The Main Battle Tank: Future Developments - A British Perspective

The Main Battle Tank:-Future Developments -A British Perspective by Major S. W. Crawford, RTR L Most 0: today’s MBTs are descendants of the Soviet T-34. In the seventy-odd years since it made its first appearance on the battlefield, near Bapaume at first light on 15 September 1916, the tank has evolved to maintain its role as the most important battlefield weapon system that armies possess. The lumbering, thinly armored, unsprung, and noisy vehicles of the World War I have given way to fast, reliable, superbly protected feats of engineering which can hurl armor-piercing projectiles with deadly accuracy to ranges in excess of 2,000 meters.

It is generally acknowledged that today’s main battle tanks (MBTs), \ \ with one or two exceptions, are direct descendants of the Russian T-34 of 1940. It was in this vehicle, arguably for the fmt time, that the MBT’s chmcter-istics of firepower, country capability. The Germans were shocked and impressed when they first met the T-34 in combat, and for a time seriously considered producing a copy vehicle. They may have regretted that they went on to produce the Panther instead for, although technically a superior vehicle, it was considerably more complicated and expensive to produce and quite unreliable in its early days.

Modem MBTs have more or less followed the T-34Panther formula, with the notable exception of the are the German Leopard 2, armed with a 120-mm smoothbore gun and powered by an MTU 1,500-bhp diesel engine, the British Challenger with 120-mm rifled gun and 1,200 bhp Perkins CV12, and the Soviet T-80 with 125-mm smoothbore barrel and 985-bhp gas turbine.

So, how will the tank develop to meet the new challenges and threats of the battlefield in the next 20 or so vances will lead to a proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems. In a sceniqjo where real time intelligence is provided by satellite and RPVs, where pinpoint attacks on ground targets can be launched years? By 2010, technological ad-mobility, and protection were welded together to produce a balanced and formidable weapon system. The T-34 was armed with a dual-purpose 76-mm gun firing high explosive and armor-piercing shells, unusual in a tank of this vintage, which considerably outranged and outperformed the weapons of the German tanks opposing it. Its armor was sloped to give added protection, and a combination of a rugged, reliable diesel engine, broad tracks, and Christie-type suspension gave it an excellent cross-Swedish “S“ Type tank. Most of today’s vehicles fall into the 45-65-ton weight range, and are armed with high-velocity guns of 105-125-mm caliber. Protection is provided by steel, laminate, and, in some cases, reactive armor packs which test the ammunition designer’s ingenuity to the full. Power comes from diesel, multi-fuel, or occasionally gas turbine engines that produce between 1,ooO-1,500 bhp. Typical of such vehicles at extreme ranges using TGSMs, and where ADP-based systems give automatic and instant information access and update to commanders, the tank needs constant refining and upgrading to maintain its position in land Wrufare.

It is convenient to assess future improvements to MBTs under the familiar headings of firepower, mobility, and protection, to which automation will be added to include all discussion on ADP, information, and control system developments. However, before setting forth on an analysis of these factors, there is one other heading which, to British tank designers at least, should be of paramount importance - reliability. In war, many more tanks are lost be-ia d The WWII-era German Panther, above, drew on many of the T-34’s concepts. as does its descendant, the Leopard II cause of mechanical unreliability than to enemy action. In a withdrawal, such unreliability can be disastrous, as broken-down vehicles can rarely be recovered. A major proportion of British tank losses in the Western Desert in 1941-43 were attributable to poor reliability. Even when advancing, poor reliability can significantly weaken the attacker’s effort. British MBTs have an unfortunate tradition of unreliability that stretches back to before World War 11. During that conflict, the problem persisted with such vehicles as A13 and Crusader being hombly prone to breakdown. The problem continues today, and no one can be unaware of Chieftain’s engine fiasco in the early days. Thankfully, Challenger is some improvement, and Chieftain has become much more available towards the end of its service life, partially through better reliability and partially owing to the large spares back-up now available.

Despite these improvements, however, British vehicles still lag behind their NATO counterparts in reliability terms. Leopard I1 is generally recognized as being an extremely reliable tank, while IDR recently quoted an MDBF for Ml’s gas turbine engine of nearly 16,000 kilometers. Even if this figure is halved, it is still impressive. Reliability like this costs, of course, and reliability engineering is a science in itself. Some will argue that availability, which can be achieved by large repair pools, spares, and manpower resources, is a better aim. But bitter experience shows that, when money is to be saved, it is the spares and repair pools that are always cut first. Far better to have a reliable tank in the first instance. Sound engineering with no cutting of comers, plus a detailed and lengthy period of trials on production standard (as opposed to prototype standard, and therefore hand-built) vehicles, is the key. The field commander of the future will find little use for tanks that are prone to failure or need extensive maintenance.

Firepower has always been near the top in terms of priorities for tank design, and future technological innovations will have a quite dramatic effect on gun performance. As already described, most modem MBTs have conventional guns of 105-125-mm caliber firing KE and CE ammunition. The ammunition is either “fixed,” meaning that shell and charge come in one piece, as per the German 120-mm smoothbore, or separated, as carried in Chieftain, Challenger, and the Soviet T-64/72/80 series.

Despite the impressive improvements made in KE ammunition performance over the last few decades, further enhancements will soon be required. Chemical energy natures, such as HEAT and HESH, have to a large extent been made obsolete by the introduction of composite and reactive armors, while KE needs improved performance to meet the projected threat. The three main areas for future gun technology are improved powder guns, liquid propellant guns, and electromagnetic (EM) guns. There is a general consensus that conventional powder guns in the!05-125-mm caliber range are nearing the limit of their stretch potential, and that future improvements in performance necessitate an increase in caliber. Such guns will probably be in the 135-140-mm caliber range and be conventionally configured, although the bulk of the ammunition will probably mean separate charge and shot and some form of autoloading. Developments in propellant research and KE penetrator technology will allow designers to take full advantage of these larger calibers.

Conventional wisdom has decreed that separated ammunition, allowing the stowage of the highly vulnerable propellant charges below the turret ring as in Chieftain, increases the tank’s survivability. This view is now being challenged on a number of counts; it may have been true in the days when, if a tank was hit in the turret, it was penetrated. But tank turrets are now generally the best protected parts of MBTs, and it seems to make sense to stow charges where they are best protected. Closely allied to this are developments in mine technology, which have significantly increased the belly attack threat, and thus the threat to hull-stored charges. Finally, the USA has developed the technology of “blow-off panels” to allow stowage of charges in the turret bustle. If the charges are initiated by penetrative attack, the force of the explosion is directed away from the crew compartment. These changes may well have negated the historical advantage of charge stowage below the turret ring.

Autoloaders were first fielded by the Soviets in the late 1960s in T-64, followed by T-72 and T-80, and can thus be considered to be mature technology. It is almost inconceivable that fu-ARMOR -

C Figure 1 ture MBTs will be designed without autoloaders, and France has incorporated one in their new MBT, the Leclerc. The most obvious advantage of an autoloader is that it allows reduction of the crew to three, and thus increased survivability by a reduction in the overall dimensions of the tank. It also allows radical design concepts, such as the external gun tank, to become a serious proposition. Opponents will stress the need for four men in a crew to cany out all the multifari-ous mks of servicing, maintenance, sentries, administration, and so on, but at a time when manpower is becoming scarcer and more expensive, this argument cannot be long sustained. There may, however, be a case for relief crews to allow rest after “sorties,” rather like air forces man their aircraft.

Liquid propellant guns have now rather fallen by the wayside as contenders for the next generation of tank guns. While they offer advantages in propellant stowage, which being a liquid can be molded into available space, and survivability, as the volatile mixture need only be mixed from individually inert components in the gun chamber, there are basic design problems. Breech design is complicated by the requirements of sealing and the need for controlled ignition of the propellant to avoid pressure peaking. It would also Seem that the improvements offered by liquid propellant guns are not of sufficient magnitude to warrant the expense of research and development, for tank guns at least. The application of liquid propellant gun technology is more likely to be in the field of lower velocity artillery pieces.

The most exciting development in tank gun techology however, is undoubtedly the EM gun. Briefly, this gun works on the principle shown in Figure 1. The forces generated will enable KE penemtors to be launched, eventually, with muzzle velocities of between four and six km/s -a real quantum leap. All the indications are that this technology will be mature by 2010. This vast increase in muzzle velocity would appear to place the advantage in the gun/mor relationship back with the gun, although research on the terminal effect of penemtors at such high speeds has yet to be completed.

The implications of the EM gun are enormous. With muzzle velocities in the four to six km/s range, all targets will become in effect static targets. The time of flight of the projectile is so short that there will be no need to aim off for moving targets, and therefore, fire control systems can be vastly simplified. The flat trajectory of KE penetntors flying at this velocity may need only one point of aim in the gunner’s sight. at which point complete automation of the gunner’s function becomes a distinct possibility.

Such high velocities also allow reduction in KE penelmtor mass. As the penetrator performance of a KE projectile is given by the formula mg/d2, where m is the mass of the projectile, v the velocity, and d the diameter, any increase in v combined with either the same or a lesser value of d drarnati-cally increases the penetration. Reduction in the KE penetrator mass offers two advantages: either the space required to stow the same amount of ammunition is very much reduced, and thus overall tank size is reduced, or a significantly greater number of rounds can be carried, thus easing the strain on the logistic resupply chain. Probably a sensible compromise can be reached.

Two final points must be made about the EM gun. First, there is no propellant, and consequently propellant vulnerability problems vanish. Second, the technology required to produce such high electrical power levels has other system applications and may enable, for example, adoption of such enhancements as electric transmissions. All in all, EM gun technology is an exciting prospect for future MBT design. Research is well underway at present and, having proved the feasibility of the concept with various demonstrators, efforts are now being directed to make the present bulky prototype systems into a size compatible with incorporation in MBTs. It is considered unlikely that MBTs mounting EM guns will appear before 20 10.

Before leaving firepower, the MBTs need for an antihelicopter capability must be discussed. It is a popular notion that the armed attack helicopter has developed into a “threat vacuum” with no natural predators and has flourished accordingly. Certainly, its appearance has added anew dimension of threat to the MBT, and efforts are being made in many countries to k SECTION DRAWING OF T-80 AND T-64B GLACIS ARMOUR counter it. There is little doubt that a dedicated antiair system is the best solution, and weapons like the Short Starstreak HVM on Stormer would seem to be ideal. However, such systems are expensive and in short supply, and cannot be guaranteed to be in constant support because of all the other demands that will be made on them.

The tank, therefore, needs its own capability. Whether an MBT needs to knock a helicopter out of the sky is another matter, for arguably all that is required is a “mission abort” or helicopter suppression system. In the shorter term, however, the solution would seem to be a gun-launched, proximity-fused, HE round of some kind, probably launched at a higher velocity than current tank CE rounds to give greater accuracy. This, added to the proximity fuse, gives a high for the MBT is how to detect an attacking helicopter. The probability of seeing one through the episcopes of a closeddown, bouncing tank going across country is very low indeed, and some form of automatic detection device is required. It is in this area, above all else, that the dedicated anti-air system scores high and is able to make full use of its weapons. I probability of a hit. The real problem I The protection requirements of MBTs can be broadly divided into two types: direct protection or the ability to survive a hit, and indirect protection, or the ability to avoid being hit in the first place. In terms of direct protection, MBTs have come along way since the 12-mm thick plate armor of the Mk IV of 1917. By 1945, the U. S. Pershing had sloped annor some 102-mm thick at the front, while the mighty King Tiger boasted plates of 185 millimeters. Such quantum increases in protection have continued to the present day, and current MBTs have considerably enhanced (and classified) levels of protection. \ F UPPER

’igure 2 Much of this increased protection is munitions, and can be optimized against either. They are most effective against HEAT and HESH attack and have led to the KE round being once more the premier mode of antiarmor attack due to the development of complex armors. Although the Germans developed such techniques as face hardening to improve resistance to penetn-tion during the last war, until recently tanks relied mainly on thickness of rolled homogenous armor (RHA) to keep projectiles out. However, armors like the pioneering British Chobham armor have become fust choice for modem MBTs, and are fielded on Chd-lenger, MI Abrams, Leopard 2, and the T-64/72/80 series. T-80’s armor, which is representative of the genre, is shown at Figure 2. These laminated armors are designed both to absorb the energy of KE pene-tmtors and diffuse the attack of CE ARMOR - OPERATION OF EXPLOSIVE REACTIVE ARMOUR

Figure 3 The decrease in effectiveness of CE rounds against armor has been reinforced by the introduction of explosive reactive armor (ERA). ERA was first brought to public attention by the Israeli use of it under the name Blazer during the Lebanon campaigns of 1982. This armor is bolted in boxes on tank hulls and turrets, and consists of explosives sandwiched between armor plates. When attacked by HEAT, for example, the explosive detonates, sending the plates flying outwards and disrupting the incoming jet, as shown in Figure 3. Although ERA has little effect on KE attack, its combination with Chobham-type armor has made CE warheads, as used by most ATGW systems, almost obsolete.

Active armor takes ERA one stage further, and aims to defeat incoming projectiles before they reach the tank. It is still very much in the development stage, and embryo systems propose either to shoot down incoming missiles with guns or antimissile missiles, or by means of explosive charges and self-forming fragments. There is no doubt that active armor may well counter CE attack and TGSMs, but KE, especially with the velocities postulated for the EM gun, may be another matter. However, it is conceivable that active armor systems will be deployed after the year 2000. However well protected an MBT may be in the primary threat arcs, the restrictions of weight and size dictate that armor on the sides, rear, and top and belly, will be lighter, and therefore more susceptible to penetration. Accepting that penetration will happen on occasion, there are a number of measures which can be used to minimize the damage. Spa11 liners can defeat low levels of residual peneba-tion, while body armor is already worn by many nation’s tank crews for the same purpose. British tank crews currently have neither spa11 liners nor body armor, although there are plans _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ for both. They will undoubtedly become standard in the future. The greatest danger following pene-kition, however, is that of an ammunition fire. Propellants that burn slowly in the open will detonate when confined, with disastrous consequences for vehicle and crew. Attempts have been made with sealed, fire-extinguishing charge bins to nip ammunition fires in the bud, but as the propellant itself can contain the necessary oxygen for combustion, this is only partially successful. In British tanks, propellmt has traditionally been stowed below the turret ring, but the rationale behind this may now be obsolete, as previously discussed. Perhaps the FRG and U. S. current practice of turret bustle stowage with blow-off panels is the way ahead. Crew compartment f i i suppression systems, like that of Leopard 2, have their main task in putting out hydraulic fires caused by damage to the gun control equipment (GCE) and small fires in oil and rag waste and other peripheral equipments. Such systems are likely to be a feature of future MBTs, although it is interesting to note that Leclerc uses the safer electrical GCE and the FRG are considering an electrical system for retrofit to Leopard 2.

Fuel fires present a lesser hazard, with fuel being generally stored in self-sealing tanks. Indeed, diesel has been proposed as a suitable outside layer for ammunition stowage bins with the idea that it will cool down penetrating splinters and thus prevent ammunition fires. Diesel fuel is particularly effective at suppressing shaped-charge attack, as long as the attack is below the fuel/air interface. So much for direct protection. Indirect protection has just as important a role to play in enhancing the survivability of the tank. This form of protection can be achieved by the combination of a host of factors such as size, agility, silhouette, use of camouflage, tactical handling, and the more recently developed techniques of signature reduction. As already mentioned, adoption of the autoloader can reduce the overall height of an MBT because there is no need to provide room for a standing human loader. Indeed, autoloading may allow future MBTs to mount the gun externally and dramatically reduce the size and vulnerability of the vehicle. Battlefield agility. a function of an MBT’s acceleration and speed across country, can reduce exposure times during movement and thus considerably enhance survivability. In extreme cases, a highly mobile tank can outperform the traversing performance of an enemy turret, a capability claimed for the Cromwell when faced with the German Tiger in the last war. It is in the field of signature reduction, however, where the most subtle enhancements to survivability may be made. The value of camouflage has long been understood, and research continues into better patterns, paints, and materials. IRdefeating materials have been fielded for some time, and methods to counter TI surveillance ae now developed. Much can be done in the future at the design stage to ensure that exhausts are shielded and hot fumes dispersed, while radar signatures can be reduced by use of some of the aircmft industry’s stealth techniques. Noise can be reduced too, and one of the benefits of the Ml’s (and presumably T-80’s) gas turbine engine is that it is extremely quiet, the tracks being the major contributor to the vehicle’s noise signature. The protection levels of future tanks, therefore, will be considerably enhanced by a combination of new armors (ERA and active armor), enhanced survivability measures to counter the effect of penetration, and a continuing increase in indirect protection. The end result is likely to be that MBTs will be much harder to acquire, track, and hit, and even a hit will not, as is the case even now, guarantee incapacitation of the target. a Turbine engines, like those in the M1-series. at left, and the Russian T-80, right, deliver high power from small size. but use much more fuel. These advances will go along way to counter the projected firepower enhancements.

In mobility terms, modem MBTs offer levels of agility, speed, and ma-neuvembility far in excess of those achieved only 20 or so years ago. Then, Centurion with its 650-bhp engine could muster 25 mph as against today’s Challenger which can achieve 56 kph from its Perkins CV 12 1,200-bhp engine, a figure which itself is low when compares to T-80’s 75 kph. A better measure of agility, perhaps is power to weight ratio. Centurion had a power to weight ratio of 12.7 bhplton, compared to Leopard 2’s 27 bhp/ton. However, engine power and power-to-weight ratio alone do not dictate an MBT’s mobility. Many other factors, like ground pressure, length-to-width ratio, track design, and so on all play their part. Modem MBTs are powered by either conventional diesel or gas turbine. Such engines currently generate between 900 and 1500 bhp to power their highly agile charges. It is generally thought that 1500 bhp will remain the standard power required for a 45-65-ton MBT, and attention in the future will tend to be focused on how to make tank power packs smaller, more efficient, and more reliable. Here, the gas turbine engine has an undoubted advantage. It is inherently more compact and lighter than a conventional diesel engine, and also more reliable on account of its simpler design. Turbine engines are now in service with the two major tank-producing nations of the world, the U. S. and Russia, and it is unlikely that such technically sophisticated nations introduced gas turbine engines in M1 and T-80 without careful thought. It is true that these engines use considerably more fuel than normal diesel engines, but much of this is consumed during the engine idling time that takes up so much of an MBT’s battlefield day. The U. S., whose M1 uses roughly twice the fuel that Challenger does, is now actively considering the installation of an auxiliary power unit to reduce fuel consumption.

Because of these advantages, therefore, it seems likely that progressively more and more MBTs will be powered by turbine engines, and by 2010 will be the first choice of tank designers. There remains considerable scope for further development of these engines, and use of adiabatic technology and transverse mounting may allow for shorter and lighter hulls. The combination of turbine engines of increasing power and the decreased weight of hulls could produce a significant increase in the MBT’s mobility and agility.

Of all the other factors that determine a tank’s mobility, perhaps one of the most important is suspension design. Challenger, Leopard 2, and the like have improved suspension with greater wheel play, which allows cross-country bumps and dips to be tackled at speed without disruption or injury to the crew. It is interesting to note that Chieftain’s poor mobility is not engine-limited, despite the disastrous early days of the L 60 engine. Recently, a Chieftain fitted with hydrostrut suspension - a development of Challenger’s excellent hydrogas system -proved considerably more mobile across country. While such suspension systems represent a considerable improvement over what went before, there is even greater scope for improvement using active suspension. Now, active suspension systems are not exactly new, having been tested in prototype form on the USmG MBT-70 project and indeed being used currently by the Swedish “S” Type tmk to lay and aim the gun. However, these suspensions are programmed by crew input, and are used in static situations or prepro-grarnmed maneuvers. The real advantage of active suspension will be revealed when it operates automatically, for example “seeing” when the tank is about to encounter a ditch and altering the suspension accordingly. This technology is by no means yet mature, but by the next century should allow MBTs to travel at considerable speed across the roughest terrain. It will be in the field of automation, however, encompassing ADP, fire control computers, information and control systems, and so on, that will make the major impact on MBT design over the next 20 years. Although fie control computers like Chieftain’s Improved Fire Control System have been around for some time, only recently has the full potential of computer technology for future tanks begun to be realized. --A host of functions and actions that at present require crewman input could be automated. In particular, it has long been realized that the tank -commander is overloaded, and attempts are now being made to lessen his burden. Most nations have some active research into this area underway. The U. S. has its Battlefield Management System, while the UK is busy formulating its requirements for its Battlefield Information Command and Control System. The French have recently fielded a system in Leclerc. So, what will such systems offer the MBT crewman in the future? The attributes of an information and control system can be divided into several broad functional areas: these are, the provision of computer-generated mapping, some sort of land navigation system, the maintenance of a data base of information on the enemy, friendly forces, minefields etc., and the handling of messages. All of these will have implications for the future and can be considered both individually and collectively.

Computer-generated mapping, presented on VDUs, will allow a large store of terrain data to be presented as required to MBT crews. Information on, say, routes and obstacles can be demanded and presented either isolated from, or integrated with, the main geographical map. New information on enemy locations and forces can be plotted and automatically transmitted to friendly vehicles to ensure an all-informed intelligence picture. Indeed, it may be possible to integrate the MBT’s fire control laser and navigation system with the computer map, so that enemy vehicles identified and ranged by an individual tank are automatically plotted on every friendly MBT’s system.

Additionally, more formal orders can be planned and plotted i,, graphic overlay form New French Leclerc MET will include a battlefield manage-rnent system to help simplify the tank commander’s workload. and transmitted without need for hard copy. The amount of paper which presently encumbers tank commanders may be dramatically reduced, and the days of trying to refold a large map while closed down and moving at speed cross-country may well be drawing to a close.

Closely allied to computer-generated mapping is the land navigation system. No matter how skillful at reading a map they may be, most MBT commanders spend much time and effort in trying to map read themselves from location to location, especially at night and in low visibility. Any tank commander who claims to never have been lost must be treated with suspicion, and the burden is particularly great on subunit commanders. A navigation aid will be a great assistance to tank crew efficiency and need not demand pinpoint accuracy; up to plus or minus 100 meters is probably sufficient for almost all situations. hovi-sion of this facility will signify a major breakthrough in relieving overload on commanders.

It is obvious that maintenance of a comprehensive and up-to-date database is fundamental to the whole concept. The scope for storage of information is enormous and only limited by the capacity of the software. On top of the temin data stowed for the computer mapping, the database must contain details of enemy strengths, locations, equipment, and the same for friendly forces. It must also contain, although not necessarily on every MBT, details of own unit personnel, equipment, logistic requirements, and so on. It should give the commander a constantly updated situation report on his own troops, with details like vehicle readiness, ammunition states, vehicle and personnel casualties, and estimated repair times of damaged tanks, among other items.

All this information will then enable the final attribute of such systems, that of automatic message sending. Commanders at all levels are burdened by a large number of reports and returns which must be sent to enable others to produce relevant p h s for future operations and logistic resupply. Future information and control systems will be able to produce such reports and returns without crew input; MBTs will produce the information, either automatically or when demanded by the commander’s vehicle system.

The introduction of such a capability has major implications. Not only has the tank commander’s workload been considerably reduced, allowing him to concentrate on fighting his vehicle and subunit, but all MBTs in 8 group will have instant access to intelligence information. Some nations have already begun to plan how they might modify their tactical groupings to take advantage of these new facilities. For example, it may no longer be necessary for troop leaders to provide an interim level of command between tank squadron leader and individual MBTs. With the instant access to information provided by an information and control system, the squadron leader may easily command up to 15 vehicles directly.

The implication that is exciting tank designers, however, is one of crew size. It is possible to provide these facilities to any crew member and this, died to the commander’s reduced workload, may mean that by judicious reallocation of tasks and transfer or duplication of operating controls, crew numbers may be further reduced. The two-man crew becomes a distinct possibility, where each member has a common crew station which allows him to drive, command, fire the gun, and operate radios and other equipment as necessary. A two-man crew, in tun, may allow reduction in the size of the MBT, thus enhancing survivability.

Having said all that, the tweman crew concept is probably unlikely to be in service in any great numbers before 2010. So, havhg given a resume of likely future developments in firepower, protection, mobility, and automation, we must return to the original question of how the tank will develop over the next 20 years or so. It would be timid not to make a speculative judgement as to what form it might take. The task is made Considerably easier if we c& divde the predictions into two; that is to say, what sort of tank might be produced by a major tank producing power in the period 2000-2010, and what might be produced after 2010.

There seems little doubt that a tank introduced into service in the fmt penod will have a conventional powder gun. This gun will almost certainly be smoothbore, unless the UK continues with its ill-judged commitment to the rifled barrel, and will fire KE and CE fin-stabilized ammunition. The CE round is not likely to have an anti-armor role, but may well be able to be proximity-fused for antihelicopter use. The gun will be fed by an autoloader, and the crew will be reduced to three. This may also allow the MBT to have a low profile or reduced volume turret. Armor protection will be provided by a combination of laminate armor and ERA, and protection against overfly top attack will be incorporated. Towards the end of the period, active armor may be introduced, probably in the form of an autonomous radar-controlled gun turret to acquire and shoot down incoming missiles and TGSMs. The vehicle is as likely to be powered by a gas turbine as a conventional diesel engine, probably of around 1.500 bhp; if the former, an auxiliary power unit will be used to reduce fuel consumption at idle. An information and control system will be incorporated, considerably reducing the crew’s workload and perhaps allowing modification of tactical groupings by removing some interim levels of command.

After 2010, the design of MBTs may go through a quite radical change. The maturing of EM gun technology will greatly simplify gun control systems and reduce ammunition size. The gun will certainly be autoloaded and may well be mounted externally, thus reducing the vulnerability of the crew compartment. The KE round will be effective against armored ground targets and all but the fastest of air targets because of its high velocity. It will also fire a slower, general purpose secondary round for general support la&.

Armored protection will now be by a combination of laminate, reactive, and active armors, and the full impact of stealth technology will have made the MBT much harder to acquire. Diesel engines will have given way to gas turbines, which will be more compact and mounted transversely to save spce and weight. Active suspension will enable high-speed, cross-country movement. Most significantly, automation will truly have come of age, and the introduction of the common crew station concept will have allowed crew reduction to two, each able to perform all functions within the vehicle. Interim levels of command, for example, at troop leader level, will have disappeared, and sustainability in continuous opentions will be achieved by alternate crews moving up under light armor during replenishment.

There will be those, of course, who say that by 2010 there will be no need for the MBT on the battlefield. Other weapon systems, for example the armored helicopter, will have greater flexibility and sustainability. These prophets must be reminded that by 2010 the “threat vacuum” into which the helicopter has developed will be filled with sophisticated antihelicopter systems, and its vulnerability will make it a fragile asset to be carefully conserved. We have yet to see attack ARMOR - January-February 7993 helicopters used extensively in mechanized operations against first class opposition. What is certain is that helicopters cannot carry the fight forward to the enemy in the face of heavy fire, nor can they assault a strongly fortified and stoutly defended position without heavy casualties. They do not have the ability to absorb punishment and continue operating, one of the fundamental attributes of the tank. It is for reasons such as these that no one weapons system is likely to be able to take the place of the MBT on the battlefields over the next 20 yews. The tanks innate ability to create and maintain shock action, by a combination of its attributes of firepower, mobility, and protection, and the fact that it is able to continue to exploit its own success, make it certain that it will remain as the commander’s main asset in future highly mobile and intensive mechanized operations.

Major S. W. Crawford graduated from Cambridge University in 1976 with an MA in Land Economy. After three years in civilian employment, he entered the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in 1979. On commissioning, he joined the 4th Royal Tank Regiment in Munster, Germany. After completing the British Army Staff Course, he served as a weapons technical officer on the staff of the Director, Royal Armoured Corps. He returned to the 4th RTR in 1989 as a squadron leader, serving six months as part of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. He became OIC of the Regiment in October 1990, but was extracted and sent to HQ, British Forces Middle East in Riyadh during the Gulf War. At present, he is attending the U. S. Army Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth.