Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match?

The so-called “second Lebanon war,” which opened on 12 July 2006, actually started on 22 November 2005, when Hezbollah attacked the village of al-Ghajar in an attempt to capture Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. The commanding general at the time, Udi Adam, noted in his after-action report, that “it was the first time Hezbollah used its entire tactical arsenal,” revealing that one of his Merkava tanks received no less than seven hits from various antitank missiles, none of which penetrated its armor while the crew escaped unhurt. Iranian instructors had taken the al-Gha-jar incident very seriously and reacted by sending antiarmor specialists from Tehran to their training base located in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley. Iranian tank experts examined Hezbollah video shots that clearly displayed hits on the Merkava tank taken during the action at al-Gha-jar. The Iranian tank experts carefully studied these displays, looking for “blind” spots in which Merkava could be vulnerable to AT-14 Kornet and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 29V fire, which they planned to introduce in future engagements. On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah was ready, its men fully trained to challenge Merkava tanks with the latest antitank weapons supplied by Iran and Syria. What followed in 33 days of battle was the ultimate test by western armor against third-generation antitank weapons from the arsenals of Russia, China, and even North Korea. Assessing Merkava in Battle Four types of Merkava tanks were in action in Lebanon 2006, including Merkava Mk4, the Merkava Mk2D (with its distinctive sloped turret), the standard Mk2 (mostly with reserve units), and Merkava Mk3Baz. Toward the end of the fighting, Brigadier General Halutzi Rodoi, the chief of the IDF armored corps, was asked to assess the performance of his tank force, and especially the lessons drawn from the fighting against advanced antitank missiles fired by Hezbollah on the coveted Merkava Mk4, which saw its first combat engagement in Lebanon. According to General Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize risk, even when it was penetrated. The IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. According to official reports, about 10 percent were hit by various threats, of which less than half were penetrated. In an overall assessment, the potential risk to crewmen would have been much higher, if the tank had been more conventionally designed. Colonel Moti Kidor, commander, 401st Armored Corps Brigade, which bore the brunt of battle, mentioned in an interview that during the war, hundreds of antitank missiles were fired on his unit, and, in total, only 18 tanks were seriously damaged. Of those, missiles actually penetrated only five or six vehicles, and according to statistics, only two tanks were totally destroyed, both of them by super-heavy improvised explosive device (IED) charges. One officer, Lieutenant Yotam, reported that his Merkava Mk4 tank had been simultaneously hit by two unspecified antitank missiles. Miraculously, all four crew members evacuated unscathed. 12 —

The unique Merkava design uses special armor to minimize the risk of spall, which is generated by shaped charge plasma jets. All Merkava vehicles use fire retardant containers to store ammunition, preventing highly lethal secondary explosions. Furthermore, tanks are equipped with a rapid fire suppression system that eliminates sympathetic detonation of ammunition. As a result, only a few tanks encountered catastrophic fire hazards after suffering penetrating missile attacks on ammunition, substantially reducing lethal-burn casualties to crew members. Some of the tanks, especially those outfitted with the low-intensity conflict (LIC) urban combat kit are equipped with bottom hull plates to protect against heavy mines and belly charges. Several Merkava tanks and heavy armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) encountered a number of these charges, some weighing more than 330 pounds. While heavily armored vehicles can hardly be expected to survive such an attack, the upgraded vehicle types demonstrated effective protection for the crew, which, in some cases, even managed to survive such an attack with only minor injuries. In one instance, a Merkava tank was hit by a belly charge carrying more than 330 pounds of explosives, which killed one crew member and wounded the remaining six (some traveling in the rear compartment). Despite the loss of one crew member, this incident is considered proof of the effective protection of the new Merkava Mk4. To reduce this threat even further, the heavily armored D-9 bulldozer was employed to precede the tanks over high-risk tracks, blowing up IEDs with minimum damage to the bulldozers and clearing the way for the tanks to follow. The IDF Armor Corps has traditionally invested considerable effort in examining after-battle hit statistics on its tanks to establish new tactics and techniques. The founder of this procedure was Major General Israel Tal, “father of the Merkava” and a leading armor expert of worldwide renown. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, General Tal led a development team that studied Israel’s unique battlefield characteristics and lessons learned from previous wars. On General Tal’s orders, a special team of experts examined every single tank hit while the tanks were still on the battlefield. The team then conducted an in-depth investigation, which resulted in developing effective means for crew protection and formed the basis of the unique Merkava project. A similar investigation team has already recorded all hits on tanks received during the Lebanon crisis. A full report was made available for an assessment team of experts, who are examining these reports in detail and preparing to make necessary amendments without delay, pending the resumption of the conflict should the presently fragile ceasefire fall apart. Assessing Hezbollah Antiarmor Tactics and Weapons Hezbollah fighters used heavier, more capable missiles, including the Metis M and the AT-14 Kornet, to engage the Merkava Mk4. The Konkurs, Fagot antitank guided missile (ATGM), and RPG-29 were mostly used against the less-protected Merkava Mk3Baz and Mk2, while nontandem weapons, such as the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile, Fagot ATGM, and RPG were left to engage other targets such as armored infantry fighting vehicles. The least used were AT-3 Sagger and nontan-dem RPGs, which are considered obsolete, but proved quite lethal against troops seeking cover in buildings. Overall, almost 90 percent of the tanks were hit by tandem warheads. In general, Hezbollah militants prioritized Merkava Mk4 over the Merkava Mk2 and Mk- 3Baz, and in general, targeted tanks over armored infantry fighting vehicles. At the beginning of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, Israel’s primary concern was a report that Hezbollah possessed Russian Kornet antitank missiles. However, Israel was also aware of the RPG-29 Vampir, armed with a tandem high-explosive antitank round that had stolen the show. There were even rumors that Hezbollah had received the notorious TBG-29V thermobaric rounds, which could not be confirmed in action. An estimated 500 to 600 members of the roughly 4,000-strong Hezbollah force in South Lebanon were divided into tank-killer teams of five or six. Each team was armed with five to eight antitank missiles, with a pre-stock stored in small fortified well-camouflaged bunkers, built to withstand Israeli air attacks. In another tactic, Hezbollah tank-killer teams would lay in wait in camouflaged bunkers or houses, having planted large IEDs on known approach routes. Once an Israeli tank would detonate one of these IEDs, Hezbollah would start lobbing mortar shells toward the attack to prevent rescue teams from rushing forward. This was also an effective method for outflanking Merkava tanks by targeting the tank’s vulnerable rear zone with RPG fire. The IDF attempted to respond with heavy artillery fire, smoke, and by using special medical evacuation Merkava tanks to evacuate casualties. It took awhile for Merkava crews to change tactics, which included dismounted infantry advancing over high-risk ground, taking out enemy bunkers with close-in fighting, and using heavily armored D-9s for recovery action under fire, thus reducing losses from Hezbollah tactics. Inadequate Tank Crew Training During the past six years, in which the bulk of the IDF was constantly engaged in low-intensity urban counterterrorist warfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, all regular forces, including tanks crews, were retrained for small-unit infantry policing operations, mostly dismounted. This proved extremely painful when young conscripts, who make up the bulk of the regular IDF, were rushed into battle after hasty retraining. It soon became apparent to IDF commanders that tank combat in Lebanon, fighting a highly prepared and well-equipped enemy, was a to-All photos courtesy David Eshel “According to General Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize risk, even when it was penetrated. The IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. According to official reports, about 10 percent were hit by various threats, of which less than half were penetrated.” — 13 tally new “ballgame” for the courageous, but inexperienced, soldiers of the armor corps. As a result, Israeli armor troops had to quickly relearn conventional, collective and individual, combat procedures. At the beginning of the war, several tanks lost tracks due to driver inexperience, especially when traveling mountainous and rugged terrain, trying to avoid the heavily mined paved roads and tracks. Moreover, during the Intifada, which began in September 2000, the armored corps did not receive top priority from senior defense establishment officials. Shortsighted budget cuts took a heavy toll on armored units. As a result, at the beginning of the war, tanks were lacking basic countermeasures such as instantaneous smoke canisters, laser warning detectors, and infrared jammers. While some of these devices were urgently supplied later in the war, the damage was already done. “Money kills” was the term used by several senior armored corps officers to express their frustrations over the defense establishment’s refusal to fund the installation of a rocket defense system on Israeli tanks, claiming soldiers were paying the price with their lives. The officers were referring to the Trophy, which is anew and unique locally developed active protection system that creates a hemispheric protected zone around armored vehicles such as the Merkava Mk4 tank. The Trophy design includes four flat-panel antennas and a search radar device mounted on the vehicle. When properly mounted, the combined radar view is a full 360 degrees. When a weapon is fired at the vehicle, the internal computer uses the signal from the incoming weapon and “It soon became apparent to IDF commanders that tank combat in Lebanon, fighting a highly prepared and well-equipped enemy, was a totally new “ballgame” for the courageous, but inexperienced, soldiers of the armor corps. As a result, Israeli armor troops had to quickly relearn conventional, collective and individual, combat procedures.” calculates an approach vector. Once the incoming weapon is fully classified, computers calculate the optimal time and angle to automatically fire neutralizers. The response comes from two launchers installed on the vehicle, one on each side, which have a pivoting/rotating ability and are able to fire in any direction the computer directs. The launchers fire neutralizing agents, which are small metal pellets similar to shotgun shot. If such measures would have been available, Merkava tank crews would have fared much better against even third-generation weapons. Summing up the performance of Merkava tanks, especially the latest Mk4, most tank crews agree that, despite losses sustained and some major flaws in tactical conduct, the tank proved its mettle during its first high-saturation combat operation. The overall consensus revealed that tanks with less armor would have caused much higher losses. Retired Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, Israel Defense Forces, is a freelance journalist and serves as a defense analyst for several military journals. Following his brief service with the British Forces during World War II, he became one of the founding members if the Israeli Armoured Corps and served as a career officer with the IDF for 26 years. Educated at the French Cavalry School at Saumur, he later held various command and staff assignments and fought in all of the Arab-Israeli wars, including the 1973 conflict, when he served as the Armoured Corps’ chief of signals. “‘Money kills’ was the term used by several senior armored corps officers to express their frustrations over the defense establishment’s refusal to fund the installation of a rocket defense system on Israeli tanks, claiming soldiers were paying the price with their lives. The officers were referring to the Trophy, which is anew and unique locally developed active protection system that creates a hemispheric protected zone around armored vehicles…” 14 —