Securing the Combat Service Support Battalion

The heavy division combat service support (CSS) battalions do not possess adequate security assets to protect themselves in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Defending the brigade support area (BSA) and securing logistics convoys both require force protection resources the forward support battalion (FSB), main support battalion (MSB), and brigade support battalion (BSB) do not have internally. Brigade staff planners must balance combat power in the decisive fight with logistics security, and the CSS battalion often suffers when such resources are scarce. The support battalion needs a change to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and a renewed emphasis by planners to provide necessary resources for force protection and security. This is relevant to maneuver leaders because we plan the operations our soldiers, both “killers” and “supporters,” put their lives on the line to execute. We must allocate our resources wisely to accomplish the mission and bring them home. The threat currently facing logistics trains is primarily asymmetric. Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan employ ambush techniques using improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), small arms fire, and snipers. Insurgents employ indirect fire and surveillance against static logistics nodes or forward operating bases. In future conflicts, this type of threat is likely to continue. When fighting a conventional adversary, any potential enemy will attempt to attack our rear area using asymmetric techniques to disrupt, limit, and ultimately destroy lines of communication. If we fight another high-tempo maneuver campaign, similar to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, lines of communication will be stretched and vulnerable. The logistics trains are vulnerable in any type of campaign and the time is long overdue to substantively address this vulnerability. In 2003, U. S. forces rapidly advancing in Iraq, encountered significant rear area activity, most notoriously, the ambush and capture of soldiers from the 507th Maintenance Company.1 This is an obvious example of the danger of accepting risk with the security of logistics elements. While there were certainly other factors involved in that one incident, such as navigational errors, broken communications, and fatigue, it is a reminder that we must carefully weigh the tactical risks that combat support (CS) and CSS units face. We have a duty to send every soldier into the fight as well prepared as possible. We do this both in our tactical planning and in how we equip and train soldiers. From August 2004 until March 2005, I had the unique opportunity as an armor officer to be the S2/3 of 215th FSB, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, while serving in Baghdad, Iraq, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II. As the S2/3, I spent the majority of my time and energy coordinating convoy security and force protection. I quickly realized that the FSB lacked adequate security resources and most of its soldiers were not well-trained in required force protection and combat skills. The 215th FSB and several other support battalions in the division solved this problem by building gun crews, gun trucks, and standard operating procedures (SOP) to provide their own security forces. They also constructed training programs to develop individual and crew combat skills. For example, 215th FSB created a gun crew skills training course modeled after the Tank and Bradley Crew Gunnery Skills Test. Fortunately, 215th FSB was able to acquire the material resources and spare the manpower to make their security plan work. Not all units had this luxury, and as a result, CSS in some areas suffered (1st Cavalry Division did allocate the 27th MSB an Avenger air defense unit in a ground convoy security role). When the 703d BSB, 3d Infantry Division, relieved 215th FSB in place during the spring of 2005, they deployed with a predesignated and trained convoy security platoon in anticipation that they, too, would self-secure.2 The need for the CSS battalions to create their own security elements from logistics manpower and borrowed resources, points — 15 to a problem in organization that transcends the current operating environment. This security dilemma has existed for along time and has yet to be properly addressed. Some of the reasons for the security shortfall in logistics units include an incomplete MTOE, gaps in doctrine, troop-to-task management challenges, and economic challenges.

Army of Excellence, Force XXI, and the current BCT MTOEs do not provide significant security assets to support battalions. No dedicated security elements exist for CSS units. The MTOE allows only a small amount of organic personal and crew-served weapons manned by logistics soldiers. Even the newest MTOE, with respect to CSS security, reflects an organization designed to fight on a linear battlefield where the rear area is less at risk than the front lines. But even in a linear fight, the FSB or BSB does not have sufficient organic combat power to secure itself for a sustained period of time in a conventional BSA. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 4-93.50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Forward Support Battalion (Digitized), articulates the lack of adequate security: “Combat service support organizations are normally the units least capable of self-defense against a combat force. They are also often the targets of enemy action. Time and effort used to defend themselves degrade their ability to perform their primary support mission. …Assistance may come from an MP unit as a response force or a tactical combat force (TCF) located in the rear. No CSS unit can sustain a defense against a determined level II or III attack, but it should plan and train to protect itself until a TCF arrives to repel the enemy attack. The FSB must be able to synchronize self-defense with BSA assets, MPs, and the TCF when it arrives.”3 This acknowledges that the BSA and combat trains do not have enough organic defensive resources. Army doctrine attempts to provide a solution by designating other assets, which may or may not be available to the brigade, to secure logistics nodes and convoys. Doctrine The doctrinal solution for CSS security is not practical or reliable. Doctrine attempts to solve the shortfall in CSS security by designating non-organic elements to secure the support battalion when needed. Assets range from maneuver units within the brigade, to the military police (MP) platoon that would normally be in general support (GS) of the maneuver brigade. In practice, these assets are rarely available to the logistics units because of troop-to-task and combat power requirements in the “close” or decisive fight. Convoy security is a daily mission-essential task in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like any other combat mission, ideally, no logistics convoy leaves without an appropriate number of crew-served weapons, thorough pre-combat checks and inspections (PCC/ PCIs), briefings, and various pieces of critical equipment. FM 4-93.50 recognizes the importance of convoy security but lacks a feasible answer: “Logistics release point security and C2 are critical. Routes into and out of each LRP must be secure. Security arrangements must be preplanned, synchronized, and executed. Convoys must include self-protection measures, such as a combination of gun trucks, military police escort vehicles, armed helicopters, and combat vehicle escorts. Field artillery, engineer, and air defense unit support may also be required.”4 Since the MTOE for the FSB does not equip such units with either security vehicles or soldiers to properly secure convoys without outside support, the MP platoon and the tactical combat force (TCF) are the two elements identified to fill this gap: “The only specific asset the FSB commander may have that is trained for and has the primary mission of rear area operations is the military police platoon. …With their ability to shoot, move, and communicate, MPs on the battlefield provide the commander both technical and tactical advantages. Commanders can rely on MPs to help keep enemy activities in the rear area from delaying his reinforcing units and disrupting C2.”5 FM 4-93.50 further explains that, “The area security mission of the MPs is vital to rear operations. … The MPs may also be used for convoy security and to protect static positions as required. However, when used in this manner, missions, which capitalize on MP mobility, are degraded.”6 While this reads well in doctrine, battlefield reality presents a tougher challenge. The planning assumption for the FSB is that the brigade’s MP platoon will be available and that the brigade commander will constitute a TCF or at least a quick reaction force (QRF). The MP and maneuver elements, however, are overtasked. The brigade has competing priorities, which require the services of both the MP platoon and other combat forces. Troop to Task During the Armor Captains Career Course, our small groups learned to build “In 2003, U. S. forces rapidly advancing in Iraq, encountered significant rear area activity, most notoriously, the ambush and capture of soldiers from the 507th Maintenance Company. This is an obvious example of the danger of accepting risk with the security of logistics elements. While there were certainly other factors involved in that one incident, such as navigational errors, broken communications, and fatigue, it is a reminder that we must carefully weigh the tactical risks that combat support (CS) and CSS units face.” 16 — brigade and battalion tactical plans. In course of action (COA) development and analysis, we constantly stumbled on the same dilemma: troop-to-task and combat-power ratios in the decisive fight conflicted with the ability to provide security in the rear. An acceptable solution, commonly used was to “accept risk” in the rear area. Perhaps this was the easiest, or even best, solution to ensure sufficient combat power in the close fight. But this reflected a loose concern for securing the logistics “tail.” After all, the important fight was up front, where the tanks and infantrymen were. And perhaps accepting risk, or assigning a small QRF or TCF for the rear area was indeed sufficient for a linear high-intensity conflict scenario against a conventional force with limited, irregular, or special operations capability. Maneuver planners have to balance multiple competing demands on combat power. Our tendency when planning a linear fight is to “accept risk” in the rear or sustaining area to ensure we meet the required combat power ratios forward. Unfortunately, this tendency persists to varying degrees on today’s nonlinear battlefield. We need every available combat and combat support element to accomplish the primary mission. Maneuver platoons are conducting reconnaissance patrols, raids, and checkpoint operations. MP platoons are engaged heavily in training the indigenous police, escorting dignitaries, guarding prisoners of war, and securing high-value assets. Everyone recognizes that convoy escort is critical to the mission, but there still seems to be a struggle to make ends meet when it comes to providing appropriate resources where needed. During Operation Iraqi Freedom II, there were abundant military police units and other security-oriented units in 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division’s battlespace, but they were needed to train Iraqi police, secure high-value assets, or dignitaries. The next logical force available to secure convoys was the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), which also served in many other roles. Every combat element was committed to patrols, checkpoints, and other combat missions. So the FSB was left with two choices: either reduce the flow of supplies to fit the reduced availability of escorts or produce an organic capability. Prior to my arrival in 215th FSB, the battalion leadership made the decision to equip and train an organic security element whose exclusive mission would be convoy security. Initially, the organic crews were only intended to augment security assets from the BRT and other escort elements, but as those units were committed elsewhere and the FSB soldiers became more proficient, they began to self-support exclusively. Several other FSBs in the division, faced with the same dilemma, did similar things to varying degrees. While 215th FSB gained the ability to fully self-secure, the other FSBs were unable to provide a full measure of self-generated security and simply limited the volume of what they could push, placing the burden on supported units to pull what they needed. While the arrangement of CSS units self-securing worked during OIF II, the FSB sacrifices capability to self-secure — drivers, gunners, and commanders of security vehicles were mechanics, cooks, and clerks. Although the supporters excelled once properly trained, these soldiers were removed from vital duties of turning wrenches and processing supplies. In the long term, the trend of allocating logistics manpower to perform security tasks degrades overall CSS efficiency. Economics and Resources Providing additional resources, such as the necessary weapons, armor, combat vehicles, personnel, and additional training, “Convoy security is a daily mission-essential task in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like any other combat mission, ideally, no logistics convoy leaves without an appropriate number of crew-served weapons, thorough pre-combat checks and inspections (PCC/PCIs), briefings, and various pieces of critical equipment.” — 17

“We should allocate training time and combat arms subject-matter experts to help train logistics soldiers to standard; some units have already accomplished this during predeployment training. The quartermaster, transportation, and ordnance schools have implemented warrior tasks, COE, and discussion of current operations into their curriculums. Quartermaster students conduct capstone field exercises that integrate warrior skills and convoy live fire into their training.” is expensive. The U. S. Government, the U. S. Army, and major commands make tough budgeting choices — we balance dollar values against capabilities, and consequently, the lives of soldiers. To date, support battalion security has not been a high enough priority to garner the needed share of these scarce resources. Improvised explosive devices, small arms fire, rocket propelled grenades, car bombs, and indirect fire, have compelled us to put armor and crew-served weapons on everything. No soldier deploys into Iraq without body armor and no HMMWV departs a forward operating base or camp without an appropriate level of armor and armament. This makes sense, but why has there been so much controversy about a shortage of armor? For years, we assessed that noncombat vehicles in rear areas did not require armor — and to outfit every vehicle with armor and crew-served weapons was undoubtedly not economically feasible. Thus, shortcomings in equipment and manpower are at least in part attributable to economic choices. And although MTOE should be driven by doctrine, doctrine has had to accommodate a budget-constrained organization. Budget remains the primary obstacle to obtaining the desired resources to properly man, equip, and train dedicated security elements for CSS units. Proposed Solutions The two solutions to the support battalion’s security shortfall include a change to organization and an emphasis by maneuver planners, particularly at the brigade level, to provide necessary resources for logistics units to accomplish their mission in the COE. The former is a Department of the Defense (DOD), Department of the Army (DA), and higher command issue that needs attention from leaders at the high est levels. The latter is a readily achievable planning issue that every maneuver and CSS planner can help solve. Organization and Equipment Captain Christopher L’Heureux, “Tactical Logistics: Adapting for the Future,” ARMOR, January-February 2005, asserts that CSS units, the battalion support platoon in particular, need some basic equipment to operate in a combat zone: “To survive in the COE, CSS elements must be properly armed. All CSS leader vehicles should be equipped with crew-served weapons on ring mounts. …Supply trucks, maintenance vehicles, and at least one-half of the support platoon’s HE MTT’s should have ring mounts and crew-served weapons.”7 I agree with Captain L’Heureux, but I think he stops short of the real need — every vehicle in the sup port platoon needs a ring mount and a crew-served weapon. Not only in the FSB, but in every deployable Army unit, all vehicles, with the exception of combat ambulances, need ring mounts and crew-served weapons. All vehicles in deployable units need some degree of ballistic armor protection as well. I can think of no contingency, past, present, or future, where units would not have this need. Likewise, CSS battalions need an assigned and dedicated security element. We should modify the FSB, BSB, and MSB MTOE to include a security platoon. The security platoon should have the capability to defend a BSA, contribute to life support area force protection, and secure two convoys simultaneously. If money and manpower were not obstacles, the platoon would consist of two M2 infantry fighting vehicles, one infantry squad, and eight M1114 armored HMMWVs (a four-truck section can secure up to a 12-vehicle convoy), each with truck com mander, driver, and gunner, as shown in Figure 1. Each M1114 would also be equipped with a gun-shield, one M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), one M500 shotgun, electronic countermeasure devices, a mix of 18 —

M2HB machine guns, M240B machine guns, and Mk19 automatic grenade launchers. Given that money and manpower are obstacles, M113 armored personnel carriers or Stryk ers could replace the M2 Bradleys, or the platoon could be all HMMWV-based. With the exception of the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle or Stryker crews, military occupational specialties are immaterial as long as we develop an appropriate training plan. The platoon would be capable of conducting convoy escort, BSA security, and personal security detachment operations. A mix of a mechanized section with a motorized section gives flexibility and firepower to the FSB for security in various environments and conditions. The Department of Defense, Department of the Army, major unit commanders, and logisticians at every echelon should ensure that logistics units are appropriately equipped to protect themselves, not once they arrive in theater, but prior to training for future deployments, and ideally, permanently. Our Army must be willing to pay the economic price to equip and man our units for success. The short-term economic cost of the right equipment will deliver along-term dividend in more combat ready units and provide soldiers the ability to survive first contact and prevail in battle under any conditions. Planners’ Emphasis Given that we do not currently, and may never, have a security platoon in support battalions, maneuver planners must dedicate appropriate combat power to logistics security, whether in a supposedly linear fight or in a COE scenario. Trainers should ensure we appropriately train logistics soldiers to defend themselves. We should allocate training time and combat arms subject-matter experts to help train logistics soldiers to standard; some units have already accomplished this during predeployment training. The quartermaster, transportation, and ordnance schools have implemented warrior tasks, COE, and discussion of current operations into their curriculums. Quartermaster students conduct capstone field exercises that integrate warrior skills and convoy live fire into their training. CSS soldiers are trying to do their part to meet the very real challenges of the COE. We maneuver planners need to support those who support us by more carefully weighing the risks that we once so readily accepted based on an erroneous assumption that the logistics soldier faced a lesser threat. Notes 1The 507th Maintenance Company gained national attention when, on 23 March 2003, a convoy that strayed off course was ambushed by Iraqi irregular forces in the city of An Nasiriyah. Eleven of 33 soldiers in the 18-vehicle march unit were killed and seven captured. The march unit had only

(2 x M2 BFV)

(4 x M1114)

(4 x M1114) Proposed Security Platoon Organization Vehicles: 2 x M2 BFV 8 x M1114 Gun Truck BFV Section: 1 x E7 (11M or 19D40): Platoon Sergeant 1 x E6 (11M/19D30): BFV Section Sergeant 2 x E5 (11M/19D20): BFV Gunner 2 x E1-4 (11M/19D10): BFV Driver 2 x E5 (MOS immaterial): Security Team Leader 2 x E4 (MOS immaterial): Security Assistant Team Leader 4 x E1-3 (MOS immaterial): Security Riflemen & Machine Gunner Crew-Served Weapons: 4 x M2HB 8 x M240B 2 x Mk-19 Gun Truck Section: 1 x O2 (branch immaterial): Platoon Leader 1 x E6 (MOS immaterial): Gun Truck Section Sergeant 6 x E5 (MOS immaterial): Gun Truck Commander 8 x E4 (MOS immaterial): Truck Gunner 8 x E1-3 (MOS immaterial): Gun Truck Driver Total Personnel: 38 Figure 1 one crew-served weapon and no armored vehicles. A detailed report on the action, “Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq, Executive Summary,” can be found at the following website: http://www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy. 2The 703d BSB was formerly 703d MSB. The 3d Infantry Division deployed to OIF III under unit of action organization; the 1st Cavalry Division was organized under Force XXI during OIF II. 3The U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 4-93.50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Forward Support Battalion (Digitized), U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., May 2002, p. 9-1, section 9-1. 4Ibid, p. 7-13, section 7-45. 5Ibid, p. 9-7, section 9-26. 6Ibid, p. 9-45, section 9-138. 7Captain Christopher D. L’Heureux, “Tactical Logistics: Adapting for the Future,” ARMOR, January–February 2005, p. 43. 8Acknowledgement: Thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Darfus Johnson and Major Jeffrey Snyder, battalion commander and support operations officer of the 215th FSB, respectively, for their input and advice in preparing this article. Thanks also to Mr. Mark Crowson at the Center for Army Leadership for assistance in grammar and articulation. Major Tim Kreuttner is currently a quality assurance officer, Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. A. from Lafayette College. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include platoon leader and XO, Company D, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Armored Division, Friedberg, Germany; S3 Air, 3d Squadron, 8th (3-8) Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (CD), Fort Hood, TX; commander, Company B, 3-8 Cavalry, 1CD, Fort Hood; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3-8 Cavalry, 1CD, Fort Hood and Baghdad, Iraq; and S3, 215th Forward Support Battalion, 1CD, Fort Hood and Baghdad. — 19