Brigade Intelligence Collection Manager

Brigade Intelligence Collection Manager by Major Kent Strader “Rommel was far superior in his more rapid assimilation of the facts, his more rapid decision about what to do, and the drive behind his command, which forced his troops to success.”1 — Ronald Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander Managing intelligence is the key to shaping the battlefield and setting conditions for success within the brigade area of operations. To manage intelligence competently, a centralized command and control node must be empowered to manage the reconnaissance fight and focus brigade assets, thereby assisting brigade com manders in setting conditions for the main battle. The trend throughout the Army’s maneuver brigades has been creating a non-modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) chief of reconnaissance position, who manages intelligence collection of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. The brigade intelligence collection manager (BICM) is the operations or execution side of the reconnaissance fight, while the S2 is the plans and analysis side. Furthermore, the S2 typically analyzes intelligence while the BICM focuses the reconnaissance effort to achieve the reconnaissance objective. This concept is borrowed from the generation prior to the contemporary operational environment (COE). In the heavy opposing force structure, the regimental reconnaissance company commander wore two hats — the company commander and reconnaissance plan executor. This article proposes a centralization of intelligence flow and execution, managed by the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) commander on the brigade operations and intelligence (O&I) net, in cooperation with the brigade S2, who analyzes the raw data being gathered. What brigade commanders want reconnaissance to achieve and what they get is hobbled by placing the mantle of chief of reconnaissance (COR) or BICM on the wrong man. Typically, a non-career course captain, who was the best scout platoon leader in the brigade, becomes the COR. He lacks the authority to interact with the brigade staff and the level of professional development necessary to operate at the brigade level, which means he is generally out of his league. Few would venture to pin the BRT commander with the rose of BICM; however, he is best suited and resourced to handle the responsibility. Nevertheless, the central issue is managing the ISR plan, which means ownership. No one will argue that the brigade S3 is the master planner and architect of the ISR scheme of maneuver and resources. However, as the maneuver planning continues into the later stages of the troop leading procedures, his control on the ISR plan is left to the executors. Therefore, he needs a representative, who works in concert with the scheme of maneuver and the brigade commander’s intent for reconnaissance. The BRT commander or BICM is the sole collector of raw intelligence and synchronizes the brigade collection plan to January-February 2006 — 45 answer the brigade commander’s intelligence requirements (IR) and saturate the brigade zone so that timely intelligence can assist the brigade commander in making judicious, informed decisions. If the brigade commander is the architect of shaping operations, the BICM is the foreman. Brigade intelligence collection managers set the conditions through synchronization of reconnaissance operations and managing the reconnaissance zone, filtering information, adjusting the reconnaissance set as losses occur, and applying fires to shape the battlefield.2 The BRT commander is resourced by the MTOE to function as an independent command and control node and has the appropriate communications architecture, with augmentation from the brigade, to command and control every collector within the brigade area of operations (AO). Scout platoon leaders, the combat observation and lasing team (COLT) platoon leader, the military intelligence ground surveillance radar (GSR) platoon leader, engineer reconnaissance platoon leader, tactical air control parties (TACPs), and the chemical reconnaissance section leader should report to and deconflict operations through the BRT commander using the brigade O&I net. Meanwhile, the BRT first sergeant operates not only as the casualty evacuation (CAS EVAC) vehicle for the BRT, but the coordination node for the brigade’s reconnaissance casualty evacuation operations. The BICM provides invaluable assets to brigade commanders, which include sharing intelligence to avoid unnecessary casualties, synchronizing the efforts of his collectors, ensuring necessary redundancy is built into the ISR plan, executing the collection plan, adjusting the collection plan when an asset becomes a casualty, maintaining contact with the enemy throughout the zone, refining targets and recommending a focus of fires during the reconnaissance fight, and preventing collector fratricide through situational awareness. Separating these roles is vital because of how they impact the brigade maneuver. Common trends seen at the National Training Center (NTC) include a lack of centralized command and control of all the battlefield collectors, contributing to intelligence gaps and unnecessary battlefield casualties resulting from a failure to share intelligence; a communications architecture that does not provide timely raw intelligence; an inability to adjust the reconnaissance set when a collector is rendered a casualty; little to no refinement of targeting; ineffective information battle handover throughout the reconnaissance zone; and most importantly, a failure to target and attrite the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield. Conversely, opposing forces (OPFOR) at combat training centers (CTCs) are adept at maintaining contact with the player brigade from the time they leave their assembly areas; accurately targeting the brigade with indirect fires and special munitions; triggering artillery delivered munitions; and ultimately setting the conditions for decisive maneuver. This is accomplished with one man on one radio net, who is responsible for the collection of battlefield intelligence and managing the reconnaissance assets within the reconnaissance zone. This creates a cohesive intelligence picture so that, at a glance, the commander can ascertain the course or courses of action that remain open to him prior to and during execution. Up-tothe-minute reporting is forwarded when and where it is needed to effect maneuver. Adaptation of this tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) is not as simplistic within a brigade combat team (BCT) as it is in the OPFOR where battalion-sized commands are fought by captains who, in reality, command a company of men with a battalion’s worth of vehicles. Therefore, it is more important to streamline the flow of intelligence and keep it centralized for prompt action and optimal situational awareness. This concept may sound extremely unorthodox and repulsive to battalion commanders who expect to lose their task force scouts to brigade; however, as you will see, this is not the case — in fact, task force scout effectiveness can double. Failure to centralize the brigade reconnaissance effort prohibits the brigade commander’s ability to decisively affect the outcome of the battle due to a retarded intelligence management system. Task force and brigade collectors will be unaware of what enemy activity has taken place within their AO prior to infiltration or occupation of a screen line, causing the brigade to wander blindly into enemy contact — centralization could have prevented contact and multiplied efficiency. Task force commanders reading this article may think they will lose control of their scouts to brigade; this is not the case. If the task force S2 uses the scout pla-Proposed Brigade O&I Net Structure Brigade O/I

BRT

Commander Brigade S2 Brigade TOC BRT Platoons Brigade ERT Platoon Leader Task Force Scout Platoons COLT Platoon Chemical Recon Platoon GSR Platoon Figure 1 46 — January-February 2006 toon internal net as a task force O&I, he can eavesdrop and gather the task forces’ pertinent intelligence, as well as converse with the scout platoon leader as needed. Net management is essential to this technique of intelligence management (see Figure 1). Communications rehearsals are imperative and should be incorporated into the ISR rehearsal. Typically, we see the ISR portion of the upcoming battle amalgamated into the combined arms rehearsal, which is a critical error. If the collectors were infiltrating and gather intelligence the night prior, the guesswork would be taken out of the S2’s job, and refining objectives and targets would assist the commander in visualizing the battlefield and providing better guidance. Instead of the collectors attending the rehearsal, the BRT commander attends and briefs the reconnaissance plan in concert with the task force S2. The BRT commander then provides his commanders a current read of raw intelligence and enemy sightings, which is followed by the brigade S2’s analysis. During this rehearsal, the reconnaissance objective and the commander’s critical intelligence requirements maybe refined if the collectors have enough time to develop the situation. Task force scout platoon leaders should also attend this rehearsal, which will assist them in visualizing the enemy’s counterreconnaissance set, refining lethal and non lethal methods of obscuration and disruption, and planning infiltration routes based on the brigade assets successes or failures. Fires are a critical element of this concept; therefore, if the brigade fire support officer (FSO) is not tied into the ISR planning and execution, the plan will fail. Essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) built from the brigade commander’s intent for fires are focused on an enemy formation and function; however, the location of targets must initially be based on the brigade S2’s enemy situation template (SITTEMP). During the reconnaissance phase of the operation, it is especially critical for the brigade FSO to plan fires based on the infiltration routes of the brigade collectors and refine targets based on intelligence collected. That’s basically how it works; however, the reality is that fires at the NTC are executed off of templates due to ineffective reconnaissance, which is tied back to decentralized intelligence collection management. The Shaping Operations Rehearsal Adding one more rehearsal to an already busy schedule may seem like an improbable situation — until you look at the end result. If reconnaissance sets conditions, then intelligence collection is key to battlefield success, and subsequently, the ISR rehearsal, perhaps more appropriately termed the “shaping operations rehearsal,” is imperative. If commanders can visualize their reconnaissance effort as part of the mobility effort (obstacle identification and reduction by engineer reconnaissance teams (ERTs) and scouts), a combination of attrition by fires, which takes away key enemy capabilities such as digging assets and mine-laying equipment, and surveillance of the enemy’s disposition and strength would shape the battlefield for future success. This is what most commanders and staffs are trying to achieve, but getting there seems to be the obstacle. This is why a shaping operations rehearsal is imperative. After observing numerous battalions and brigades at the NTC, shaping operations or ISR rehearsals are not currently occurring as part of the BCT battle rhythm; however, any rehearsal is preferable to no rehearsal. Rehearsals should incorporate all battlefield operating system (BOS) elements to coordinate reconnaissance CASEVAC, fires planning, mobility planning, air defense planning, close air support, chemical reconnaissance, recovery and maintenance operations, and intelligence operations. Therefore, the recommended attendee list should include, but not be limited to the brigade XO, S3, S2, S4, FSO, air defense artillery officer (ADAO), as-Shaping Operations Rehearsal Checklist ❏ Roll Call: o Brigade S3 o Brigade S2 o Brigade S4 o Brigade FSO o ADAO o ABE o ALO o CMO o SIGO o BRT Commander and 1SG* o Task Force Scout Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants* o Charlie Med Company Commander o Medevac Flight Team o TACP Team Leaders* o MI Company Commander o Chemical Reconnaissance Platoon Leader or Section Leader* o Task Force S2s o ERT Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant* o GSR Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant* ❏ S3 briefs focus statement and brigade scheme of maneuver ❏ Brigade S2 briefs most probable course of action (MPCOA) and most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) and NAIs ❏ Brigade FSO addresses assets available, EFSTs, targets supporting infiltration, availability of immediate suppression missions, and target refinement requirements ❏ ABE briefs POE, reviews marking and bypass criteria and ERT focus ❏ ALO briefs Commander’s Intent for CAS, location of TACPs and concept of employment, relevant air tasking order (ATO) info and ordnance ❏ SIGO briefs locations of retrans and infil routes, retrans plan and redundant commo plan ❏ CMO briefs enemy chemical reconnaissance teams locations, concept of employment, by expected enemy COA for employment of WMDs ❏ Combat health support officer (CHSO) briefs brigade CASEVAC plan ❏ *Collectors address T/O, T/P and scheme of maneuver to include actions on contact, actions enroute, actions at recon objective, specific NAIs and associated PIR and CASEVAC plan *Denotes collectors who must brief IAW checklist. Figure 2 January-February 2006 — 47 sistant brigade engineer (ABE), air liaison officer (ALO), civil-military operations of ficer (CMO), signal officer (SIGO), BRT com mander and first sergeant, task force scout platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, the forward support battalion medical company commander and medical flight lead, all TACP team leaders, the military intelligence (MI) company commander, the chemical reconnaissance section leader, all task force S2s, and all separate collection leaders, such as the engineer reconnaissance platoon leader and platoon sergeant, and GSR platoon leader and platoon sergeant. The steps outlined in the checklist at Figure 2 are self-explanatory; however it is necessary to elaborate on the collectors. Everyone should use a terrain model/cloth to brief. Each collector addresses individual unit task organization, task and purpose, and scheme of maneuver, to include actions on contact; actions en route; actions at the reconnaissance objective; specific named areas of interest (NAI) and associated priority intelligence requirements (PIR); and CASEVAC plan. Each leader will conclude the back brief with a plan for adjusting the reconnaissance set in the event of losses on critical NAIs. The order of briefing should be by order of movement; for instance, starting with the BRT and ending with the task force scouts. Each element must address who he will coordinate with in advance to “pull” him through sector; for instance, a task force scout platoon leader should recite his scheme of maneuver and address how he will coordinate with the BRT and other brigade-level assets to “pull” his platoon through sector. He should be required to address the frequencies and call signs of each element from which he will require assistance. The BICM or BRT commander is then responsible for assisting each platoon leader by reminding him of who he needs to coordinate with prior to movement, and receiving a brief back on changes to infiltration routes and reported or suspected enemy locations. He is responsible for coordinating indirect fires during infiltration. The issue of dedicated fires in the heavy force has been a subject of some debate across the Army. Should a battery be assigned to fire in support of each BRT platoon or infiltration sector? Based on experience, I have seen probably only five fire missions called for a scout who was in contact. Normally, missions are denied by the brigade fire support element (FSE) because either the observer failed to send an accurate target description or the mission objective did not support the scheme of fires. At the NTC, it appears that the issue is effects based. Will the mission destroy the enemy or suppress him? Therefore, firing by battery is very problematic because decisive effects cannot be achieved. The effects the collectors need are suppressive and even if it has not been articulated, protection of ISR assets is an EFST during the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance phase of any operation. Providing these fires requires the fire support coordinator to restrict the ammunition consumption to support the brigade commander’s other EFSTs. The BICM can not exhaust the controlled supply rate, so someone must enforce the stated trigger when fires must be denied to support the brigade commander’s intent for fires and permit the artillery battalion to achieve its EFSTs. The task force is not relieved from the responsibility of providing fires to support its own organic ISR assets. Mortars must support the reconnaissance fight from the line of departure to maximum safe extent of range to help service contacts in the brigade zone. Therefore, the task force mortars should be employed forward with a counterreconnaissance com pany during the security or reconnaissance fight. In the reconnaissance fight, destruction of a target is not the desired effect; suppression is preferred to allow the collector to break contact and survive the engagement. Linear smoke missions to screen a collector or a section infiltration route should be standard operating procedure at likely enemy contact locations. A Final Note on Collector Net Management The intelligence collector manager must have the capability to manage information. The element leader must be prepared to manage two specific nets: the brigade O&I and his internal platoon or section frequency. For instance, the task force scout platoon leader sets his vehicle radios on the brigade O&I net and his platoon internal frequency net, while his platoon sergeant sets his vehicle radios on the battalion command net and platoon internal net. This allows the platoon leader or element leader to coordinate and deconflict the actions of the platoon within the brigade reconnaissance zone while his platoon sergeant keeps the parent battalion informed. Brigade-level assets do not experience the same friction, except in the case of the lone collector or TACP who has one radio and whose location is not disseminated to all collectors in the brigade AO. His lack of situational awareness and desire to be positioned in the most advantageous observation post does not take into account other collectors whose fire missions are subsequently denied because they were unaware of the lone collector operating in their battle space. NTC observer/controllers have observed brigades that do not adequately plan and track fire support coordination measures planned to protect ISR assets. Contrary to expectations, Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2) systems have not noticeably improved this situation. A centralized manager who has constant situational awareness of all elements forward of the forward line of troops has been the missing ingredient in making the system work. The principles are basic and flexible. The problem is simple and the solutions are achievable. If leaders will commit to coordinating our reconnaissance efforts throughout the brigade AO, we can eliminate the pain of denied fire missions. Perhaps some may say this is too hard to achieve with all the other rehearsals and meetings that require attendance; however, I will remind you that the enemy has defeated you without firing a shot when you surrender the focus of your reconnaissance assets — you are no longer setting the conditions for success. Notes 1Ronald Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander, Barnes and Noble, Inc., New York, March 1999. 2It is imperative that the brigade intelligence collection manager refine targets and attack within the brigade commander’s guidance with a minimal amount of interference from the fire support coordinator once infiltration begins. Major O. Kent Strader is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.S. from Liberty University. His military education includes U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, Jumpmaster Course, Bradley Leaders Course, Long Range Surveillance Leaders Course, and Joint Firepower Control Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include advisor, G2/G3, Western Region Headquarters, Kalipah Omar bin Khattab Brigade, Tarif, Saudi Arabia; advisor, Western Sector Training Center and Range, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; scout platoon observer controller and company primary and battalion task force live fire observer controller, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; company commander, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment (OPFOR), Hohenfels, GE; and company commander, 1st Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Airborne), U.S. Army Airborne School, Fort Benning, GA. 48 — January-February 2006