Tactical Logistics: Adapting for the Future

A logistics package (LOGPAC) rumbles through a small town along the main supply route (MSR) of a third world country. As dusk touches down, the support platoon leader becomes anxious. Working out the difference between forecasted requirements and actual needs with the support operations officer put him 45 minutes behind schedule. The radio crackles, “Road Dog One, this is Road Dog Two-One-Red. I’ve got something suspicious up ahead, break. It looks like there’s some wire across the road to the right of a three-story building.” The platoon leader quickly glances at his map; the only three-story building in town had already been identified as checkpoint Z35. “Roger Two-One-Red. All Road Dogs this is One, execute breach drill.05 southeast checkpoint Z35, I’m going higher.” As the convoy slows, a sudden explosion interrupts the stillness and is quickly followed by a series of pops. “One this is Two-One-Red, contact RPG [rocket propelled grenade] and rifle fire from Z35!” “Road Dogs this is One, execute near ambush. Four, set perimeter at rally point Romeo and turn them around. White, move up to suppress Z35 so Red can break contact. Grunt, have your dismounts move to my position, over.” The commands are quickly followed by a series of “rogers.” Two HEMTTs [heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck], armed with an MK19 and an M2, move forward and begin lobbing 40mm grenades and.50-caliber fire at the target building. As vehicles begin to move toward the rally point, the dismount squad links up with the lieutenant and gets a quick FRAGO [fragmentary order] to clear Z35. As the dismount squad approaches the south side of the building, they throw a violet smoke grenade and the direct fire shifts to the north. “One, this is Two-One-Red, I’ve got two wounded and I’m moving to Romeo.” “Grunt, this is White, I can see you against the south wall. I see four enemy soldiers in third-story windows with small arms. The RPG gunner is on the roof, over.” “Roger, I’m going in now.” As the dismounted squad clears the building, there is constant radio chatter between them and the support-by-fire trucks. The platoon leader is in constant radio contact with both his men and the battalion TOC [tactical operations center]. The platoon sergeant is consolidating and reorganizing at the rally point. “Two-One-Red, this is Four, Romeo is 600 meters to your south on MSR Red-sox, LZ [landing zone] is set, and Dust Off is in route, over.” U. S. Army soldiers are likely to encounter an ambush in any number of places throughout the current operating environment. Combat service support (CSS) elements can only sustain forces if they can protect themselves from the enemy. They must be organized, equipped, and trained to fight. Battalion task force-level CSS doc trine has changed little to contest the threat poised by the contemporary operational environment (COE), even with the addition of the forward support company (FSC).

Task force CSS doctrine must adapt to reflect current tactics, techniques, and procedures, and CSS elements must be organized, equipped, and trained as we fight current battles and prepare to fight future conflicts. This requires changing doctrine, — 39 reorganizing CSS assets on the battlefield, procuring and fielding additional equipment, and anew focus on combat logistics training. To accomplish their mission without external support in a COE, CSS elements at the task force level must be reorganized, equipped, and trained to fight first and complete critical logistics missions. The Threat Threat doctrine in the COE is based on flexibility, adaptability, and initiative. While able to fight regional enemies conventionally, enemies realize they cannot defeat U. S. forces head to head. Against a technologically advanced foe, the threat “…will forgo massed formations, patterned echelonment, and linear operations that would present easy targets.”1 U. S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, further explains that, “Adversaries [of the United States] will continue to seek every opportunity for advantage over U. S. and multinational forces. When countered, they will adapt to the changing conditions and pursue all available options to avoid destruction or defeat. This environment and the wide array of threats present significant challenges.”2 Using complex terrain, the threat will adapt to more nonlinear, synchronized operations against perceived U. S. vulnerabilities. One of these vulnerabilities is the dependence of “U. S. forces …on an extraordinarily complex and comprehensive logistics system. A large percentage of U. S. forces are tied up in logistics, since U. S. military personnel require far more supplies and creature comforts than other armies do.”3 Logistics elements are a high-priority target for the threat. They are lightly defended and often manned by soldiers who are unpracticed and uncomfortable with close combat. Often organized on an ad hoc basis, the destruction of logistics elements enables the defeat of maneuver units by robbing them of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and other critical supplies. Attacks on lines of communication (LOCs) create chaos and uncertainty, which draws combat power away from decisive operations. Finally, the threat exploits our national intolerance for casualties by engaging CSS elements, which are easier to destroy than combat units. The primary threat to logistics assets is paramilitary and special purpose forces that operate throughout the depth of the battlefield. Even if operations against a threat begin in a linear and contiguous environment, once the enemy’s conventional forces are destroyed, U. S. forces transition to stability operations and support operations and the operational environment becomes nonlinear and noncontiguous. The Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where U. S. forces are limited in what they can control, are perfect examples. Secure zones or forward operating bases (FOB) surrounded by unsecured areas full of noncombatants and enemy activity characterize the area of operations. The LOCs that link secured areas become kill zones for paramilitary and special purpose forces looking for lucrative targets. Changing How We Fight The U. S. Army is changing to fight our current and next war. Stryker brigade combat teams task organize combined arms and push more battlefield operating systems to lower levels. Units of action are being organized using the same principles. Future battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) and blue force tracker are making situational awareness easier for commanders and staff. In Kosovo, company, platoon, and section outposts were located throughout the U. S. sector, some more than 50 km from even a battalion-sized FOB.4 The 3d Infantry Division (3ID) used battalion task forces to accomplish what divisions did during World War II.5 During operations in Iraq, task forces have been ordered to establish blocking positions several miles away from the main body. As the capability of our force increases, the U. S. Army will operate over greater distances with smaller units. This causes a need for greater capability in logistics assets at the task force level. The basis for change relies on doctrine. The current CSS doctrine at brigade and below is based on either the Army of Excellence (AOE)/Limited Conversion Division (LCD) XXI model or the Force XXI Division model. The AOE/LCD XXI has three basic CSS elements: company trains, combat trains, and field trains. Company trains provide immediate and responsive CSS to the company commander, usually in the form of medical and maintenance support. Combat trains provide the battalion task force with immediate and responsive CSS, short distances from the forward line of troops (FLOT), and in the form of a battalion aid station, unit maintenance collection point (UMCP), and emergency classes of supply. Field trains are usually located in the brigade support area (BSA), longer distances from the FLOT, and provide routine logistics to the task force in the form of LOGPACs. The Force XXI division adds an FSC in place of the field trains and establishes a task force support area (TFSA) located mid-range from the FLOT. The TFSA centralizes CSS under a logistics commander who reports to both the maneu- “Combat service support (CSS) elements can only sustain forces if they can protect themselves from the enemy. They must be organized, equipped, and trained to fight.” 40 — ver task force and forward support battalion (FSB). This enables the ability to rapidly cross-level logistics around the brigade combat team (BCT) based on support priorities. The trains, in both models, can consolidate or echelon, based on mission, enemy, troops, time, terrain, and civilian (METT-TC) considerations. Adding a TFSA allows for direct throughput from corps, but most supply is still processed through the BSA in the Force XXI model.6 In either case, logistics movement is linear, from supply sources to users, but is evolving from a supply-based system to a distribution-based system. Distribution-based logistics are efficient, but a maneuver task force cannot depend on just-in-time logistics. The problem with a distribution-based system at the task force level is if a breakdown occurs, the task force in contact pays for the problem. The task force must have assets to support supply-based logistics. It took an average of three to six months, after crossing the border between Kuwait and Iraq, before units received more supplies. For example, one task force crossed the border with a 20-foot military van (MILVAN) packed with class III package products (III [P]) and did not receive additional class III (P) until mid-June.7 A forward support unit, in support of a 1st Armored Division unit, entered Baghdad with over 15 MILVANs of spare parts brought from its warehouses in Germany. Another task force brought a MILVAN full of M1 track, which became essential after a few months of driving tanks in an urban environment and intense heat.8 These parts became critical when an overwhelmed supply system failed to deliver. The answer is to provide a robust supply package with prerequisite transportation at the task force level and use distribution-based logistics at the FSB and higher echelons of support. Security In the COE, enemy activity in the areas occupied by CSS nodes and LOCs increase, but doctrine only casually examines security considerations. Doctrine assigns the task force S4, headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander, and FSC commander responsibility for train security, and advocates a perimeter defense. It also requires steps be taken to ensure LOC, and CSS asset security, “Because the security of CSS elements is critical of the company team and the task force missions, the company team and task force combat trains and the task force field trains must all develop plans for continuous security operations. The trains, however, may lack the personnel and combat power to conduct a major security effort.”9 A tactical combat force (TCF) is not adequately resourced at the task force level. Task force commanders have limited combat power to begin with and are loath to commit it to enabling operations.10 In an attack toward Baghdad, an armored task force cut from its trains more than once during their attack, leaving the trains to defend themselves.11 Doctrine asserts that trains use passive security measures for protection to counter the lack of personnel and combat power, but a passive defense requires concealment from enemy observers. In current and next war, keeping those elements a secret is virtually impossible. Reorganizing Logistics are accomplished using convoys. Although doctrine breaks a convoy into an advance guard, close-in protective group, and rear guard, the organization within these groups is based on available assets. Task force logistics operations should be organized with redundancy. Armored ambulances and recovery vehicles will normally move from the company areas to the task force aid station or UMCP alone, but in the current operational environment, the first rule is no vehicle moves alone. The second rule requires crew served weapons on every mission. These orders mitigate risk but are impossible to apply during sustained combat with the current organization. All logistics convoys should organize vehicles with crew served weapons into sections capable of mutual support. Special teams should be organized for breaching, casualty evacuation, maintenance and recovery, and enemy prisoner of war collection, as required. The internal organization of task force CSS units must be focused on maximizing combat power, not logistics efficiency. Treat any logistics convoy as a combat patrol. At the company team level, the maintenance team becomes organic to the supported company. This allows unity of command, tailoring prescribed load lists (PLL), developing unit cohesion, and rehearsing standard operating procedures (SOP). An additional company medical team would provide immediate medical care while medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is in route and facilitate casualty collection point operations. While this does not preclude attaching an ambulance to line companies, it does provide the medical platoon with the flexibility to surge MEDEVAC ambulances without stripping a company of medical coverage. During operations in the Balkans and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), additional medical assets are pushed down from higher levels of support to support decentralized operations.12 Making a medical team organic to line companies also benefits unity of command, develops unit cohesion, and aids in rehearsing SOPs. Besides the normally associated elements, task force combat trains should also include the majority of the support platoon, the decontamination team, and additional wheeled recovery assets.13 Task force combat trains were enormous as- “Logistics elements are a high-priority target for the threat. They are lightly defended and often manned by soldiers who are unpracticed and uncomfortable with close combat. Often organized on an ad hoc basis, the destruction of logistics elements enables the defeat of maneuver units by robbing them of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and other critical supplies.” — 41 sets during 3ID’s attack into Baghdad, com pared to what training and doctrine dictate.14 The 2d Battalion, 69th Armor’s combat trains consisted of over 80 vehicles during their drive toward Baghdad.15 Once maneuver combat operations were over, units garrisoned FOBs and consolidated their CSS assets at the task force level. U. S. forces in the Balkans are similarly organized with consolidated trains in the task force area, leaving no one in the BSA. The support platoon operates from combat trains to give responsive class I, III, and V support to the task force. As supplies are used, convoys are built and sent back to the BSA to resupply. As required, the FSB, in coordination with the field trains command post (FTCP), pushes pack ages of all classes of supply to the combat trains, thus limiting the need to go back to the BSA to resupply. The heavy-wheeled section, part of the light-wheeled section, and decontamination team become part of the UMCP. This reorganization provides maintenance support for wheeled vehicles forward of the BSA, name ly the scouts and combat trains elements. The decontamination team in the UMCP affords the task force responsive operational decontamination support and the ability to use the equipment to wash vehicles in preparation for maintenance. The benefits of maintaining robust combat trains give responsive and immediate resupply to the task force, downsize the BSA footprint, and create a clear logistics chain of command. Permanently organizing in this fashion will increase cohesion and decrease inoperability. The recommended changes to CSS organization make the TFSA unnecessary. A second node between the BSA and combat trains is another perimeter to defend. During 4th Infantry Division’s (4ID) planning process to attack Iraq through Turkey during OIF, Task Force 1st Battalion, 66th Armor did not plan for a TFSA. It was another logistics node that could not be protected.16 Until digital information systems are fully fielded, an FTCP is still required in the BSA. The FTCP conducts critical coordination with the FSB. Once division and corps CSS elements are able to push supplies and personnel to the task force level, and information systems provide visibility of the task force logistics situation, the FTCP becomes surplus. Combat trains can absorb additional supplies by adding a logistics release point (LRP) in the train area. This also increases the security of the CSS elements by keeping the combat trains as close to the task force main body as possible.17 In this new model, field trains become solely a logistics command post, responsible for coordinating supplies and conducting personnel actions. The personnel action center, supply sergeants, and HHC headquarters platoon make up the field trains. Currently, these elements order supplies and process personnel actions, until future digital information systems make doing this forward possible. Furthermore, placing all task force field trains close to the BSA facilitates close coordination. Specifically, as the BCT plan or task organization changes, HHC commanders can ensure continuous support. Currently, the HHC commander is the only company commander in the task force with a planner. The S4 provides the task force logistics plan, which the HHC executes, but the S4 should direct the task force logistics elements on the battlefield because he is the planner. The HHC commander prepares support for the task force from the BSA and the HHC executive officer (XO) moves forward to control the combat trains organization. The FSC commander is extraneous and his presence further complicates unity of command and strains the timely support of missions that support logistics demands. A liaison officer (LNO) from the FSB, however, is an important addition to the S4 section during combat. The LNO is the subject-matter expert on FSB operations. More importantly, the LNO knows whom to talk to get support. As digital systems and distribution-based logistics make field trains obsolete, the HHC commander relocates to the combat trains to act as a third “field grade” officer. The ability of the S4 to direct and command the combat trains with the HHC XO assisting, allows the HHC commander the opportunity to respond to unforeseen situations on the battlefield. It is important that task force logistics keep combat arms leaders. Combat leaders give logistics elements a focus on combat operations and provide CSS soldiers with an understanding of how a maneuver task force operates. Attachments based on threat levels are another important addition to the organization of task force CSS elements. Escort elements are attached directly to the logistics commander, as he is responsible for employing the escort elements. The convoy commander uses his judgment to divide escorts with his internal capability to maximize the effectiveness of his force. For example, a scout truck with an MK19 may be paired with a HEMTT, equipped with an M2 to build a support-by-fire team. Finally, habitual attachments are the key to successful operations at any level. Too often, logistics convoys are thrown to- “Currently, the HHC commander is the only company commander in the task force with a planner. The S4 provides the task force logistics plan, which the HHC executes, but the S4 should direct the task force logistics elements on the battlefield because he is the planner. The HHC commander prepares support for the task force from the BSA and the HHC executive officer (XO) moves forward to control the combat trains organization.” 42 — gether at the last minute without even a combat order or a precombat inspection. Equipment Currently, CSS elements have only their basic equipment needs met. First, communications equipment must be developed and updated. FBCB2 has the capability to send logistics reports so CSS planners and executors have real-time visibility of a combat unit’s logistics status. This needs further exploitation to truly be user friendly and effective. The next step is to update the unit level logistics system-ground (ULLS-G) and ULLS-S4, so units can order parts and supplies over extended ranges. The ULLS system currently uses frail floppy disks or limited FM range to send data.18 The standard installation/ division personnel system (SIDPERS) and electronic military personnel office (eMILPO) must also communicate over long distances. Unless logisticians can operate systems over extended ranges, resupply will not be effective on the future battlefield. An immediate fix is to equip key CSS elements with appropriate communications systems. The S4 command post track should have systems that are redundant to the task force tactical operations center (TOC). The combat trains command post (CTCP) has most of these systems, such as the tactical fax, but they are outdated or inoperable.19 The CTCP should have the capability to monitor four nets instead of three, have satellite communications, and FBCB2. This added flexibility enables the CTCP to better monitor CSS operations and the overall battle. Additional radios are required for the support platoon to operate over extended distances and cope with the contingencies of the COE. Each support squad should be equipped with one dual net and two single net radio systems so they can conduct decentralized operations. Squad radios that can integrate with single channel ground-air radio systems (SINGARS) or all-source imagery processing (ASIP) systems are also essential to enabling CSS elements to survive combat actions. To survive in the COE, CSS elements must be properly armed. All CSS leader vehicles should be equipped with crew served weapons on ring mounts. Either an M2 or a combination MK19/M240B would suffice for the support platoon leader, support platoon sergeant, S1, S4, HHC commander, HHC XO, battalion commander, battalion XO, command sergeant major, operations sergeant major, mortar platoon leader, mortar platoon sergeant, medical platoon leader, and medical platoon sergeant. These key leaders can defeat threat forces in the COE during logistics convoy operations. Supply trucks, maintenance vehicles, and at least one-half of the support platoon’s HEMTTs should have ring mounts and crew served weapons. Equip CSS soldiers with personal weapons, such as the M4, the new M8 system, or an MP5, that can be effectively fired from the cab of a vehicle. Pistols would be an appropriate stopgap, as they are with tank crews, if they have sufficient stopping power. These weapons will provide critical combat power to CSS elements and added flexibility while conducting full-spectrum operations. Logistics elements need additional transportation assets organic to the task force. The S1 and support platoon sergeant are key leaders who are not issued high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) through the modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE). A five-ton truck is not large enough to carry authorized equipment, duffle bags, and a tank company’s supplies. The HEMTT is the answer. Maintenance teams should also replace their five-ton trucks with HEMTTs. These trucks add increased mobility and enlarge the available space for PLL and supplies, making a company more self-sufficient. Soft-skinned vehicles can be lined with Kevlar blankets and tarps instead of canvas. Add-on armor kits made of lightweight materials can be made available. CSS elements need to be equipped to fight on the battlefield, as task force-level logistics are now specific targets. Training Training is the most important way to prepare our CSS elements for combat — six 88M truck drivers can learn room-clearing procedures, given the appropriate time and resources. “CSS soldiers “Attachments based on threat levels are another important addition to the organization of task force CSS elements. Escort elements are attached directly to the logistics commander, as he is responsible for employing the escort elements. The convoy commander uses his judgment to divide escorts with his internal capability to maximize the effectiveness of his force. For example, a scout truck with an MK19 may be paired with a HEMTT, equipped with an M2 to build a support-by-fire team.”

need to train more on tactical missions with their weapons. The enemy learned not to attack armored vehicles, choosing instead to wait for soft skinned support vehicles, so every soldier ended up in the fight.”20 Overall, logistics training in the U. S. Army is lacking. The full logistics system is never tested or strained in a training environment. During brigade rotations at combat training centers (CTC), the division’s main support battalion provides limited support to the FSB. During most rotations, maneuver task forces turn off their class II and IV from the supply support activity. During a division’s recent Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotation, maneuver units were unable to get adequate class III (P) through the supply system and were forced to find it outside the maneuver area. The reason for this was the unit’s poor forecasting and the supply system’s inability to respond quickly to requirements. Even if units use historical data to project class III (P) needs for a CTC rotation, projections are irrelevant in a combat situation, especially if using equipment drawn from Army pre-positioned stocks. Because training time is short, CSS soldiers train CSS-related skills, leaving little time, if any at all, to train actual combat skills. As a LOGPAC convoy entered the BSA at a CMTC rotation, the BSA came under attack. The LOGPAC convoy was forced to stay outside the perimeter during the action. Leaders familiar with combat would not leave soldiers on the outside of a perimeter during this situation; however, some CSS soldiers lack a clear understanding of combat because of the focus on CSS tasks. It is important to train soldiers in combat skills first. Individual training must focus on common tasks and weapons. Common task training (CTT) needs to be continuously rehearsed and sergeant’s time, with little resource overhead, can easily accomplish this. These skills are basic combat skills, needed to survive at the point of contact. CSS soldiers also need to focus on marksmanship and fire individual weapons more often. Additional qualification requirements are not the solution; however, moving target and known-distance ranges are the solution. All CSS soldiers should qualify with crew served weapons and fire anti-armor weapons such as the AT4. The terminal objective of these qualifications is to enable soldiers to react to contact, confident in their ability to kill the enemy. Image is another important individual task to train. The way a soldier sees the enemy is important, as we have seen during OIF. Soldiers who look “squared away” and present a soldierly image are less likely to be attacked. Chinstraps undone, equipment that does not fit properly, or even the misalignment of a camouflage band on a Kevlar can be a signal that a soldier or unit is weak. Continuous training and established standards prevent this. Training crews and squads is the next important step. As combat operations become more decentralized, so do CSS operations. Crews and squads carry out CSS at the task force level. Crew drills incorporating crew served weapons can be done in the motor pool. One method is to place targets in the pit of a maintenance bay. Vehicles line up, oriented on the pit, while soldiers pop up targets to which vehicles react. Situational training exercise (STX) lanes are the next step in training CSS forces. Each lane should be combat focused and involve combat with an opposing force before, during, and after completing the CSS mission. While the importance of STX lanes should be on mission accomplishment, CSS elements should also be forced to consider how to react to an enemy. For example, a tank battalion conducting gunnery can easily support a 44 — “All CSS leader vehicles should be equipped with crew served weapons on ring mounts. Either an M2 or a combination MK19/M240B would suff ice for the support platoon lead er, support platoon sergeant, S1, S4, HHC commander, HHC XO, battalion commander, battalion XO, command sergeant major, operations sergeant major, mortar platoon leader, mortar platoon sergeant, medical platoon leader, and medical platoon sergeant. These key leaders can defeat threat forces in the COE during logistics convoy operations.”

mounted live fire for individual vehicles or combined action. Individual CSS vehicle crews can make runs similar to a Tank Table VIII to qualify crews. The run should integrate targets for both the crew served weapon and individual weapons. A combined medical and maintenance CSS live fire is also necessary. For example, during gunnery a disabled tank lies in the center of the range. The first sergeant and maintenance M113s occupy positions to the left and right of the disabled vehicle. While the two M113s provide suppressive fire, an armored ambulance begins MEDEVAC from the point of injury. Once MEDEVAC is complete, an M88 tows the disabled tank to the rear.21 For guidelines on how to conduct a convoy live fire, see “Convoy Live Fire: Training the Support Platoon to Defend Itself in Ambushes.”22 These scenarios can be tailored to increase or decrease the level of difficulty by adding or subtracting additional targets and changing conditions. Battle-focused training is essential to prepare CSS elements for combat. Larger element CSS training should focus on command post operations, movement, and perimeter defense. A logistics command post exercise (CPX) is difficult to replicate without computer simulations or units in the field to generate requests for support, but it is essential to prepare the CTCP or FTCP for combat.23 Logistics command post personnel often have little experience in tracking combat and CSS operations. S1 and S4 personnel can be farsighted and focus only on their functional areas. In training, they must learn to be interchangeable and multifaceted logisticians, capable of running a TOC and understanding maneuver task force operations. The combat and field trains must also maneuver during training. For example, during maneuver, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, placed trains in four columns about 30 meters apart with crew served weapon-equipped vehicles placed on the flanks. When the trains stopped, they parked motor-pool style.24 Leaders made a conscious decision to use a technique that disregarded some doctrinal tenants in favor of others — these decisions should be explored and tested in training, not on the battlefield. Finally, a 360-degree perimeter defense live fire training would be extremely beneficial to task force CSS troops, although most current range facilities cannot accommodate such training. An attack against combat trains, field trains, or TFSA is almost guaranteed in the next conflict, so it is critical to practice a perimeter defense in training. One result of repeated training is a practiced and verified unit SOP. Although each unit’s logistics SOP will differ based on many variables, each should include routine and immediate resupply, medical and maintenance operations, trains security, movement techniques, and convoy operations. The actions of the support platoon in the initial narrative demonstrate the level of competence that can be obtained by a unit that is properly equipped and organized, at a high state of training, and has an established SOP. Even highly trained combat soldiers can face significant challenges. In combat, “logistics convoys are more vulnerable to attack than ground maneuver forces, and they, along with all other seemingly routine operations, should be planned and executed as a combat operation.”25 The importance of better preparing CSS elements based on a more potent threat is essential to successful combat operations. CSS troops must be lethal at the point of contact. The way we organize, equip, and train CSS elements is the simplest way to improve their ability to fight and win. If task force CSS elements are capable of defeating the threat and completing their logistics mission, they give combat forces the ability to conduct decisive operations. As the U. S. Army Chief of Staff stated, “…we’ve got them performing ground functions — infantry functions, MP functions. Everybody’s got to be able to do that … everybody’s a rifleman first.”26 Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-100, Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington D. C., 29 August 2001, p. 3-18. 2FM 3-0, Operations, GPO, Washington D. C., 14 June 2001, p. 1-9. 3FM 7-100, Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy, p. 1-11. The threat views the United States with an overall advantage in warfighting capability, but saddled with the vulnerabilities of coalition warfare and force projection, an unwillingness to accept heavy losses, a sensitivity to public opinion and lack of national commitment, a preference for standoff combat and a lack of optimization for close, dismounted combat, a dependence on high technology, robust logistics, and information dominance, a reliance on contractor support, predictable operations, a lack of cultural awareness, and a tendency to downsize after the initial conflict has ended. 4During Kosovo Peacekeeping Forces (KFOR) rotation 2B, outposts were common. It has since been reported that U. S. forces have consolidated to a few major installations. 5Personal interview with CPT Robert E. Underwood, S1, Task Force (TF) 2d Battalion, 69th Armor (2-69 AR), March 2004. 6FM 3-90.2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, GPO, Washington D. C., 1 May 2003, pp. 10-13 to 10-26. 7Personal interview with CPT Edward J. Ballanco, S4, TF 4th Battalion, 64th Armor (4-64 AR), June 2003. 8Author served as S4, TF 1st Battalion, 35th Armor (1-35 AR), during OIF until August 2003. 9FM 3-90.1, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, GPO, Washington D. C., 9 December 2003, p. 10-7. 10Personal interview with CPT Robert E. Underwood, S1, TF 2-69 AR, March 2004. The author and CPT Underwood experienced the same apprehension from their battalion commanders. 11Ibid. 12Author served as a tank platoon leader during KFOR rotation 2B and had an M997 ambulance from the FSB attached to his platoon while occupying a platoon outpost. The FSB often pushed wheeled ambulances and treatment teams to the maneuver task forces during training and operational deployments. During KFOR and OIF, additional medical assets were used predominately for units operating apart from established medical facilities when response time was too long and to secondly to support civilians and nation building. 13Doctrine states the combat trains consist of the CTCP, battalion aid station, an emergency class III and V squad from the support platoon, and the UMCP. 14Personal interview with CPT Robert E. Underwood and CPT William F. Coryell, HHC XO, TF 1-64 AR, March 2004. 15Personal interview with CPT Robert E. Underwood, 10 March 2004. 16Personal interview with CPT Michael J. Rust, S1, TF 1st Battalion, 66th Armor, 15 March 2004. 17The combat trains can effectively replaced the TFSA. 18There are three ways that the author currently is aware of to send information in ULLS, with includes FM blast, KC wireless, and disk drop. Although flash keys were tried, the ULLS system would not accept them. ULLS-G switched to a laptop system but ULLS-S4 still uses a large desktop computer system. Floppy disks and drives are extremely vulnerable to desert/extreme heat conditions. 19One example is the tactical fax. The system can only talk to other tactical fax systems. It cannot communicate with the more modern Blackjack Fax, which is used at the brigade level. 20CPT Jason A. Miseli, HHC CDR, TF 2-69 AR, Interview with companycommand.com, 2003. 21The author witnessed this during alive fire gunnery at Grafenwoehr Training Area in 2000. 22CPT J. M. Pierre, “Convoy Live Fire: Training the Support Platoon to Defend Itself in Ambushes.” ARMOR, November-December 2000, p. 21, available online at http://www.knox. army.mil//ArmorMag/nd00/6convoy00.pdf. 23Logistics CPXs are worthless unless tied to maneuver. The 2d BCT, 1st Armored Division FSB led a logistics CPX, which was not tied to any type of maneuver operation. The only benefit was the set up of the actual command post and test of communications equipment. 24Personal interview with CPT William F. Coryell, HHC XO, TF 1-64 AR, 6 March 2004. 25CPT Dean J. Dominique, “Tactical Convoy Outline.” The quote is from a memorandum from the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Headquarters in Mogadishu, Somalia, 19 October 1993. 26Sean D. Naylor, “Chief of Staff To Soldiers: You’re a Rifleman First,” Army Times, 20 October 2003. Captain Christopher L’Heureux is currently serving as brigade assistant S1, 172d Infantry Brigade (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), Fort Wainwright, AK. He received a B. A. from Providence College. His military education includes Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Cavalry Leaders Course, Airborne School, Armor Officers Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Mountain Warfare School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3 Plans, 4th Squadron, 14th U. S. Cavalry, Fort Wainwright; battalion S4, Task Force 1st Battalion, 35th Armor (1-35 AR), 1st Armored Division (1AD), Baumholder, Germany; support platoon leader, 1-35 AR, 1AD, Baumholder; and tank platoon leader, 1-35 AR, 1AD, Baumholder. — 45