic Act of 1902.54 An elected Philippine Senate replaced the appointed Philippine Commission and the former Philippine Assembly was renamed the House of Representatives.55 As before, the U.S. President appointed the governor general, responsible for the executive branch. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 established the commonwealth of the Philippines, which at the end of a 10-year transition period would become the fully independent Republic of the Philippines.56 A plebiscite on the constitution for the new republic was approved in 1935 and the date for national independence was set for 4 July 1946. Aside from the onset of the Japanese invasion in 1941 and subsequent liberation by allied forces, independence occurred as promised. Summary By 1907, at the conclusion of major combat operations in the Philippines, the United States had gone to war against Spain ill-prepared, and had emerged as a major global player, modifying many of the constabulary tactics and strategies that were used against the Plains Indians.57 When viewed from a military context 100 years later, the lessons learned from the Philippine war offer valuable examples into the complexities of localized insurgencies and indigenous resistance to foreign influence. More importantly, how the U.S. military conducted the war offers not a model, but indicators as to how a nation deals with complex military and political situations. “Moroland consisted of mostly Muslim people on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago who were fiercely independent and never accepted Spanish rule. Not only were the Moros different in their religious beliefs, but they differed in their laws, customs, and languages from the people of the Chris-tianized north. The Moros were xenophobic and political patchwork of feuding clans. The United States was faced with an enemy that had no central government or leadership to influence.” 30 — January-February 2007

Lessons to be Learned Force Size Following Commodore Dewey’s victory on 1 May 1898 at Manila Bay, using his force of 1,743 men against the Spanish fleet, the immediate question for President McKinley became “what next?”58 Dewey’s only directives were to defeat the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay and to invest in the city of Manila. This initial action was loosely consistent with the United States’ new strategic policy of obtaining bases in the Pacific island chain (Oahu, Samoa, and Guam, following Manila), mapping a course to the untapped East Asian economic markets.59 Following Spain’s surrender of Manila to U.S. forces four months later, President McKinley did not gain an adequate appreciation of the developing situation in the Philippines. Conflicting reports advised him that Philippine revolutionists were fighting for annexation to the United States first and their independence was secondary. Initial Philippine enemy forces were between 80,000 and 90,000 regulars, with an additional estimate of 30,000 to over 300,000 people in local organizations throughout the Philippine provinces.60 U.S. Army troop strength to begin the initial conventional war against the insurgency was over 20,000.61 It peaked at 70,000 men in 1900, and averaged 40,000 during the 1898- 1902 periods. State volunteers bore the brunt of the early conventional war in 1899; U.S. volunteers assisted with the ensuing guerrilla war, and the Regulars settled into full responsibility of the pacification effort only after struggling with counterinsurgency tactics during the first two years of the war.62 Virtually all Army Regular combat units during this time served in the Philippines.63 Only 15,000 U.S. soldiers were required to garrison the islands by 1903, less than a year following the official end of the war.64 This number steadily declined over the next decade, although U.S. forces were required to keep the Moros living in Mindanao (including the Sulu archipelago) in check until the start of World War II. Therefore, the United States dedicated an average counterinsurgency campaign force four times larger than the force required to topple the Spanish regime in the Philippines. This force size was consistent with the counterinsurgency tenet of bringing enough coverage to positively affect a given geographic area. Effective counterinsurgency campaigns are manpower intensive. John M. Gates’ study of the Philippine war implies that even more U.S. forces committed to counterinsurgency operations may have shortened the length of the war. Decentralized Counterinsurgency Operations and Individual Effectiveness Native Filipinos were primarily of Malayan and some Indonesian descent, and could be loosely categorized into eight ethnic Christian divisions, two non-Christian groups (Mohammedan and primitive pagan in Mindanao, Mindoro, and Palawan), and Negritos, who were non-Malayan and located in the interior highlands over the whole length of the Philippines.65 This is the country profile the U.S. Army was up against with native insurgent forces present on every major island group. Through differing trial and error pacification practices, which were sometimes egregiously fatal for both sides, it took the U.S. Army until the final year and a half of the war to become proficient in executing its pacification policies. Although the U.S. military averaged 40,000 men in country, the dispersion of the U.S. Army over the vast archipelago was so great that the consequent shortage of officers usually permitted only one for each garrison. This officer was often times a young lieutenant who was required to perform a full range of duties, which included supervising municipal government, civil affairs, and police functions. His duties also included preparing forces to repel night attacks and/or mount offensive field operations against insurgents and ensuring the population did not support them. The young officer’s troops were often recruits or volunteers with little or no military experience and training.66 Some garrison commanders were able to devote most of their time to valuable civil projects; others were involved in daily, violent defensive and offensive clashes in the central and southern islands.67 Other commanders experienced both ends of this spectrum and had to find middle ground from which to operate. It was often up to the individual commander’s discretion and direction to identify the proper counterinsurgency and/or pacification tactics in his region to achieve overall campaign success — many little wars also occurred in the Philippines. Extensive decentralization of the countrywide pacification effort from higher headquarters in Manila existed due to the island’s geography. Again, this reality placed additional individual responsibility on the shoulders of young commanders. Even though benevolence was the official Manila pacification policy, young commanders became all important to determining what methods were actually employed. Overall, the policies followed by each region or garrison in the last year and a half of the war were effective. Tour lengths of at least one year greatly enhanced the ability of these young commanders to establish the required community relationships for executing the appropriate counterinsurgency and/or pacification tactics.68 Autonomy for these commanders resulted in overall success. In the end, U.S. officers with minimal training functioned effectively in almost any assigned ca- “Soon after Emilio Aguinaldo was captured and swore his allegiance to the United States, Congress authorized the President to proceed with establishing a civil government in the Philippines. Growing political pressure on President McKinley, which focused on the real and perceived methods used by the U.S. military to execute the war, helped expedite the change.” Aguinaldo and other insurgent leaders, January 1899. January-February 2007 — 31 pacity when provided with proper guidance and permitted sufficient flexibility in making decisions based on their own initiative and judgment.69 Transfer from Military to Civil Authority Soon after Emilio Aguinaldo was captured and swore his allegiance to the United States, Congress authorized the President to proceed with establishing a civil government in the Philippines. Growing political pressure on President McKinley, which focused on the real and perceived methods used by the U.S. military to execute the war, helped expedite the change. William Howard Taft was installed as civil governor on 1 July 1901, providing him executive authority throughout the archipelago, except for the territory inhabited by the Moros.70 The work of Taft’s civil authorities’ commission helped bring about conciliation between the Americans and the Filipinos. Most Filipinos desired some freedom from the restrictions of martial rule, which were easily invoked under the military’s governorship. Ironically, the benevolent programs initiated by the civil government were almost invariably a continuation of efforts begun by the U.S. Army. At times, even to Taft’s dismay, he had to rely on the remotely located garrison commanders, who often asserted authority Taft believed they did not legally possess, to execute his civil policies in the remote areas already pacified.71 Population Protection The U.S. Army did not begin to succeed in pacification operations until they widely deployed and dispersed their units into strategic garrisons under Major General MacArthur’s General Order 100, which provided security for townspeople from terrorism and intimidation from insurgents. Simultaneously, U.S. forces pressured and isolated the insurgents from these new vantage points, and increased the internal surveillance of their respective municipalities to detect agents, terrorists, and supporters. The arrest and conviction of these individuals provided further evidence to the townspeople that the U.S. Army was capable of protecting them, and when they cooperated with the Army, protection increased. The United States’ pursuit of insurgents from these locations cut off their supply lines, kept them off balance, and detached them from popular support.72 Insurgents lacking popular support could not maintain operations against opposing forces. Their terrorist activities soon backfired as the population began to feel more secure under U.S. auspices.73 Once this occurred, the Filipinos could support the United States without having to pay the previously inevitable consequence of being victimized by revolutionary terrorists. Separating the population from the insurgents was crucial to ending their influence in towns, thereby destroying the system by which they obtained sanctuary, supplies, and information.74 Eventually, municipal police organizations manned with Filipinos were established, followed by the Philippine Constabulary, which was assigned to highly populated areas to provide for their own self-defense. This development further increased municipal security, and because the Filipinos felt even safer, they were more likely to support the United States and withdraw support from the insurgents. Insurgent surrender rates increased remarkably. Protecting the civilian population is a core counterinsurgency tenet, which is required before all other follow-on tactics can succeed within a campaign. For comparison purposes, in early cases of gains made in municipalities in 1900 through benevolent pacification policies, they were more than offset by insurgent terror tactics and the inability of the United States to provide protection. The protection given the population by the United States in 1901 made them understand that peace under American control was a reasonable alternative to continued war and the uncertain goal of independence. The native population became a U.S. weapon in the war against the insurgents.75 Pseudo-operations76 The effectiveness of the U.S. Army was greatly improved by the use of indigenous personnel. They were trained for and served effectively in the same Filipino-American units as U.S. servicemen.77 Their use began in the first year of the war. Captured or surrendered enemy personnel, well treated, often became invaluable and loyal allies.78 Many Filipino soldiers succumbed to the United States’ offer of money for the surrender of their weapons.79 The indigenous population was also used later in the pacification effort as popular support shifted to the United States and from the insurgency. Once protection for the towns increased, even more Filipinos were willing to aid the United States as guides, scouts, agents, and spies.80 Operations in which friendly forces were disguised as the enemy were most productive.81 Of course, the most famous case of using friendly, former insurgent officers disguised as the enemy was General Frederick Funston’s expedition to capture Emilio Aguinaldo in northern Luzon in early 1901. This event helped shift the momentum of the war toward achieving U.S. strategic “The U.S. Army did not begin to succeed in pacification operations until they widely deployed and dispersed their units into strategic garrisons under Major General MacArthur’s General Order 100, which provided security for townspeople from terrorism and intimidation from insurgents. Simultaneously, U.S. forces pressured and isolated the insurgents from these new vantage points, and increased the internal surveillance of their respective municipalities to detect agents, terrorists, and supporters.” 32 — January-February 2007 objectives. Passing himself off as a captured U.S. Army private, Funston led his operation on a grueling six-day, 110-mile journey to Aguinaldo’s sanctuary; the deceit was so complete the revolutionary leader never knew what hit him as he became a U.S. prisoner.82 Force Recommendations Joint and individual service doctrine will continue to develop and change over time, which will require leaders to stay abreast of current models and phraseology. However, there are a few historical principles that if analyzed and implemented correctly, may lead to a successful military campaign. Although there is no one solution that applies from conflict to conflict, these basic observations will greatly increase chances of success. Local ethnic, religious, and tribal beliefs. At the forefront of observation is the knowledge that leaders gain about the indigenous people of the country they are planning a campaign against, and how to include this knowledge throughout the planning and operational processes. Evidence from past conflicts, such as the American Revolution, Vietnam, and the war in Iraq, confirms that ethnic, religious, and tribal relationships existing in particular areas have crucial implications on determining how an operation progresses. This is extremely important when the operation advances to phases IV and V — during the initial stages of the operation if religious beliefs are discounted, pacifying the population will be difficult at best. The religious beliefs and values of the area may dictate how to carry out operations in one area, which may be vastly different from that in another area of the same country. Operational planning must acknowledge the area’s religious beliefs; however, there is a fine balance between satisfying the religious beliefs of the ‘enemy’ and not risking lives of friendly military forces. Taken one step further, if leaders understand a particular moral view of some religions, they will realize that some individuals are willing to die for their cause to meet a higher calling. Not only must the various religious beliefs and values be clearly understood, one must also understand the dynamic population makeup of the country as a whole. Discontentment within a particular country may be the root cause for operations being conducted in the first place. Just as is the case with religious knowledge, understanding the dynamics of a population may greatly alter one’s course of action, especially when planning and conducting phase IV and V operations. The will of the local people. The will of the people is also essential during the planning and execution phases of an operation — if the local populace does not believe that the United States has their best interests in mind, operational successes will be hampered. Regardless of the operation’s purpose, the local populace needs to be assured and reassured that the United States will stick with it until the end, providing for a better future that is compatible with its values. Without the will of the local populace, peace will not easily be achieved, nor will it be enduring. The will of the American people. The will of the local populace is not all that must be considered. Perhaps, more importantly is the will of the American people. This is perhaps the biggest area that insurgents can exploit and use to their advantage. While Americans are well educated in the facets of American politics, the American public at large is not content without a quick and decisive victory with minimal casualties. This is one area that the upper echelons of political leadership must aggressively attack and pursue to maintain the support of the U.S. populace at large. Politics are extremely important in running our great Nation, but ill-advised decisions can sometimes limit military effectiveness. If discontentment within the American populace grows too great, a political decision designed to limit domestic uneasiness may be made and not necessarily in accordance with the military plan. Safety and security of the local people. Both in the Philippines and Iraq, U.S. forces were initially viewed as liberators and had the support from the majority of the local populace. However, as soon as the safety and security of the local population dissipated, many persons transferred their allegiances to opposition forces to increase their chances for personal survival. Operational planning must guarantee the safety and security of the local populace. Planners must allow for the possibility of an insurgency to occur and use every option available to decrease the threat to the local populace. Again, peace will be difficult to obtain if the local populace is in opposition to the forces present. Send an overwhelming force. Planners and leaders must acknowledge the fact that operations, especially when facing a possible insurgency, will be manpower intensive. Those forces sent forward must possess an overwhelming amount of force. This force is required to swiftly defeat an enemy and adequately provide safety and security to the local populace. This should be viewed as a prerequisite to entering phases IV and V; then, and only then, should smaller troop levels be considered. History has proven repeatedly that insurgency operations will not end quickly. That said, military planners should not set a hard-and-fast timeframe for an operation. Allowances for lengthy operations should be the norm; anything less is viewed as a bonus. This concept must be emphasized and accepted at all levels of government and the U.S. populace at large, as it directly ties into the will of the people at home. Combat tours should be maintained at a year, if not longer, especially during the end of phases III through V. This will ensure that relationships built between military troops and the local populace will have a greater chance of enduring, and thus ensuring the support of the local populace. This will also allow greater “corporate knowledge” to be maintained in any particular area, thus increasing the chances for success. Joint force planning and operations are a very dynamic and fluid process. No matter what the operation is named or how the phases are labeled, there is one constant throughout time — each conflict is unique and there is no cookie-cutter solution to be applied. The observations listed above are constant throughout any military operation, to include possible insurgent activities. More importantly is the direct relationship that ties them all together — the relationship between people and time. Campaign planners and leaders must understand the people they are dealing with and provide them with a sense of safety and security. This serves to garner the support of the local populace, and more importantly, the support of the U.S. populace as a whole. Perhaps the most important aspect of a professional military is ensuring those in the future learn from the past. Following the end to hostilities in the Philippines, U.S. President Taft blocked the publication of Captain John R.M. Taylor’s five-volume book, History of the Philippine Insurrection, to avoid embarrassing the Filipinos who gave the Americans legitimacy.83 This act by President Taft, no matter what the underlying reason, denied the U.S. military the ability to learn from past conflicts and better apply lessons learned in future military operations. Notes 1“History: Republic of the Philippines,” WWW-VL History Central Catalogue, 20 June 2006, online at http://vlib.iue.it/history/asia/Philippines/index.html, accessed 7 August 2006. 2Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2000, p. 328. January-February 2007 — 33

3Neal Gaber, “A Splendid Little War,” Salon.com, 21 February 2003, online at http://archive. salon.com/opinion/feature/2003/02/21/maine/index_np.html, accessed 2 August 2006. 4Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860- 1941, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 99. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. As geographers have noted, the term Filipino is no more accurate in describing a people of one race and culture than is the term American. 7Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 108. 9Ibid. 10Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902, p. 15. Until the mid-19th century, Spanish rule remained concentrated in Manila, while in the countryside, the poor and undermanned imperial government ruled by confirming the authority of local chieftains and tribes. 11Ibid., p. 16. 12Ibid., p. 17. 13Ibid., p. 110. 14Ibid., p. 119. 15Ibid., p. 112. 16Ibid. 17John Gates, School Books and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1973, pp. 163-164. 18Birtle, p. 102. 19Ibid. Ultimately, U.S. pacifying efforts during and after the insurrection allowed the Philippine population a commonwealth status with their own president, legislature, and judicial system that set the foundation for a transition to full independence in 1946. 20Ibid., p. 159. 21Ibid. 22Ibid. The Moro’s strong beliefs in Islam led many to launch attacks against infidels with the assurance that death in combat would guarantee an entry into paradise. 23Ibid., p. 160. 24Ibid. 25Ibid. 26Ibid. 27Ibid. 28Ibid. 29Ibid., p. 161. The results of these reforms, which lasted right up to December 1941, paid long-term dividends to both the Philippine commonwealth government and the United States. During World War II, the Sulu islands were never completely occupied by Japanese forces and the Sultan of Sulu kept the Stars and Stripes flying over his headquarters during the conflict. 30Ibid., p. 168. 31Ibid. 32Ibid. 33Ibid. 34Colonel Craig Bollenberg, “Standardized Campaign Phases,” Campaigning, Volume1, Issue 1, 30 September 2005, p. 2., online 4 August 2006, at http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/ jaws/JOINT_ADVANCED_WARFIGHTING_SCHOOL_Newsletter.doc. 35Ibid. 36Ibid. During the threatened U.S. invasion of Haiti in 1994, it can be argued that under the current-phase model that phase zero (shape) and phase one (deter) were conducted. Phase two (seize the initiative) and phase three (dominate) were not required due to the capitulation of the Haitian Military Junta. The coalition force then transitioned to phase four (stabilize). 37Ibid. 38Dr. Milan Vego, “Campaign Phasing and the New Joint Publication 5-0,” Campaigning, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Journal of the Department of Operational Art and Campaigning, Winter 2006, p. 5. 39Birtle, p. 118. Army Brigadier General Franklin Bell explained at the time, “Government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a Government be established in time, which is based upon the will of the governed. This can only be accomplished satisfactorily by obtaining and retaining the good will of the people.” 40Ibid., pp. 119-120. 41Ibid., p. 112 42Ibid., p. 114. 43Ibid., p. 325. 44Ibid. 45Ibid., p. 327. 46Ibid. 47“History: Republic of the Philippines,” WWW-VL History Central Catalogue, 20 June 2006. 48Ibid. 49Ibid. 50Ibid. 51Ibid. 52Ibid. In 1904, the administration paid the Vatican $7.2 million for most of the lands held by the religious orders. The lands were later sold back to Filipinos. Some tenants were able to buy their land, but it was mainly the established estate owners who could afford to buy the former church lands. 53Ibid. The Nacionalista Party of Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena won the election and continued to dominate Philippine electoral politics until 1941. The political success of the Nacional-ista Party was based on the skills of Quezon and Osmena in tying the traditional patron-client relations to the new institutions of the modern civil state. 54Ibid. 55Ibid. 56Ibid. 57John P. Langellier, Uncle Sam’s Little Wars: The Spanish-American War, The Philippine Insurrections and Boxer Rebellion, 1898-1902, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsbrug, PA, 1999, p. 8. 58Jules Archer, The Philippines’ Fight for Freedom, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1970, p. 45. 59William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism – Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia, International Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 35. 60Ibid., p. 37. 61Gates., p. 78. 62Linn, pp. 325-326. 63Gates, p. 286. 64Ibid., p. 270. 65Conrado Benitez, History of the Philippines, Ginn and Company, Manila, RP, 1954, pp. 1-9. 66Gates, p. 284. 67Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1951, pp. 137-145. 68Gates, pp. 284-285. 69Andrew D. Sens, A Summary of the U.S. Role in Insurgency Situations in the Philippine Islands 1899-1955, American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 23. 70Arthur S. Pier, American Apostles to the Philippines, The Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1950, pp. 30-31. 71Gates, pp. 272-273, 282. 72Ibid., pp. 271, 278. 73Sens, p. 24. 74Gates, pp. 280-281. 75Ibid., pp. 271, 277-278, 281. 76Defined: employing either former insurgents and/or indigenous personnel to combat remaining insurgents using tactics of deceit (dressing and acting like the enemy). 77Sens, p. 23. 78Ibid., p. 24. 79Gates, p. 275. 80Ibid., pp. 271-272. 81Sens, p. 24. 82Pier, pp. 20-24. 83William Marina, The Three Stooges in Iraq and the U.S.’s First Stooge, The Independent Institute, Oakland, CA, 14 October 2004. Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, U.S. Army, is currently a future warfare planner, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Reston, VA. He received a B.A. from Norwich University, and two M.A. degrees from Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base. His military education includes Joint Forces College, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Jumpmaster Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Cavalry Leaders Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Airmovement Operations Course, Aviation Officer Basic Course, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include operations planner, Multinational Corps-Iraq, Camp Victory, Iraq; operations officer, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 159th Aviation Regiment, Iraq; XO, 1st Battalion (Training Support) (Aviation), 337th Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 82d Aviation Regiment, Fort Bragg, NC; and commander, Aviation Detachment, Joint Task Force Safe Border, Patuca, Ecuador. Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, U.S. Navy, is a logistics action officer, J4, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, HI. He received a B.S. from Carnegie Mellon University and a M.S. from the Naval Postgraduate School. His military education includes Joint Forces Staff College, U.S. Army Logistics Management College, Naval Supply Corps School, and Naval Nuclear Power School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include supply officer, USS Wadsworth FFG-9; general supply and fiscal officer, Fleet Hospital Operations and Training Command, Camp Pendleton, CA; cargo officer and helicopter control officer, USS Rainier AOE-7, Bremerton, WA; and engineering watch supervisor, USS Alaska SSBN-732(G), Bangor, WA. Major William M. Stowe III, U.S. Air Force, is currently a joint operations staff officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Joint Command, Lisbon, Portugal. He received a B.S. from Ohio State University, a M.S. from Lesley College, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. His military education includes Joint Forces Staff College, Naval Command and Staff College, and Squadron Officer School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include director of operations, 55th Air Refueling Squadron, Altus Air Force Base, OK. 34 — January-February 2007