The Cavalry Model in Iraq: Right Time, Right Place

During the summer of 2004, as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom III, the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), an enhanced brigade of the Tennessee Army National Guard, was reorganized and deployed as a regimental combat team. The regiment served in Iraq during both the January 2005 elections and October 2005 referendum and conducted operations northeast of Baghdad along the Iranian border straddling the green line between the recognized Kurdistan regional government and Iraq’s Diyala Province. An Army in Transition As we progress further and further from the former Cold War crises and the large armies and doctrine associated with that era, we are forced to adapt anew military structure to deal with present and future threats throughout the world. Change is characteristic of a forward-looking military, and each generation’s ability to fight through the urge and comfort of the status quo has been a struggle from the very creation of the First Continental Army. Each major restructure brings with it hindsight in regards to systems and organizations that are swept up in the winds of change, but in reality, should have remained. As a byproduct of a forward-looking military, this is unavoidable. Smart people with the best of intentions strive to make perfect choices, which we all know is impossible for humans. So, in the aftermath of change, comes the realization of these areas where a good idea was followed by bad execution — not in total, but in some of the small, yet significant, pieces that make up the big picture. Over the course of Operation Iraq Freedom, many units, armor, infantry, and artillery, the cornerstone arms of combat, were obliged to conduct similar missions throughout the theater. Although each one brought expert training in its respective branch, all of them were required to conduct similar combat and noncombat operations in a theater with no rear area and as much mentoring as shooting. The 101st Airborne Division’s command sergeant major, after the division returned from its initial deployment, provided apiece of advice: “prepare your men to receive a handshake or a hand grenade, and many times within the same day and hour.” This was sound advice as the 278th Regimental Combat Team, a Tennessee National Guard Enhanced Brigade, began its tour just prior to the January 2005 elections. Reorganization: Does one size really fit all First assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, then to the 42d Infantry Division, the regiment straddled the time gap between what is considered by some to be the two most important defining moments in the history of Iraq. While the regiment was originally organized as a heavy armored cavalry regiment, it went through a painful reorganization, as did many active and reserve units, prior to deployment. A unit, whose entire organization was tailored to providing information, reconnaissance, and security in close operations, was reorganized to conduct the very tasks it was historically designed to do. Cavalry, by its organization, is a force capable of conducting a full spectrum of security and reconnaissance operations over very large areas along the front, flanks, and rear of a main body. It has “a lot of teeth and a little tail.” Simply meaning, it has the firepower similar to a divi-

“The area of operation assigned to the 278th Regimental Combat Team was well suited for cavalry operations — it was a diverse section of terrain with mountains along the border and to the north, intersected by rivers, streams, and large flat spaces of desert farther to the south.” sion, packed into a smaller, more mobile force than a conventional armored or mechanized infantry division. During the Army’s hasty attempt to re-package all deploying brigades into a structure better suited to the current mission in Iraq and meet the intent of the brigade combat team (BCT) concept, the cavalry regiment, along with many units in the cavalry community, were swept up in this assembly line of force packaging. Little regard was given to the true understanding of the cavalry role and how well suited it is in its original form to conduct operations in Iraq. While the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons replace the traditional organic cavalry troops in the new force structure, the larger regimental cavalry organizations, particularly the 3d ACR and 278th ACR, appear to be forced into the BCT mold as well in some variation. The logisticians, in their typical struggle with the maneuver side of the house, weighed in heavy with the BCT concept, the need to provide a standard logistics template, and the plug-and-play ability of the brigade-sized unit. However, while reaching in the standard brigade tool box to prepare the next brigade for transition, someone should have realized that a cavalry regiment was already halfway there — particularly when compared to a typical divisional brigade of infantry or armor. What could and should have been a slight modification to an already 90 percent solution, turned into a complete and complex overhaul of a cavalry regiment. Once the dust had settled and the unit task organized for combat in Iraq, it looked like a hybrid of its original organization; having the capabilities of combined arms within each maneuver squadron, just as before, but this time with the painful attachment and detachment process. Squadron units, having recently given up their own organic Bradley and tank crews and indirect fire elements, now received them back once in theater. Only this time, these soldiers were attached from the newly created artillery battalion, and tank and Bradley companies. The squadron’s soldiers, who had been tankers before, now worked beside tanks manned by soldiers from another squadron. They then gave up Bradley crews to other squadrons who had already initially trained Bradley crews prior to the mobilization reorganization. With a realization of the armored cavalry regiment’s original organization, the mobilization process could have been less painful and much more efficient with a simple conversion of some of the squadron’s tank crews to infantry to fill the seats of an infantry platoon. One could make a good case in arguing against restructuring a cavalry regiment at all based on the type of missions being conducted in theater. Again, hindsight is 20/20 and while there should be no attempt to cast blame, there should be an attempt to observe the success of all cavalry units deployed in Iraq and take note of the ability of the cavalry trooper to perform those missions. The fact is many of the missions now being performed in theater are the cavalry’s bread-and-butter missions such as gathering intelligence, securing routes, and conducting area, route, and zone reconnaissance. Many at higher headquarters wondered aloud how a cavalry regiment could obtain such a high rate of success in discovering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) before detonation. The answer lies in the basic knowledge of a cavalry scout. Cavalry scouts conducting these missions are trained to be leery of the easy route, the out-of-place rock pile, and the signs of imminent danger. Tailored Mobilization Training While no one is naive enough to think a cavalry unit is any different in its need to conduct theater specific training prior to deployment, there are definite abilities that need to be considered to allow valuable pre-deployment time to be used to the fullest. You do not have to teach an old dog new tricks when some of the tricks are already second nature. You do not have to teach him how to smell, just what to smell for. Although using his nose to locate something different, his nose still works the same. While this may seem to be a sarcastic overture of the 278th ACR’s mobilization reorganization and training, the concept should apply to any type unit. One-size-fits-all training does not take into account the experience and training the unit brings to the table. While resources prevent customized pre-deployment training programs for each unit, a selection of training blocks could be made available that would allow units to devote time to training specific tasks. This should apply not only to cavalry units, but other units as well. While an infantry unit should not spend an enormous amount of time retraining dismounted patrolling and room clearing, a cavalry unit should receive that full block of time. On the other hand, the infantry unit should receive extensive training on route security and reconnaissance, and in the same light, the cavalry unit should conduct only a quick refresher block. Post Mobilization Training: A 90-Percent Solution Mobilization training for the 278th ACR was conducted at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, by 3d Brigade, 87th Division (TS) with elements of the 85th Division. A concept of theater immersion was integrated into the training as described in “Theater Immersion: First Army Post-Mobilization Training,” by Lieutenant General Russel Honoré and Colonel Daniel L. Zajac, in the May-June 2005 issue of ARMOR. Adding theater immersion to the mobilization training was a success. Even though the 278th ACR was the first brigade-sized unit to mobilize at Camp Shelby and often outran its ever-increasing support structure, its mobilization training was developed under a solid concept. The ability to increase Camp Shelby’s capacity, as well as arrange and stand up anew mobilization training program, was — 13 a great success. As with all new ventures, the training will continue to be modified to best emulate the ever-changing Iraqi theater. The training program did however have one challenge: orchestrating a full load of tasks in a short amount of time. While the time allowed was adequate, wisely selecting from available tasks (those in which the unit lacked experience versus those in which the unit had experience), would have made more time available to address weaker, more unfamiliar tasks that would be required in theater. Whether a training program can be modified to allow this flexibility is an answer that requires some study beyond the scope of this article. To lessen the success of the training would be unjust; however, modifications can and should be implemented to ensure continuous improvement. Cavalry Country The area of operation (AO) assigned to the 278th Regimental Combat Team was well suited for cavalry operations — it was a diverse section of terrain with mountains along the border and to the north, intersected by rivers, streams, and large flat spaces of desert farther to the south. Most of the population centers were medium to small in size, and the large geographical area forced the regiment’s squadrons to operate with a high degree of independence, falling in line with the typical cavalry role. While our infantry brothers are experts in urban areas, the missions typical of the 278th’s AO allowed the unit to exercise its years of training in cavalry operations. Many of the missions, such as route clearance and security operations, resulted in nearly 60 percent of all IEDs being discovered before detonation. This resulted in the highest discovery percentage in the division — a typical task every cavalryman is trained on before he is allowed to wear the spurs. The widely dispersed smaller cities and villages forced the regiment to conduct both small-level urban operations, as well as zone and area reconnaissance operations throughout the largely agricultural area, which was intertwined with numerous irrigation canals and fields. Again, this terrain provided areas directly suitable for cavalry operations, operating in small-unit actions and covering large areas to apprehend suspects fleeing the cordons. The Iranian border represents a largely undefined “line in the sand,” separating villages and families with mountains and trails bisecting the area between Iran and Iraq. Along the Iraqi and Iranian border, permanent forts, which were constructed early in the 20th century, are often times located within audible voice range, while other portions of the border remain isolated and most often unobserved. Only by continuous patrols do the Iraqi border guards have any hope of maintaining the sometimes large areas separating the forts. Once again, a suitable mission for a cavalry unit trained to screen infiltration along a flank or in front of a larger unit. The screen mission was not only used along the border, but also throughout the AO as part of outer cordons, which were used to isolate villages or areas to prevent intervention or exit from any element inside or outside the targeted area. “Once the dust had settled and the unit task organized for combat in Iraqi, it looked like a hybrid of its original organization; having the capabilities of combined arms within each maneuver squadron, just as before, but this time with the painful attachment and detachment process.” As often debated, one of the most important principles of war is unity of command. While in its border context, unity of command simply means the control of multiple forces in a common mission under a single command. Equally important is the esprit de corps and relationship the multiple units have in working as a team. While this is a lesser discussed variant of the unity of command tenet, it is a vitally important aspect and should not be overlooked as a combat multiplier. While armor or infantry battalions and brigades are organized into task forces and teams during deployment, the cavalry is habitually task organized in its pure organization. This produces well-rounded leaders, knowledgeable and comfortable with various combat arms; but more importantly, it produces soldiers who consider their combat arms brothers an equal and vital part of their organic organization. The reorganization of the 278th ACR, while a good idea in some respects, failed to recognize the strengths of the cavalry organization. Partly to blame is the cavalry community’s small voice and the often unrecognized aspects of what a cavalry unit brings to the fight. The BCT concept is missing a well-balanced unit in the combined arms role, specifically trained to con duct traditional cavalry missions, and versatile enough to conduct a full spectrum of combat operations. To provide the corps commander a unit that is flexible and sizable enough to conduct large-scale urban, security, and reconnaissance missions during economy-of-force operations, the cavalry regiments should remain part of the force structure. Although modifications to the organization may apply, the traditional strengths of the cavalry should not be ignored or discarded. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Holmes is currently serving as commander, Task Force Raider, 3d Squadron, 278th Regimental Combat Team, Forward Operating Base Cobra, Diyala Province, Iraq. He received a B. A. from the University of Tennessee. His military education includes Armor Officers Basic Course, Armor Officers Advanced Course, Officer Candidate School, Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including squadron operations officer, 3d Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Tennessee Army National Guard, Knoxville, TN; commander, I Troop, 3d Squadron, 278th ACR, Tennessee Army National Guard, Cookeville, TN; and battalion intelligence officer, 3d Battalion, 109th Armor, 30th Separate Armored Brigade, Tennessee Army National Guard, Lebanon, TN. 14 —