Task Force Initiatives

The focus of this article is on the armor and mechanized infantry battalion task force (TF). It is a collection of ideas that worked well for Task Force “DESERT ROGUES,” 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The purpose for writing is to share techniques that worked during mounted combat in the Gulf War, enabling great soldiers to do their jobs a little better. Task Force Movement Until the final Operations Order (OPORD) was written and approved for release, there were few certainties about the enemy situation other than the Iraqi defense on the Kuwaiti border. It was this uncertainty that caused several assumptions and decisions to be made about TF movement and support structure. Field Manual (FM) 71-2, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Task Force, outlines seven movement techniques: column, wedge, V, echelon, line, box, and diamond. All have advantages and disadvantages, but terrain is always a factor when selecting a particular formation. The key is to choose one that fits, train it to standard, and rehearse it until every vehicle commander understands it and can execute it regardless of conditions. Task Force Desert Rogues consisted of two tank and two mechanized infantry companies. The task force commander chose task force diamond (Figure 1). The requirement for speed was the determinant in selecting this movement technique. This formation allowed the leadership to develop a few basic battle drills that the TF could quickly execute without losing momentum. The belief that the field trains would/could not help the TF during movement determined their location with the forward support battalion (FSB) and consquently the structure of the support platoon. The support platoon was designed to carry as much Class I, III(B), III(P), and Vas possible. The platoon was organized for rapid resupply of the TF; more on the support package later. The scout platoon was 4-6 kilometers in front of the task force, spread over a 5-7 kilometer front. Each section used a Global Positioning System (GPS) for accurate position reporting. A tank company led the main body with mechanized infantry companies on the flanks and the second tank company trailing. The mortar platoon followed in the center, behind the lead tank company. The threat of enemy air was low but one Vulcan was with the tactical operations center (TOC), and another moved with the admin-logistic operations center (ALOC). The TF commander’s guidance was to minimize the number of wheeled vehicles, except for HEMTTs, in the formation. Therefore, only five wheels moved forward with the combat elements: two in the support platoon (platoon leader and sergeant); one in each aid station with trauma kits; and one carrying the Stinger platoon sergeant moving with the support platoon. During hours of daylight and good visibility, the trail tank company moved in front of the support platoon and recovery section to facilitate fast battle drills to the front or flanks of the formation. At night, the support platoon moved in front of the trail tank company for greater protection. The recovery section always trailed. Support Platoon The support platoon was the lifeblood of the task force. Any item required for battle was on a combat vehicle or in the support platoon. The field trains carried all non-essential equipment and traveled with the forward support battalion (FSB). The support platoon was organized as shown in Figure 2. Vehicle modifications were the first order of business during Operation DESERT SHIELD. The lead HEMTTs received radios. This allowed the platoon leader or platoon sergeant to talk to any lead vehicle, which was always commanded by a noncommissioned officer. The two wreckers (5 and 10 ton) already had radios (MTOE authorizations). Spare tires were in the 11⁄2-ton trailers. We learned this lesson the hard way late in the ground war after abandoning several trailers because we had no assembled spare tires and no time to stop and repair them. Pulling trailers with flat tires quickly caused damage to the prime mover. Refuel on the move (ROM) was a critical battle drill rehearsed innumerable times. This subject warrants a separate article, but each column of the support platoon was designed to support a company during a ROM. Each column was independent and tailored to a specific type company (i.e., tank or mech). This was particularly true of peculiar Class V and Class III(P) requirements. However, each column also had sufficient generic stocks to support any company in case of vehicle loss or breakdown. Within each column, cargo HEMTTs (M977s) carried tailored Class V packages. The scouts, mortars, and HHC(-) were also supported with specific vehicles. Cargo 11⁄2-ton trailers were loaded with Class III(P) products tailored to the type of vehicles being supported (Abrams vs. Bradley). Vehicles carrying Class III(B) (M978), water, and a limited number of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) rounded out the supporting column. The platoon leader and sergeant each controlled two columns. The ALOC kept track of fuel consumption using reports from the companies. The TOC monitored the status and plotted future ROM sites. After the commander approved a recommended ROM site, the TOC would issue the order to the ALOC, which in turn would order the support platoon to execute a ROM. In hours of daylight, each first sergeant (traveling in the company maintenance M113) would drop back to the trail tank company, pick up his support column, and guide it forward to his company. At night, they moved to the center of the diamond formation and met up with their column in the vicinity of the TOC. To simplify identification, each column of HEMTTs fixed two colored glow sticks to the front of each vehicle, helping the first sergeant find them; different colors were used for ARMOR — 39 (Continued from Page 39) Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Boyd is currently the U. S. Army Exchange Officer at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. He served as the XO of 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 24th ID(M) at Ft. Stewart, Ga., during Operations

SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

is accepted into Excellence in Armor, his DA Form 2-1 should be annotated as discussed earlier. Now for the benefits! Incentives for Excellence in Armor soldiers with exceptional performance are as follows:

• OSUT commanders may promote 10% of their class at the completion of Basic to PV2 and those 10% may be promoted to PFC at the completion of the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) specific phase. Statistics show that the greatest number of these promotions go to Excellence in Armor soldiers, primarily because they have proven themselves to be overachievers.

• A sergeant who is a Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course graduate may request to take the SCCT/ TCCT II through his local TCO or

TSO.

It is a comprehensive two-hour test on Skill Level 3 and 4 tasks. If he passes with a score of 70 or higher, he is eligible to receive 50 promotion points in Military Education for his SSG promotion packet. This is in accordance with Army Regulation 600-8-19, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions.

• All senior NCO promotion boards are briefed that Excellence in Armor identifies an Armor soldier as a “cut above.” On the last SFC promotion board, there were more Excellence in Armor soldiers selected for promotion to SFC than any other category in CMF19. Being an Excellence in Armor soldier certainly has its advantages, not only by increasing your chances for promotion, but also in recognizing you as a cut above everyone else. The proof of the program has been seen in CMF19 promotions. During the first year that the original OSUT Excellence in Armor enrollee was eligible for promotion to SSG and SFC, 75% of SSG promotions and 74% of SFC selections were Excellence in Armor. Commanders are selecting, and promotion boards are recognizing, the highest quality soldiers. But the program cannot survive and flourish without command involvement. Leaders have four responsibilities when it comes to Excellence in Armor: first, identify and challenge incoming Excellence in Armor soldiers; second, establish and support a unit Excellence in Armor program; third, accelerate SPC/SGT/SSG promotions and school attendance for Excellence in Armor soldiers; and fourth, maintain quality in the program! If a soldier no longer meets the standards, disenroll him. Finally, if you have any questions about Excellence in Armor, you can direct them to the following address: Commander U. S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARP (SFC Berg/Ms. Graham) Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000 Or call DSN 464-1368/3188 or Commercial (502)624-1368/3188. Keep Charging! Driver’s Seat (Continued from Page 5)