Tank Warfare During the Rif Rebellion, 1921-1927

Tank Warfare During the Rif Rebellion 1921-1927 by José E. Alvarez in favor of French equipment. France’s geographic proximity to Spain, as well as its shared interest in Morocco, contributed to the deal being consummated between Paris and Madrid. Consequently, in August 1921, the French prime minister authorized the sale of tanks, artillery, and airplanes to the Spanish Army. The tanks, known as “carros de combate/asalto” in Spain, arrived in January of the following year.4 The initial delivery to the Army numbered twelve 6.5-ton Renault FT-17s; eleven were armed with a 7-mm Hotchkiss machine gun, one served as a command tank (FT-17TSH). These twelve tanks were delivered to the Escuela Central de Tiro. Six Schneider CA1 tanks were also purchased and placed at the disposal of the artillery branch of the Army.

The FT-17s were incorporated into a company (“Compañia de Carros de Asalto”), with a command staff using the TSH, two platoons of five tanks each, as well as a support and repair unit. The twelfth tank would remain at the Testing Ground to be used in training. The company equipment also included twelve Renault tank transport trucks, two Hispano-Suiza tanker trucks, and a Ford light truck to transport stores. In addition, a repair truck which remained in Segovia, was never delivered. The staff consisted of a captain, two lieutenants, one sergeant-major, eight sergeants who would serve as TCs, and forty enlisted men (eleven tank drivers, twenty truck drivers, and nine mechanics and service personnel).5 King Alfonso XIII saw a demonstration of the new tanks at a military camp outside Madrid soon after their arrival. After a brief period of instruction for the new unit, the General Staff ordered that the tank company be transferred by rail to the port of Malaga on March 8, and from there by ship to Melilla. Once there, the unit was immediately sent to the encampment at Dar Drius. However, suitable shelter for the tanks from the inclement weather, as well as repair facilities, had not been established. This led the company commander, Captain José de Alfaro, to pen a terse report to Army HQ in Melilla. As a result, all tanks needing major repairs had to be sent from Dar Drius to the artillery’s machine shop in Melilla.6 No more than two months had gone by since the tanks had arrived in Spain and they would now be pressed into service against the Beni Said tribe. On March 17, the company joined General

F. Berenguer Fuste’s column at the forward outpost of Itihuen/Ichtiuen. The following morning, at 0600 hours, the tank company began its advance with the infantry of the Foreign Legion deployed behind the FT-17s. The operation, which called for the capture of Tuguntz, succeeded in reaching and occupying the houses of Ambar/Anvar. Once there, however, they began to take heavy fire from their left flank. The tanks had advanced, over broken terrain, faster than their infantry, and a distance of some 800 meters separated them. The Riffians, undaunted by the appearance of these new war machines, surrounded the unprotected tanks and began hurling stones at them. Finding the machine gun’s blind spots, they thrust their daggers (gumias) through the vision slits, injuring one machine gunner’s face. Many of the tank’s machine guns, installed the day before, jammed during firing due to faulty ammunition.

The tanks had to withdraw to rejoin the Legionnaires, but during the withdrawal, fighting continued, forcing some of the tankers to abandon their disabled or disarmed vehicles. The outcome of this less than auspicious event in the history of Spanish armor left two sergeants and one enlisted driver wounded, and three tanks disabled. Lacking the necessary recovery equipment, two of the tanks had to be left on the battlefield where the Riffians blew them up with dynamite four days later.7 The Army’s General Staff examined the lackluster performance of the tanks, and concluded that the determining factor in the fiasco was the lack of coop-ARMOR — 27 eration between the infantry and tanks. The gap which developed between the two elements, as well as the failure of the machine guns, were also important contributing factors. It was also noted that the tanks had been rushed to the front without the opportunity for coordinated training/exercises with the infantry.8 For the remainder of the campaign in the Protectorate, tanks were used on a smaller scale, to provide support during retreats, in punitive operations, in wheeled-vehicle recovery, and in reconnaissance operations with cavalry and infantry units. They would once again be used in a major operation during the amphibious landings at Alhucemas Bay in September, 1925, where the company of FT-17s were to disembark first in order to provide fire support for the infantry who followed them ashore. The landing craft, however, struck a shoal, forcing the infantry and artillery to disembark unassisted. The tanks were brought ashore the following day, where they provided support for the left flank of the beachhead and, with the collaboration of the VIth and VIIth Banderas of the Legion, advanced to take the strategic heights/line of Malmusi Alto, Malmusi Bajo, and Morro Viejo.9 With the successful landing at Alhucemas Bay by the Spanish Army, the defeat of Krim and his “Rif Republic” was assured. The war would continue, with less intensity, until peace was declared in mid-1927.

In conclusion, Spain’s first use of armor during the Rif rebellion in Morocco resulted in a minor setback. Nevertheless, among the farsighted officers of the Army, the use of tanks in a colonial setting, where difficult terrain would be encountered, was a reality. In this type of campaign, it was of the utmost importance that armor and infantry provide mutual support. If not, either could be easily cut off and destroyed.

This not only happened to Spanish tanks at Ambar, but to Italian armor during the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-36. Greater mechanical reliability, along with better ammunition, improved the fighting capability of Spanish tanks during the rebellion, and even though they did not play a major role during the Alhucemas Bay landings, they were available to provide fire support if called upon to do so.

Within the Spanish Army, there was no turning back. Armor was here to stay.