An Integrated Approach: British Political-Military Strategy in the Malayan Emergency

Since the end of the Vietnam War, the study of conventional, high-technology warfare has provided the main emphasis for American military professionals and scholars. With the current insurgency in Iraq, the study of counterinsurgency warfare has recently emerged as a top priority for the U. S. military. However, counterinsurgency is not a recent phenomenon, and despite certain opinions of the war in Iraq, insurgencies can be defeated. The British army fought a communist insurgency in Malaya from 1948 to 1960. The British succeeded largely because they integrated political and military strategies to form a cohesive overall strategy that reinforced the Malay government’s political legitimacy. This example offers several lessons for U. S. political and military decisionmakers in Iraq. However, before analyzing British counterinsurgency in Malaya, we must understand the nature of insurgency. Insurgency is “an attempt to overthrow or oppose a state or regime by force of arms” and is often termed “guerrilla war.”1 It is “the weapon of the weak” for those who cannot oppose their enemies with traditional conventional warfare.2 Counterinsurgency can be defined as the government’s attempt to preserve its place as the legitimate political authority within the state.3 Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, western armies fought several counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the United States in the Philippines and Vietnam, French colonial wars in Indo-China and Algeria, and Britain in South Africa, Kenya, Malaya, and other former colonies. Although some view insurgency and coun terinsurgency as a recent development, this is not the case.4 The British army developed tactics, techniques, and procedures for dealing with insurgencies during the late 19th century. Colonel C. E. Callwell wrote some of the earliest professional literature on the subject with his book, Small Wars, first published in 1896. The British discovered that at the heart of every insurgency lies a political problem — “guerrilla insurgency is quintes-sentially a political phenomenon” — and must be solved primarily through political solutions.5 Although an insurgency springs from political grievances, it manifests itself through violence. Insurgents attack where the government is weakest — isolated outposts or supply convoys. Because insurgencies are violent, governments must use force to preserve law and order. Also, since political dissatisfaction feeds an insurgency, a government must address these political grievances through policy changes. Because of this dual political-military nature, one of the most important principles in defeating an insurgency is the integration of a coherent political strategy with a coherent military strategy. During the Malayan Emergency of 1948- 60, the British army developed and integrated coherent military and political strategies that ultimately resulted in decisive victory. British strategy in Malaya transitioned between three phases: the initial phase (1948-1950), characterized by a predominantly military approach to counterinsurgency through the use of force; the second phase (1950-1951), in which the British recognized the need for a political strategy, as well as necessary changes to the military approach, and implemented these changes; and the third, integrative phase (1952-1960), which com bined the political and military strategies. Before analyzing these phases, one must first understand the history of the Malayan Emergency. Geography and the Beginning of British Influence in Malaya Geographically, the modern-day Federation of Malaysia shares only one land border — with Thailand — and occupies approximately 50,000 square miles. In the late 1940s, the population was comprised of 49 percent ethnic Malays, 38 percent Chinese, 11 percent Indian, 1 percent aboriginal tribes, and about 12,000 Europeans.6 The majority of the Federation’s 5.3 million people lived around the major cities of Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, and Taiping. Jungle highlands dominate the interior of the peninsula, reaching 7,000 feet.7 British influence in Malaya reaches back to the late 18th century, with the signing of several commercial treaties between Britain and local rulers. In 1909, modern Malaya, then called Kedah, came under direct British control with the Anglo-Kedah Treaty. Malaya experienced strong economic growth and became important to British policy in Southeast Asia.8 Based largely on rubber, latex, and tin exports, the Malayan economy provided many natural resources that Imperial Japan lacked during its expansion prior to World War II. Recognizing this, the Japanese invaded Malaya in 1941 and occupied the country for the duration of the war. The Malays fought a small-scale guerrilla campaign until the Japanese surrender in 1945.9 The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) provided many contributions to the anti-Japanese effort during the war, but later initiated the insurgency campaign that sparked the British high commissioner for Malaya to declare a state of emergency in June 1948. The MCP and Outbreak of Insurgency The MCP, primarily comprised of ethnic Chinese, gained power among the Chinese elements of society through its opposition to the Japanese occupation. World War II had “exacerbated the ethnic tensions that had already existed in Malaya, as the Malays had largely cooperated with the Japanese occupiers. The British forces that arrived to reoccupy the country in September 1945 had lost their aura of invincibility after their defeat four years earlier.”10 Ethnic tensions between Malays and Chinese led to the collapse of law and order across the country. The MCP, although only nominally communist, formed the Malayan People’s Anti-British Army (MPABA) and declared “under the increased exploitation and oppression and even the use of violent attacks of the British im-perialists, the working classes launched a violent strike struggle, followed by an outbreak of peasant struggle in certain places.”11 The communists launched a series of terrorist attacks, destroying property and murdering several Europeans. On 17 June 1948, the high commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, declared: “On unanimous advice of the G. O. C. [General Officer Commanding] and all other officials and unofficial members of my Executive Council, I have decided that it is essential to extend Emergency Regulations mentioned in my telegram number 630 so as to make them applicable to the whole of the Federation.”12 Phase I: Initial Approach to Counterinsurgency When Sir Edward Gent declared a state of emergency, the Federal government had at its disposal only 10 infantry battalions and 9,000 police officers.13 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Montgomery, approved a request for another infantry brigade to be dispatched to Malaya. However, Montgomery cautioned that “there must be no delusion… that by sending one brigade to the Far East, the situation there would be solved.”14 Initially, British administrators approved and enacted the emergency regulations, which authorized the heavy-handed use of detention, deportation, and the collective punishment of entire towns and villages. The high commissioner was authorized to “use the banishment ordinance without prior reference to me [Creech Jones, Secretary of State for Colonies]” and to detain all those “implicated in acts of violence, or in organizing or inciting persons to take part in strikes, disturbances, or demonstrations in which violence of the threat of violence is used.”15 Although the emergency regulations were an act of policy, and therefore a political element of British strategy, the regulations relied almost exclusively on a heavy-handed approach. The authorities could essentially take whatever actions they wished, without many legal restrictions such as due process. The government’s harsh application of the emergency regulations and the police and military forces’ behavior, fostered the belief among many Chinese that the government did not care about their welfare.16 “Although an insurgency springs from political grievances, it manifests itself through violence. Insurgents attack where the government is weakest — isolated outposts or supply convoys. Because insurgencies are violent, governments must use force to preserve law and order.” — 35

Militarily, the British reorganized the Malay police force, increasing its numbers and providing better training for its officers. With more police officers available, the British began using Malay police to patrol villages and perform local guard duties, which allowed more British and Malay soldiers to patrol the jungle in search-and-destroy missions. British commanders employed a “conventional” mindset, sending large patrols on vast jungle sweeps for short periods of time in search of enemy troops or bases.17 Often, soldiers would find recently abandoned enemy camps — the large-scale, multiple-battalion sweeps were simply too slow to catch most communist terrorists (CTs) before they could disperse. To their credit, the British quickly realized that they needed to adapt their approach. In a letter dated 23 August 1948, the Permanent Undersecretary of State in the Colonial Office, Sir Thomas Lloyd, wrote that “the daily reports about the struggle to get the upper hand of the terrorist campaign continue to present a fluc tuating record of success and disappointment, and there is still no definite indication of that lessening.”18 In addition to recognizing the need for military changes, the British also realized that they had to approach the insurgency as a political phenomenon: “Reports, which we have seen from Malaya, have spoken of the Chinese community as sitting on the fence. We realize that the main reasons for this attitude — if it exists — are doubt about our ability to protect the law-abiding Chinese and eventually to liquidate the terrorists… there may be room for more active efforts to enlist the enthusiasm of these people.”19 Throughout 1948 and 1949, British officials quickly realized the necessity to adapt their strategy both by changing their military approach and by adopting a political strategy for winning the support of the Malayan population, including its ethnic Chinese elements. By 1950, the British had reached the second phase in the development of an integrated political and military strategy. Phase II: Implementing Political and Military Changes Realizing the need to improve jungle warfare training, the British army established a Jungle Warfare School in Singapore to train officers and NCOs. The British also recognized the value of special operations forces. As early as 1948, the British formed “Ferret Force,” which was “designed for traveling light and living off the land,” during long-range jungle operations.20 Ferret Force, though small in numbers, became proficient in jungle tracking and long-range patrolling. Grasping the value of special operations units, such as Ferret Force, the British formed the Malayan Scouts in 1950 — the precursor to the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment.21 The SAS conducted long-range patrols deep in the jungle over several months in duration, tracking CTs and laying ambushes, destroying CT supplies, and performing reconnaissance and surveillance. In addition to these innovations, the British began improving their intelligence capabilities. In 1950, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs was named director of operations in Malaya. Briggs created the Federal Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee to coordinate the collection and management of intelligence throughout the peninsula. He also initiated the Federal War Council, which included civil, military, and police officials. This innovation eased coordination between the different civil and military authorities.22 Briggs’ tenure as director of operations also marked the beginning of a coherent political strategy for dealing with the insurgency. In a document, which has since become known as the “Briggs Plan,” Briggs outlined his strategy to gain the support of the population, which would isolate the MCP from its supplies and intelligence sources. In this plan, the police concentrated “on fulfilling normal police functions, including the obtaining of intelligence,” while the army would “maintain in States a framework of troops, deployed in close conjunction with the Police, to cover those populated areas which the Police cannot themselves adequately cover.” The civil administration would “strengthen…their effective control of the populated areas… to ensure that all populated areas are effectively administered.”23 Within each Malay state, the army established strike forces “to dominate the jungle up to about five hours journey from potential bandit supply areas.”24 The Briggs plan placed a priority “on winning the support of the population rather than defeating the insurgents by force of arms.”25 This marked the beginning of a strategic focus on the enemy’s political vulnerabilities. Rather than applying methods of detention, deportation, and collective punishment, the British realized that they must build up the population’s confidence in government.26 These measures improved security in the major cities and larger villages, but support for the insurgency continued in the squatter areas.27 To increase government control of these communities, Briggs adopted a policy of forced relocation, establishing “new villages,” protected by barbed-wire fences, and anew Chinese auxiliary police force. The government would also provide services such as schools and medical facilities. Although the new villages increased security in the squatter communities, and eventually re-settled over 400,000 people, “the support of the population for the MCP continued.”28 Sir Henry Gurney, the high commissioner for Malaya, who replaced Gent in October 1948, wrote of the new village concept: “Into these settlements and into trade unions and into schools, the MCP are trying hard to penetrate and are succeeding. If they are allowed to continue thus unopposed by any Chinese effort whatever, the whole of the Chinese rural population will soon come under Communist domination.”29 Clearly, the new 36 — “Ferret Force, though small in numbers, became proficient in jungle tracking and long-range patrolling. Grasping the value of special operations units, such as Ferret Force, the British formed the Malayan Scouts in 1950 — the precursor to the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment. The SAS conducted long-range patrols deep in the jungle over several months in duration, tracking CTs and laying ambushes, destroying CT supplies, and performing reconnaissance and surveillance.”

villages alone would not provide the solution to the insurgency. Despite the mixed successes of the new village concept, this second phase of British strategic development marked a distinct change in the military approach to fighting the insurgency, resulting in a much more effective military strategy, and represented the beginning of the realization that the insurgency must be defeated through the application of a political strategy as well. The British Secretary of State for War, John Strachey, wrote in a memorandum in June 1950: “The political essence of the problem is, in my view, the extent and the limits of popular support for the Communists… if there was no popular support for them, there would be no problem for us.”30 By the end of 1951, Gurney had been assassinated in an ambush, Briggs had retired due to poor health, and the head of police, Colonel Nicol Grey, had been relieved. Though the British had recognized the need for adapting their military strategy and the need for establishing a political strategy, the Malayan situation at the end of 1951 seemed sinister. Two developments during the last months of 1951 and the first months of 1952 ushered in the third phase of British strategy. Phase III: Adapting and Integrating The first development that initiated phase three was the 1951 election of a conservative government headed by second-time Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill. Churchill’s new Secretary of State for Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, visited Malaya and offered his conclusions in a cabinet memorandum. He believed that, “although the Briggs Plan is fundamentally sound and has achieved a certain measure of success, the communist hold on Malaya is as strong, if not stronger, today than it ever has been. This fact must be faced.” In his view, “the crux of the problem is the winning of the confidence and loyalty of the bulk of the Chinese population.”31 Lyttelton’s report outlined political success as the primary means of achieving peace and stability in Malaya. With this in mind, Lyttelton chose General Sir Gerald Templer to replace the retiring General Briggs. Templer’s selection provided the leadership and vision necessary to adapt British political strategy, making it much more effective, and integrating the political and military strategies into a single, coherent, and successful strategy. Lyttelton’s directive to Templer on his assumption of command stated that “not only will you fulfill the normal functions of High Commissioner, but you will assume complete operational command over all armed forces assigned to operations in the Federation.”32 Lyttelton essentially granted Templer complete political and military control of the situation in Malaya. With civil and military authority now centralized, Templer could enact whatever policies he deemed necessary. Templer immediately energized the British effort in Malaya through his strong personal leadership. First, he continued the successful military innovations from phase two, using small-unit patrols and special operations forces proficient in jungle combat and improved on this through institutional learning. As individual soldiers and units gained more experience from fighting in the jungle, their lessons were incorporated into the curriculum of the Jungle Warfare School and turned into doctrine with the publication of a jungle warfare handbook, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya.33 These innovations allowed inexperienced soldiers to learn more in training, which made them more proficient in tactics and procedures once they reached the battlefield. He also adapted the political aspects of British strategy by creating a rewards system and improving propaganda. Policies of collective punishment proved counterproductive, so Templer repealed many of the unpopular emergency regulations while establishing the concept of “white areas.”34 The more stable and secure sections of Malaya were declared white areas where travel restrictions, curfews, and food restrictions were lifted. This provided incentives for the population to support the government’s efforts in combating the CTs. After the first white areas were declared, other Malays learned the benefits to be gained from living in a “safe” part of the country (these benefits were publicized through British propaganda).35 Propaganda improved as the British recruited more Chinese speakers as interpreters for police or civil administrators and initiated programs, such as Radio Malaya, and mobile propaganda units, which would travel from village to village, playing pro-British films.36 Also, the increased use of Malay police and soldiers — made up of both ethnic Malays and Chinese — provided better interface with local populations. After initiating more effective political and military measures, Templer began integrating the political and military aspects of British strategy. In a memorandum addressed to Lyttelton, he announced his intention to consolidate the Federal War Council (primarily military experts) with the Federal Executive Council (civil experts). Integrating the military and civil/political efforts at the highest level ultimately led to further integration at lower levels of authority. He established state and district war executive committees, which controlled each state or district. These committees were comprised of a soldier, police officer, and civil servant, which essentially forced the three branches of government to work together to solve the problems in their regions of the Federation.37 Templer integrated Britain’s political and military strategies by reorganizing the com- “The more stable and secure sections of Malaya were declared white areas where travel restrictions, curfews, and food restrictions were lifted. This provided incentives for the population to support the government’s efforts in combating the CTs. After the first white areas were declared, other Malays learned the benefits to be gained from living in a “safe” part of the country (these benefits were publicized through British propaganda).” — 37 mand and control structure of government in Malaya. This allowed for closer coordination between military, police, and civil administrators. Under Templer’s command, British strategy was also integrated through the subordination of military force to the rule of law. British soldiers had to follow the established rules of engagement, resting on the principle of minimum force. Prior to the Templer era, British troops could act indiscriminately, largely because of the wide range of powers granted to the authorities under the emergency regulations. The harsh policies and behavior of military and police forces, prior to Templer’s assumption of command, created the sense among the Chinese population that government “was no friend of the Chinese.”38 With the repeal of the emergency regulations, the law imposed greater limits on military and police forces and the circumstances in which they could use force. By legally restricting the security forces’ power, the Malay population began viewing the rule of law as the source of legitimate government.39 By centralizing military and political authority in one figure, Sir Gerald Templer, Britain created the necessary conditions to integrate the political and military aspects of British strategy. Templer reorganized the high-level decisionmaking bodies of the government, which allowed better, more efficient coordination between the different branches of government. Also, by emphasizing the use of limited force, Templer presented the law as the supreme authority, which lent more credibility and legitimacy to the federal government. This approach created a legitimate security role for the military and police forces within civil society, further integrating the military and political approaches to achieving British objectives in Malaya. The Integrated Strategy: Results Implementing a cohesive, integrated political and military strategy provided a means for the British to address the fundamental political issues that fueled the insurgency and preserved law and order by subduing communist terror attacks. By 1954, many Malays, whether ethnically Malay or Chinese, supported the British policies. In late 1954, the Federation of Malaysia conducted its first national election. Templer “left Malaya on 31 May 1954, driving to the airport in an open car.”40 Although the Emergency was not declared over until Malaya’s independence in 1957, and the insurgency actually dragged on until 1960, the integrated British political-military strategy, formulated in three phases from 1948 to 1954, provided the necessary conditions for Britain’s ultimate victory. Lessons Integrating political and military strategies directly addressed the dual political-military nature of the insurgency. Within this integrated framework, three major lessons emerge. First, military force was restricted — military and police forces operated within the constraints of the law. Although it restricted British forces’ firepower, this measure lent political legitimacy to the government since no one was above the rule of law. The use of force was restricted to only the minimum amount necessary. Second, civil programs, such as the white areas, Radio Malaya, and the state and district war executive committees, provided for the civic needs of the Malay population, which directly attacked political issues that had led to the insurgency. Third, strong centralized leadership and a willingness to adapt contributed greatly to Britain’s success. Sir Gerald Templer’s pragmatic personal leadership provided strategic direction. British and Malay forces also adapted to changing circumstances — the Jungle Warfare School and The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya handbook institutionalized lessons learned in the field. The most important lesson of the Malayan campaign is that an integrated political-military campaign provides the most effective means of addressing the disease (political disaffection) and the symptoms (terrorism and guerrilla war) of insurgency. However, other factors, such as strong leadership and professional competence, also proved essential. The integrated political-military campaign relied on the Malayan government, police force, and army for ultimate success. Creating a stable and independent Malaysia was Britain’s strategic objective — the political process that created a legitimate Malay government began with British-inspired civil programs, progressed to democratic national elections in 1954, and finally resulted in Malay independence in 1957. Establishing a legitimate national Malay government provided the British with a ticket home. In Iraq, a legitimate national Iraqi government will provide U. S. forces with tickets home, and hopefully revitalize the shattered Middle East. Notes 1Anthony James Joes, Jr., Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2004, p. 1. 2Ibid. 3This is my definition based on Joes’ definition of insurgency. 4For instance, U. S. Marine Corps Colonel Thomas Hammes’ book, The Sling and the Stone, identifies insurgents who use low-technology, asymmetric guerrilla tactics against high-technology, modern militaries, such as the U. S. military as practitioners of “fourth generation warfare.” Portraying insurgency as some sort of new “fourth generation” of warfare is simply a false distinction — insurgents have always sought to engage the enemy’s weaknesses, whether through high-tech or low-tech means. The principles of insurgency, such as its fundamental political nature and emphasis on fighting the enemy’s vulnerabilities, have remained unchanged despite technological advances. 5Joes, p. 7. 6John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2002, p. 60. 7Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 1. 8Ibid, pp.2-6. 9Ibid, pp.7-10. 10Nagl, p. 62. 11Transcript from the Fifth Plenary Session of the MCP Central Committee, as quoted in Nagl, p. 63. 12Declaration of Emergency: Telegram from Sir E Gent, 17 June 1948, from the British Documents on the End of Empire collection, A. J. Stockwell, ed., Malaya: Part II The Communist Insurrection 1948-1953, HMSO, London, 1995, p. 19. 13Nagl, p.65. 14Cabinet Defence Committee Minutes, 13 August 1948, Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, p.52. 15Telegram from the Secretary of State for Colonies, Creech Jones, 12 June 1948, Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, pp. 17-18. 16Kumar Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds 1948-1958, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2002, p. 100. 17The official term for enemy combatants was “communist terrorist” or “CT.” On the conventional mindset of British officers during the early phase of the emergency, see Nagl pp. 66-68. 18Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, p. 65. 19Lloyd’s 23 August 1948 letter, Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, p. 66. 20Nagl, p. 69. 21Jackson, pp. 36-37. 22Nagl, p. 71. 23The Briggs Plan, Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, p. 218. 24Ibid. 25Nagl, p. 72. 26Ramakrishna, p. 102. 27The squatter communities were made up of mostly unemployed Chinese who fled to the jungle during the 1930s and 1940s, occupying land and cultivating their own food. These areas were mostly located in remote areas on the outskirts of the jungle. See Jackson, p. 20. 28Nagl, p. 75. 29Memorandum from Sir Henry Gurney, dated 4 October

1951. As quoted in Nagl, p. 75. 30Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, pp. 236-237. 31Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, pp. 310-311. 32The Times, 8 February 1952, as quoted in John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, p. 205. 33Nagl, p. 97. Institutional learning provides the central theme of Nagl’s book, in which he analyzes the institutional structure of the British army to understand why and how it managed to adapt to changing situations. 34Ramakrishna, p. 120. 35Ibid, pp. 138-139. 36Ibid, p. 111. 37Memorandum to Lyttelton, 28 February 1952, Stockwell Documents Vol. 2, pp. 373-376. 38Ramakrishna, p. 97. 39Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919-1960, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990, pp. 17-57. Mockaitis devotes an entire chapter to the concept of the limited use of force in British counterinsurgency operations. 40Nagl, p. 102. Lieutenant Brian Drohan is currently a student at the Mounted Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. A. and an M. A. from the University of Pennsylvania. He has served as a research assistant for the Department of Political Science at the U. S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO; and as a researcher and writer for the Patton Museum of Armor and Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY. 38 —