Building for the Future: Combined Arms Officers

The U. S. Army is undergoing a significant period of transition. As with many past conflicts, the Global War on Terror has hastened this change and the unpredictable enemies we now face have altered the notions that Army leaders had concerning the status of our military in the post-Cold War world. For example, the widely heralded demise of heavy armor forces was quickly forgotten as the battlefields of Iraq demonstrated the continued value of tanks working in close coordination with infantry. However, the winds of change are still blowing against the armor branch, especially its junior leaders. There is no doubt that our soldiers and noncommissioned officers will remain specialists in very specific fields, retaining their technical expertise as tank crewmen and cavalry scouts. However, future armor officers are going to require a broader range of technical and tactical expertise. Although the time-tested principles of combat leadership remain true, the tactical skill set expected of our company-grade armor officers has greatly expanded, highlighting the need to reexamine some aspects of officer training and professional progression. It is no exaggeration to say that today, and in the foreseeable future, armor officers are not just tankers anymore. Not Just “Tankers” Anymore The old (and misguided) notion of “death before dismount” has been completely invalidated by recent combat operations in Iraq. Armor officers are no longer chained to tanks as they conduct counterinsurgency missions. Although tanks remain a vital tool in this fighting environment, the role of the armor officer has expanded beyond the confines of a tank turret, to include the vehicle commander’s position on the M1114 up-armored HMMWV, the patrol leader’s position on dismounted ambushes, and the UH-60 landing zone during air assault operations. Our lieutenants and captains are not just tankers anymore. Armor officers at the company level must feel equally comfortable on their feet with M4 carbines as they do in a turret behind a 120mm main gun. This is hardly anew idea — armor lieutenants have long served as scout platoon leaders mounted in HMMWVs, and many of our captains have commanded light cavalry troops. However, with the advent of the combined arms battalion (CAB) we have reached anew stage in the evolution of our officer corps. The CAB provides maneuver commanders with a level of organic tactical flexibility previously unknown. By placing armor, infantry, and engineer units in the same battalion, the Army sent a clear signal that field-grade officers are expected to possess a level of expertise that allows them to properly train and prepare units for combat. In the days of temporary task organization, battalion commanders and op- 20 — erations officers could get by with a basic knowledge of operations beyond the scope of armored formations. Of course, the best commanders and S3s always strove to master all aspects of combined arms operations, but now that our battalions are truly combined arms formations, such knowledge and experience must be the rule rather than the exception. Tomorrow’s field-grade officers are being developed today — in combat theaters with young lieutenants and captains. Observations from the Front The strains of multiple year-long combat deployments have prompted many changes that would have been practically inconceivable just a few years ago. Junior officers are being asked to do things that few of us would have thought about early in our careers. Despite this, lieutenants and captains are rising to the challenge and accomplishing their missions with an almost unbroken record of success. The lines between the branches, at least on the tactical level, have not restrained our company-grade officers, as indicated by job assignments and performances. Due to a shortage of infantry lieutenants, many new armor lieutenants are initially serving as platoon leaders for mechanized infantry. Despite the fact they were prepared to lead tank platoons, these young officers have generally performed very well. There is little difference between the amount of initial on-the-job training and mentorship for new armor lieutenants and that required for new infantry lieutenants. Combat leadership and warrior spirit are common to both branches, so the transition is not as drastic as one might initially think. Under close supervision of a seasoned company commander, young armor officers, who get the opportunity to lead infantry platoons, gain a valuable set of experiences that will serve them well throughout their careers. Battalion commanders at the front are asking many senior armor lieutenants to serve as executive officers of infantry companies. Such assignments are the result of a clear understanding of the importance of the company executive officer. As executive officers, lieutenants learn their most valuable lessons, which will help them as future commanders. They have the chance to observe their commanding officers in away that was not possible as platoon leaders. Most importantly, they become acting commanders in the absence of the commander. The benefits of an armor lieutenant getting to serve in an infantry company are immense from both a tactical and logistics perspective. There is no such thing as exclusively “armor” or “infantry” missions anymore. There are only missions. Iraq presents our combined arms battalions with a complex battlefield. Due to the ever-changing threat, high operating tempo, and limitations in manpower and resources, it is not always possible to match up armor and infantry formations to their traditional roles. As stated above, our leaders at the company level must possess the flexibility to plan and execute any type of mission. This means that lieutenants and captains must get the widest set of tactical training and experiences possible, and they must maintain an aggressively flexible mindset that will allow them to think beyond the traditional confines imposed on armor forces. Of course, this does not mean that units should merely throw a platoon of 19K tank crewmen on a UH-60 and fly off on a mission (although with the proper training this is not impossible). It does mean, however, that armor officers who find themselves as scout platoon leaders, infantry platoon leaders, and maneuver company commanders (to include a headquarters company) can expect to perform a myriad of different tactical missions, many of which will not be traditional tanker missions. Scouts have long performed extensive dismounted operations, and armor lieutenants fortunate enough to lead scout platoons have greatly benefited from the experience. Tank platoons in Iraq often find themselves operating as motorized infantry, mounted on M1114 up-armored HMMWVs. An armor officer in command of a battalion headquarters and headquarters company can easily find himself leading an air assault operation with battalion scouts and 11C infantrymen from the mortar platoon. None of these tasks are traditional “armor missions.” In fact, such labels are becoming obsolete. Different missions might demand different levels of force or different types of resources and combat power, but they are increasingly becoming merely “missions” that all tactical leaders, regardless of whether they are armor or infantry officers, must be ready to execute. Implications for the Future Flexibility is nothing new to armor officers — we have always been proud of our emphasis on combined arms warfare, integrating infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, and engineers into the fight. Therefore, the notions in this article should hardly be surprising. They are a natural outgrowth of our branch’s inherent strengths “The old (and misguided) notion of “death before dismount” has been completely invalidated by recent combat operations in Iraq. Armor officers are no longer chained to tanks as they conduct counterinsurgency missions. Although tanks remain a vital tool in this fighting environment, the role of the armor officer has expanded beyond the confines of a tank turret, to include the vehicle commander’s position on the M1114 up-armored HMMWV, the patrol leader’s position on dismounted ambushes, and the UH-60 landing zone during air assault operations.” — 21 and the ever-changing battlefield of the Global War on Terrorism. Combined arms battalions require flexible field-grade officers who understand the capabilities and limitations of every formation in the unit. Building this type of senior officer begins at the lieutenant and captain levels. The line dividing armor and infantry officers in mechanized units continues to fade, and this trend is likely to continue. We should welcome this development and prepare for the future accordingly. It is impossible to say exactly what the future holds. Will the armor and infantry branches eventually come together to form a combined arms maneuver branch? Only time will tell. However, we can be certain that young lieutenants and captains require expanded tactical skills, which include missions that are not traditionally armor missions. The challenges of training and leading combined arms battalions demand that we prepare young officers today for what they will face tomorrow. Many Challenges and Possible Solutions Of course, there are many challenges with placing lieutenants in the right jobs within the ridiculously short time before they are promoted to captain. There is no way a newly arrived lieutenant can lead both an infantry and armor platoon, and serve as an executive officer or specialty platoon leader before he is promoted to captain. To ensure lieutenants get the appropriate amount of experience and professional development, it is now common for officers to serve as executive officers or specialty platoon leaders following their promotion to captain. Rarely do newly pinned captains attend career courses; instead, they stay in their battalions longer, which delays their attendance to career courses by months and sometimes even years. While this is often frustrating, it is necessary for new captains to learn everything they need at their first duty station. As long as battalion commanders track this closely and do everything they can to get young captains to career courses in a reasonable amount of time, there should be few problems with this arrangement. It is not necessary for all new armor lieutenants to serve as infantry platoon leaders prior to leading tank platoons. It is also not necessary to add executive officer duty time in a company of the opposite branch as a standard in an armor officer’s progression. This would hardly be possible; however, assigning an armor lieutenant to an infantry company should become something of a normal course of action, and only the very best armor lieutenants should serve as second-in-command of mechanized infantry companies (just as only the best infantry lieutenants should serve as armor company XOs). Such assignments should be seen as recognition of past excellence and clearly identify potential, much in the same way that we think of specialty platoon assignments. At the captain level, career courses must continue to evolve, putting emphasis on planning and executing operations, such as air assaults, dismounted infiltrations, raids, and all manner of urban operations. Post-command captains instructing at ACCC are bringing these lessons with them to the classroom, but there must be an official effort to codify such efforts within the schoolhouse. In this way, we can ensure that future staff captains and company commanders are fully prepared to plan and execute the myriad of operations that battalion commanders will demand. Embracing the Change and Building the Future Branch rivalry will likely be the biggest obstacle to making these very necessary changes. As professionals, all must overcome the petty jealousies and foolish prejudices standing in the way. The armor community must play its vital part and, along with our infantry and engineer brothers, step boldly into the future. We must train and prepare our lieutenants to be the best staff captains and company commanders possible, which leads to developing the strongest possible field grade leadership for our combined arms battalions in the years to come. This discussion is important for the future of the armor branch and the Army as a whole. It is a discussion that involves all the combat arms branches, especially our own and the infantry. This article is written with emphasis on armor officers, but much of the information applies to infantry officers — we both have vital roles to play. The foundations of future excellence must be built today. Captain Chad R. Foster is currently serving as commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor (1-66 AR), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division (ID), Taji, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, Air Assault School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood, TX; S3 (air), 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3/7 CAV), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA; scout platoon leader, A Troop, 3/7 CAV, 3d ID, Fort Stewart; and tank platoon leader, A Troop, 3/7 CAV. “The strains of multiple year-long combat deployments have prompted many changes that would have been practically inconceivable just few years ago. Junior officers are being asked to do things that few of us would have thought about early in our careers. Despite this, lieutenants and captains are rising to the challenge and accomplishing their missions with an almost unbroken record of success. The lines between the branches, at least on the tactical level, have not restrained our company-grade officers, as indicated by job assignments and performances.” 22 —