Maintenance Under Fire

“Black 6, this is Blue 1…Slant 3. A32 is a mobility kill vicinity November-Kilo 449121…Break…Black 7, request vehicle evacuation.” “Roger, Wrench is en route.”

When the mechanics went to recover the “disabled” tank, they thought their mission was routine: get to the vehicle, simulate the hook-up, and tow A32 to the maintenance collection point. It was a typical operation, conducted several times in this and other training events. There was no big hubbub made as the M88 lumbered across the rolling terrain Then the opposing force (OPFOR) appeared — a three-man ambush. The mechanics’ eyes widened. They halted in the center of the “enemy” kill zone. It was an indecisive moment for the team mechanics fumbling with their .50 caliber machine gun. Thirty seconds later, in response to a constant stream of “enemy” fire, the company/team’s mechanics fired back. Their return fire was late; it was intermittent at best. The OPFOR had the upper hand and they held their ground. Then they were gone. At the vehicle recovery site, thinking the threat had vanished, the mechanics casually walked to A32. Black 7 had evacuated the crewmen. The area looked safe: “Okay, let’s get this thing out of here,” the shop foreman said right before he walked into a booby trap. Remember that OPFOR ambush team? They returned with more ammunition. Fully uploaded, they wanted to fight again. This was not a “typical” vehicle recovery — you know, the kind of staged event where Combat Service Support (CSS) assets have an uncontested reign over the conquered battlefield. This mission had a live, thinking opposing force that was dedicated to disrupting their efforts. It forced them to fight as hard as the company/team they supported, and therein it demonstrated a weakness of the maintenance team: self-defense. The mechanics became proficient in the technical tasks of vehicle retrieval, their everyday job — recovery, equipment repair, and maintenance estimates. But they were unable to execute the tactical tasks necessary for self-defense. The battle ends leaving one side the victor, the other wondering what went wrong, and both sides licking their wounds as they reconstitute for the next engagement. It is in this quiet moment that the dedicated maintenance team shines. The heavy force, bound as we are to our tanks and Bradleys, are likewise tethered to those maintenance fellows who feverishly regenerate our vehicular combat power. It is in this lull that the mechanics must ostensibly become riflemen, retrieving disabled vehicles from the field. On the face of it, training mechanics as riflemen seems like a low priority collective training event. It appears to take resources away from infantrymen, tankers, and scouts while distracting mechanics from their priorities: repair and recovery. However, when one M88 and its contingent of 63Ts are committed to the recovery of 14 combat systems and three M88s exist in the maneuver battalion, the OPFOR’s disruption of recovery efforts directly impacts the ability of the company/team and the battalion task force to regenerate combat power for future operations. The solution is to train long-forgotten soldier skills and to focus training on selfdefense on the battlefield. During the 1998-1999 training year, Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry (Mechanized) trained vehicle evacuation as an isolated lane designed to support its battalion and company essential task: “Sustain.” By Battlefield Operating Systems, HHC, 2-9 IN (M) focused its training program as shown in Figure 1. Maintenance Live Fire was conducted in four phases and per FM 20-22, ARTEP 7-94 MTP, and ARTEP 17-236- 10 MTP. The greatest emphasis went to those tasks involving tactical movement and establishing a hasty defense at the recovery site. The second priority was a safe recovery of the vehicle per FM 20-22. Finally, the training program stressed moving tactically and recovering safely under several adverse conditions replicating the “fog of war,” including NBC, EPWs, booby traps, and the ever-present opposing force. Phase I was the orientation and rehearsal (rock drill and dry run) portion of the training. Phase II (blank fire) introduced soldiers to moving and shooting as part of their recovery. Phase III (NBC fire and validation) reinforced the training of the previous iterations under more intense conditions. Success in this phase validated the maintenance teams to proceed to Phase IV (maintenance live fire), the most exciting and dangerous portion of the training. After the soldiers became familiar with the process of reacting to an enemy, live fire developed confidence in their ability to kill the enemy. Soldiers learned to ask three questions: An M88 crewman engages targets during live fire, overseen by a safety monitor. 44 ARMOR — January-February 2001

1) Am I prepared to defend myself?

2) Is the area and vehicle secured?

3) Have I properly estimated the rig and load?

SCENARIO

The lane begins in the midst of a company/team offensive mission (See scenario diagram on Page 47). The maintenance team monitors the company/ team net in an “attack position.” Under simulated combat conditions, a tracked vehicle is immobilized by hostile fire. On order, the maintenance team conducts a tactical movement to the recovery site, establishes security, conducts a battle damage estimate, calculates the resistance needed to move the load, and returns the disabled vehicle to the maintenance collection point without further damage to the vehicle or injury to soldiers (“Tow disabled track vehicle,” Task Number 17-4-1292, ARTEP

17-236-10 MTP).

PLANNING

Maintenance live fire was programmed as part of the 2-9 IN (M) yearly gunnery training. HHC coordinated for the Warrior Valley range, the ammunition requirements, and rotated its maintenance teams with the recovery section to replace the loss to the companies. The HHC commander was the primary trainer and maneuver evaluator. The battalion maintenance technician (BMT) was the technical trainer and recovery evaluator. Soldiers were tasked to serve as the range OIC, NCOIC, ammunition NCO, and range safety/controllers. Finally, medics followed as part of the recovery effort, both to provide medical coverage and to train their task of medical evacuation. In the planning phase, HHC, 2-9 IN (M) conducted a leader’s reconnaissance of the Warrior Valley Range at the Korea Training Center. The range OIC, BMT, and battalion maintenance sergeant (BMS) gained an understanding of the terrain by walking the range and talking about the actions of each soldier during the different phases of the training. They refined the scenario based on the range restrictions, safety considerations, and troop proficiency. As surface danger zones (SDZ) of the range varied within its depth, they also ensured the range supported the ammunition used. Finally, they validated and modified the scenario with Range Control personnel. In the end, the leaders of HHC, 2-9th IN walked away with a common vision of the firing lines and the target arrays.

PREPARATION

Soldiers started their preparation for maintenance live fire three months prior to the event. As mission support prevents the mechanics from conducting dedicated everyday training, NCOs took advantage of the weekly Sergeants Time to train those individual tasks that supported the collective tasks above:

ARMOR — January-February 2001 45

MANEUVER TASKS

Occupy Assembly Area

7-2-1317 Perform Tactical Road March 7-2-1301 Hasty Occupation of a Battle Position 17-3-2601 Conduct Tactical Movement 17-3-1016 Execute Actions On Contact 17-3-1021 Disengage from the Enemy 17-3-2380 Defend Against Ambush/Road Not Blocked 17-3-1059

FIRE SUPPORT TASKS

Employ Fire Support

7-3-1320

INTELLIGENCE TASKS

Practice Communication and Electronic Security 7-3-1406

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY TASKS

React to Chemical Attack

7-2-1318 Perform Hasty Decontamination 7-3-1301 Cross Contaminated Area

7-2-1315 Employ Camouflage

7-3-1309 Operate in NBC Environment 7-3-1318 Treat NBC-Contaminated Casualties 7-3-1602

AIR DEFENSE TASKS

Defend Against Air Attack (Passive) 7-2-1312

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TASKS

Destroy Unit Vehicle and Equipment 7-3-1311 Perform Maintenance Operations 7-3-1316 Evacuate Casualties

7-3-1613 Provide Maintenance Operations 7-3-1703 Control Maintenance Operations 7-3-1704 Establish Unit Maintenance Collection Point 7-3-1705 Provide Class IX Support

7-3-1707 Perform Recovery of Vehicle and Equipment 7-3-1708 Perform Battle Damage Assessment and Recovery 7-3-1711

COMMAND AND CONTROL TASKS

Consolidate/Reorganize

7-3-1302 Prepare For Combat

7-3-1305 Sustain

7-3-1306 Establish Communication

7-3-1307 Control Support Operations

7-3-1514 Perform Continuous Operations 7-3-1315 Recover a Mired Vehicle

17-4-1295 Select and Establish UMCP or Field Maintenance Sites 17-3-1266 Perform Battle Damage Assessment 17-3-1279 Repair Unit Equipment

17-3-1280

Figure 1

land navigation, radio procedures, driver training and boom operation, and weapons qualification. A current weapons qualification was also mandatory for the live fire. Unqualified mechanics would be permitted to participate in the training but could not shoot ball ammunition.

EXECUTION

During Phase I - Dry Run soldiers were briefed on the scenario and provided the task and purpose of the training by the OIC. This was followed by a rock drill and training on individual movement techniques (IMT). The training objective was the repetition of reaction tasks as they were to be performed during the live fire. After the practice, soldiers conducted a mounted dry run of the lane. The M88 reacted to an ambush by ‘engag-ing’ targets as the team chief reported to higher. At the recovery site, a team of four mechanics dismounted the M113 and conducted a local reconnaissance of the area. They established security along the main avenue of approach and directed the rest of the maintenance team to continue with the recovery mission. When targets appeared, they engaged from the prone position to defend the recovery effort. During the mounted portion, target acquisition was the biggest problem. During the dismounted portion, soldiers had to relearn individual and buddy movement. They had to also learn how to establish a firing line. Soldiers tended to mask each other’s fires, silhouette themselves, or establish poor firing positions. Again, repetition of IMT and reaction skills was crucial in this phase and proficiency was a criterion for moving to the blank fire training phase. In Phase II, blank fire, the same actions were conducted with the addition of blank ammunition, artillery simulators, and trip flare booby traps. In this iteration, soldiers learned to execute their mission with the din of “battlefield noise.” During the mounted portion, the .50 caliber gunner usually had trouble firing his machine gun from the top of the M88 — a perishable skill that they rarely trained. During the dismounted portion, the team chiefs found that they had trouble with command and control of both the security force and the recovery when the gunfire started. This was overcome by having the shop foreman direct the security section as the team chief directed the recovery effort. Now leaders were present at two crucial areas and the team chief was near the radio in order to request indirect fire. Soldiers also discovered they had to move tactically through an inhospitable terrain in order to find cover from “enemy” fire while maintaining their fire line. Again, repetition during the dry run was essential for teaching them how to move. Trainers emphasized 3- to 5-second rushes and communication with all members of the dismounted security team as they established their firing line. With more skills to retrain in order to safely progress to a live fire, the blank fire was conducted twice. Time constraints prevented full speed runs so, as a minimum, crucial events were rehearsed as much as possible. The most demanding iteration was Phase III, the NBC fire and validation. The skills developed in blank fire were reinforced in MOPP IV. The ability to successfully and safely drive off-road, conduct recovery tasks, engage targets, and command and control while impaired by a protective mask and gloves validated the teams for the live fire run. During Phase IV, safeties certified that soldiers could properly dismount their vehicles, conduct movement to the firing line, and shoot. On the M88, its safety certified that the gunner could successfully load his .50 caliber machine gun, shoot, and clear it. Mechanics were decertified if they failed to point their weapons at the ground during IMT, failed to keep their weapons on safe, or failed to point up and down range on the firing line. An accidental discharge of a weapon was a cause of immediate decertification. Training Aids Training aids enhance training when they create the “effects of the battlefield.” For example:

• A breach lane was built through a wire/mine obstacle. The breach was intentionally placed off the main flow of traffic in order to train teams to identify and move through the single lane breach.

• Trip flares and whistling devices were used as booby traps — these forced soldiers to thoroughly search vehicles.

• Target lift devices with E-type silhouettes were primarily used. An operator with the remote control device walked the lane and lifted targets on command. This reduced target confusion as the maintenance teams moved through the range.

• Where lift devices could not be placed, E-type silhouettes were suspended at a 45-degree angle by cord and a balloon. Shooting the balloon caused the target to fall. This worked exceptionally well for training individual marksmanship, fire control, and fire distribution.

• Uniforms on the targets further created the effect of a real enemy presenting himself.

• Video cameras recorded every action to allow us to dissect our TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) at the AAR (after-action review). Soldiers learned more quickly when they saw themselves making mistakes.

• Medical teams were the most significant addition to the maintenance lane. They conducted medical-related training that supported our essential task, SUSTAIN. We focused on the tasks listed in Figure 2.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TASKS

Prepare and Evacuate Casualties 7-2-1314 Evacuate KIA Remains

7-3-1509 Treat Casualties

7-3-1601 Treat/Secure/Evacuate Enemy Prisoners of War 7-3-1608 Perform Triage

7-3-1609 Develop/Supervise Medical Support 7-3-1611 Establish Medical Platoon Area of Operation 7-3-1612 Evacuate Casualties

7-3-1613

Figure 2 46 ARMOR — January-February 2001

Conclusion At the end of maneuver training a voice comes over the command net: “ENDEX…ENDEX…ENDEX…move to the AAR site.” The objective has just been seized. Maybe platoons have finished consolidating, but the support assets have not moved to clear the battlefield. This fails to integrate CSS into the overall training exercise. It, therefore, fails to enforce basic soldier skills, such as security, tactical movement, and marksmanship, while teaching that vehicle retrieval is administrative — never conducted under the weapon sights of the OPFOR. A simple vehicle recovery may then result in untrained supporters involved in a direct firefight. So, as the company/team consolidates on its objective, possibly having left some “enemy” dismount alive, are the soldiers ready to return fire? Is security around the vehicle established? Are there booby traps around the vehicle? What amount of effort is required to secure the site while retaining enough manpower for the mission? Isolated CSS training events, such as the maintenance live fire, specifically address weaknesses in the forgotten components of the company/teams by training them to competently answer these questions. It builds confidence in maintenance teams, and in individual soldiers, assuring them that they can accomplish their mission no matter where the OPFOR may appear.

CPT J.M. Pierre is a 1992 graduate of the Fordham University ROTC program. He has served as a tank platoon leader and tank company XO in 1-67th AR, 2d AD. After AOAC, he commanded A/1-72d AR and HHC, 2-9th IN (M), both in the 2d ID, Camp Casey, Korea. He is currently the Cavalry Team Chief and S3 of 3d BN (TS), 307th IN. ARMOR — January-February 2001 47 Maintenance Live Fire Scenario

ATK

PSN

PREPARE FOR

COMBAT

CONDUCT

TACTICAL MOVEMENT

MOVE THROUGH

BREACH LANE

REACT TO AMBUSH

(MOUNTED)

REACT TO AMBUSH

(DISMOUNTED)

TOW DISABLED

TRACK VEHICLE

At left, local security is set up to protect mechanics during a recovery. Above, medics train by evacuating a “casualty”.

An Abrams tank firing KE ammunition is widely regarded as the most effective anti-armor weapon in the world. The M829E3 round will provide greater armor penetration capability than its predecessors and will also improve accuracy out to greater tactical line of sight (LOS) ranges in the “Red Zone.” 120mm Canister. We increasingly expect our Abrams tank to operate in close, complex, and urban terrain supporting assaulting infantry. As such, the M1A1/M1A2 requires a simple, quick means of engaging enemy infantry with an area weapon that provides a greater volume than the tank’s machine guns or the organic weapons of friendly infantry. The intent is to quickly neutralize the enemy and shatter his morale. Used by tanks in previous wars, nothing does that better, close in, than thousands of steel balls, flechettes, and pellets launched with one pull of the trigger. Our need for an effective canister round spans the full spectrum of conflict, from small-scale contingencies to major theaters of war. Meeting the requirement will facilitate dominant maneuver and provide an offensive form of force protection. The Mechanized Force is currently unable to provide effective, rapid, lethal fire against massed assaulting infantry armed with hand-held anti-tank and automatic weapons at close range (500 meters or less). The current inability of the Abrams tank to defeat enemy infantry and close-in anti-tank systems reduces the survivability of the maneuver force and the infantry it supports. Canister will solve this problem. We hope to begin fielding the canister round in 2003-4. 4. Recapitalize through rebuild (M1A1D/M2A2ODS) remaining mechanized containment and reinforcing forces (AC/RC). While Priorities One and Two address upgrades for our decisive counterattack force, our early entry and containment “first to fight” forces also require an adequate level of overmatch. The 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, and 2nd Infantry Division require recapitalization and digitization of current weapon systems. Additionally, the eight National Guard enhanced separate brigades and seven National Guard divisions require recapitalization as soon as practical. Key M1A1D improvements include information dominance technologies with FBCB2, 1st GEN FLIR, FTL, BIT/FIT, GPS. Also critical is a rebuild program that brings the tank to “zero time” with limited modification and a completely rebuilt engine. We also hope to gain approval for 2nd Gen FLIR for incorporation on the M1A1D. The key capabilities of rebuilt systems for the Bradley ODS-D are information dominance, FBCB2, 1st GEN FLIR, FTL, GPS, Bradley tile protection enhancements, and a rebuild to zero time on the engine.

5. Match Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) with appropriate early entry containment force equipment.

6. Invest in adequate institutional, home station, and CTC training upgrades to ensure Mechanized Force readiness. The centerpiece of our institutional improvements is the Institutional Digital Education Program (IDEP), which will ensure leaders and staffs get the most out of the digital equipment coming online. The key components of the home station training upgrades will be a fixed tactical internet, Close Combat Tactical Trainers (CCTT’s) for Company/Team Maneuver/Direct Fire Training, and Home Station Integrated Training Systems (HITS) to provide a CTC-like training experience. CTC training enhancements include a programmed upgrade and rebuild of infrastructure and equipment, an enhanced live fire capability for USAREUR, and MOUT capabilities.

7. Ensure adequate obstacle reduction (Grizzly) and gap-crossing (Wolverine) capability in III Corps.

8. Develop and procure long-range indirect fire systems (Crusader) and munitions to enhance non-line-of-sight effects.

9. Acquire reconnaissance platform to provide III Corps with inter-netted ISR/target acquisition capability.

10. Invest in O&S cost reducers (common engine, built-in diagnostics reliability improvements).

11. Empower XVIII Corps with appropriate reconnaissance, surveillance and security cavalry capability. As discussed in last month’s Commander’s Hatch, we are diligently engaged in studying and recommending ways to transform the 2nd ACR into a more viable reconnaissance and security organization in the near term.

12. Procure adequate battlefield recovery capability (Hercules) to outfit the III Corps counterattack force. We are satisfied that the MFM Plan lays out the best way ahead for our Legacy Force. These improvements will ensure the dominance of our current heavy force while we confidently apply resources to pursue the Objective Force armed with the Future Combat System. Scheduled to initially enter the force around 2010, the FCS will be a radical departure from traditional combat vehicle design. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Army have embarked on an ambitious program that will be a “system of systems” which leverages emerging technologies and has a built-in capability to incorporate future advances. Key to its success will be our ability to harness improvements in the distribution and effective use of information power. The commander of this force will achieve battlefield dominance through inter-netted sensors and shooters and the ability to quickly mass and combine fires to achieve tactical dominance. Although much research has already been completed, we can’t yet predict exactly what the FCS will look like or how it will work. We do know this much, however. It will continue to do what only ground forces can do: close with the enemy in a manner that leaves him no option but to yield or be destroyed. One of the FCS “shooter” vehicles should be a direct-fire platform manned by soldiers trained in the best tanker and cavalry traditions. It will weigh less than 20 tons and be deployable by C-130 and tilt-rotor aircraft. It will have Line of Sight (LOS) and Beyond LOS (BLOS) lethality to defeat all Level One armor threats. Further, it will possess superior tactical and operational mobility regardless of terrain or operational area infrastructure. Even though it will weigh less than a third of the Abrams tank, the FCS will have greater survivability. How? By incorporating advanced counter detection/acquisition technologies such as electronic signature elimination and enemy target acquisition and fire control interdiction. Additionally, capabilities such as false target generation and more traditional passive, active, and reactive armor packages will enhance protection. We can expect to see the first demonstration of applicable technologies in 2003. The future of the mounted force is exciting and full of promise. Our important role in Army Transformation is just one more example of how the Army depends 48 ARMOR — January-February 2001 HATCH from Page 5 heavily on our branch for ideas and leadership. The opportunities for growth, personal and professional satisfaction, and warrior leadership will grow and expand in our branch. For those who choose a career as an armor warrior, the future will provide opportunities just as monumental as the days when we transformed from the horse to the mechanized platform. Nonetheless, turbulence always accompanies change. With regard to our officer leaders, we’ve recently seen many fine captains leave our ranks. I’d like to address this captain attrition in the branch and give you some thoughts on why we want you to stay with our unique profession. As of the 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 2000, the overall attrition rate for Armor captains stands at about 12% per year. This is 2% higher than the same time last year. The added 2% means that about 23 more captains will leave the Armor Force this year than left last year. While these increased losses won’t effect our ability to fulfill Armor missions, they do concern me. Opportunities for excellence in leadership and personal satisfaction are in fact growing in the branch. We hope this increased attrition is an anomaly. Numerous departing officers cite the large amount of time spent deployed from their family as a reason for leaving. Stabilization and support missions are noted as especially unpopular. Nonetheless, engagement throughout the world is a key tenet of our National Security Strategy, so these missions simply must be conducted to standard. PERSCOM now tracks every soldier’s time spent deployed from home. Once that time goes over 180 days in any 12-month period, that trooper will return home as soon as possible. Additionally, Reserve Component units participate in stability missions in increasingly large numbers. The recent success enjoyed in Bosnia by the 49th Armored Division of the Texas National Guard is but one example. Full use of the Total Army also allows us to address another shortcoming that factored in a number of decisions to separate: lack of combat training opportunities. With a decrease in stability and support deployments, (and the train-up necessary to complete them), warfighting skills can receive increased attention. Another distracter named by those leaving the service is long hours spent in garrison performing non-METL tasks accompanied by personnel shortages. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s goal to man TOE units at 100% by the end of the year will go a long way to rectify this situation. Further, the Army has increased manning authorizations for units in the field. While “garrison activities” will always be with us, fully manned units will have more options available to meet them. The most troubling reason given for leaving is a perceived “zero defect” command climate and a resulting culture of micro-management. Many came into the Army to lead soldiers and willingly shouldered the immense responsibility of command. Some of those separating, however, tell us that superiors more concerned with making sure nothing goes wrong on their watch have taken this responsibility away. Most importantly, they are frustrated because they feel senior leaders are either unwilling or unable to understand and address their concerns. What are we doing to address the full range of concerns? This past year has seen approval of the largest package of pay raises and pay incentives since

1980. The redux retirement plan was repealed and the old 50% plan restored. Additionally, OPMS XXI provides officers alternate career choices and increases their chances for promotion in non-operations fields. It also dramatically increases battalion command opportunity for those officers who remain in their basic branches. While not specifically designed to eliminate a perceived “zero-defect” culture, increased pay and better opportunities for promotion lay the groundwork for a healthier command climate. Still, the Army will remain in a state of change until the full benefits of OPMS XXI take effect and we gain fuller clarity on the course transformation will take. We’ve seen challenges like this before. The inter-war years of the 1920s and ’30s are a great example. We were deployed throughout the world while simultaneously transforming into a mechanized force. Many officers were uncertain about the direction of the Army and what their role would be. However, had great officers like Patton, Eisenhower, Abrams, and Bradley given up, our successes on the battlefield during the Second World War may have been fewer and farther between, with much higher casualties. Fortunately, they, and thousands like them, stayed and led the Army to victory over arguably the greatest threat our nation has ever faced. Today, together, we can make this great Army even better. I have a challenge for you, NCOs and officers alike. If you see something wrong, tell your commander what the problem is and see if it is something that he can fix. If it is an institutional or systemic shortcoming, work to correct it in your current position. Use one of our Army’s many avenues of communication to inform senior leaders of the problem so they can address the issue. I am personally interested in your views and concerns. Write me and I will do everything I can to positively impact the situation. Even better, challenge yourself to achieve a level where you can be even more influential in solving the problem. Finally, take a hard look at the Army and yourself. Don’t be afraid to talk to your superiors. Chances are many of them faced the same dilemmas you do today. I am convinced that your senior leaders will not penalize their subordinates for expressing their convictions. In fact, we invite dialog and highly encourage professional debate. We are all committed to eliminating the notion of a zero defects climate — real or perceived. The Army will always offer unique opportunities and camaraderie that you won’t find in civilian life simply due to the nature of our profession. If you have the opportunity, talk to some officers who have recently come back on active duty voluntarily. Use their perceptions to help make your decision. Certainly, the strong economy of the last few years has its appeal. Some tankers and cavalrymen legitimately determine the Army life isn’t right for them or their families. Those officers deserve our thanks and any help we can give them to ease them into civilian life. Indeed, many of these former soldiers do a great job telling the Army story and helping our recruiting efforts. In the final analysis, for all the personal reasons to stay in or depart the Army, one ideal looms large in the heart of any American who has sworn the commissioning or enlistment oath: Selfless service to our great nation. The notion of being part of something greater than ourselves motivated many of us to join the service in the first place. By any measure, we truly live in the greatest nation the world has ever seen. Certainly, we have our shortcomings. But overall, more people have more opportunities than any one of us can truly imagine. Armor officers and troopers are directly responsible for this prosperity. Your dedication and hard work make American freedom possible. We want to keep you on our winning team. Forge the Thunderbolt and Strike First!

ARMOR — January-February 2001 49