The Emperor’s New Clothes

“A leader must meet battle situations with timely and linequivocal decisions.”’

The children’s story, the “Emperor’s New Clothes,” is an amusing tale about pride and ignorance. In the story, two tailors have failed to make the emperor anew robe on the scheduled fitting date. In desperation, they develop a scheme to cover up their mistake. After long and elaborate argument, the tailors convince the emperor that they have created a beautiful new robe that is made from completely new materials. The tailors insist that the material in the robe is so special that only the most intelligent and enlightened people could appreciate it.

At first, the emperor was suspicious. He explained the story of the new robe to his trusted advisors, as he stood before them dressed only in his underwear. The advisors, unwilling to admit to the emperor or to each other that they were not intelligent enough to see the new material, began to describe the robe in vivid detail. Others, wishing to demonstrate that they too were intelligent enough to see the new robe, stated that the robe was the most beautiful robe that they had ever seen. Not willing to Seem ignorant, everyone the emperor met admitted to seeing the robe. Eventually a child tells the emperor the truth. The emperor suddenly realizes that there is no robe, and everyone learns a lesson in humility.

In many ways, this story is a fitting introduction to the topic of the Decision Support Template or DST. The DST has been apart of the U. S. Army’s lexicon for several years. Like the emperor’s clothes, most professional soldiers admit to the value of preparing and using a DST. But why do so few staffs understand how to produce one? Is the DST a tool of the S2, the S3, or the commander? Is the DST a process or a product? Is the DST the find step in the synchronization of the plan? If everyone understands how to use a DST, then why do so few units ever develop a DST for combat operations?

Our intent in this article is threefold First to answer some questions we can’t get answered from existing doctrinal literature. Second, to challenge some doctrinal answers that we feel are incorrect or don’t apply at the battalion or brigade level. And third, to show how the DST can be a valuable decision-making tool. To accomplish this task, we will review the history of the DST, offer an improved definition of what a DST is, and provide an example product. Armed with this article, and some practice, it is the hope of the authors that DSTs will assist commanders to make battlefield decisions in a “timely and unequivocal manner.”

The DST: An Evolving Concept What is a DST? The current doctrine on the Decision Support Template is confusing. FM 100-5, Operations (1986). the Army’s capstone manual for wdighting, does not mention the DST. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (1984). the Army’s primary manual for staff planning and decision making, is also silent on the subject. FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols (1985) does not list the DST as an operational term. It is only in more recent manuals, the ones produced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. that the DST concept appears. A chronological review of some of this literature reveals that the DST is an evolving concept. FM 71 -3, Annored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade (May 1988). mentions the DST in a section on the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). This manual states that the “DST consolidates the steps in the (IPB) process. The S3 briefs the commander on the DST. The DST does not dictate decisions to the commander. It outlines friendly courses of action, relative to time and location, that the commander may execute.”2 A DST sketch is given as an example in FM 71-3. FM 71-3 goes on to say that the “DST focuses on critical areas and times needed to plan for and execute friendly force employment... at brigade, the intelligence estimate is likely to be in DST frmat.” This last sentence hints that the DST is a tool of execution and an orders product. Unfortunately, FM 71-3 does not mention the DST again anywhere else in the manual. No explanation is provided as to how to create the DST. In September 1988, the Army published FM 71-2. The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. In this manual the DST is defined and a defensive sketch is provided as the DST product. FM 71-2 explains the DST as “the final template of IPB. It does not dictate decision to the commander, but rather identifies critical events and threat activities relative to time and location which may require tactical decisions. Critical events and threat activities are displayed on the decision support template using target areas of interest, decision points and time lines.’“ FM 71-2, however, does not explain the DST further. In Appendix B, Combat Orders, the FM 71-2 clearly leaves out the DST as an orders product. In addition, FM 71-2 emphasizes the Troop Leading b e -dures (TI..’) as the primary ‘‘task force command and control process.”’ In the TLP, the IPB process is mentioned in the “Estimate of the Situation” and ‘‘Analyze Courses of Action

- War Game” steps. The DST then, according to FM 71-2, is a wargaming tool and not an orders product. Nowhere in FM 71-2 does it state that a commander uses his DST to fight the battle!

FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (May 1989). is the primary reference for the IPB process. The DST is listed 22 times in FM 34-130. This manual includes a definition, a sequence to develop the DST, and depicts various types of DSTs (air, enemy countenttack, enemy defense, enemy withdrawal, friendly, friendly attack, and rear operations). FM 34-130 establishes the DST as a wargaming the most probable course of action. “The staff then develops decision support ternplates (DSTs) for the most likely enemy course of action and probable branches and sequels. The staff then briefs the commander on the DST.”7 The commander then wargames the DST to make s m that it covers all potential enemy courses of action (COAs) and integrates his intent. “The commander then updates the PIRs (Priority Intelligence Requirements), based on the DST, and issues a decision and concept of the FM 34-130 depicts these actions in a diagram that integrates the IPB process with the “Commander’s Decisionmaking Process.” FM 34-130 clearly shows the DST in the decision-making process and establishes the DST as a product that is issued to subordinate leaders as apart of the final order. It describes the threat integration process as having three steps: develop situation templates, develop event template and matrix, and develop decision support template. FM 34-130 states that the staff product that is produced after DST, in final form, is a “combined intelligence estimate and Operations estimate in graphic In addition, the manual states that several DSTs will be needed for each opention. In July 1989, Fort Leavenworth produced ST 100-9, The Command Estimate. Although a student text (ST) does not carry the weight of m Army field manual, this text did describe the DST in a section concerning the IPB process: “The decision support template relates the details of event templates to decision points that are of significance to the commander.... The decision support template provides a structured basis for using experience and judgment to reduce battlefield uncertainties.... Decision support templating identifies those areas where enemy or terrain targets can be attacked to support the commander’s concept for fighting close and deep operations. It also relates projected battlefield events and targets that will require the commander’s decision.”” ST 100-9 (1989) provides a diagram of a DST for an offensive opention. In addition, ST 100-9 states that a DST

“depicts the TAIs (Target Area of Interest) and decision points. To save time, the decision support template can be combined with the situation ternplate and event template... The decision support template will highlight the commander’s opportunities and options and ensure timely and accurate decisions. thus providing the means to influence enemy actions rather than just reacting to them... The template is not the battle map. It does not represent locations of enemy units that are confirmed by intelligence; rather, it is the best guess of a G2 mcer.””

A diagram of the IPB process and the command estimate (which includes the DST for the first time) is shown in ST 100-9 (1989). In July 1991, Fort Leavenworth printed anew version of ST 100-9 with anew title, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Decisionmaking. The explanation of the DST in this new student text is a reprint from the 1989 pamphlet. In March 1990, FM 34-3. Intelligence Analysis, was published. ”lis manual explained that the IPB “sup ports the use of fire and maneuver to achieve a tactical advantage. Event templating facilitates following enemy forces and determining their probable course of action. Decision’ support templates (DSTs) enable the commander to apply combat power in a timely manner.”’* FM 34-3 prescribes that the DST is prepared during the threat integration phase of the IPB process as a shared SUS3 product. The purpose of the DST is to assist a commander “as to when tactical decisions are required relative to battlefield eents.”’ According to FM 34-3, a properly prepared DST portrays the enemy’s most likely course of action and possible target areas of interest, along with time p h m lines (TPLs) and decision points which relate to fire, maneuver, and combat service support (CSS). This manual also states that a “decision support matrix supplements the DST.”I4 A sketch of an offensive DST is given as an example in FM 34-3. In June 1990, FM 71-100, Division Operations, was published. This manual made only one reference to the DST. The DST is described as a “melding of the enemy situation and event template information with the friendly course of action sketch or operations overlay of the final approved OPLAN or OPORD.”’ FM 71-100 establishes that the DST is a master execution matrix. The DST is started during the war game phase of the planning process and is expanded once a specific course of action is selected by the commander.

“The DST is, essentially, a master execution matrix. It correlates the enemy operational timetable and the friendly operational timetable while identifling decision points (DPs) for commitment of friendly combat power, target areas of interest (TAI) where the combat power must be applied. time phase lines (TPLs) to assist the decision maker in synchronizing the combat power which is available and the named area of interest.”“ FM 34-24. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (Final Draft, November 1990). established the DST as the final IPB product of the combined staff effort. Although a “Final Dmft” is not approved doctrine, it does show the direction that the DST concept is heading from the Intelligence School’s perspective. FM 34-2-1 states that the DST is a product of wargaming. The purpose of the DST is “to synchronize all battlefield operating systems (BOS) to your commander’s best advantage. The DST consists of target areas of interest (TAI)s, decision points or lines, TPLs, and a synchronization matri.”’ This manual depicts a diagram of a DST, with decision lines that relate directly to the matrix below the sketch. This manual also includes a diagram of a slightly different commander’s decision-making process FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, BattalionlTask Force, and Company Team (Final Draft, June 1991), adds little to our knowledge of “how to” develop and use the DST. The discussion in this manual on IPBDST is simply a repeat of what is said in other manuals. FM 71-123 fails to carry the tactical discussion of the DST from brigade to battalion level. (supported by IPB) th3n FM 34-130. A DST for Maneuver Commanders Doctrinal literature is not consistent concerning the DST. It does not adequately define or describe the use or development of the DST. To be effective at the battalion level, the DST must assist the commander to execute combat decisions during the battle. In other words, the purpose of a DST is to promote agility.

FM 100-5, Operations, emphasizes agility and operational flexibility as the key to successful tactical operations. Tactical commanders are ex-t t t t t t H-HR

H+30 H+50 H+1 hr, 5 min H+1 hr, 40 rnin H+2 hr Decision Point Criteria Action Fir= BROWN

Enemy west of L3, moving 3 MRB - Moscow, Angel-Tula 903 BEAR west, passes blocked 1 MRB-B1,2 MRB - 82 or 904 GOLDEN

Enemy east of L3, 3 MRB - Moscow, Angel-Tula 901 601 9024 602 OPFOR west of D1 4 MRB - 63.7 MRB - B1 moving west, passes 1 MRB-G1,2MRB-G2 clear, OPFOR east of L1 PANDA-BEAR

, Enemy east of L4, ’ moving west, passes clear, OPFOR east of l2 Enemy east of L5, moving west, passes clear, OPFOR east of L3 1 MRB - PI, 2 MRB - P2

MRB - PI, Angel - P I 4 MRB - K316 7 MRB - K3

DSTs are really nothing new. A rudimentary example of a DST is provided by an ordinary company/tem fire plan. An effective company fire plan orients on several possible enemy avenues of approach. The company commander designates target reference points (TRPs) to help him mass his fires at the critical point. The commander decides where to direct his fires based on the enemy’s actions. Primary and alternate positions are focused on the most likely enemy avenue of approach. Supplemental positions allow the company/team commander to maneuver fires in other directions (Le. a branch plan). A DST at the battalion/task force level follows the same theme, but involves many more pieces.

The DST and Branch Plans AirLand Battle requires a flexible and intelligent orders process that is oriented on the enemy and recognizes the critical value of time. FM 100-5, Operurions states the challenge aptly: “Our tactical planning must be precise enough to preserve synchronization throughout the battle... it must be flexible enough to respond to changes or to capitalize on fleeting opportunities.”’’

Some maneuver commanders see no need for a DST because they often plan to execute a battle according to a rigid, yet synchronized plan. These set-piece battles usually contain only one detailed course of action. Subordinate units are expected to execute the plan. This type of operation can work if the enemy cooperates with the assumptions that were developed when the single come of action plan was devised. If a plan is inflexible, and does not include branches, there are few decisions for the commander to make after the battle has started. But what if the enemy doesn’t cooperate? What if the enemy isn’t where you expected him when you issued the order twelve hours before crossing the line of departure? The key to agility is to develop plans that can be executed once the enemy situation becomes clearer. This situation usually occurs closer to battle-time or during the battle. To achieve the flexible thinking and fast reaction prescribed in FM 100-5, commanders must develop phns that are oriented on the enemy in an action and reaction thought process. This thought process demands that each plan have several branches. Branch plans provide for tactical agility and can compensate for any disadvantage associated with the chosen come of action. They can assist the commander to act decisively to exploit enemy weaknesses as those weaknesses are discovered on the battlefield. A DST can phy a critical role in the execution of tactical agility by acting as a master execution matrix for the implementation of branch plans.

Branch plans are also central to effective deception planning. Deception operations exploit enemy actions by manipulating multiple friendly courses of action. Deception does not always require a separate feint or ruse to deceive. Multiple friendly courses of action become deceptions in themselves. By presenting the enemy with a pattern that depicts a strong attack in one direction the enemy may respond by moving forces to protect against your attack. If the enemy doesn’t respond, continue with your planned attack. If he does, quickly execute a branch plan. This kind of agility, that attacks the enemy’s newly created weakness, may often be enough to smash through his defenses before he can issue further orders.

The branch plans are driven by E-connaissance and appear on the DST as on-order plans. The commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) are focused on the critical information needed to make decisions about which branch plan(s) to execute.

Conclusion Current literature on DSTs is confusing and contradictory. The decision support template is a master intelligence and operations execution product (overlay, sketch, matrix, or combination sketch with matrix, or overlay with matrix) used by the commander and his staff to assist them in the execution of the battle. The DST is a product of the initial war game of the commander’s chosen course of action and is refined continuously until execution. The DST lists all critical decisions, targets and time distance factors that will assist the commander in making accurate and timely battlefield decisions. In its final form, it is the commander’s battle map.

Commanders must master time and space factors to fight effectively on the modem battlefield. A DST is one technique that helps the commander simplify time-space data. To make correct battbfield decisions in time, you must first plan the decisions that you know that you will have to make. Next you can plan decisions for possible branches and contingencies. All of these decisions involve a precise understanding of what can be done in a specified time. The DST reduces these time and space calculations to efficient battlefield information. In addition, the DST focuses the commander and his staff on the enemy. The DST, therefore, is a tool that assists the. commander to think and act faster. This ability helps to synchronize combat power and allows the commander to quickly take decisive advantage of enemy mistakes as they unfold. Commanders and staffs trained to develop DSTs in a systemic fashion can increase their ability to execute tactical plans in minimum time. This makes the DST a critical enabler for AuLand Battle doctrine. It is now time for the decision support template to become part of every maneuver commander's tactical tool box. It is time that we see that the emperor's new robe, like the confused concept of the DST as related in current doctrine, is useful only if we weave some fabric into the design!

Notes 'Captain C. T. Lanham. Infantry in Battle, Garrett and Masse. Richmond, 1939). p. 152. 'Headquarters, Depatment of the Army, Field Manual 71 -3, Armored and Mechanized Itfantry Brigade, Washington D. C.. 11 May 1988, p. 2-10.

31b;d., pp. 2-10 lhru 2-13. Major John F. Anta1 was commissioned in A m r in 1977 from USMA. He is currently the XO of the 1st Bde, 1st ID, Ft. Riley, Kan. A 1990 graduate of the CGSC, where he earned a masters degree in Military Science, he has served in tank units as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, BMO, tank company commander, asst. brigade S3, battalion 53, G3 training officer, SGS for the 1st Cav Division, brigade operations trainer at the NTC, and as the XO, 1st Battalion Armor (OPFOR) where he acted as the chief of staff of the 32d Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at the NTC. He also writes for military and historical periodicals. Since 1985, he has published over 18 articles in professional journals, including Army Magazine, Military Review, ARMOR, Infantry, Engineer, Army Trainer, and Military History Magazine. In addition, his first book, Armor Attacks, The Tank Platoon, was published by Presidio Press in December 1991 and is currently used by the U. S. Military Academy as a textbook for military science instruction.

Lieutenant Colonel Lee R. Barnes Jr., an Armor officer, is currently Bronco 07, the senior brigade staff trainer, with the Operations Group of the National Training Center (NTC). He is a 1972 graduate of the U. S. Military Academy. A 1984 graduate of the Command and General Staff College, where he earned a Masters Degree in Military Science, he has served as a tank platoon leader, a scout platoon leader, a battalion S1, and battalion S4.

He commanded E Troop, 1-10 Cavalry and served in the US.

Army

Readiness Group, Fort Douglas, Utah. From 1985 to 1987 he was a lead writer in revising the final draft of FM 71-2 The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. In 1987, he served as the executive officer of 2-69 Armor and then as brigade S3, 197th Infantry Brigade. In 1990, he commanded 1-63 Armor (OPFOR) at.the NTC.

4Headquiuters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Banalion Task Force, Washington D. C., 27 September 1988. pp. 2-27 thm 2-28. 'lbid., p. 2-14.

6Author's Notes: LTC b e Barnes was a lead writer for FM 71-2 as it developd from a coordinating draft manual into a fmal draft manual (1986-1987). The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) portion of Chapter 2 was revised several times to aamnmodate the evolving concepts of IPB and DST. The ann-ments from the Intelligence Center and School at that time clearly indicated that IPB was an informal process at levels below division. The DST was viewed simply as the summing up of the previous templates -a collection of the S2 officer's assumptions, predictions and fads. The DST was considered a briefmg aid for the S2 to use during the decision-making process. It was not considered an orders product to use during mission execution.

7Headquarters. Department of the Army. Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Prepration of the Battl&e&i, Washington D. C., 23 May 1988, p. 3-1. '/bid.

91bid., p. 4-66.

"Command and General Staff College, Student Text 100-9. The Command Estimate. Fort Leavenworrh. July 1989. p. 7-34. "Command and General Staff College, Student Text 100-9. Techniques and Procehres for Tactiml Decisionmaking. Fort Leavenworth, "Headquiuters.

Department of the Army.

Field Man 4 34-3 Intelligence Analysis, Wash-in ton D. C..

March 1990. p. 4-1. '31bid., p. 4-6. ''1bid.. p. 4-32.

"Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-100. Division Operations, Washington D. C., 16 June 1990. p. 3-17. Jul 1991. p. 7-29.

161bid.

17Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-2-1 Reconnaissance o d Surveillance vial Draft, November 1990). p 2-31.

"Headquarters.

Department of the Army.

Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington D. C.. 11 May 1988). p. 133. I9Author's Note: This DST was used by the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) regiment in a meeting engagement at the National Training Center. The battle, which occurred in the late winter of 1992. has since become known as the 'Battle of Golden Bear." The DST used in this battle helped to make the action one of the most successful meeting engagements in OPFOR history.

The DST listed four separate plans. The first plan, Brown Bear, was designed to fight the battle if the OPFOR engaged the Blue Forces near CRASH HILL. This plan envisaged the BROWN AND DEBNAM passes under Blue Force control. The forward detachment was ordered to seize Objective MOSCOW in the