UCOFT Certification: An Achievable Goal

by Major General Paul E. Blackwell and Lieutenant Colonel (P) John S. Brown The Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer is along established feature of our Abrams and Bradley training program. The level of UCOFT achievement we should require of our gunners is less completely agreed upon, however, and the precise relationship between UCOFT training and live-fire gunnery is ill-defined. Commanders might consider requiring all crews to be UCOFT certified (i.e., computer recommended RA28 in the case of Bradleys and RA39 in the case of Abrams) before conducting live-fire gunnery at all. Let us discuss the results of such an approach and the challenges involved.

The clear advantage of UCOFT is its ability to provide vehicle commanders and gunners considerable experience at minimum expense. We have generally thought of it as a preliminary to, rather than as a substitute for, live-fire gunnery, although higher reticle aim levels do carry crews through circumstances far more challenging than ranges can reproduce. There is no practical way to replicate the UC0FI”s degraded mode gunnery in live-fire circumstances. One might think that the further along crews were in the UCOFT the better they would perform on qualification tables VIII and XII. We think so, too. Recent gunnery training in the 24th Infantry Division has given us the opportunity to compare Table VIII results before and after each battalion’s required 100 percent certification as a prerequisite for qualification gunnery (See Table 1). Clearly, having every crew UCOFT certified prior to live-fire gunnery made a big difference in results. This is not to mention economies realized with respect to range time and ammunition expenditure by having crews begin live fire at a higher entry level.

Arguments against insisting on UCOFT certification prior to gunnery include competing requirements, available time, personnel turbulence, and the theory that higher reticle aims bring one to a point of limited return with respect to Table VIII performance. Insofar as competing requirements are concerned, we all have to set priorities. If target effect is our first tactical priority, gunnery training will be our first training priority. We will make time for other things once we have guaranteed the time necessary to train fully qualified crews and platoons. Time is available. A good rule of thumb is that it takes about an hour of UCOFT time for every reticle aim level to be advanced. Thus, a tank crew at RA13 should be scheduled for 26 hours (but for not more than three hours a day) if RA39 is to be achieved. This rule of thumb is an average. Inexperienced gunners may take longer; experienced gunners should take less. The average does take into account the computer directed commander’s engagements that -mesh into the flow of the UCOFT program. Over a battalion sample, the average holds up in the aggregate. Even if a tank battalion had every single crew at RA8 - a very unlikely event even in these times of turbulence -it should only take 31 x 58 = 1798 UCOFT hours to achieve 100 percent certification. In six months there are 182 x 24 = 4368 hours. Our Fort Stewart UCOFT contract, which is probably typical, allows 18 hours a day for about 22 training days a month -or about 396 hours a month -for UCOFT. We have one UCOFT per battalion; and battalions often loan UCOFT utilization to each other. In our experience, battalions have been able to achieve 100 percent UCOFT certification by investing about lo00 UCOFT hours in the three months preceding qualification gunnery, shot twice a year. The issue is defining priorities, not time.

Personnel turbulence is our most devastating readiness detractor. Stabilizing crews in the approach march to live-fire gunnery is the greatest single challenge a commander faces. The challenge is even more formidable if, for sustained readiness, one intends to stabilize crews beyond the conclusion of Tables VIII and XII. Nevertheless, we have managed to fire crews stabilized for six months beyond the con- 35 TABLE Vlll Qualification clusion of qualification gunnery.

Since we fire semi-annually, the greatest period of disruption is in the months immediately before, rather than in the months immediately after, each gunnery. Rules of thumb that have served us well are to stabilize individual crews as early as you can, certify available crews as quickly as you can, go final two weeks out, and form not more than a dozen new crews at that time. A dozen new crews working three hours a day, each on two UCOFTs - one borrowed from a friendly sister unit -can certify comfortably in less than two weeks’ time. Once again the issue is defining priorities; with command emphasis, all crews can go into live-fire gunnery UCOFT certified.

A theory to the contrary is that 100 percent UCOFT certification is not worth the cost. The tactical circumstances developed at higher levels of reticle aim are beyond the requirements of Tables VIII or XII. Favorable results gained by insisting on UCOFT certification result from stabilization, not on UCOFT training, per se. This argument seems chicken and egg. UCOFT certification requires stabilization, and stabilization - given command emphasis - leads to UCOFT certification. Stabilization allows crews to gain maximum advantage from other gunnery training as well. This is not to mention that UCOFT training is designed to pre-visors avoid them whenever possible. pare for war, not just Table VIII. It Whatever works. We recommend may well be that requiring 100 per-commanders consider requiring 100 cent UCOFT certification prior to percent UCOFT certification of battal-qualification makes crew changes so ions going into semi-annual qualifica-painful that intermediate level super-tion gunnery. It has worked for us. Lieutenant Colonel (P) John

S. Brown, a 1971 graduate of the USMA, served as a tank platoon leader and tank company XO in Erlangen, Germany; tank company commander and brigade training officer at Fort Knox, Ky., and tank battalion operztion officer, tank battalion XO, and brigade XO in Aschaffenburg, Germany. He commanded 2-66 Armor in Garlstedt, Germany and in the Persian Gulf War. His most recent assignment was as G3 of the 24th ID (M). He is to assume command of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood. He holds an MMAS from Command and General Staff College, a master’s degree from the Naval War College, and a Ph. D. in history from Indiana University. His doctoral dissertation was published as Draftee Division: A History of the 88th Infantry Division In World War /I, by the University of Kentucky Press in 1986. Major General Paul E. (Gene) Blackwell received his ROTC commission from Clemson University where he earned a bachelor‘s degree in agricultural education and a masters degree in horticulture and agricultural education. Entering active duty in June 1965, he completed the Infantry Officers’ basic and advanced courses, the Marine Command and Staff College and the Army War College. He has held a wide variety of command and staff positions culminating in his current assignment as CG, 24th ID (M) and Fort Stewart. He has served in every type of US Army division - light infantry, airborne infantry, air assault infantry, mechanized infantry, motorized infantry, and armor. He completed two tours of duty in Vietnam and participated in Operation DESERT STORM and the liberation of Kuwait with the 3d Armored Division.